State v. McDowell.

40 S.E. 840, 129 N.C. 523, 1901 N.C. LEXIS 110
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedNovember 12, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 40 S.E. 840 (State v. McDowell.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. McDowell., 40 S.E. 840, 129 N.C. 523, 1901 N.C. LEXIS 110 (N.C. 1901).

Opinions

Eueches, C. J.

The prisoner was indicted for the murder of one Harlee Leak, convicted of murder in the second degree, sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary, and appealed. And this being a Court of errors, we can only consider the errors of law presented by the record.

There are several exceptions to the rulings of the Court upon the evidence, none of which can be sustained.

The witness James Jenkins was asked by the State: “Was it light enough for defendant to have seen deceased as he passed out of the house and know who he was ?” To the question the prisoner objected, and upon his objection being overruled, excepted. This exception is put upon the ground that the question “involved the expression of an opinion by the witness,” and State v. McLaughlin, 126 N. C., 1080, is cited as authority for this contention. But we do not think McLaughlin’s case sustains the exception. In that case two statements of the evidence were made, and the witness was asked and allowed to' testify that in his opinion they were substantially the same. This was purely a matter of opinion, and invaded the province of the jury. Not SO' in this case, which was a statement of what he knew by sight, and not what he believed by the exercise of his mind and powers of reasoning.

The next exception is to the exclusion of what the prisoner said to J ames Jenkins after the shooting. This exception [525]*525can. not be sustained, as it does not appear to be a part of the res gestae, nor does it appear to be as to a conversation between the witness and Jenkins, about which Jenkins had testified.

Another exceptions is to the evidence of Sheriff McLeod at the time he arrested the prisoner. It appears that the Sheriff and three other men went to the house of the prisoner about 11 o’clock the night the deceased was killed, for the purpose of arresting him. The door was closed, and the Sheriff pushed it open, and he and the three persons with him, acting as his deputies went-in and found the prisoner standing near the foot of the bed. They drew their pistols, told him that he was their prisoner, and to throw up his hands, ■which he did, and. asked what was the matter. The Sheriff replied, “You know what is the matter; you have killed Harlee Leak.” To this the prisoner replied: “That he had not done anything of the kind. He said he had not had his pistol; it had been home with his wife. He didn’t seem to know much about the shooting.” The evidence was received over the objection of the prisoner, upon the ground .that it was not a confession obtained through fear. But the prisoner contended that it should not have been admitted under the rulings of this Court in the cases of State v. Dildy, 72 N. C., 325, and State v. Davis, 125 N. C., 612. It does not seem to us that either of these cases sustains the exception. In the case of State v. Davis, the defendant was arrested by one Conrad, and, while under arrest, Conrad said to him: “That he had worked up the case, and he had as well tell all about it.” At first the defendant denied any knowledge of the alleged stolen articles, but afterwards said that another person had brought them into his house, and this evidence was held to be incompetent. But Davis’ case differs from this in two respects. In that case the defendant was induced to make the confession by being told by the officer that he “had worked; [526]*526up the case, and he had better tell all about it"; while in this, ■case nothing of the kind is said to the prisoner, but he volun-. teered to say what he did. But a greater distinction is that. in this case there was no confession. The prisoner denied, all knowledge of the killing, and it is difficult to see how this could be considered a confession of the crime.

There are other matters shown by the record which have given us trouble. It appears from the evidence offered by the prisoner that other shots were fired than those fired by the prisoner, and from different directions. There is also evidence tending to show that if the deceased was killed by the: prisoner, he would have been shot in the back; while the evidence is that he was killed by a shot from the front. It is also in evidence from the Sheriff and othres with him at the time of the arrest, that the prisoner’s pistol, freshly fired, was '■ a 32 Iver & Johnson pistol. This evidence was undisputed- and uncontradicted. G. W. Waddell took the witness-stand-with his scales, and in the presence of the Court and jury-proceeded to weigh the bullet that killed the deceased, and to. weigh one taken from the prisoner’s pistol by the Sheriff.. The bullet that killed the deceased weighed 105 grains, and . the bullet taken from the prisoner’s pistol by the Sheriff, when - he arrested the prisoner, weighed but 85 grains; and the witness Waddell testified that the bullet which killed the de■ceased could not have been shot out of a 32 Iver & Johnson pistol. This evidence was uncontradicted. And we find that, at the request of the prisoner,, the Court charge.d the jury: “That if you find from the evidence that the deceased came to his death by a bullet which could not have been fired from an Iver & Johnson 32 cal. pistol, you should acquit the prisoner.” But they found him guilty. We suppose they did not believe this undisputed testimony of the witness Wad-dell. The prisoner asked several instructions, all of which. were given but one, and that one should not have been given. > [527]*527The State asked several special instructions, all of which were given and excepted to by the prisoner; and the case states: “His Honor, after having stated to the jury, in his general charge, every reasonable contention of the State, gave the following special instructions asked by the State:

“1. The prisoner, Jim McDowell, is charged in the indictment with murder in the first degree. Under the,indictment, the jury may find a-verdict of murder in the first degree or the second degree, or manslaughter, or not guilty, accordingly as the jury may find the facts to be from the evidence produced upon the trial. If the State has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner slew the deceased with a pistol, as contended for by the State, then the law presumes that the prisoner is guilty of murder in the second degree, and the burden shifts to the prisoner to satisfy the jury, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but simply to satisfy the jury of such mitigating circumstances as are sufficient in law to mitigate and reduce the murder in the second degree to manslaughter. This instruction was given, and prisoner excepted.
“2. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that the prisoner slew deceased with a pistol, and if the prisoner has failed to show to the satisfaction of the jury such mitigating circumstances as in law would reduce the killing to manslaughter, then the jury should find a verdict of murder in the second degree. Given. , Prisoner excepted.
“3. The first thing for you to decide is, did the prisoner slay the deceased, as is alleged by the State, and the State relies on the following testimony to sustain its contention that the prisoner actually slew the deceased: The evidence of Dave Sammons, who was with the deceased at the time he was shot; Jim Jenkins, who was with the prisoner at the time he fired the pistol; John Leak, who testified as to threats on the afternoon before the killing; of Mary Eaulk, who testi-[528]

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
40 S.E. 840, 129 N.C. 523, 1901 N.C. LEXIS 110, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-mcdowell-nc-1901.