[Cite as State v. McClain, 2016-Ohio-838.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 26764 : v. : T.C. NO. 14CR1581 : JAMES McCLAIN : (Criminal Appeal from : Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :
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OPINION
Rendered on the ___4th___ day of _____March_____, 2016. ...........
CHRISTINA E. MAHY, Atty. Reg. No. 0092671, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
DANIEL J. O’BRIEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0031461, 1210 Talbott Tower, 131 N. Ludlow Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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FROELICH, P.J.
{¶ 1} James McClain pled no contest to possession of heroin in an amount of 10
grams or more, but less than 50 grams, a felony of the second degree. The trial court
sentenced him to two years in prison and suspended his driver’s license for one year.
McClain was ordered to pay court costs. The trial court stayed McClain’s sentence -2-
pending appeal.
{¶ 2} McClain appeals from his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred in
failing to dismiss the charges due to the State’s destruction of a police cruiser video
recording and video recordings at the Montgomery County Jail. For the following
reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Background and Procedural History
{¶ 3} On August 6, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on McClain’s motion to
suppress, during which Dayton Police Officer Angela Woody was the sole witness. Her
testimony established the following facts.
{¶ 4} At approximately 4:40 a.m. on April 30, 2014, Officer Woody was dispatched
to the intersection of Hoover Avenue and James H. McGee Boulevard on a report that a
white vehicle was stopped at the light and the driver was slumped over the steering wheel
of the vehicle. The caller indicated that the driver had sat through several lights, and the
caller was concerned about the driver’s well-being.
{¶ 5} Upon her arrival, Officer Woody saw a vehicle sitting at the light, and the
vehicle did not move when the light was green. Woody approached the vehicle and, in
an attempt to get the driver’s attention, knocked on the driver’s window and all four
windows. The driver did not respond. Woody could see that the driver was breathing,
and she did not see any overt signs of injury. Officer Jerry Bell arrived, and he shined
his cruiser’s spotlight directly on the driver’s face. At that point, the driver, who was later
identified as McClain, began to awake.
{¶ 6} The officers had McClain exit his vehicle. The officers ultimately determined
that McClain was not injured, but was intoxicated. Officer Woody could smell an odor of -3-
an alcoholic beverage, McClain was very lethargic, and his speech was slurred. He
failed the three field sobriety tests that Woody administered. Officer Woody placed
McClain under arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OVI), read him his Miranda
rights, did a pat down for weapons, and transported him to the Safety Building, where she
administered a breathalyzer test. Afterward, Woody took McClain to the Montgomery
County Jail.
{¶ 7} At the jail, Officer Woody did a full search prior to McClain’s entry to the jail’s
receiving room. McClain was wearing a jacket, and Officer Woody located baggies in
the front right pocket of the jacket. The baggies contained a tannish-white powdery
substance, which she suspected was heroin. Woody indicated that there are video
cameras in the receiving area of the jail, and the jail would possess those videos.
{¶ 8} Officer Woody testified that both her and Officer Bell’s cruisers had cameras.
Woody stated that the camera records whenever her lights and siren are on and every
time someone gets into the back seat of the cruiser. She also indicated that she could
activate the camera if she felt the need. After McClain’s arrest, Woody selected a button
to indicate that the subject on the video had been arrested. That selection identified the
recording as one that should be preserved for future proceedings.
{¶ 9} McClain was indicted for possession of heroin in an amount of 10 grams or
more, but less than 50 grams. The OVI charge was presented to the Dayton Municipal
Court, where separate proceedings occurred.
{¶ 10} On June 10, 2014, McClain moved in the common pleas court to suppress
all evidence seized as a result of his interaction with the police and any statements he
made. At the conclusion of the August 6 hearing on the motion, described above, the -4-
trial court instructed the parties to make efforts to obtain the cruiser and jail videos and
the discovery from the OVI case. The following day, the trial court set a scheduling
conference for August 13, 2014.
{¶ 11} The record does not reflect what occurred at the August 13 scheduling
conference, if one were held. That day, however, McClain filed a request for discovery,
which included a demand that the State “[p]reserve and provide any video/audio tapes *
* * including any and all police cruiser audio/videos at the scene from the two (2) separate
cruisers[;] [a]ny and all videos * * * from the Sheriff’s Department at the Montgomery
County Jail, at the outer-receiving area that involves the reception of James McClain in
the jail with Ptl. Angela Woody, et al. and of the inside of the reception and book-in area
of the jail.” (Doc. #16, ¶ 8.) The trial court also scheduled a hearing on a motion to
suppress for September 5, 2014. The record does not contain a transcript of a hearing
on September 5, 2014, and it is unclear whether any such hearing was held. (Neither
party states that a hearing was held.)
{¶ 12} On September 11, 2014, the trial court set a scheduling conference for
September 24, 2014. On September 25, 2014, the trial court scheduled a hearing on a
motion to dismiss for November 21, 2014, although no written motion had been filed as
of that date (September 25).
{¶ 13} On October 21, 2014, McClain filed a motion to compel discovery and a
memorandum in support of a motion to dismiss; McClain’s “motion to dismiss cause [or]
suppress evidence” was filed on October 23. In his motion and memorandum, McClain
stated that the State had failed to provide video recordings from the cruisers and the jail.
He argued that the cruiser video was “highly relevant” to whether there was probable -5-
cause to arrest him for OVI and that the videos of the jail would have shown what McClain
was wearing on April 30. McClain asserted that such evidence would have shown that
the jacket in which the heroin was found would not have fit him and did not belong to him.
McClain’s motion indicated that an appendix was attached, which would have included
the docket sheet from the Dayton Municipal Court, the discovery demand filed in
municipal court, an order from the municipal court granting McClain’s motion to compel
in the OVI case, and other documents. No supporting documents were attached to
McClain’s motion.
{¶ 14} The State opposed the motion to dismiss or suppress, providing the
following chronology of events regarding the video recordings:
On May 21, 2014, Defendant filed a Discovery Demand in Dayton
Municipal Court. On August 13, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel
Discovery in Dayton Municipal Court and a Request for Discovery in
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court. August 13, 2014, was the first
date that Defendant made any requests as to video in Montgomery County
Common Pleas Court.
This filing was made more than 90 days after the arrest. Dayton
Police Department has a 90 day retention policy on cruiser camera. The
Montgomery County Jail has a 60 day retention policy of jail videos.
Despite the Montgomery County Prosecutor’s efforts, there was no way to
obtain the videos at the time of Defendant’s requests. Review of the
dockets will show that Defense Counsel never filed a Motion to Preserve
this evidence in either Dayton Municipal Court or Montgomery County -6-
The State asserted that McClain could not demonstrate that the evidence was materially
exculpatory and, at best, the video recordings were potentially useful. The State further
argued that comparable evidence was available by other reasonable means. Finally, the
State asserted that McClain could not carry his burden to demonstrate bad faith on the
part of the State. The State did not provide any supporting documentation.
{¶ 15} On December 16, 2014, the trial court overruled McClain’s motion. The
trial court found that McClain had not met his burden of proving that a video recording of
his interaction with the police at his vehicle would be materially exculpatory, noting that
“there is evidence of Defendant’s intoxication apart from the Dayton Police Department’s
cruiser cam video.” The trial court noted the evidence of intoxication observed by the
officers and the fact that McClain failed the breathalyzer test. The trial court concluded
that probable cause had existed for McClain’s arrest.
{¶ 16} With respect to the jail recording, the trial court stated that “the jail has an
Inmate Property Receipt describing Defendant’s coat at the time of his booking. Thus,
this information he seeks regarding his clothing is available to Defendant should he
choose to refute it or otherwise use it as part of his defense.” The trial court found that,
at most, the missing video recordings would be potentially useful to McClain, and there
was no evidence to support a finding of bad faith. The court stated, “The record of this
Court demonstrates that Defendant requested these recordings of the booking more than
ninety days after his arrest and more than thirty days after they were erased per the policy
of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s office.”
{¶ 17} In June 2015, McClain pled no contest to possession of heroin. The trial -7-
court sentenced him accordingly.
{¶ 18} McClain appeals from his conviction, raising one assignment of error.
II. Standard for Destruction of Video Recordings by the State
{¶ 19} McClain’s sole assignment of error states:
The Trial Court below committed prejudicial error in overruling the
Defendant-Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss this case and Suppress Evidence
when the total record shows the State of Ohio allowed, after request by the
Defendant, and in violation of Rule 16, Brady v. Maryland (1963), 291 Md.
261 material, Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 115 S. Ct. 1555 material and Giglio v.
United States (1972) 92 S. Ct. 763 and the Montgomery County Rules of
Court, the destruction of exculpatory evidence, including numerous
videotapes from multiple locations, which would have conclusively shown
that the jacket which contained the illegal heroin was not being worn by the
Defendant at the time of his arrest, but was in fact retrieved from the back
of the car he was driving. This Defendant was demonstrably larger,
heavier, by 50-60 pounds and taller than the owner of the jacket which had
been left in the car which the Defendant was driving at the time of his arrest,
but which he did not own.
{¶ 20} In his assignment of error, McClain claims that his due process rights were
violated by the destruction of the cruiser video and the video recording at the jail. He
argues that the video recordings were materially exculpatory, and that the State’s
apparent destruction of the videos required the dismissal of the charges against him.
McClain cites State v. Benton, 136 Ohio App.3d 801, 737 N.E.2d 1046 (6th Dist.2000), -8-
State v. Benson, 152 Ohio App.3d 495, 2003-Ohio-1944, 788 N.E.2d 693 (1st Dist.), and
State v. Blair, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25578, 2014-Ohio-1279.
{¶ 21} The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects a criminal defendant from being convicted when the State either fails
to preserve materially exculpatory evidence or destroys, in bad faith, potentially useful
evidence. E.g., State v. White, 2015-Ohio-3512, 37 N.E.3d 1271, ¶ 58 (2d Dist.).
Evidence is “materially exculpatory” if it (1) possesses “an exculpatory value that was
apparent before the evidence was destroyed” and (2) is “of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available
means.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413
(1984); State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 856, ¶ 74.
{¶ 22} “In contrast, evidence is not materially exculpatory if it is merely potentially
useful. Potentially useful evidence indicates that the evidence may or may not have
incriminated the defendant. The failure to preserve evidence that by its nature or subject
is merely potentially useful violates a defendant’s due process rights only if the police or
prosecution acted in bad faith.” State v. Cox, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25477, 2013-
Ohio-4941, ¶ 88. “The term ‘bad faith’ generally implies something more than bad
judgment or negligence. ‘It imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious
wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of
the nature of fraud.’” (Citations omitted.) Powell at ¶ 81.
{¶ 23} The defendant bears the burden to prove that the evidence in question was
materially exculpatory, not merely potentially useful. Id. at ¶ 74.
{¶ 24} At oral argument, McClain’s counsel suggested that the State had admitted -9-
error by having now adopted a discovery policy that preserves video evidence. We have
nothing before us reflecting such a policy, what type of potential evidence it preserves,
and how it is implemented. Regardless, the adoption of such a procedure, as meritorious
and commendable as that may be, is not an acknowledgement of any legal error by the
State or the trial court in a case arising prior to the adoption of that policy, such as the
case before us.
{¶ 25} McClain’s counsel further advocated at oral argument that the State should
bear the burden of establishing that any destroyed evidence was not materially
exculpatory, particularly when a defendant faced potential incarceration. As an
intermediate court of appeals, we lack the authority to alter the burden of proof mandated
by Ohio Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court precedent. See State v.
Beavers, 2012-Ohio-6222, 986 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.).
Within the judicial branch, the Supreme Court is supreme. Whether we
agree or disagree with its reasoning, or even whether we agree that it is
acting within its constitutional powers, we are bound to follow its edicts.
Any rule to the contrary would permit anarchy within the judicial branch of
the government, since different courts inferior to the Supreme Court might
reach multiple conclusions, thereby depriving the Supreme Court of its
power to promote uniformity and predictability within the judicial
department.
Hapner v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 14510, 1995 WL 371069, *2
(June 23, 1995).
{¶ 26} Due to this limitation, we previously rejected the position set forth in -10-
Columbus v. Forest, 36 Ohio App.3d 169, 522 N.E.2d 52 (10th Dist.1987), that when the
defendant specifically requests that certain evidence be preserved and that evidence is
subsequently destroyed or lost by the State, the burden shifts to the State to show that
the evidence was not materially exculpatory. Beavers at ¶ 16-23. We recognized that
we “are bound to follow to the dictates of the Ohio Supreme Court, which has chosen to
follow Trombetta, Youngblood and [Illinois v.] Fisher [, 540 U.S. 544, 124 S.Ct. 1200, 157
L.Ed.2d 1060 (2004)].” Beavers at ¶ 26.
{¶ 27} This is not to say that we totally agree with Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S.
51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) and its progeny. See Beavers at ¶ 25 (noting
that Youngblood has been subject to criticism and, “[i]n our view, that criticism is well-
deserved.”); see also, e.g., State v. Frasure, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0033, 2008-
Ohio-1504, ¶ 46 (“We would be remiss if we did not voice our concern over the potential
effect of [the Youngblood] bright-line test and the difficulty for a defendant to satisfy the
bad faith standard.”)
{¶ 28} In the analogous situation involving spoliation of evidence in a civil case, we
have employed a shifting burden. Where a plaintiff or the plaintiff’s expert has destroyed
or altered evidence prior to being examined by the defendant, we have required the
defendant to show “(1) that the evidence is relevant; (2) that the plaintiff’s expert had an
opportunity to examine the unaltered evidence; and (3) that, even though the plaintiff was
contemplating litigation against the defendant, this evidence was intentionally or
negligently destroyed or altered without providing an opportunity for inspection by the
defense.” (Emphasis added.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
26330, 2015-Ohio-699, ¶ 39, quoting Hetzer-Young v. Elano Corp., 2d Dist. Greene No. -11-
2013-CA-32, 2014-Ohio-1104, ¶ 30. If such is shown, the burden then shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant was not prejudiced by the alteration or
destruction of the evidence. Id. The trial court must determine the degree of prejudice
and impose an appropriate sanction for those circumstances.
{¶ 29} We note that, under their state constitutions, a number of courts have
rejected Youngblood in favor of a balancing test. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 232 Conn.
707, 657 A.2d 585 (1995); State v. Delisle, 162 Vt. 293, 648 A.2d 632, 643 (1994); Dinger,
Should Lost Evidence Mean a Lost Chance to Prosecute?: State Rejections of the United
States Supreme Court Decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 27 Am.J.Crim.L. 329 (2000).
As expressed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, “the sole fact of whether the police
or another state official acted in good or bad faith in failing to preserve evidence cannot
be determinative of whether the criminal defendant has received due process of law.”
Morales at 593.
{¶ 30} As cruiser cameras, body cameras, surveillance videos, and smart phone
videos become more commonplace, the sources of evidence – both inculpatory and
exculpatory – expand and change. It is government’s (whether federal, state or local)
responsibility to ensure due process in light of these changing sources.
{¶ 31} Oftentimes – and for good reasons – legal principles temporally lag behind
cultural and technological events. Regardless, under current law, the defendant bears
the burden to establish that missing evidence is “materially exculpatory” or that it was
destroyed in “bad faith,” a burden that is often overbearing.
When evidence has been lost or remains untested “there is often no way
for a defendant to ascertain the true extent of its exculpatory nature.” It -12-
may well be impossible for a criminal defendant to prove the exculpability
of lost evidence, and such a requirement would not further the Brady duty
to disclose. In an extreme case, a prosecutor would be able to suppress
potentially exculpatory evidence by pleading its loss.
(Citation omitted). State v. Bailey, 144 Vt. 86, 475 A.2d 1045, 1050 (1984), which
continues to apply to the Vermont Constitution.
III. Analysis in light of the Record on Appeal
{¶ 32} In denying McClain’s motion, the trial court relied on information that is not
in the record before us. The record in this case references the companion OVI
proceedings in the Dayton Municipal Court, and there is some discussion of the video
recordings. However, much of the documentation of the efforts to obtain the video
records and of the bases for the apparent destruction of the records is not in the record.
{¶ 33} The transcript of the suppression hearing established that an OVI offense
was being prosecuted in the Dayton Municipal Court, and defense counsel stated that he
had not requested discovery in the OVI matter, because the prosecutor was “holding off
on anything until this case is over.” Counsel clarified that the prosecutor would dismiss
the OVI case “depending upon what happens over here [in common pleas court].”
{¶ 34} At the conclusion of the August 6 suppression hearing, the trial court asked,
“Who’s going to get this video? * * * Because I don’t want any delay.” The following
discussion ensued:
MR. SCHOEN: The State will definitely make all requests from Dayton
Police Department in relation to a preservation of the video. The State will
also call the Public Defender’s Office noting that this initially on the OVI side -13-
was Adelina Hamilton’s case. The State's aware that Mike Dailey makes
requests of all cruiser cam videos in relation to arrests. If there’s a chance
that DPD may have, you know, taped over this or it went out of existence,
the hope is the Public Defender’s Office would have it. Now, with that in
mind, Mr. O’Brien then took over the case. So the State would ask that Mr.
O’Brien request the discovery in his misdemeanor case because for all I
know it could be sitting down there waiting him to just pick it up. And if
that’s the case, we would expect that Mr. O’Brien would deliver the OVI
paperwork and the video. But the State will do everything it can in its power
to do what it can to get the video, itself.
THE COURT: Yeah. In the interest of getting this resolved, I think that’s a
good plan. The State will, it seems odd, but I guess this is the way they do
things that this has been bifurcated. Interestingly, there’s a new statute
that will shortly be in effect, I believe, that if there’s a felony and a
misdemeanor, they both come over here. So perhaps this won’t be a
problem in the future. However, for the time being, I would like the State
to take those steps to try and find the video and the report. I would also
ask Defense counsel, since you are counsel of record, that you make a
request of the -- * * * The city prosecutor’s office to get the discovery in this
case including the disk and then if you get it, under reciprocal discovery -- *
* * let Mr. Schoen know.
MR. O’BRIEN: Absolutely.
THE COURT: If he already has it, that’s fine. You both have copies. If not, -14-
whoever gets it shares it with the other side.
MR. O’BRIEN: And that absolutely goes without saying, Judge. Only loose
end here now is that they also have admitted there’s a video of the outside
receiving section which would become very critical in this case. We will
also want to get a copy of that video from the sheriff.
THE COURT: And I'm not sure if those are kept or not. Can you check that
out, please?
MR. SCHOEN: I can look into it and see what their preservation policies
are.
THE COURT: Yeah. Because that one I think is more of a safety thing than
anything else. But go ahead and see if they have it. See if you can get
copies of that, too. Okay?
(Supp.Tr. at 44-47.)
{¶ 35} The record in this case does not contain the record of the OVI case in the
Dayton Municipal Court stemming from McClain’s interaction with the police on April 30,
2014. Nor is there any documentation of either party’s efforts to obtain the video
recordings via the OVI case.
{¶ 36} The record indicates that additional hearings were scheduled on September
5, 2015 (motion to suppress) and November 21, 2014 (motion to dismiss) in this case.
After filing his notice of appeal, McClain requested a “verbatim transcript of the court
proceedings of the suppression hearing taken on 09/05/2014.” However, the record
contains a transcript of the August 6, 2014 suppression hearing, not the September 5,
2014 suppression hearing (if one was held). No request was made for a transcription of -15-
a November 21, 2014 hearing, and the record does not indicate if such a hearing was
held. In their briefs, neither party states that hearings were held on September 5 or
November 21.
{¶ 37} The State and the trial court stated that the Dayton Police Department has
a 90-day retention policy on cruiser camera recordings and that the Montgomery County
Jail has a 60-day retention policy of jail videos. There is no evidence in the record of
either of those policies (although neither party appears to contest this), nor is there
evidence that the video recordings that McClain sought were destroyed pursuant to those
policies. In fact, there is no evidence in the record that the video recordings have been
destroyed, although apparently this is not in dispute.
{¶ 38} The State also indicates, and the trial court found, that an inmate property
receipt is kept at the jail documenting the clothing that McClain was wearing at the time
of his booking. No inmate jail receipt is included in the record.
{¶ 39} McClain attaches several exhibits to his appellate brief. “[A]ttachments to
appellate briefs that are not a part of the record cannot be considered on appeal, as ‘[a]
reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial
court’s proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.’” State
v. Shouse, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26172, 2015-Ohio-3918, ¶ 42, quoting State v.
Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 40} In summary, it is unclear whether the trial court’s decision made factual
findings without evidentiary support for those findings or, instead, made factual findings
based on the evidence before it, but that evidence was not made part of the record on
appeal. -16-
{¶ 41} Regardless, McClain has the burden on appeal “to show the existence and
effect of the error he assigns, and to do so by specific reference to the trial record.” State
v. Burkholder, 2d Dist. Darke No. 1750, 2009-Ohio-5526, ¶ 5. In other words, McClain
has the duty to provide a record which exemplifies the error he assigns. Id., citing Knapp
v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980).
{¶ 42} Here, the record does not support a conclusion that the video recordings
were materially exculpatory. The only evidence in the record regarding McClain’s
encounter with the police on April 30, 2014 came from Officer Woody at the August 6,
2014 suppression hearing. She testified that McClain appeared to be intoxicated, and
that he failed the field sobriety tests that she administered. McClain was given a
breathalyzer test at the Safety Building and was then taken to jail. Woody further testified
that McClain was wearing a jacket throughout their encounter, including at the jail, and
that baggies of suspected heroin were located in a jacket pocket during a search at the
jail. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the cruiser video recordings or
recordings at the jail would contradict her testimony.
{¶ 43} McClain stated in his motion and repeats in his appellate brief that he would
have produced “two female witnesses who would have testified that the jacket * * * was
in fact not his jacket but belonged to a smaller, thinner gentleman who had been with the
ladies and Mr. McClain earlier in the evening.” However, these potential witnesses did
not testify or provide affidavits to the court, and McClain’s unsworn representation does
not constitute evidence. McClain also could have testified or presented an affidavit
indicating that the jacket would not have fit him, but no such evidence was produced.
Accordingly, McClain has not demonstrated that the video recordings are materially -17-
exculpatory.
{¶ 44} Although the parties agree that the video recordings are no longer available,
McClain has failed to establish that their destruction was due to bad faith on the part of
the State. On August 6, 2014, the prosecutor represented, as an officer of the court, that
he would “make all requests from Dayton Police Department in relation to a preservation
of the video” and would call the Public Defender’s Office to inquire whether a public
defender had requested the cruiser video. The prosecutor also stated that he would look
into obtaining the jail recordings and the jail’s retention policies. There is no indication
that the State failed to search for the video. In addition, there is no evidence regarding
when the recordings were destroyed, whether they were destroyed pursuant to any
retention policy, and whether they were destroyed after the State was asked to retain the
videos. Accordingly, McClain has failed to establish that due process required the
dismissal of the indictment due to the destruction of the videos.
{¶ 45} Based on the evidence before us, the trial court did not err in denying
McClain’s motion to dismiss or suppress evidence. McClain’s assignment of error is
overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 46} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
DONOVAN, P.J., concurs.
HALL, J., concurring:
{¶ 47} I join with my colleagues in affirming the judgment of the trial court. I write
separately to say that I am not as critical of Youngblood and its progeny as the majority -18-
is. To me, Youngblood strikes a reasoned balance on the question of who should bear
the burden to prove that unavailable evidence would likely make a difference. In my view,
most potential evidence that is not collected or preserved is not available because of
innocent inadvertence to recognize or save material that has potential or sometimes
theoretical evidentiary value. We should not assume that police or prosecutors will
“suppress potentially exculpatory evidence by pleading its loss,” as the Vermont Supreme
Court said in State v. Bailey, quoted by the majority. Nor should we assume that a
defendant or counsel will create a defense specifically related to unavailable potentially
or theoretically valuable evidence only after its unavailability is discovered, as perhaps
occurred in this case.
{¶ 48} McClain claims that the jacket containing the drugs that he was wearing
when he was booked into jail was not his and did not fit him. This, he later argues, would
have been evident if videos from the arrest and the booking had been available. But
according to the state’s unchallenged assertion in the trial court, the jacket was listed as
part of McClain’s property on the inmate property receipt, made when he was booked.
And when he was released on bond the day after his arrest, McClain either possessed or
had access to the jacket. If this ostensibly ill-fitting and unowned jacket was so important
to his defense, it is McClain who could have retained it.
Copies mailed to:
Christina E. Mahy Daniel J. O’Brien Hon. Barbara P. Gorman -19-