[Cite as State v. McMahon, 2025-Ohio-3295.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-7 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 24-CR-0632 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas RODNEY McMAHON, JR. : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on September 12, 2025, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
RONALD C. LEWIS, JUDGE
EPLEY, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur. -2- OPINION CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-7
TRAVIS L. KANE, Attorney for Appellant CHRISTOPHER P. LANESE, Attorney for Appellee
LEWIS, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Rodney McMahon, Jr. appeals from a judgment of the
Clark County Common Pleas Court, which followed McMahon’s guilty pleas to charges of
trafficking in cocaine and tampering with evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On August 20, 2024, a Clark County grand jury indicted McMahon on the
following counts: (1) trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); (2) possession
of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A); (3) tampering with evidence in violation of R.C.
2921.12(A)(1); (4) failure to comply with an order or signal of police officer in violation of
R.C. 2921.331(B); and (5) possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A).
McMahon pleaded not guilty to the charges, and a jury trial was scheduled.
{¶ 3} McMahon entered into a plea agreement with the State prior to the start of the
scheduled trial. On January 28, 2025, pursuant to the plea agreement, McMahon changed
his pleas from not guilty to guilty on the trafficking in cocaine and tampering with evidence
charges. The trial court accepted McMahon’s guilty pleas and found him guilty of trafficking
in cocaine, a first-degree felony, and tampering with evidence, a third-degree felony. The
other charges were dismissed. -3- {¶ 4} Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced McMahon to an
indefinite prison term of 10 to 15 years in prison for trafficking in cocaine and a definite prison
term of 3 years for tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed the prison sentences
concurrently for an aggregate, indefinite prison term of 10 to 15 years. McMahon was given
146 days of jail-time credit. McMahon filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. The Trial Court Complied with Crim.R. 11
{¶ 5} McMahon’s sole assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY COMPLY WITH CRIM.R. 11.
{¶ 6} McMahon concedes that “the trial court thoroughly explained to Appellant his
constitutional rights relating to his guilty plea” and his right not to testify at trial. Appellant’s
Brief, p. 4. However, McMahon notes that the trial court did not explain to him that his
decision not to testify at trial could not “be used against him in any way.” Id. McMahon
cites to the Ohio Jury Instructions as support for his argument that the trial court was required
to explain to him “that if he chose not to testify, that could not be used against him at trial in
any way.” Id. at 5.
{¶ 7} The State responds that the plain language of Crim.R. 11 “does it indicate that
a trial court is required to explain the flipside of the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination; that being that a defendant’s exercise of the privilege cannot be used to draw
negative inferences regarding the defendant’s guilt.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 4, citing Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c). Therefore, the State contends that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11.
{¶ 8} To satisfy the requirements of due process, a guilty plea must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate as
much. State v. Chessman, 2006-Ohio-835, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 -4- U.S. 238 (1969). For a plea to be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the trial
court must follow the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Brown, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13 (2d
Dist.). “[T]he rule ‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to
personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and
determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’ ” State v. Dangler, 2020-
Ohio-2765, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975).
{¶ 9} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
In felony cases the court . . . shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without
first addressing the defendant personally . . . and doing all of the following:
...
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to
confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the
defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 10} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) mandates that the trial court inform the defendant of the
constitutional rights he is waiving, namely the right to a jury trial, the right to confront
witnesses, the right to compulsory process, the right against self-incrimination, and the right
to require the State to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perdue, 2022-
Ohio-722, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). A failure to strictly comply with this part of the rule invalidates the
plea. Id. -5- {¶ 11} McMahon concedes that the trial court complied with all of the constitutional
requirements contained in Crim.R. 11 with one exception: the trial court should have
explained to McMahon that if he went to trial and decided not to testify, his silence could not
be used against him. We do not agree that Crim.R. 11 requires the trial court to explain
this.
{¶ 12} During the plea colloquy, the following exchange occurred between the trial
court and McMahon:
THE COURT: You would have the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses called by the State. You would have the right to use the Court’s
subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses. You would have the
right to testify in your own defense but could not be forced to do so. And you
could only be convicted upon the unanimous verdict of a jury; do you
understand all of these rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And do you understand that by entering this guilty plea you
would [be] waiving all of these rights?
Plea Tr. 11. Notably, the “Waiver of Rights” section in the written guilty plea form signed
by McMahon included the following sentence: “I know at trial I could not have to take the
witness stand and could not be forced to testify against myself and that no one could
comment if I chose not to testify.”
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[Cite as State v. McMahon, 2025-Ohio-3295.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-7 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 24-CR-0632 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas RODNEY McMAHON, JR. : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on September 12, 2025, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
RONALD C. LEWIS, JUDGE
EPLEY, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur. -2- OPINION CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-7
TRAVIS L. KANE, Attorney for Appellant CHRISTOPHER P. LANESE, Attorney for Appellee
LEWIS, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Rodney McMahon, Jr. appeals from a judgment of the
Clark County Common Pleas Court, which followed McMahon’s guilty pleas to charges of
trafficking in cocaine and tampering with evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On August 20, 2024, a Clark County grand jury indicted McMahon on the
following counts: (1) trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); (2) possession
of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A); (3) tampering with evidence in violation of R.C.
2921.12(A)(1); (4) failure to comply with an order or signal of police officer in violation of
R.C. 2921.331(B); and (5) possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A).
McMahon pleaded not guilty to the charges, and a jury trial was scheduled.
{¶ 3} McMahon entered into a plea agreement with the State prior to the start of the
scheduled trial. On January 28, 2025, pursuant to the plea agreement, McMahon changed
his pleas from not guilty to guilty on the trafficking in cocaine and tampering with evidence
charges. The trial court accepted McMahon’s guilty pleas and found him guilty of trafficking
in cocaine, a first-degree felony, and tampering with evidence, a third-degree felony. The
other charges were dismissed. -3- {¶ 4} Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced McMahon to an
indefinite prison term of 10 to 15 years in prison for trafficking in cocaine and a definite prison
term of 3 years for tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed the prison sentences
concurrently for an aggregate, indefinite prison term of 10 to 15 years. McMahon was given
146 days of jail-time credit. McMahon filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. The Trial Court Complied with Crim.R. 11
{¶ 5} McMahon’s sole assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY COMPLY WITH CRIM.R. 11.
{¶ 6} McMahon concedes that “the trial court thoroughly explained to Appellant his
constitutional rights relating to his guilty plea” and his right not to testify at trial. Appellant’s
Brief, p. 4. However, McMahon notes that the trial court did not explain to him that his
decision not to testify at trial could not “be used against him in any way.” Id. McMahon
cites to the Ohio Jury Instructions as support for his argument that the trial court was required
to explain to him “that if he chose not to testify, that could not be used against him at trial in
any way.” Id. at 5.
{¶ 7} The State responds that the plain language of Crim.R. 11 “does it indicate that
a trial court is required to explain the flipside of the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination; that being that a defendant’s exercise of the privilege cannot be used to draw
negative inferences regarding the defendant’s guilt.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 4, citing Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c). Therefore, the State contends that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11.
{¶ 8} To satisfy the requirements of due process, a guilty plea must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate as
much. State v. Chessman, 2006-Ohio-835, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 -4- U.S. 238 (1969). For a plea to be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the trial
court must follow the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Brown, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13 (2d
Dist.). “[T]he rule ‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to
personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and
determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’ ” State v. Dangler, 2020-
Ohio-2765, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975).
{¶ 9} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
In felony cases the court . . . shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without
first addressing the defendant personally . . . and doing all of the following:
...
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to
confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the
defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 10} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) mandates that the trial court inform the defendant of the
constitutional rights he is waiving, namely the right to a jury trial, the right to confront
witnesses, the right to compulsory process, the right against self-incrimination, and the right
to require the State to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perdue, 2022-
Ohio-722, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). A failure to strictly comply with this part of the rule invalidates the
plea. Id. -5- {¶ 11} McMahon concedes that the trial court complied with all of the constitutional
requirements contained in Crim.R. 11 with one exception: the trial court should have
explained to McMahon that if he went to trial and decided not to testify, his silence could not
be used against him. We do not agree that Crim.R. 11 requires the trial court to explain
this.
{¶ 12} During the plea colloquy, the following exchange occurred between the trial
court and McMahon:
THE COURT: You would have the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses called by the State. You would have the right to use the Court’s
subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses. You would have the
right to testify in your own defense but could not be forced to do so. And you
could only be convicted upon the unanimous verdict of a jury; do you
understand all of these rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And do you understand that by entering this guilty plea you
would [be] waiving all of these rights?
Plea Tr. 11. Notably, the “Waiver of Rights” section in the written guilty plea form signed
by McMahon included the following sentence: “I know at trial I could not have to take the
witness stand and could not be forced to testify against myself and that no one could
comment if I chose not to testify.”
{¶ 13} The Seventh District Court of Appeals faced a similar situation in State v.
Giovanni, 2009-Ohio-3333 (7th Dist.). There, the defendant contended that his plea was
less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because in advising him that he would be -6- waiving his right against self-incrimination, the trial court failed to explain during the plea
colloquy that no one could comment on his refusal to testify at trial. Such an explanation,
however, was contained in the written plea agreement. Id. at ¶ 12. The Seventh District
rejected the defendant’s argument on appeal, explaining:
[T]here is no requirement of further explanation of the right [against self-
incrimination] because the current rule does not require the rights listed to be
defined or otherwise mention that the defendant should be advised that no one
can comment on his refusal to testify. Rather, the rule merely states that the
defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself at trial, and the
Supreme Court prefers tracking this language. Consequently, in advising that
the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself, the court need
not further explain that no one can comment on a defendant's failure to testify
where the defendant answers that he understands his right against self-
incrimination.
Id. at ¶ 16.
{¶ 14} We agree with the Seventh District that the plain language of Crim.R. 11 does
not require the trial court to explain to the defendant prior to accepting his plea that if he
proceeded to trial and did not testify, no one could comment on his silence. Rather, the trial
court is only required to explain that a defendant may not be compelled to testify at trial,
which it did in McMahon’s case. McMahon affirmatively stated that he understood that right.
{¶ 15} Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court failed
to comply with Crim.R. 11. Therefore, McMahon’s sole assignment of error is overruled. -7- III. Conclusion
{¶ 16} Having overruled McMahon’s assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
.............
EPLEY, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.