STEINMETZ, J.
This case was certified to this court by the court of appeals; we accepted certification.
The issue is whether prior violations of sec. 346.63(1), Stats.,
are elements of the crime of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance, thereby requiring that
the question of their existence be submitted to the jury. The trial court answered “no,” and we affirm.
Unquestionably, the state has the burden of proving each essential element of a crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970);
Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684 (1975);
Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977);
Muller v. State,
94 Wis. 2d 450, 473, 289 N.W.2d 570, 582 (1980). Equally beyond dispute is the proposition that where the finder of fact is a jury, rather than a judge, proof of all essential elements must be tendered to the jury.
Holland v. State,
91 Wis. 2d 134, 138, 280 N.W.2d 288, 290 (1979),
cert. denied,
455 U.S. 931 (1980);
Seidler v. State,
64 Wis. 2d 456, 460, 219 N.W.2d 320, 323 (1974). A judge may not direct a verdict of guilt against a defendant in a criminal case.
The defendant, Ronald J. McAllister, was convicted of a third offense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OMVWI). The prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that he was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The state, however, adduced no proof before the jury to establish that the defendant had been previously convicted of violating sec. 346.63(1), Stats., or a conforming local ordinance, or that he had been revoked under sec. 343.305 within the five years preceding the instant offense.
Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal or dismissal with prejudice or amendment of the charge to a civil forfeiture violation of sec. 346.63(1), Stats., at the close of the state’s case and at the close of all the evidence. Defendant argued that he could not be convicted of a criminal violation of sec. 346.63(1) unless the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury that he had previously been convicted of violating sec. 346.63(1) or a conforming local ordinance or had been revoked under
sec. 343.305 within five years of the instant offense. The trial court rejected this position and instead viewed secs. 346.63(1) and 346.65 (2)
as án offense and penalty enhancing scheme akin to a repeater statute. The defend
ant was sentenced to 35 days in jail and fined $500, with the sentence stayed pending appeal.
A crime is “conduct which is prohibited by state law and punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.” Sec. 939.12, Stats.
The conduct prohibited by sec. 346.63(1), Stats., consists of (1) driving or operating a motor vehicle, and (2) doing so while under the influence of an intoxicant.
It is the conduct of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant which is prohibited by sec. 346.63(1). Nothing more need be proven to sustain a judgment of conviction against a motorist. These were the two elements of the offense contained in the jury instruction, and the jury was therefore properly instructed.
The penalties for violation of OMVWI are contained in sec. 346.65(2), Stats. Repeated violations are subject to increasingly harsher penalties. This graduated penalty structure is nothing more than a penalty enhancer similar to a repeater statute which does not in any way alter the nature of the substantive offense,
i.e.,
the prohibited conduct, but rather goes only to the question of punishment.
In
State v. Banks,
105 Wis. 2d 32, 45-50, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981), this court distinguished sec. 346.65, Stats., from general repeater statutes in holding that the enhancement provisions of sec. 346.65(2) (a) are applicable to repeat offenders regardless of the sequence of viola
tions. The issue in
Banks
regarding the timing of drunk driving offenses is unrelated to the present question of whether prior violations of sec. 346.63(1) must be proven as an element of the substantive offense. Thus, the distinction drawn in
Banks
is irrelevant to our present discussion.
This court characterized sec. 161.48, Stats.,
prescribing enhanced punishment for second and subsequent violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, as a repeater statute, in
Olson v. State,
69 Wis. 2d 605, 608, 230 N.W.2d 634 (1975), wherein the court held: “[T]hat while the repeater provision authorizes stiffer sentences, it does not itself create a crime and cannot support a separate and independent sentence.”
In
Block v. State,
41 Wis. 2d 205, 212, 163 N.W.2d 196 (1968), speaking of this state’s general repeater statute, sec. 939.62, Stats.,
this court stated: “A charge of being a repeater is not a charge of a crime and, if proved,
only renders the defendant eligible for an increase in penalty for the crime of which he is convicted.”
In
Wells v. State,
40 Wis. 2d 724, 731, 162 N.W.2d 634 (1968), the court stated: “[T]he repeater statute does not define an offense but is treated as part of the criminal law regulating the sentence and judgment in cases where persons are guilty of successive repeated offenses.”
In
Harms v. State,
36 Wis. 2d 282, 285, 153 N.W.2d 78, 80 (1967), we stated: “The habitual criminality statute increases the penalty for a particular misdemeanor or felony involved, but in no way changes the nature of the crime.”
As we held in
Dahlgren v. State,
163 Wis. 141, 144, 157 N.W. 531 (1916):
“Prior conviction is an essential element of the charge in the information in order to secure the punishment provided for in case of a second offense and must be alleged in the information under the statute, sec.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
STEINMETZ, J.
This case was certified to this court by the court of appeals; we accepted certification.
The issue is whether prior violations of sec. 346.63(1), Stats.,
are elements of the crime of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance, thereby requiring that
the question of their existence be submitted to the jury. The trial court answered “no,” and we affirm.
Unquestionably, the state has the burden of proving each essential element of a crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970);
Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684 (1975);
Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977);
Muller v. State,
94 Wis. 2d 450, 473, 289 N.W.2d 570, 582 (1980). Equally beyond dispute is the proposition that where the finder of fact is a jury, rather than a judge, proof of all essential elements must be tendered to the jury.
Holland v. State,
91 Wis. 2d 134, 138, 280 N.W.2d 288, 290 (1979),
cert. denied,
455 U.S. 931 (1980);
Seidler v. State,
64 Wis. 2d 456, 460, 219 N.W.2d 320, 323 (1974). A judge may not direct a verdict of guilt against a defendant in a criminal case.
The defendant, Ronald J. McAllister, was convicted of a third offense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OMVWI). The prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that he was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The state, however, adduced no proof before the jury to establish that the defendant had been previously convicted of violating sec. 346.63(1), Stats., or a conforming local ordinance, or that he had been revoked under sec. 343.305 within the five years preceding the instant offense.
Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal or dismissal with prejudice or amendment of the charge to a civil forfeiture violation of sec. 346.63(1), Stats., at the close of the state’s case and at the close of all the evidence. Defendant argued that he could not be convicted of a criminal violation of sec. 346.63(1) unless the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury that he had previously been convicted of violating sec. 346.63(1) or a conforming local ordinance or had been revoked under
sec. 343.305 within five years of the instant offense. The trial court rejected this position and instead viewed secs. 346.63(1) and 346.65 (2)
as án offense and penalty enhancing scheme akin to a repeater statute. The defend
ant was sentenced to 35 days in jail and fined $500, with the sentence stayed pending appeal.
A crime is “conduct which is prohibited by state law and punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.” Sec. 939.12, Stats.
The conduct prohibited by sec. 346.63(1), Stats., consists of (1) driving or operating a motor vehicle, and (2) doing so while under the influence of an intoxicant.
It is the conduct of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant which is prohibited by sec. 346.63(1). Nothing more need be proven to sustain a judgment of conviction against a motorist. These were the two elements of the offense contained in the jury instruction, and the jury was therefore properly instructed.
The penalties for violation of OMVWI are contained in sec. 346.65(2), Stats. Repeated violations are subject to increasingly harsher penalties. This graduated penalty structure is nothing more than a penalty enhancer similar to a repeater statute which does not in any way alter the nature of the substantive offense,
i.e.,
the prohibited conduct, but rather goes only to the question of punishment.
In
State v. Banks,
105 Wis. 2d 32, 45-50, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981), this court distinguished sec. 346.65, Stats., from general repeater statutes in holding that the enhancement provisions of sec. 346.65(2) (a) are applicable to repeat offenders regardless of the sequence of viola
tions. The issue in
Banks
regarding the timing of drunk driving offenses is unrelated to the present question of whether prior violations of sec. 346.63(1) must be proven as an element of the substantive offense. Thus, the distinction drawn in
Banks
is irrelevant to our present discussion.
This court characterized sec. 161.48, Stats.,
prescribing enhanced punishment for second and subsequent violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, as a repeater statute, in
Olson v. State,
69 Wis. 2d 605, 608, 230 N.W.2d 634 (1975), wherein the court held: “[T]hat while the repeater provision authorizes stiffer sentences, it does not itself create a crime and cannot support a separate and independent sentence.”
In
Block v. State,
41 Wis. 2d 205, 212, 163 N.W.2d 196 (1968), speaking of this state’s general repeater statute, sec. 939.62, Stats.,
this court stated: “A charge of being a repeater is not a charge of a crime and, if proved,
only renders the defendant eligible for an increase in penalty for the crime of which he is convicted.”
In
Wells v. State,
40 Wis. 2d 724, 731, 162 N.W.2d 634 (1968), the court stated: “[T]he repeater statute does not define an offense but is treated as part of the criminal law regulating the sentence and judgment in cases where persons are guilty of successive repeated offenses.”
In
Harms v. State,
36 Wis. 2d 282, 285, 153 N.W.2d 78, 80 (1967), we stated: “The habitual criminality statute increases the penalty for a particular misdemeanor or felony involved, but in no way changes the nature of the crime.”
As we held in
Dahlgren v. State,
163 Wis. 141, 144, 157 N.W. 531 (1916):
“Prior conviction is an essential element of the charge in the information in order to secure the punishment provided for in case of a second offense and must be alleged in the information under the statute, sec. 4763, but it is not an essential element of the substantive offense charged.”
In
Dahlgren, supra,
at 144, the court rejected a contention similar to that made by the present defendant:
“[T]he proof made was not sufficient to sustain what he calls the second and third counts of the information, which relate to the convictions in Minnesota; and further contends that the jury should have passed specifically upon each of the so-called counts of the information. The fact is in the instant case there was but one count in the information, but one offense. The matter relating to the former convictions merely affected the severity of punishment and was not a part of the substantive offense with which the defendant was charged. The evidence was sufficient to prove all the allegations of the information and warrant conviction.”
Finally, in
Mulkovich v. State,
73 Wis. 2d 464, 468, 243 N.W.2d 198 (1976), we stated: “A repeater charge is relevant only to the action of the trial judge in imposing sentence after the jury has made the finding of guilt in respect to the crime tried before it.”
The legislative directive concerning the law of repeater and penalty enhancers is clear and has been upheld by this court. The application and impact of such provisions has been repeatedly defined. Consistent with this development of the law, we hold that the fact of a prior violation, civil or criminal, is not an element of the crime of OMVWI either in the ordinary sense of the meaning of the word element,
i.e.,
the incidents of conduct giving rise to the prosecution, or in the constitutional sense.
The defendant argues that since he cannot be convicted of this crime unless there has been a previous civil or criminal conviction of the same offense, the previous conviction is an element of the offense and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. We reject that argument and rule that the previous conviction of sec. 346.63(1), Stats., whether civil or criminal, is not an element of the offense.
There is no inherent unfairness in considering previous convictions as penalty enhancers rather than as an
element of the charged offense. As the United States Supreme Court stated in
Patterson v. New York, supra,
at 210: “Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society’s interests against those, of the accused have been left to the legislative branch.”
The Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged the wide leeway states have always been accorded in administering repeater statutes and in dividing responsibility between the judge and jury in criminal cases.
Spencer v. Texas,
385 U.S. 554, 560, 565-69 (1967).
There is no presumption of innocence accruing to the defendant regarding the previous conviction or convictions; such convictions have already been determined in the justice system and the defendant was protected by his rights in those actions.
The defendant does have an opportunity to challenge the existence of the previous penalty-enhancing convictions before the judge prior to sentencing. However, the convictions may be proven by certified copies of conviction or other competent proof offered by the state before sentencing.
The defendant has suggested that the same jury should hear the substantive charge of OMVWI and then, in a bifurcated trial, the evidence of the triggering civil or criminal convictions. This would interfere with the fact-finding process and intrude on judicial discretion by allowing the jury to rule on punishment, an area exclusively within the province of the judge. There is no unfairness in using the prior convictions, if proven to the satisfaction of the judge, as punishment enhancers.
By the Court.
— The judgment of the circuit court for Dane county is affirmed.