NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D15-2734 ) M.C., ) ) Appellee. ) )
Opinion filed February 10, 2017.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Ralph C. Stoddard, Judge.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Joanna Beth Conner, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.
LaROSE, Judge.
The State appeals the trial court's order granting a motion for judgment of
dismissal that was premised on the granting of a dispositive motion to suppress
statements. The State argues that M.C. was not in custody or interrogated when she
gave statements to a law enforcement officer. Thus, the State contends, the officer was not required to give M.C. Miranda warnings.1 We have jurisdiction, see Fla. R. App. P.
9.140(c)(1)(A), and reverse.
Facts
Officers Woehlk and Zeigler responded to an unrelated call at a group
home where M.C. lived. While there, they learned that M.C. was on juvenile probation
and out past her curfew. After leaving the group home, the officers drove down the
street in their marked police vehicle. A few houses down the street, they saw M.C. and
another girl sitting in the driveway. Officer Woehlk exited his vehicle, approached the
girls, and engaged them in conversation. He was a few feet away from M.C. and saw a
purse on the ground next to her. He spied contraband. His police report recounted that
he "clearly observed a small bag of marijuana inside the open purse." It is unclear if
M.C. knew that the officer spotted the contraband. Officer Woehlk asked M.C., "Whose
purse is this?" M.C. admitted that it was hers. According to Officer Woehlk, M.C. was
not free to leave after he spotted the contraband.
M.C. moved to suppress the evidence because she was subjected to
custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The trial court agreed
with M.C. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges of
possession of cannabis.
Standard of Review
"When reviewing a motion to suppress, the trial court's factual findings
must be affirmed if supported by competent, substantial evidence, while the trial court's
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -2- application of the law to those facts is reviewed de novo." State v. Kennon, 901 So. 2d
375, 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citation omitted).
Analysis
"Failure to provide the Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation
generally requires exclusion from trial of any post-custody statements given." State v.
McAdams, 193 So. 3d 824, 833 (Fla. 2016). To determine whether a person is in
custody, courts consider: "(1) the manner in which police have summoned the suspect
for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent to
which the suspect was confronted with evidence of guilt; and (4) whether the suspect
was informed of a right to leave the place of questioning." Hewitt v. State, 920 So. 2d
802, 804 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). "Although the four factors provide the structure of our
analysis, the ultimate inquiry is twofold: (1) the 'circumstances surrounding the
investigation;' and (2) 'given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt
he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.' " Ross v. State, 45
So. 3d 403, 415 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663
(2004)); see also Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 574 (Fla. 1999); Fowler v. State,
782 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("[T]he relevant inquiry for determining whether a
suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda is how a reasonable person in the
suspect's position would have understood their situation.").
The State argues that a reasonable person in M.C.'s position would not
believe she would be arrested. Because M.C. is a juvenile, however, the reasonable
person standard is how a juvenile in her position would view the situation. Ramirez, 739
So. 2d at 577; State v. S.L.W., 465 So. 2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 1985) (holding that totality
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogations "includes evaluation of the -3- juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence" (quoting Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979))).
When we examine our decision in Fowler, 782 So. 2d 461, it is clear why
we conclude that M.C. was not in custody. In Fowler, an officer stopped a car with a
broken tail light. The officer told Fowler why he had been stopped. When running
Fowler's driver's information, the officer learned that Fowler was suspected of selling
drugs. The officer returned to Fowler and directed him to step out. Two back-up
officers arrived. The officer told Fowler that he heard Fowler had been selling drugs at
the park and asked him if he had drugs on him. After Fowler responded, the officer
read him his Miranda warnings. As in this case, the officer stated that "Fowler was not
free to leave from the time the officer received information from the dispatcher." We
held that Fowler was subjected to custodial interrogation, and should have been given
Miranda warnings prior to questioning. Fowler, 782 So. 2d at 462.
Unlike Fowler, there is no evidence, here, suggesting that M.C. was in
custody when Officer Woehlk asked her about the purse. The officers did not activate
the lights or siren of their vehicle. They withdrew no weapons from their holsters. They
never issued any commands or directions to M.C. M.C. was sixteen years old and was
in foster care. She had prior experience with the juvenile justice system. Although
beyond her curfew, M.C. was merely sitting in the driveway with her friend. Officer
Woehlk walked up to the girls and began talking to them. He did not impede M.C.'s
ability to leave. Nor did he confront her with any evidence of guilt. He simply asked
about the purse on the ground. The fact that M.C. might be in violation of her probation
is of no moment when there was no evidence that she was confronted with that fact.
-4- In Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1188 (Fla. 1997), the supreme court
held that even though the "police had a warrant for Davis's arrest at the time he went to
the station," that fact does not conclusively establish that he was in custody. "Rather
there must exist a 'restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.' " Id. (quoting Roman v. State,
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D15-2734 ) M.C., ) ) Appellee. ) )
Opinion filed February 10, 2017.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Ralph C. Stoddard, Judge.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Joanna Beth Conner, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.
LaROSE, Judge.
The State appeals the trial court's order granting a motion for judgment of
dismissal that was premised on the granting of a dispositive motion to suppress
statements. The State argues that M.C. was not in custody or interrogated when she
gave statements to a law enforcement officer. Thus, the State contends, the officer was not required to give M.C. Miranda warnings.1 We have jurisdiction, see Fla. R. App. P.
9.140(c)(1)(A), and reverse.
Facts
Officers Woehlk and Zeigler responded to an unrelated call at a group
home where M.C. lived. While there, they learned that M.C. was on juvenile probation
and out past her curfew. After leaving the group home, the officers drove down the
street in their marked police vehicle. A few houses down the street, they saw M.C. and
another girl sitting in the driveway. Officer Woehlk exited his vehicle, approached the
girls, and engaged them in conversation. He was a few feet away from M.C. and saw a
purse on the ground next to her. He spied contraband. His police report recounted that
he "clearly observed a small bag of marijuana inside the open purse." It is unclear if
M.C. knew that the officer spotted the contraband. Officer Woehlk asked M.C., "Whose
purse is this?" M.C. admitted that it was hers. According to Officer Woehlk, M.C. was
not free to leave after he spotted the contraband.
M.C. moved to suppress the evidence because she was subjected to
custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The trial court agreed
with M.C. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges of
possession of cannabis.
Standard of Review
"When reviewing a motion to suppress, the trial court's factual findings
must be affirmed if supported by competent, substantial evidence, while the trial court's
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -2- application of the law to those facts is reviewed de novo." State v. Kennon, 901 So. 2d
375, 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citation omitted).
Analysis
"Failure to provide the Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation
generally requires exclusion from trial of any post-custody statements given." State v.
McAdams, 193 So. 3d 824, 833 (Fla. 2016). To determine whether a person is in
custody, courts consider: "(1) the manner in which police have summoned the suspect
for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent to
which the suspect was confronted with evidence of guilt; and (4) whether the suspect
was informed of a right to leave the place of questioning." Hewitt v. State, 920 So. 2d
802, 804 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). "Although the four factors provide the structure of our
analysis, the ultimate inquiry is twofold: (1) the 'circumstances surrounding the
investigation;' and (2) 'given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt
he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.' " Ross v. State, 45
So. 3d 403, 415 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663
(2004)); see also Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 574 (Fla. 1999); Fowler v. State,
782 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("[T]he relevant inquiry for determining whether a
suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda is how a reasonable person in the
suspect's position would have understood their situation.").
The State argues that a reasonable person in M.C.'s position would not
believe she would be arrested. Because M.C. is a juvenile, however, the reasonable
person standard is how a juvenile in her position would view the situation. Ramirez, 739
So. 2d at 577; State v. S.L.W., 465 So. 2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 1985) (holding that totality
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogations "includes evaluation of the -3- juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence" (quoting Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979))).
When we examine our decision in Fowler, 782 So. 2d 461, it is clear why
we conclude that M.C. was not in custody. In Fowler, an officer stopped a car with a
broken tail light. The officer told Fowler why he had been stopped. When running
Fowler's driver's information, the officer learned that Fowler was suspected of selling
drugs. The officer returned to Fowler and directed him to step out. Two back-up
officers arrived. The officer told Fowler that he heard Fowler had been selling drugs at
the park and asked him if he had drugs on him. After Fowler responded, the officer
read him his Miranda warnings. As in this case, the officer stated that "Fowler was not
free to leave from the time the officer received information from the dispatcher." We
held that Fowler was subjected to custodial interrogation, and should have been given
Miranda warnings prior to questioning. Fowler, 782 So. 2d at 462.
Unlike Fowler, there is no evidence, here, suggesting that M.C. was in
custody when Officer Woehlk asked her about the purse. The officers did not activate
the lights or siren of their vehicle. They withdrew no weapons from their holsters. They
never issued any commands or directions to M.C. M.C. was sixteen years old and was
in foster care. She had prior experience with the juvenile justice system. Although
beyond her curfew, M.C. was merely sitting in the driveway with her friend. Officer
Woehlk walked up to the girls and began talking to them. He did not impede M.C.'s
ability to leave. Nor did he confront her with any evidence of guilt. He simply asked
about the purse on the ground. The fact that M.C. might be in violation of her probation
is of no moment when there was no evidence that she was confronted with that fact.
-4- In Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1188 (Fla. 1997), the supreme court
held that even though the "police had a warrant for Davis's arrest at the time he went to
the station," that fact does not conclusively establish that he was in custody. "Rather
there must exist a 'restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.' " Id. (quoting Roman v. State, 475 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (Fla. 1985)).
Moreover, although Officer Woehlk testified that he did not believe M.C. was free to
leave, "[t]he proper inquiry is not the unarticulated plan of the police, but rather how a
reasonable person in [M.C.'s] position would have perceived the situation." See Davis
698 So. 2d at 1188. We are unable to conclude that a reasonable person in M.C.'s
position would not believe that she was free to leave.
Further, the State argues that even if M.C. was in custody, the officer was
not interrogating her, unlike the situation in Fowler. "Interrogation takes place . . . when
a person is subjected to express questions, or other words or actions, by a state agent
that a reasonable person would conclude are designed to lead to an incriminating
response." Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 n.17 (Fla. 1992). The officer simply
asked M.C. whose purse was on the ground. Such an innocuous inquiry, absent
evidence that M.C. realized the officer had seen the small bag of marijuana in the purse,
would not lead a reasonable person to conclude the officer intended to elicit an
incriminating response.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's order of dismissal and remand for further
proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
SILBERMAN and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur. -5-