State v. McInturff

Opinion

No. 809 August 26, 2026 535

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GORDON LEE McINTURFF,

Defendant-Appellant.

Washington County Circuit Court 24CR05675; A186157

Kathleen J. Proctor, Judge. Submitted June 30, 2026. Jordan Duhe Willets and Duhe Willetts Law; and Lindsey Burrows filed the brief for appellant.

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Peenesh H. Shah, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Egan, Presiding Judge, Jacquot, Judge, and Armstrong, Senior Judge.

EGAN, P. J. Affirmed.

536 State v. McInturff

EGAN, P. J. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for burglary. On appeal, he argues, first, that it was error for the trial court to conclude that he validly waived his right to counsel and second, that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s request for a continuance. We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his right to counsel, and that it did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to continue. Accordingly, we affirm.

When a trial court allows a defendant to represent himself, the court must ensure that the defendant has voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel. State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 132-33, 831 P2d 666 (1992). “Voluntarily” refers to the fact that the waiver is an intentional act that is not coerced, and “intelligently” “refers to a defendant’s knowledge and understanding of the right to counsel.” Id. at 132 n8. A waiver of the right to counsel is valid only if the defendant understands that he has the right to counsel, and that there are risks inherent in self- representation. Id. at 133. “When the trial court’s decision is predicated on a subsidiary question of law” concerning the scope of the right to counsel, “we review for legal error.” State v. Covernali, 341 Or App 476, 481, 574 P3d 496 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A colloquy on the record between the court and the defendant wherein the court, in some fashion, explains the risks of self-representation is the preferred means of assuring that the defendant understands the risks of self-representation.” Meyrick, 313 Or at 133. Whether a defendant validly waived his right to counsel must be reviewed in light of circumstances particular to the case. Id. at 132.

Defendant argues that the record does not reflect that he knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel, because the court’s reading through defendant’s written waiver on the record is not the type of meaningful colloquy envisioned in Meyrick and the record otherwise fails to establish that defendant understood the risks inherent in proceeding pro se. We disagree. The record discloses

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 535 (2026) 537

that the court had an extended discussion with defendant concerning his appointed counsel and the advantages of proceeding to trial with counsel, as well as the specific risks that self-representation posed in the context of his particular case, including the sentencing risks. The court twice recessed so that defendant could consult with his attorneys , and after each recess, the court again discussed the risks of self-representation with defendant, before engaging in a formal colloquy and ultimately accepting his signed waiver. Afterwards, when defendant expressed some confusion regarding his motions in limine, the trial court asked if defendant wanted to change his mind about proceeding pro se; he did not. See, e.g., Covernali, 341 Or App at 481-82 (trial court did not err in finding that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when the trial court engaged the defendant in a colloquy, reviewed the risks of self-representation, including sentencing risks, and discussed the advantages of proceeding with counsel, and the defendant expressed his desire to proceed pro se). On this record, the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant validly waived his right to counsel.

In his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his requests for a continuance which were made on the morning of trial. “A motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. We review the denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. * * * Additionally, we will not overturn a denial of a defendant’s motion for a continuance unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice.” State v. Ferraro, 264 Or App 271, 280-81, 331 P3d 1086 (2014) (citations omitted). On appeal, defendant has not identified how he was prejudiced by those denials, and our review of the record also does not disclose how defendant was prejudiced. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s rulings.

Affirmed.