State v. McLain

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

State v. McLain

177 S.E.2d 742, 10 N.C. App. 146, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1211

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina

DecidedDecember 16, 1970

Docket7010SC599

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 177 S.E.2d 742 (State v. McLain) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. McLain, 177 S.E.2d 742, 10 N.C. App. 146, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1211 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970).

Pincite

Opinion

HEDRICK, Judge.

The defendant first assigns as error the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of intoxication. In State v. Cureton, 218 N.C. 491, 11 S.E. 2d 469 (1940), Barnhill, J., stated the rule with respect to the defense of intoxication as follows:

“While intoxication is an affirmative defense no special plea is required. However, to avail the defendant and require the court to explain and apply the law in respect thereto, there must be some evidence tending to show that the defendant’s mental processes were so overcome by the excessive use of liquor or other intoxicants that he had temporarily, at least, lost the capacity to think and plan. As to this, he is not relegated to his own testimony. It is sufficient if the testimony of any witness tends to establish the fact. But it must be made to appear affirmatively in some manner that this defense is relied upon to rebut the presumption of sanity before the doctrine becomes a part *148 of the law of the case which the judge must explain and apply to the evidence.”

Although there was evidence in the instant case that the defendant had been drinking, and the defendant himself testified that he was “pretty high” and that he was not fully himself, there is no evidence that the defendant’s mental processes were deranged by intoxication, but, on the contrary, the defendant’s own evidence tends to show that he was in complete control of his mental faculties. There Jwas no prayer for special instructions, nor did the defendant indicate during the trial that he was relying on the defense of intoxication. This assignment of error is not sustained.

Next, the defendant contends the court committed error by denying his motion for a new trial for alleged misconduct of the jury. The record reveals that during the jury’s deliberation a definition of uttering copied from a dictionary by one of the jurors was taken into the jury room. The jury made inquiry of the court as to the definition of uttering, and told the judge what had happened. Judge Ragsdale told the jury to “disregard in every way” the dictionary definition and then proceeded to repeat his instructions as to the charge against the defendant of uttering the forged check. It was improper for the jury to obtain and read a dictionary definition of one of the offenses charged in the bill of indictment; however, the able trial judge properly instructed the jury to disregard the definition taken from the dictionary and the defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced in any way by the conduct of the jury. In re Will of Hall, 252 N.C. 70, 113 S.E. 2d 1 (1960).

We have carefully considered the record in this case and conclude that the defendant had a fair trial in the superior court free from prejudicial error.

No error.

Judges Campbell and Britt concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

HEDRICK, Judge.

The defendant first assigns as error the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of intoxication. In State v. Cureton, 218 N.C. 491, 11 S.E. 2d 469 (1940), Barnhill, J., stated the rule with respect to the defense of intoxication as follows:

“While intoxication is an affirmative defense no special plea is required. However, to avail the defendant and require the court to explain and apply the law in respect thereto, there must be some evidence tending to show that the defendant’s mental processes were so overcome by the excessive use of liquor or other intoxicants that he had temporarily, at least, lost the capacity to think and plan. As to this, he is not relegated to his own testimony. It is sufficient if the testimony of any witness tends to establish the fact. But it must be made to appear affirmatively in some manner that this defense is relied upon to rebut the presumption of sanity before the doctrine becomes a part *148 of the law of the case which the judge must explain and apply to the evidence.”

Although there was evidence in the instant case that the defendant had been drinking, and the defendant himself testified that he was “pretty high” and that he was not fully himself, there is no evidence that the defendant’s mental processes were deranged by intoxication, but, on the contrary, the defendant’s own evidence tends to show that he was in complete control of his mental faculties. There Jwas no prayer for special instructions, nor did the defendant indicate during the trial that he was relying on the defense of intoxication. This assignment of error is not sustained.

Next, the defendant contends the court committed error by denying his motion for a new trial for alleged misconduct of the jury. The record reveals that during the jury’s deliberation a definition of uttering copied from a dictionary by one of the jurors was taken into the jury room. The jury made inquiry of the court as to the definition of uttering, and told the judge what had happened. Judge Ragsdale told the jury to “disregard in every way” the dictionary definition and then proceeded to repeat his instructions as to the charge against the defendant of uttering the forged check. It was improper for the jury to obtain and read a dictionary definition of one of the offenses charged in the bill of indictment; however, the able trial judge properly instructed the jury to disregard the definition taken from the dictionary and the defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced in any way by the conduct of the jury. In re Will of Hall, 252 N.C. 70, 113 S.E. 2d 1 (1960).

We have carefully considered the record in this case and conclude that the defendant had a fair trial in the superior court free from prejudicial error.

No error.

Judges Campbell and Britt concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

177 S.E.2d 742, 10 N.C. App. 146, 1970 N.C. App. LEXIS 1211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-mclain-ncctapp-1970.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack