State v. McGinley

4 Ind. 7, 1852 Ind. LEXIS 2
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 24, 1852
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 4 Ind. 7 (State v. McGinley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. McGinley, 4 Ind. 7, 1852 Ind. LEXIS 2 (Ind. 1852).

Opinion

Perkins, J.

This was a proceeding instituted by McGinley, under a special statute, to recover damages from the state for an alleged breach of contract. The case is as follows:

On the 1st of March, 1837, the state of Indiana, by David H. Maxwell, one of the commissioners of public works, entered into a contract with Patrick’ McGinley for the building by said McGinley of a stone bridge over Silver creek, on the line of the Jeffersonville and Grawfordsville road. In the contract McGinley agreed to build said bridge in a substantial and workmanlike manner, “ at the rate of 7 dollars and 75 cents per perch of twenty-five cubic feet, all excavations for foundations included in the above price, and the bridge to be built according to the plan furnished by the principal or resident engineer on said road.” The payments were to be upon monthly estimates, ten per cent, being withheld as a forfeit, should the, contractor fail in fulfilling his agreement. It was also stipulated that should McGinley refuse at any time to conform to the directions and instructions of the engineer, or in any manner violate the contract, the engineer [9]*9should have power to declare the contract forfeited, &c.. And further, that in case of any difference arising between the parties as to the construction of the agreement, the decision of the engineer should be final in the premises. No particular specifications as to the manner in which the work was to be done appear to have been furnished in writing at the letting, but Mr. Pettit, the chief engineer, says that it was to be executed like that of the Wills creek bridge on the Cumberland road, which he thus describes: The masonry in the abutments rock-work, the beds and joints of all the stone in the face of the work being cut to regular surfaces. The backing is composed of stones having parallel beds and tops, of which not more than two should be used to equal the front stone in the height, and no stones were admitted of less than two cubic feet in contents, except the spalls necessary to fill interstices. The whole was' laid in mortar made of' sand and lime. Headers were used in front of the abutments, and in the whole work. Their average length was probably about four feet, although many were more. The distance between the headers varied from seven to twelve feet, depending in a measure on the kind of stone used for ashler. No stone was admitted having more height than bed.” Mr. Pettit further states, that at the time of the letting said Silver creek bridge, he described to McGinley the character of the work, so that he understood it, and referred him “ to the bridge across Wills creek as exhibiting the character of the masonry required in the Silver creek bridge, which reference was made to enable him to bid understandingly.” Jesse L. Williams, who subsequently became chief engineer, also states that Mc-Ginley informed him that the work was to conform to that of the Wills creek bridge. This evidence does not appear to have been objected to, and was probably legally admissible; but the case is clearly made out, as will hereafter be seen, independently of it, in favor of the state.

McGinley commenced working upon his job. He was subsequently arrested in his operations by the following declaration:

[10]*10“Whereas, on the 5th of October last, the contractor for the Silver creek bridge was directed by the principal engineer to take down certain portions of the masonry on account of its imperfect character, and whereas the contractor refused to follow such directions, but continued his operations, covering up the defective work; therefore, in performance of my duty to the state, and by virtue of authority vested in the engineer by the terms of this agreement, I hereby declare the within contract forfeited, null, and void. Dec. 11th, 1837. R. H. Fauntleroy, resident engineer on the Jeffersonville and Crawfordsville road.”

The plan of the bridge was then changed, a wooden structure instead of a stone arch being placed upon the abutments. This was done, say some of the witnesses, on account of the defective character of the masonry in the abutments so far as laid by McGinley, a wooden structure being lighter than an arch of stone.

The completion of the stone work was relet to Moulton and company at the rate of 10 dollars per perch.

The amount paid to McGinley while prosecuting the work was 21,814 dollars. He afterwards presented a claim to the board of internal improvement for a further allowance, and they rejected it.

In 1839, the legislature, by a joint resolution, authorized McGinley to sue the state on his alleged claim, and the suit was prosecuted in the Floyd Circuit Court. That Court gave him a judgment for 13,500 dollars. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, where judgment was rendered against McGinley for costs, the Court holding him entitled to no further compensation, nor to damages, on his contract. In 1848, an act was passed by .the legislature authorizing his claim to be heard in Floyd county, by arbitrators appointed by the governor. The appointments were made by governor Dunning, the cause heard, and said arbitrators awarded to McGinley the sum formerly adjudged to him by the Floyd Circuit Court, together with interest during the intervening time, making in all 21,143 dollars. The award was filed in the clerk’s [11]*11office of Floyd county, and an appeal taken therefrom to this Court.

The bill alleges that McGinley did not fail in the fulfillment of his contract, and that the state, therefore, wrongfully declared it forfeited. It further alleges that he had performed extra work, and had lost on the sale of his tools, shanties, &c.

The answer denies the material allegations in the bill.

Proofs were introduced.

Before going into the evidence, however, a couple of preliminary questions must be settled.

The act of 1848, under which this suit was instituted, required, in section 4, that “ two of the persons to be appointed [as arbitrators] by the governor, under the provisions of the first section of this act, shall be men of legal attainments, and before,” &c.

A plea in abatement was filed at the meeting of the arbitrators, averring that no two of them were men of legal attainments. The plea was demurred to and the demurrer sustained.

We think this decision was right. The statute requires no particular degree of legal attainments in the arbitrators, and almost every man in this country possesses some. The statute points to no test by which the question could be decided. It does not say the arbitrators should be judges, licensed lawyers, justices of the peace, or men of any particular class. Suppose issue had been taken on the plea and evidence introduced, what would, have been the rule of decision ? From the indefiniteness of the act in this particular, we think it was merely directory to the governor, and that his action in the premises could not be reviewed in the proceedings.

The remaining preliminary question relates to the power of this Court over the case.

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Bluebook (online)
4 Ind. 7, 1852 Ind. LEXIS 2, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-mcginley-ind-1852.