IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) ) v. ) Cr. ID. No. 1911010766A & B ) ) MARKEEVIS R. MCDOUGAL, ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: October 22, 2025 Decided: March 31, 2026
COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF SHOULD BE DENIED AND POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW SHOULD BE GRANTED
William H. Leonard, Jr., Esquire, and Christina R. Wroten, Esquire Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for the State.
Edward F. Eaton, Esquire, The Eaton Law Firm, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant Markeevis R. McDougal.
SALOMONE, Commissioner This 31st day of March 2026, upon consideration of Markeevis R. McDougal’s
(“Defendant” or “McDougal”) Motion for Postconviction Relief, as amended,1 the
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and Memorandum of Law2 in support thereof with
accompanying Appendix,3 the Affidavit of Trial Counsel,4 the Affidavit of Appellate
Counsel,5 the State’s Response to the Amended Motion,6 the Responses filed by
Defendant,7 and the record in this matter, it appears to the Court as follows:
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 18, 2019, the Wilmington police responded to a shooting
incident on the 100 block of East 24th Street after City Watch cameras observed a
large crowd gather on the street before spontaneously dispersing.8 After the crowd
dispersed, an individual was seen “hobbling away” from the scene.9
1 State v. Markeevis R. McDougal, Delaware Superior Court Criminal Docket, ID No. 1911010766A at 49 (hereinafter, “D.I. __”). Defendant filed his initial Motion for Postconviction Relief on December 9, 2022. Thereafter, he filed an Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief (the “Amended Motion”) on January 24, 2023. D.I. 52. 2 D.I. 63-64. 3 D.I. 65. (Appendix to Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw). All references to the Appendix to Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw provided by postconviction counsel are hereinafter referred to as “A ___”. 4 D.I. 84. Affidavit of Brian J. Chapman, Esquire (hereinafter, “D.I. 84 at __”). 5 D.I. 85. Affidavit of Benjamin S. Gifford, IV, Esquire (hereinafter, “D.I. 85 at __”) 6 D.I. 86. 7 D.I. 57; D.I. 87-88, 90, 92. 8 Adult Complaint and Warrant, In the Justice of the Peace Court In and for the State of Delaware, State of Delaware v. Markeevis McDougal, #19-11-010766, Exhibit B (hereinafter, “Warrant at ___”); see also D.I. 42, Trial Transcript, dated August 3, 2021, at 33-37, 45-48. (hereinafter, “Trial Transcript at ___”). East 24th Street is located in Wilmington, DE. 9 Warrant at 1; Trial Transcript at 45. 1 Further review of the surveillance footage in the area showed that,
immediately prior to the shooting, two individuals were engaged in a shoving match
until one withdrew a concealed firearm and discharged it, striking the victim in the
right thigh.10 Upon reporting to the scene, the police located a 9mm shell casing. 11
While the police were investigating, the victim, Bernard Goodwyn, drove himself to
Wilmington Hospital to be treated for his wound.12 The Wilmington police
circulated a photo of the suspect department-wide and McDougal was quickly
identified as the suspected shooter.13
McDougal was arrested on December 16, 2019, in connection with the non-
fatal shooting of Bernard Goodwyn.14 On April 20, 2020, McDougal was assigned
an attorney (“Trial Counsel”) from the Office of Conflicts Counsel to represent
him.15 On July 27, 2020, McDougal was indicted for the following offenses in
connection with the shooting: (i) Assault First Degree, (ii) Possession of a Firearm
During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), (iii) Carrying a Concealed Deadly
Weapon (CCDW”), (iv) Possession or Control of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited
10 Warrant at 1. 11 Id.; see also Trial Transcript at 69-76, 83-84. 12 Warrant at 1; Trial Transcript at 36-40. 13 Warrant at 2; Trial Transcript at 91-92, 95-96, 99-100. 14 D.I. 1. 15 D.I. 84. 2 (“PFBPP”), and (v) Possession or Control of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited
(“PABPP”).16
On July 21, 2021, Trial Counsel filed a motion to sever the Assault First
Degree, PFDCF, and CCDW charges from the PFBPP and PABPP charges on
Defendant’s behalf.17 The Court granted the unopposed motion the same day.18 On
July 27, 2021, the State filed a Motion in Limine to permit the use of a recorded 911
call as evidence at trial.19 Trial Counsel successfully opposed the Motion in Limine
and the recording was not used.20
After jury selection, trial commenced on the charges of Assault First Degree,
PFDCF and CCDW (the “A” case) on August 3, 2021.21 Following the two-day
trial, on August 4, 2021, a Delaware Superior Court jury convicted McDougal of
PFDCF and CCDW in connection with his role in the shooting of Bernard
Goodwyn.22 With respect to the charge for Assault First Degree, however, the jury
found the Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of Assault Second
Degree.23 After the verdict, the same jury returned for a subsequent trial (the “B”
16 D.I. 11. (Indictment) 17 D.I. 21. 18 D.I. 22. 19 D.I. 29. 20 D.I. 25; D.I. 84. 21 D.I. 27. 22 Id. 23 Id. 3 case) on the severed charges of PFBPP and PABPP, finding the Defendant guilty of
both counts.24
On December 13, 2021, the State filed a motion to declare McDougal a
habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) for the Assault Second Degree
conviction, which was granted by the Court at sentencing on December 17, 2021.25
That same day, the Superior Court sentenced McDougal to a combined minimum
mandatory period of incarceration of twenty-three (23) years, followed by
probation.26
On January 13, 2022, Defendant filed a notice of appeal of his sentence to the
Delaware Supreme Court.27 Thereafter, in April 2022, the Office of Conflicts
Counsel appointed Benjamin S. Gifford, IV, Esquire (“Appellate Counsel”) to
represent McDougal on appeal.28 On June 23, 2022, Appellate Counsel filed a
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Appeal on Defendant’s behalf.29 On December 9,
2022, McDougal filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief.30 Four days later,
24 State v. Markeevis R. McDougal, Delaware Superior Court Criminal Docket, ID No. 1911010766B at 5. 25 D.I. 32-33. 26 D.I. 33; A507-10. 27 D.I. 36; see also D.I. 88, Exhibit A-1 to Affidavit for Markeevis McDougal (hereinafter, “D.I. 88 at __”). McDougal was initially represented on appeal by Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, from the Office of Conflicts Counsel. Mr. Collins advised McDougal by letter, dated January 13, 2022, that he had filed a Notice of Appeal on Defendant’s behalf with the Delaware Supreme Court the same day. 28 D.I. 85; A514. 29 D.I. 48. 30 D.I. 49. 4 on December 13, 2022, he filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel.31 On January
24, 2023, Defendant filed an Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief (the
“Amended Motion”), asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against
both Appellate Counsel and Trial Counsel.32
On April 25, 2023, this Court granted McDougal’s Motion for Appointment
of Counsel.33 Edward F. Eaton, Esq. (“Postconviction Counsel”) was appointed and
a briefing schedule was set.34 On March 22, 2024, Postconviction Counsel filed a
Motion to Withdraw having found no meritorious grounds for postconviction
relief.35 Defendant requested numerous extensions to respond to the Motion to
Withdraw, which the Court granted.36 Trial Counsel filed an affidavit in response to
Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on January 15, 2025.37 On
February 4, 2025, Appellate Counsel likewise filed an affidavit in response to
Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.38 The State responded to
the Amended Motion on March 3, 202539 and Defendant replied to each of the
foregoing by way of an affidavit and letter filed on March 19, 2025 and May 29,
31 D.I. 50. 32 D.I. 52. 33 D.I. 53. 34 D.I. 58-59. 35 D.I. 63-64. 36 D.I. 66-77; see also D.I. 78, 82 (denying Defendant’s request for additional extensions). 37 D.I. 84. 38 D.I. 85. 39 D.I. 86. 5 2025, respectively, followed by a Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s
Postconviction Motion on October 22, 2025.40 The Amended Motion is now ripe
for decision.
DEFENDANT’S CLAIMS FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
In his Amended Motion, McDougal raises six claims for relief.41 Defendant
asserts two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against Appellate Counsel,
alleging that he was ineffective for (i) failing to fully explain McDougal’s direct
appeal rights and procedure, and (ii) failing to challenge the trial court’s adverse
ruling regarding Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.42 Defendant argues
that Appellate Counsel’s actions prejudiced him by denying him his fundamental
right to appeal his sentence and challenge the claims preserved by Trial Counsel.43
Defendant asserts four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against Trial
Counsel, alleging he was ineffective for (i) failing to provide McDougal with
discovery, (ii) failing to challenge McDougal’s unlawful identification, (iii) failing
to challenge the admissibility of the 911 call and shell casing obtained at the crime
scene, and (iv) failing to object to the trial court’s inclusion of an instruction
regarding the lessor included offense of Assault Second Degree.44 Defendant claims
40 D.I. 87-88, 90, 92. 41 D.I. 52. 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 Id. 6 these alleged errors by Trial Counsel prejudiced him by (a) preventing him from
making an informed decision regarding accepting the State’s plea offer, (b)
preventing the suppression of his identity, and (c) securing a conviction for Assault
Second Degree, as well as multiple weapons convictions.45 For the reasons
discussed below, each of these claims is without merit.
APPLICABLE LAW FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
Rule 61 and Procedural Bars to Relief
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) governs the procedures by
which an incarcerated individual may seek to have his conviction set aside based on
the court’s lack of jurisdiction or any other ground that is a sufficient factual and
legal basis for a collateral attack upon the conviction.46 Rule 61 is a means by which
the court may correct Constitutional infirmities in a conviction or sentence.47 “Rule
61 is intended to correct errors in the trial process, not allow defendants unlimited
opportunities to relitigate their convictions.”48
Considering this limitation, the Court must first determine whether there are
any procedural bars to the Amended Motion before considering the merits of any of
McDougal’s claims for postconviction relief.49 Rule 61(i) establishes four such
45 Id. 46 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1). 47 Harris v. State, 410 A.2d 500 (Del. 1970). 48 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013). 49 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 7 procedural bars for postconviction relief.50 Rule 61(i)(1) requires that a motion for
postconviction relief must be filed within one year of the date when the conviction
becomes final.51 Rule 61(m) provides that a judgment of conviction is final for
purposes of Rule 61(i) thirty (30) days after the Court imposes sentence if the
defendant does not file a direct appeal, and (ii) if the defendant files a direct appeal,
when the Supreme Court issues a mandate or order finally determining the direct
appeal.52
Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive motions for postconviction relief unless certain
conditions are met.53 Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3) and (4), any ground for relief that
was not previously raised is deemed waived, and any claims that were formerly
adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an
appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, are
thereafter barred.54 However, ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be
50 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4). 51 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 52 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m). 53 Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive or subsequent motions for postconviction relief unless the movant is able to “plead with particularity” that (i) “new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted” or (ii) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.” Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2). 54 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) and (d)(2)(i), (ii). 8 raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings and are properly presented by way of a
motion for postconviction relief.55
McDougal’s claims are not procedurally barred. McDougal was sentenced by
the Court on December 17, 2021.56 Therefore, his conviction became final thirty
days later on January 16, 2022.57 His initial motion for postconviction relief was
filed on December 9, 2022, within one year of his conviction becoming final.58 As
such, his postconviction motion was timely filed. This is McDougal’s first motion
for postconviction relief so the procedural bar against repetitive motions set forth in
Rule 61(i)(2) does not apply. Nor are his claims procedurally barred by 61(i)(3) and
(4), as his ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Appellate Counsel and
Trial Counsel could not have been raised in any earlier stage in the proceedings.
Standard of Review for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington.59 This test
requires a defendant to show: (a) counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that his
55 Sabb v. State, 2021 WL 2229631, at *1 (Del. Supr. May 28, 2021); Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 187-188 (Del. 2020); Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del. Supr. Apr. 28, 2016); State v. Evans-Mayes, 2016 WL 4502303, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2016). 56 D.I. 33. 57 Although McDougal filed an appeal of his conviction on January 13, 2022, because that appeal was voluntarily dismissed, January 16, 2022 remains the appropriate date for calculating the time in which he could file his motion for postconviction relief. 58 D.I. 49. 59 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 9 attorney’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”60 and
(b) prejudice.
The first prong requires the defendant to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that defense counsel was not reasonably competent.61 Judicial scrutiny
under the first prong is highly deferential. Courts must ignore the distorting effects
of hindsight and proceed with a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was
reasonable.62 The Strickland Court explained that a court deciding an actual
ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct
on the particular facts of the case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.63
The second prong asks whether a defendant has been prejudiced and requires
the movant to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the
outcome.”64 Not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome
undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding.65 The court must consider
the totality of the evidence and must ask if the movant has met the burden of showing
that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the
60 Id. at 688. 61 Id. at 687-88, 694. 62 Id. at 689. 63 Id. at 690. 64 Id. at 694. 65 Id. at 693. 10 errors.66 “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”67
The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel lies with the
defendant.68 A defendant must make and substantiate concrete allegations of actual
prejudice; mere allegations of ineffectiveness or conclusory statements will not
suffice.69 The court must be convinced that the alleged errors were so serious that
counsel was not properly functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed to a defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.70 It is not enough for a defendant to demonstrate that the
error had some “conceivable effect” on the outcome, but rather that the error
undermined the reliability of the result of the proceeding.71
The Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.72 While not unsurmountable, there is a strong presumption
that defense counsel’s conduct constituted sound trial strategy.73
66 Dale v. State, 2017 WL 443705, * 2 (Del. Supr. Jan. 31, 2017); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695-696 (1984). 67 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 840 (Del. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). 68 Oliver v. State, 2001 WL 1751246, at *1 (Del. Supr. Oct. 16, 2001). 69 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 70 State v. Gonzalez, 2019 WL 1762976, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2018). 71 Id. 72 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988); Salih v. State, 2008 WL 4762323, at *1 (Del. Supr. Oct. 31, 2008). 73 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (1984). 11 The Strickland test equally applies to the performance of appellate counsel.74
Importantly, appellate counsel is not constitutionally required to raise all possible
issues on appeal.75 “A defendant can only show that his appellate counsel
ineffectively represented him where the attorney omits issues that are clearly
stronger than those the attorney presented” on appeal.76 Even where a defendant is
successful in demonstrating the foregoing, he must then establish a reasonable
probability that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue, the defendant
would have prevailed on appeal.77
Motion to Withdraw
A Motion to Withdraw as Postconviction Counsel is governed by Rule
61(e)(6). Rule 61(e)(6) provides that:
If counsel considers the movant’s claim to be so lacking in merit that counsel cannot ethically advocate it, and counsel is not aware of any other substantial ground for relief available to the movant, counsel may move to withdraw. The motion shall explain the factual and legal basis for counsel’s opinion and shall give notice that the movant may file a response to the motion within 30 days of service of the motion upon the movant.78
74 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 75 Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 938, 946 (Del. 2013). 76 Ploof, 75 A.3d at 832. 77 Neal, 80 A.3d at 947. 78 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(6). 12 To evaluate McDougal’s Amended Motion and determine whether his
Postconviction Counsel’s motion to withdraw should be granted, the Court should
be satisfied that Postconviction Counsel made a conscientious examination of the
record and the law for claims that could arguably support the Amended Motion. In
addition, the Court should conduct its own review of the record to determine whether
the Amended Motion is so totally devoid of any, at least, arguable postconviction
claims.79
With this backdrop in mind, the Court turns to McDougal’s specific
postconviction claims.
MCDOUGAL’S POSTCONVICTION CLAIMS
A. Ineffectiveness Claims Asserted Against Appellate Counsel
McDougal argues in ground one of his Amended Motion that Appellate
Counsel’s representation was ineffective because he (i) failed to fully explain
McDougal’s direct appeal rights and procedures; and (ii) failed to challenge the trial
court’s adverse ruling on his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.80 Defendant claims
that, as a result of these failures, he was denied his fundamental right to appeal his
conviction and raise the claim which was preserved by Trial Counsel.81
79 Matos v. State, 2015 WL 5719694, *2 (Del. Supr. Sept. 29, 2015). 80 D.I. 49, D.I. 52. 81 D.I. 49. 13 1. McDougal’s Direct Appeal Rights and Procedures Related Thereto Were Fully Explained by Appellate Counsel.
Contrary to McDougal’s assertion, the record reflects that appellate counsel
effectively explained McDougal’s rights and procedures on direct appeal.
McDougal was initially represented on appeal by Patrick J. Collins, Esquire
(“Collins”).82 By letter, dated January 13, 2022, Collins advised McDougal that
Trial Counsel had notified the Office of Conflicts Counsel that he wished to appeal
McDougal’s sentence and that Collins had filed the Notice of Appeal with the
Delaware Supreme Court that same day.83 Collins further advised that he had
requested transcripts in McDougal’s case and outlined the procedural process for an
appeal before the Delaware Supreme Court in detail, explaining when the record is
complete, the briefing schedule, and the potential for oral argument.84 On April 6,
2022, McDougal spoke with Collins, who advised him that he had filed an extension
for filing his appeal on his behalf and that Appellate Counsel would be taking over
his appeal.85
In a letter dated April 10, 2022, newly appointed Appellate Counsel first wrote
to McDougal to make an introduction and further explain his appellate rights,
stating:
82 D.I 85 at 1, D.I. 88 at 1. 83 D.I. 88, Ex. A-1. 84 Id. 85 D.I. 88 at 1-2, Ex. A-3. 14 Keep in mind, direct appeals are limited to errors made by the Court - for example, if a motion to suppress was denied when it should have been sustained. You cannot raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; that can only be done during the postconviction process.86
After reviewing the entirety of Defendant’s file, Appellant Counsel scheduled
a video conference with McDougal for May 25, 2022 at which time he advised
McDougal that he did not believe any meritorious claims existed that Appellant
Counsel could ethically raise on Defendant’s behalf on direct appeal.87 Appellate
Counsel explained that, in view of the foregoing, he would be filing a motion to
withdraw as counsel and a non-merit brief in accordance with Delaware Supreme
Court Rule 26(c).88 Appellate Counsel further advised McDougal that he had a right
under the Delaware Supreme Court rules to file points for the Supreme Court’s
consideration prior to rending its decision on his appeal.89 Discussion ensued
between the two regarding the length of the appeal process, with Appellate Counsel
indicating in his experience an appeal would typically be decided within 90 to 120
days after the filing of the non-merit brief and motion to withdraw.90
Based on the foregoing, McDougal’s appeal rights were “fully explained” to
him by virtue of the combined advice provided by Collins and Appellate Counsel.
86 A514. 87 D.I. 85 at 2-3; see also D.I. 88 at 2-3. 88 Id. 89 D.I. 85 at 4. 90 D.I. 85, 88. 15 Indeed, McDougal does not appear to dispute the facts as recited herein. So, as a
free-standing claim, the notion that McDougal was not fully advised of his appellate
rights is without merit as he was properly advised of the appeal process and timeline
through his combined meetings and correspondence with Collins and Appellate
Counsel. The more critical issue, from McDougal’s perspective, is addressed in his
second claim against Appellate Counsel for ineffective assistance as discussed
below.
2. Appellate Counsel’s Failure to Challenge the Trial Court’s Adverse Ruling on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Central to McDougal’s second claim is his contention that he did not give
Appellate Counsel authority to voluntarily dismiss his direct appeal.91 As discussed
below, Appellate Counsel’s and McDougal’s recollection of the May 25th meeting
differ in many material respects. Their differing recollections are discussed below.
Appellate Counsel asserts that McDougal was of the view that his
postconviction claims were viable and wanted to proceed with them promptly rather
than wait for his direct appeal to be resolved.92 Appellate Counsel contends that he
advised McDougal that he could expedite his ability to proceed with his
postconviction claims if he were to voluntarily dismiss his pending appeal.93
91 D.I. 60, 80, 87. 92 D.I. 85 at 4. 93 Id. 16 Appellate Counsel further states that McDougal affirmatively expressed his desire
to voluntarily dismiss his appeal.94 Despite this affirmation by McDougal, Appellate
Counsel contends that, because the deadline to file McDougal’s appeal with the
Supreme Court was not until the first week of July, he told McDougal to consider
his options and notify him in writing before June 23, 2022 if he wished to proceed
with the appeal process.95 Appellate Counsel further advised McDougal that he was
willing to handle his postconviction motion as long as the Office of Conflicts
Counsel approved.96
On June 2, 2022, Appellate Counsel sent Defendant a letter which was
intended to memorialize the discussion between the two during the May 25th
meeting, stating “[a]ccordingly, you gave me permission to file a notice of voluntary
dismissal of your appeal.”97 In the same letter, Appellate Counsel reiterated that he
would wait until June 23, 2022 to file the notice of voluntary dismissal, in the event
that McDougal should change his mind.98 Receiving no response, Appellate Counsel
filed the notice of voluntary dismissal of Defendant’s appeal on June 23, 2022.99 In
a follow up letter, dated June 24, 2022, Appellate Counsel advised McDougal that
94 Id. 95 Id. 96 Id. at 4-5. 97 Id. at 5; see A515. 98 Id. 99 Id. at 5; see A516, D.I. 48. 17 the notice of voluntary dismissal had been timely filed and that he could move
forward with his motion for postconviction relief.100
On November 16, 2022, a letter was docketed with the Supreme Court from
Defendant in which he was seeking a status update regarding his direct appeal. 101
On that same day, after reviewing the letter, Appellate Counsel wrote to the
Defendant stating that “we may not have been on the same page as to how you
wanted to handle your direct appeal” and suggested McDougal request different
counsel in connection with his postconviction motion so that he had the option of
bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Appellate Counsel.102
In his pro se affidavit, McDougal denies having ever received the letter, dated
June 2, 2022, from Appellate Counsel or otherwise authorizing Appellate Counsel
to voluntarily dismiss his appeal.103 As evidence of the foregoing, McDougal
provides copies of the logs kept at the Department of Corrections for receipt of his
legal mail.104 On their face, the logs appear to support McDougal’s claim, as the
100 Id. at 5; see A517. As previously noted, Appellate Counsel also indicated his willingness to represent the Defendant in his postconviction motion if such was acceptable to the Office of Conflicts Counsel. Id. 101 D.I. 85 at 3-6. 102 Id.; see A518. 103 D.I. 88 at 4. 104 Id., Ex. C-1, Ex. D-1, Ex. D-2, Ex. D-3. 18 logs do not show that he received any correspondence from Appellate Counsel in
June of 2022.105
McDougal contends that during the May 25th meeting Appellate Counsel
urged the Defendant to withdraw his appeal and proceed with the postconviction
process.106 McDougal asserts that his conversation with Appellate Counsel involved
much arguing, and that Appellate Counsel grew frustrated at McDougal’s desire to
pursue his appeal, stating “you’re not going home, you should move forward with
your post-conviction.”107 McDougal states that he advised Appellate Counsel that
he was not comfortable with dismissing his appeal and needed to review the trial
transcripts before he would be in a position to make any decision regarding
dismissal.108 McDougal further claims that Appellate Counsel also stated that if he
did move forward with his postconviction claims, he could more than likely get his
plea offered back to him.109
105 Id. The Court notes, however, that the logs also do not show that McDougal received any correspondence from Appellate Counsel in August of 2022, but the Defendant acknowledges receipt of Appellate Counsel’s letter, dated August 14, 2022. Moreover, the first entry of the log set forth in C-1 is dated November 3, 2022. McDougal does not dispute that he received mail from Collins on January 13, 2022, which is also not reflected in the logs, thus calling into question the accuracy of said logs. 106 D.I. 88 at 2-3. 107 Id. 108 Id. 109 Id. McDougal notes that Appellate Counsel never explained how he was going to be able to get his plea offered back to him. 19 If a criminal defendant expresses his desire to file a direct appeal of his
conviction, counsel has an obligation under Superior Court Rule 26(a) to do so.110
As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained, “Trial counsel (whether appointed,
privately retained or Public Defender, it matters not) has a duty to docket an appeal
if the client wants to appeal.”111 If an attorney fails to perfect a timely direct appeal
after his client has expressed a desire to do so, such representation is ineffective
under the Sixth Amendment.112
The differing factual recollections of the May 25th meeting makes it clear to
the Court that there may have been a miscommunication between McDougal and
Appellate Counsel regarding McDougal’s desire to voluntarily dismiss his appeal.
Situations involving similar miscommunications between counsel and a defendant
with respect to the filing of direct appeals have been previously addressed by
Delaware courts. In State v. Mitchell, the defendant brought a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to trial counsel’s failure to effect a timely appeal
on his behalf to the Delaware Supreme Court.113 At issue before the court was what
remedy should a defendant be afforded when trial counsel, who is still the attorney
of record, fails to perfect an appeal within the required time period, when requested
110 See Dixon v. State, 581 A.2d 1115 (Del. 1990). 111 Erb v. State, 332 A.2d 137, 139 (Del. 1974), see Braxton v. State, 479 A.2d 831 (Del. 1984); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). 112 State v. Mitchell, 1994 WL 149263, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 1994). 113 Id. 20 to do so by his client.114 In Mitchell, the factual claims were similarly at odds. Trial
counsel asserted that his client never requested that he file an appeal whereas the
defendant indicated that he had made such a request.115 While the Court found trial
counsel’s assertions to be more credible, the Court also found that there may have
been a miscommunication between the parties and that the interest of justice required
that the defendant be given the “right to appeal the conviction and sentence if he
wishes to do so.”116 For those reasons, the court (i) granted the defendant’s motion
for postconviction relief on the sole ground of ineffective assistance of counsel for
trial counsel’s failure to perfect a direct and timely appeal to the Delaware Supreme
Court and (ii) vacated and immediately reimposed the defendant’s sentence to allow
him the opportunity to file a direct appeal within thirty days of the effective date of
the new sentencing order.117
In Proctor v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court endorsed this remedy in
similar factual circumstances.118 Proctor filed an untimely pro se notice of appeal,
but the evidence was conflicting as to whether he had notified his counsel of his
114 Id. at *3. 115 Id. 116 Id. 117 Id. 118 788 A.2d 528 (Del. 2001) (TABLE); compare State v. Garris, 2002 WL 31484801(Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2002) (denying defendant’s motion for postconviction relief on the ground that her counsel’s representation was ineffective by his failure to file a timely direct appeal where the evidence supported trial counsel’s assertion that he was not directed to file an appeal by his client). 21 desire to file a direct appeal.119 Despite the foregoing, the Court found that the
defendant had “manifested an intent to docket a direct appeal” by his own, albeit
untimely, filing and concluded that, under the circumstances of that case, “the
Superior Court should consider resentencing Proctor to renew the time to file the
appeal.”120
Here, of course, there is no question that Appellate Counsel “failed to docket
an appeal” for McDougal due to the misunderstanding. And, like Proctor,
McDougal’s letter to the Delaware Supreme Court inquiring as to the status of his
appeal manifested his intent to proceed with his direct appeal. Appellate Counsel
similarly recognized McDougal’s intent when he acknowledged “we may not have
been on the same page as to how you wanted to handle your direct appeal.”
Regardless of the reason, in this case, it appears to the Court that Appellate
Counsel’s action in filing the voluntary dismissal due to the misunderstanding
between the two cost McDougal “an appeal that the defendant would have otherwise
pursued” thereby prejudicing him as contemplated by Strickland.121 That is,
McDougal has demonstrated to the Court--through his affidavit and November 2022
119 Id. 120 Id. Delaware courts have consistently endorsed this remedy. See, e.g. Tisinger v. State, 2024 WL 1757229 (Del. Super. Ct. 2024): see also Braxton v. State, 479 A.2d 831 (Del. 1984). 121 Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000); Wheeler v. State, 296 A.3d 363, 376-77 (Del. 2023) (holding “[w]hen a criminal defendant waives an important constitutional right because of the ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant shows that he has been prejudiced when he demonstrates a reasonable probability that he would have exercised that right in the absence of counsel’s ineffective assistance.”). 22 letter to the Delaware Supreme Court--a reasonable probability that he would have
pursued his direct appeal but for counsel’s deficient conduct.122
But the remedy of vacating and reimposing defendant’s sentence to allow for
the filing of a direct appeal is not the only remedy Delaware courts have deemed
appropriate in such circumstances. In Middlebrook v. State,123 the Court explained
that “[t]he alternative is for the trial court to allow the defendant to raise any issue
in a post conviction proceeding that could have been raised on direct appeal. If that
post conviction proceeding petition is denied, the defendant can file an appeal,
thereby receiving the same review he or she would have had in a timely appeal.”124
Guided by the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Middlebrook, the Court
finds the appropriate remedy in this case is for the Court to consider the issue
McDougal asserts he would have raised on direct appeal in his postconviction
motion.125 That is, he would have appealed the trial court’s adverse ruling on his
122 Appellate Counsel himself acknowledges that the misunderstanding could have been avoided with best practices. D.I. 85 (stating “[i]n retrospect, however, I should have had Mr. McDougal sign a document acknowledging that, although I intended to withdraw as counsel because I did not believe any meritorious claims existed that could be raised on direct appeal, he had the right to file points for consideration by the Supreme Court and that by voluntarily dismissing the appeal, he was effectively waiving his right to direct appeal of his conviction. Although I asked Mr. McDougal to acknowledge in writing that he was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily opting to voluntarily dismiss the appeal.”) 123 815 A.2d 739 (Del. 2003). 124 Id. at 743 (citations omitted). 125 Other than appealing the denial of his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, McDougal does not set forth any other appellate claims he purports to have other than to say he “was looking forward to [an] all-or-nothing defense, and rais[ing] issues about discovery of several issues I was in belief that were violations of my rights.” D.I. 88 at 4. Neither Appellate Counsel nor Postconviction Counsel, for their parts, found any claims for which they could ethically advocate. 23 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Such an appeal, however, would not have been
successful.
It is only “in the rare case where there is irreconcilable conflict in the State's
evidence concerning the defendant's guilt, such as would preclude a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt, [that] the trial court must . . . grant a motion for judgment
of acquittal.”126 In State v. Mayfield, this Court addressed the same issue as the case
at bar in the defendant’s postconviction motion.127 According to the defendant in
Mayfield, his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted because the
victim provided exonerating statements concerning her attacker when interviewed
by the police that she later contradicted at trial, arguing that the State did not prove
his identity as the attacker beyond a reasonable doubt due to the inconsistencies.128
According to the defendant, appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the denial of that
motion for judgment of acquittal on appeal constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.129 In denying defendant’s postconviction claim, this Court found that,
based on other scientific evidence identifying the defendant as the attacker, there
was “no substantial likelihood that our Supreme Court would reverse this Court’s
denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal . . .130
126 State v. Mayfield, 2024 WL 4586540, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2024) (quoting Washington v. State, 4 A.3d 375, 378 (Del. 2010). 127 State v. Mayfield, 2024 WL 4586540 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2024) 128 Id. at *10. 129 Id. 130 Id. 24 Here, it also appears that there is no substantial likelihood of the Delaware
Supreme Court reversing the trial court’s denial of McDougal’s Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal given the evidence presented at trial. Had Appellate Counsel
appealed this Court’s denial of the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, the Supreme
Court would have reviewed that denial de novo “to determine whether a rational trier
of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have
found the essential elements, beyond a reasonable doubt.”131 Notably, the crimes for
which McDougal was convicted were recorded on surveillance video, which was
shown to the jury. The State also submitted considerable evidence in support thereof
proving McDougal was the perpetrator of those crimes. First, the State relied on the
testimony of Detective Michael Hayman, who gathered the evidence regarding the
shooting on November 18, 2019, which included surveillance video of the time and
location where the assault occurred from multiple angles as well as the victim’s
medical records indicating he had sustained a gunshot wound to the right thigh.132
Detective Hayman also testified regarding his observation of the nature of the injury
sustained by the victim and identified him as the individual seen hopping off the
street on the video surveillance.133 He likewise identified McDougal as the suspect
131 State v. Mayfield, 2024 WL 4586540, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2024) (quoting Howell v. State, 268 A.3d 754, 775 (Del. 2011) (citing Cushner v. State, 214 A.3d 443, 446 (Del. 2019))). 132 Trial Transcript at 30-39, 43-48, 51-52, 55-59, 60-61. 133 Trial Transcript at 36, 45. 25 in the surveillance video as well as in open court.134 Second, the State called
Corporal Michael Fossett, who worked in the forensic services unit, and was called
to the scene of the shooting to gather and photograph physical evidence, which
included a 9 mm shell casing.135 Corporal Fossett also photographed the victim’s
injuries at the hospital and testified that the bullet hole in the victim’s leg was
consistent with the shell casing he had collected.136 Third, the State relied on
testimony from Officer Daniel Collins, who was familiar with McDougal based on
past interactions with him, and identified the Defendant initially as a suspect through
a still picture generated from the surveillance video, as well as in the courtroom.137
The State also admitted known photographs of McDougal for the jury to compare to
the surveillance video.138
The evidence presented, when considered in its totality and in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for the jury to find McDougal guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. McDougal has failed to demonstrate there was an
“irreconcilable conflict in the State’s evidence concerning his guilt” or, in fact, any
conflict at all. Given that failing, the likelihood that the Delaware Supreme Court
would have reversed the trial court’s denial of McDougal’s Motion for Judgement
134 Trial Transcript at 47-48, 104-105. 135 Trial Transcript at 66-77, 83-84. 136 Trial Transcript at 77-78. 137 Trial Transcript at 91-97. 138 Trial Transcript at 100-104. 26 of Acquittal if it had been raised on appeal is unsubstantial. Accordingly, McDougal
has failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on his
claim had Appellate Counsel appealed the denial of his Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal.
B. Ineffectiveness Claims Asserted Against Trial Counsel.
McDougal argues in ground two of his Amended Motion that Trial Counsel’s
performance was deficient due to his (i) failure to provide movant with discovery,
(ii) failure to challenge movant’s unlawful identification; (iii) failure to challenge
the admissibility of the 911 call and crime scene shell casing evidence; and (iv)
failure to object to the Court’s initiation of the lesser included offense of Assault
Second Degree in the jury instructions.139 The Defendant also claims in ground two
that Trial Counsel’s actions prevented him from making an informed decision on
accepting the State’s plea offer, “prevented the suppression of his identity” and
“secured a 2nd Degree Assault conviction for the State, as well as, multiple weapons
convictions.”140
1. Failure to Provide McDougal with Discovery.
The allegation that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to provide
McDougal with discovery is unsupported by the factual record. In his affidavit, Trial
139 D.I. 49, D.I. 52. 140 Id. 27 Counsel explains the manner in which McDougal was provided with discovery in
his case.141
On March 19, 2021, Trial Counsel sent a letter to McDougal enclosing copies
of the police reports.142 Then, on May 26, 2021, Trial Counsel met with McDougal
at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institute to review the surveillance videos
which the State intended to admit as evidence at trial.143 According to Trial Counsel,
the surveillance videos were reviewed multiple times during that meeting.144
At no point in his various responses, does the Defendant ever specify what
discovery was in Trial Counsel’s possession that McDougal did not receive copies
of or have the opportunity to review prior to trial.145 Without more, based on the
record, the Court finds that the manner in which Trial Counsel provided the
Defendant with discovery was objectively reasonable and consistent with good trial
practice. As such, McDougal’s claim that Trial Counsel failed to provide him with
discovery is without merit.
141 D.I. 84 at 1-2. 142 Id., Ex. A. 143 D.I. 84 at 1-2. 144 Id. 145 In a letter addressed to Postconviction Counsel, which was docketed with the Court on December 11, 2024, McDougal states “I was blindsided at trial with inadmissiable [sic] evidence,” but he never specifies to what evidence he was referring. D.I. 60. 28 2. Failure to Challenge McDougal’s Unlawful Identification.
McDougal claims that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
his “unlawful identification.” Again, without more from the Defendant, the Court is
hard pressed to fully understand the Defendant’s assertion. As best the Court can
glean, McDougal is arguing that the testimonial evidence presented at trial to
identify him was improper and Trial Counsel should have objected to such
testimony.
As previously noted, the State relied on the testimony of Officer Daniel
Collins to support the identification of McDougal.146 Officer Collins testified that
he worked for the State of Delaware for sixteen years and was familiar with
McDougal based on interactions with him over the past five or six years. 147 Officer
Collins identified McDougal in the courtroom, and further testified that he identified
McDougal from a still-frame photograph taken from the surveillance footage.148 In
addition, the State presented known photographs of McDougal to the jury to allow
them to make their own comparison between the known photographs and the
surveillance.149
146 Trial Transcript at 81-96. 147 Id. at 91. 148 Id. at 92. 149 Id. at 99-104. See Weber v. State, 38 A. 3d 271, 277 (Del. 2012) (finding circumstances surrounding officer's out-of-court identification of defendant as the man in the surveillance video were neither impermissibly suggestive nor unreliable). 29 From the record, it does not appear that there was any legal or evidentiary
basis for Trial Counsel to object or otherwise challenge the identification of
McDougal at trial.150 As such, Trial Counsel’s failure to challenge McDougal’s
identification at trial was not unreasonable and, accordingly, lacks merit under
Strickland.
3. Failure to Challenge the Admissibility of the 911 Call and Shell Casing.
McDougal’s claim that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
the admissibility of the 911 call is also unsupported by the record. On July 27, 2021,
the State filed a Motion in Limine seeking to introduce an anonymous 911 call into
evidence at trial, arguing the 911 call fell within one of the statutory exceptions to
the hearsay rule.151 On August 2, 2021, Trial Counsel filed a response to the State’s
Motion in Limine arguing against the admissibility of the 911 Call.152 Prior to the
Court rendering a decision on the Motion in Limine, the State determined not to
present the 911 call as evidence at trial.153
Put simply, Trial Counsel did challenge the admissibility of the 911 call. And,
given that the 911 call was not ultimately admitted into evidence after Trial Counsel
objected, his challenge was seemingly effective. As such, this claim has no merit.
150 The Court notes that Trial Counsel requested an offer of proof with respect to Officer Collins (i.e. the probation officer) and cross examined the testifying officer regarding his identification of McDougal. See Id. at 86-88, 93-97. 151 D.I. 29. 152 D.I. 25. 153 D.I. 83. 30 McDougal also asserts that Trial Counsel should have challenged the
admissibility of the shell casing into evidence at trial. Again, it does not appear that
Trial Counsel had a legal basis to do so. Corporal Michael Fosset testified that he
located and recovered the spent shell casing while investigating the crime scene,
making the evidence relevant.154 He further testified as to law enforcement’s process
and chain-of-custody procedure for such evidence, which supported its
authentication.155 As such, Trial Counsel had no obligation to challenge the
admissibility of the shell casing when there was no evidentiary basis for doing so,
making his conduct objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
4. Failure to Object to the Trial Court’s Initiation of Lesser Included Offense Instruction. McDougal asserts that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the inclusion of a jury instruction regarding the lesser included offense of Assault
Second Degree. He claims the inclusion of said instruction “secured a 2nd Degree
Assault conviction for the State.” McDougal argues that the trial judge suggested
the inclusion of the jury instruction of her own accord, but the record reflects that
was not the case.156 In addition, this claim is without merit as the lesser included
offense jury instruction was appropriate in view of controlling precedent.
154 Trial Transcript at 68-71. See D.R.E. 401. 155 Trial Transcript at 69-77. See D.R.E. 901. 156 Defendant contends that the statement made by the Court was outside of the Court’s role as a neutral arbiter and constituted judicial abuse of discretion. D.I. 60. As McDougal puts it, “[t]here was a prayer conference held at the end of my trial that resulted in [a] judicial misconduct claim. . 31 At the close of trial on August 3, 2021, the State and Trial Counsel convened
with the trial judge to discuss the jury instructions.157 In reviewing a portion of the
jury instructions that had been highlighted by the State, the trial judge asked the
State to confirm whether it would like to include the lessor included offense of
Assault Second Degree in the jury instructions.158 The State replied in the
affirmative, explaining, “I believe the evidence is developed that that it is an
appropriate lesser included at this point.”159 Trial Counsel did not object, but rather
agreed with the State that the instruction was appropriate as Trial Counsel also
believed that there was an evidentiary basis for such a request.160
As Trial Counsel indicates in his affidavit, the jury instruction regarding the
lesser included offense of Assault Second Degree was proper under Delaware law.161
In State v. Cox, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a judge commits legal error
by denying a request for a lesser included offense instruction that was rationally
. with no objections from [Trial Counsel] in which he could have because [lesser included offense] was not requested by the State at this point . . .that exchange was prejudicial to me because there was nothing on record to suggest that the State was going to ask for a lesser included offense, if not for the impermissible question posed by the Court than [lesser included offense] would not have been charged to the jury and I would have been acquitted on first degree assault. This was an infelicitous action on [the judge’s] part . . . And just a mere suggestion from a judge could’ve intimidated the State as well as my attorney and by her suggestion it tipped the scales of justice in favor of the State and showed that the [trial judge] was being biased. . .” Id. at 3-4. To the extent that McDougal is raising a claim for judicial abuse of discretion in his Amended Motion, it is procedurally barred as he was required to raise such a claim on direct appeal. 157 A307. 158 Trial Transcript at 124. 159 Id. 160 Id.; D.I. 84 at 4. 161 Id. 32 supported by the evidence.162 Thus, even if Trial Counsel had objected to the
inclusion of the lesser-included offense instruction, it is unlikely that the trial judge
would have heeded his objection as it would have been legal error for the Court to
deny the jury instruction based on the evidence presented at trial.163
Therefore, Trial Counsel’s failure to object to the lesser included offense
instruction was not objectively unreasonable given his understanding of the law and
the facts presented at trial. Moreover, given that a trial judge must instruct the jury
on a lesser included offense over the objection of an opposing party if there exists a
rational basis in the evidence for the jury to convict the defendant of the lesser charge
and acquit the defendant of the greater charge, Trial Counsel’s failure to object did
not cause any prejudice to McDougal.164 For these reasons, this claim is also without
merit.
5. McDougal’s Prejudice Claim Related to Trial Counsel.
Finally, McDougal generally asserts that Trial Counsel’s ineffectiveness
prevented him from making an informed decision on accepting the State’s plea offer.
162 State v. Cox, 851 A.2d 1269, 1275 (Del. 2003) (explaining, “[i]n criminal proceedings, a trial judge is required to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense over the objection of an opposing party if: it is requested by any party; there exists a rational basis in the evidence for the jury to convict the defendant of the lesser charge and acquit the defendant of the greater charge; and prosecution for the lesser-included offense is not time barred.”) 163 A rational jury having reviewed the medical records presented at trial could have determined that the victim’s gunshot wound amounted to a “physical injury” as required for Assault Second Degree rather than a “serious physical injury” as required for Assault First Degree. Trial Transcript at 37-39. 164 State v. Cox, 851 A.2d 1269, 1275 (Del. 2003). 33 This claim is also without merit as the record reflects that McDougal did make an
informed decision regarding the plea offers extended by the State.
At his final case review, Trial Counsel reviewed the terms of the Plea
Agreement in open court, including the ten-year minimum mandatory
recommendation, and advised that McDougal had rejected the State’s plea offer. 165
The trial judge informed McDougal that if he were convicted of all crimes as charged
and the State filed a habitual offender motion, he would face a minimum mandatory
sentence of 73 years to life of incarceration.166 Upon being apprised of the foregoing
by the trial judge, McDougal stated that he understood the potential sentence but
nevertheless wanted to “reject the plea.”167 He also stated that he satisfied with Trial
Counsel’s representation.168 Trial Counsel also noted for the record that the same
plea offer was presented to the Defendant on May 26, 2021 and he rejected it on that
date as well.169 Thereafter, the Court found McDougal’s rejection of the plea offer
to be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.170 The Court does not see how
any actions taken by Trial Counsel with respect to the plea offers prejudiced the
Defendant.
165 A66-67. 166 A68-69. 167 Id. 168 Id. 169 A69-70. 170 A70. 34 CONCLUSION
The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that
McDougal’s Amended Motion is without merit and devoid of any other substantial
claims for relief. The Court is also satisfied that Postconviction Counsel made a
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly determined
that Defendant does not have a meritorious claim to be raised in his postconviction
motion. For all of the foregoing reasons, McDougal’s Amended Motion for
Postconviction Relief should be DENIED and Postconviction Counsel’s Motion to
Withdraw should be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/ Janine M. Salomone The Honorable Janine M. Salomone
oc: Prothonotary cc: Brian J. Chapman, Esquire Benjamin S. Gifford, IV, Esquire Markeevis McDougal (SBI #00394144)