State v. McLaughlin

2025 Ohio 5163

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 14, 2025
• Docket: 30440
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. McLaughlin, 2025-Ohio-5163.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30440 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 00607 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas LAMARCUS DEVONTE MCLAUGHLIN : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 14, 2025, the judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE

EPLEY, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30440

CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY, Attorney for Appellant SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Lamarcus McLaughlin appeals from the trial court’s

judgment denying his motion to withdraw a waiver of indictment following a withdrawal of his

guilty plea fifteen months earlier related to charges in his original indictment and subsequent

bill of information. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McLaughlin’s motion

because it complied with the requirements under R.C. 2941.021 when accepting

McLaughlin’s waiver of indictment, and McLaughlin had no absolute right to withdraw the

waiver of an indictment. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

{¶ 2} On July 11, 2022, McLaughlin was indicted on one count of aggravated

vehicular assault (suspension) in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1), a felony of the second

degree; one count of operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI) in violation of

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree; one count of OVI (marihuana

10ng urine or 2ng blood) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(vii), a misdemeanor of the first

degree; one count of OVI (marihuana metabolite 15ng urine or 5 ng blood) in violation of

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(vii)(I), a misdemeanor of the first degree; and one count of vehicular

assault (suspension) in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b), a felony of the third degree. On

July 22, 2022, McLaughlin stood mute in front of the trial court, and the court entered a plea

of not guilty on his behalf. The allegations against McLaughlin arose from an automobile

collision where McLaughlin’s vehicle struck another vehicle attempting to make a turn.

2 {¶ 3} On March 26, 2023, a bill of information was filed against McLaughlin for attempt

to commit felonious assault (deadly weapon) in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of

the third degree, and tampering with evidence (alter/destroy) in violation of

R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the third degree. The tampering with evidence charge was

based upon allegations that several eyewitnesses saw McLaughlin hide a black bag

containing marijuana in a tree line after the collision.

{¶ 4} The following day, McLaughlin was personally served with the bill of information

and appeared before the court represented by counsel. The court orally advised McLaughlin

of his constitutional right to be prosecuted by indictment and his right to one-day service

under R.C. 2941.49. McLaughlin then orally waived one-day service and prosecution by

indictment on the attempted felonious assault and tampering with evidence charges (as

stated in the bill of information). He also signed and submitted to the court a written waiver

of indictment and waiver of one-day service.

{¶ 5} McLaughlin then plead guilty to one count of attempted felonious assault and

tampering with evidence as stated in the bill of information and to one count of OVI (under

the influence) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) as stated in the indictment, in exchange

for the dismissal of the remaining counts in the original indictment and with no agreement

as to sentencing. The trial court accepted his guilty plea and scheduled his sentencing for

April 24. On the day of sentencing, defense counsel requested that the sentencing hearing

be continued. The court granted McLaughlin’s continuance request and continued his

sentencing hearing until July 10.

{¶ 6} On June 6, before sentencing occurred, McLaughlin filed a motion to withdraw

his plea and appoint new counsel, arguing that he was not guilty of any of the charges and

that his current counsel may become a witness at the hearing on his motion to withdraw the

3 pleas. At that time, he did not move to withdraw his waiver of indictment or one-day service.

{¶ 7} Per his request, McLaughlin was appointed new counsel. At the plea

withdrawal hearing on June 30, his former counsel testified that the additional charges for

felonious vehicular assault and tampering with evidence in the bill of information were

suggested to the State by former counsel as part of McLaughlin’s plea agreement because

those charges did not carry a mandatory prison term.

{¶ 8} In August 2023, the trial court granted McLaughlin’s motion to withdraw his plea,

finding that McLaughlin was visibly hesitant during the plea hearing and that certain

questions were mistakenly omitted from the court’s standard plea colloquy. After

McLaughlin’s plea was withdrawn, the case was continued several times, and trial was

eventually scheduled for October 15, 2024.

{¶ 9} During a pre-trial conference in September 2024, the State indicated its intent

to proceed to trial on count two of the bill of information—tampering with evidence as a third-

degree felony. On October 7, 2024 (eight days before trial and more than fifteen months

after he sought to withdraw his guilty plea), McLaughlin filed a motion to withdraw his waiver

of indictment on the bill of information and to dismiss the bill of information itself, arguing

that his waivers of the right to prosecution by indictment and one-day service were not

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The trial court denied his motion.

{¶ 10} In denying McLaughlin’s motion to withdraw the waiver of indictment, the court

observed that the bill of information filed on March 26, 2023 was never dismissed and that

McLaughlin presented no authority to support his assertion that the withdrawal of his guilty

plea resulted in the automatic withdrawal of his waiver of indictment on the charges in the

bill of information. The court noted that permission to withdraw a waiver of indictment was a

matter within the trial court’s discretion, not an absolute right. The court reasoned that the

4 justification to allow McLaughlin to withdraw his guilty plea (that McLaughlin was visibly

hesitant during the plea hearing and that certain questions were mistakenly omitted from the

court’s standard plea colloquy) did not apply to his waiver of indictment and waiver of one-

day service. The court found that it had complied with all requirements in R.C. 2941.021

regarding waiver before the plea hearing began. The court emphasized that McLaughlin

was present in open court and represented by counsel when the court advised him of the

nature of the charges against him in the bill of information and of his constitutional right to

prosecution by indictment. The court further noted that McLaughlin waived, in writing and in

open court, his rights to prosecution by indictment and one-day service. Based on the

foregoing, the trial court concluded that McLaughlin’s waivers were knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent and that the sufficiency requirements set forth in R.C. 2941.03 were met.

{¶ 11} At trial in February 2025, the jury found McLaughlin guilty of all counts

presented: aggravated vehicular assault, OVI (under the influence), OVI (marihuana 10 ng

urine or 2 ng blood), and vehicular assault, all charges set forth in the indictment; and

tampering with evidence, as set forth in the bill of information. The OVI (marihuana

metabolite 15 ng urine and 5 ng blood) and attempted felonious assault counts were not

presented to the jury and, after direction by the court, were nolled. McLaughlin was

sentenced to three to four-and-a-half years on the aggravated vehicular assault charge

(merged with the vehicular assault charge), 180 days on the merged OVI charges, and 24

months on the tampering with evidence charge, to be served concurrently for an aggregate

prison term of three to four-and-a-half years.

{¶ 12} McLaughlin now appeals the trial court’s judgment denying his motion to

withdraw his waiver of indictment.

5 {¶ 13} McLaughlin’s sole assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT OVERRULED

MCLAUGHLIN’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE WAIVER OF INDICTMENT

HE SIGNED AS PART OF A PLEA DEAL LATER WITHDRAWN.

{¶ 14} McLaughlin contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

his motion to withdraw his waiver of indictment on the tampering with evidence charge

contained in the bill of information. He asserts that he only agreed to the waiver as an integral

part of a plea agreement and that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw

the waiver after permitting him to withdraw his guilty plea. He also argues that he was

prejudiced due to the trial court’s imposition of a two-year prison term for the tampering with

evidence charge. We disagree.

{¶ 15} Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10 provides, in part, that “no person shall be held to

answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless on presentment or indictment of

a grand jury. . .” R.C. 2941.021, however, permits a defendant to waive his right to be

indicted by a grand jury on a felony charge and allows the State to proceed with prosecution

under a bill of information, stating:

Any criminal offense which is not punishable by death or life imprisonment may

be prosecuted by information filed in the common pleas court by the

prosecuting attorney if the defendant, after he has been advised by the court

of the nature of the charge against him and of his rights under the constitution,

is represented by counsel or has affirmatively waived counsel by waiver in

writing and in open court, waives in writing and in open court prosecution by

indictment.

{¶ 16} A bill of information is sufficient if it can be understood from it that (1) it is

6 entered in a court having authority to receive it, though the name of the court is not stated;

(2) it was subscribed and presented to the court by the prosecuting attorney of the county in

which the court was held; (3) the defendant is named, or, if his name cannot be discovered,

that he is described by a fictitious name; (4) an offense was committed at some place within

the jurisdiction of the court; and (5) the offense was committed at some time prior to the time

of filing of the information. R.C. 2941.03.

{¶ 17} Fundamentally, a felony bill of information acts as a substitute for an

indictment. See Wells v. Sacks, 115 Ohio App. 219, 223 (10th Dist.1962). When a

defendant subsequently moves to withdraw a waiver of indictment on a bill of information,

we review the trial court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v.

Coble, 118 Ohio App. 258, 261 (2d Dist.1962). An abuse of discretion has been defined as

an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place

Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990).

{¶ 18} In the case before us, it is undisputed that McLaughlin was orally advised by

the court of the nature of the charges against him in the bill of information and of his rights

under the constitution; that he was represented by counsel in open court; and that he waived,

in writing and in open court, prosecution by indictment on the tampering with evidence

charge. It is also undisputed that the bill of information containing the tampering with

evidence charge was sufficient under R.C. 2941.03.

{¶ 19} We note that the trial court granted McLaughlin’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea because McLaughlin was visibly hesitant during the plea hearing and that certain

questions were mistakenly omitted from the court’s standard plea colloquy. A proceeding to

waive indictment and one-day service is separate and distinct from a plea colloquy, even as

to the same charges. McLaughlin argues that he only agreed to waiver of the indictment

7 on the bill of information’s additional charges as an integral part of his plea agreement and

that, because his plea agreement was withdrawn, his waiver of indictment on the bill of

information should also have been withdrawn. However, McLaughlin provides no authority

to support his position.

{¶ 20} We agree with the State that, while connected, McLaughlin’s waiver of

indictment and guilty plea were not only separate choices effected by him during these

proceedings but were also subject to different procedural considerations in the trial court.

The bill of information contained additional charges against McLaughlin, and nothing within

his waiver of indictment or plea form provided that his waiver was conditioned upon a

subsequent guilty plea.

{¶ 21} Finally, McLaughlin argues that he suffered prejudice due to the two-year

sentence on the tampering with evidence charge and that the additional conviction for a

crime that implies dishonesty makes it more difficult for him to obtain housing and

employment. However, there was no prejudice with respect to the amount of time for the

sentence, as the two-year sentence for tampering with evidence was to run concurrently

with the three-to-four-and-a-half-year sentence on the aggravated vehicular assault charge.

McLaughlin further claims that he only waived the indictment for the charges in the bill of

information because his counsel negotiated those charges as alternative charges to avoid a

mandatory prison term. Yet, McLaughlin has not challenged the sufficiency or manifest

weight of the evidence for the tampering charge. Even if McLaughlin had not agreed to

waive indictment and to plead to the bill of information, the information could have been

withdrawn, and the State could have sought indictment on the tampering charge given the

overwhelming evidence. See State v. Devore, 2020-Ohio-4688, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.)

{¶ 22} We conclude that, even if McLaughlin only signed the waiver of indictment

8 because he believed that doing so was part of a plea agreement, he has not shown that he

was entitled to withdraw the same, nor that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling

his motion. McLaughlin’s waiver was properly obtained by the trial court, and he had no

automatic right to withdraw his waiver simply because he withdrew his guilty plea. Under

these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by not permitting

McLaughlin to withdraw his waiver of indictment just days before trial and nearly fifteen

months after he withdrew his guilty plea. McLaughlin’s assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 23} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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EPLEY, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.