[Cite as State v. Mayweather, 2025-Ohio-1665.]
COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. Andrew J. King, J. -vs-
JEREZ S. MAYWEATHER Case No. 2024 CA 00087
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 24 CR 233
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 8, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JENNY WELLS APRIL CAMPBELL Licking County Prosecuting Attorney Campbell Law, LLC 6059 Franz Road, Suite 206 KENNETH W. OSWALT Dublin, Ohio 43017 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 20 S. Second Street, 4th Floor Newark, Ohio 43055 Hoffman, J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant Jerez Mayweather appeals the judgment entered by
the Licking County Common Pleas Court convicting him following bench trial of
possession of cocaine (R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(e)) and trafficking in cocaine (R.C.
2925.03(A)(C)(4)(f)), and sentencing him to a term of eight to twelve years of
incarceration. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} In early 2024, Appellant had been under surveillance for several years by
the Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task Force for suspected drug trafficking activity. In
the weeks and months leading up to April of 2024, officers believed Appellant and his
girlfriend, Caitlyn Luckeydoo, were trafficking in narcotics. Officers suspected Appellant
of transporting drugs from Chicago, Illinois, to Newark, Ohio. On March 28, 2024, officers
recorded a phone call between Appellant and Michael Clark, in which they discussed
trafficking in crack cocaine. Police obtained a GPS warrant for Clark’s vehicle, which was
being driven by Appellant. The tracker was placed on the car on March 29, 2024. Officers
tracked the car traveling to and from Chicago.
{¶3} On April 8, 2024, officers observed Appellant and Luckeydoo traveling in
Clark’s vehicle in Licking County, Ohio. Appellant was observed making what appeared
to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction in an alley. Shortly thereafter, his vehicle was
stopped for making a turn without using a signal. Luckeydoo was in the passenger seat.
The police officer noticed Luckeydoo was moving around a lot while sitting in the car. The
officer called for backup, including a K-9 officer. The K-9 conducted an open-air drug
sniff and alerted on the car. Officers found a digital scale and a traffic citation from Indiana
inside the car. {¶4} Luckeydoo was detained in the backseat of a cruiser. An officer noticed her
adjusting something in her vaginal area. Luckeydoo was transported to the police station
where she was sent into a restroom with a female officer. Luckeydoo admitted to the
officer she had drugs in the front of her pants. Luckeydoo retrieved the drugs herself,
and handed the officer a plastic bag containing both powder and crack cocaine.
{¶5} Appellant was interviewed by police. Appellant admitted he knew about the
baggie of drugs which police found on Luckeydoo. Appellant asked the police to not
charge Luckeydoo because she was trying to get her kids back.
{¶6} Officers executed a search on an apartment shared by Appellant and
Luckeydoo. A small bag of cocaine was found in the pocket of a jacket hanging in a
closet. Appellant was interviewed again after execution of the search warrant. Appellant
asked how he could be charged with trafficking when he did not have drugs on him. When
asked who handed the drugs to Luckeydoo, Appellant responded, “I did, but she…okay,
I understand that.” State’s Exhibit 5E. When confronted with the fact he was selling drugs
to a man named “Tony,” who was the lessee of a residence where police believed
Appellant stored the drugs he transported, Appellant conceded the point.
{¶7} Appellant was indicted by the Licking County Grand Jury with possession
of cocaine and trafficking in cocaine, both first-degree felonies because the amount of
cocaine involved equaled or exceeded twenty-seven grams, but was less than one
hundred grams. The case proceeded to bench trial in the Licking County Common Pleas
Court.
{¶8} Appellant testified at trial. He denied knowledge of the drugs found on
Luckeydoo, claiming she was a drug addict, and the drugs belonged to her. He testified he attempted to take the blame in his interview with police because Luckeydoo was trying
to get her kids back. Appellant claimed he traveled to Chicago every three days to visit
his son.
{¶9} The trial court found Appellant guilty of both possession of cocaine and
trafficking in cocaine in an amount exceeding twenty-seven grams. The trial court found
the charges merged, and the State elected to have Appellant sentenced for trafficking in
cocaine. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eight to twelve years of incarceration. It
is from the September 18, 2024 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes his
appeal, assigning as error:
I. MAYWEATHER’S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS DENIED BY
THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO ALLOW THE STATE TO USE
OTHER ACTS EVIDENCE THAT MAYWEATHER WAS A MAJOR DRUG
TRAFFICKER FOR A THREE-YEAR PERIOD, IN VIOLATION OF EVID. R.
403, 404, AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED MAYWEATHER HIS RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL BY FINDING HIM GUILTY BEFORE HE PUT ON HIS CASE
IN CHIEF.
III. MAYWEATHER’S FIRST-DEGREE FELONY CONVICTIONS
WERE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, BECAUSE THE
STATE COULD NOT AGGREGATE THE WEIGHT OF DRUGS FOUND
FROM TWO DIFFERENT SEARCHES IN TWO DIFFERENT LOCATIONS. TO DO SO WOULD BE BOTH A STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION.
IV. THE EVIDENCE WEIGHED MANIFESTLY AGAINST
CONVICTING MAYWEATHER OF TRAFFICKING AND POSSESSING
FIRST-DEGREE FELONY QUANTITIES OF COCAINE.
I.
{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues admission of evidence of
his prior drug trafficking activity violated Evid. R. 404(B) and Evid. R. 403. He also argues
the admission of this evidence violated the Due Process Clause because he was tried for
crimes for which he was not indicted. We disagree.
{¶11} The trial court admitted evidence Appellant was the subject of a three-year
investigation by the Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task Force into the sale of narcotics
transported by Appellant from Chicago. The evidence demonstrated a traffic citation from
the State of Indiana was found in the vehicle. Evidence was admitted of a phone call on
March 8, 2024, in which Appellant admitted bringing drugs into Licking County for sale.
The State presented evidence a GPS tracker was placed on Appellant’s vehicle pursuant
to a warrant, and he was tracked traveling to and from Chicago. Appellant argues this
evidence was inadmissible other acts evidence.
{¶12} “A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility
of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the
rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271 (1991).
{¶13} Evid.R. 404(B) provides in pertinent part: (B) Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong or act is not
admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice. This evidence may be admissible for
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
{¶14} Evid.R. 403(A) provides, “Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of
confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
{¶15} “Evid.R. 404(B) categorically prohibits evidence of a defendant's other acts
when its only value is to show that the defendant has the character or propensity to
commit a crime.” State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-4441, ¶ 36. Other acts evidence may,
however, be admissible for another non-character-based purpose, such as “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Evid.R. 404(B)(2). “The key is that the evidence must prove something other
than the defendant's disposition to commit certain acts.” State v. Hartman, 2020-Ohio-
4440, ¶ 22.
{¶16} In State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-5695, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth a
three-part analysis for consideration of admissibility of other acts evidence: The first step is to consider whether the other acts evidence is
relevant to making any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Evid.R. 401. The next step is to consider whether evidence of the other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is presented to prove the character of the accused
in order to show activity in conformity therewith or whether the other acts
evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as those stated in
Evid.R. 404(B). The third step is to consider whether the probative value of
the other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. See Evid.R. 403.
{¶17} Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶18} The admissibility of other acts evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) is a
question of law. Hartman at ¶ 22. A trial court is precluded from admitting improper
character evidence under Evid.R. 404(B), but it has discretion to allow other acts evidence
which is admissible for a permissible purpose. Id., citing Williams at ¶ 17.
{¶19} At the outset, we note this was a bench trial. In a bench trial, the judge is
presumed to consider only the relevant, material and competent evidence in arriving at a
judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively appears from the record. State v. Simon,
2021-Ohio-2738, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.). This presumption is present even if the evidence at
issue was improperly admitted. State v. White, 15 Ohio St. 2d 146, 151 (1968). As
applied to other acts evidence, in a bench trial the judge is presumed to use the evidence
for its proper limited purposes. State v. Baldwin, 2024-Ohio-2397, ¶ 36 (12th Dist.). {¶20} Appellant incorrectly asserts the trial court permitted the State to introduce
evidence regarding three years of drug trafficking activity by Appellant. To the contrary,
when a State’s witnessed noted Appellant was part of a multi-year investigation, the trial
court allowed the testimony in general, but specifically stated, “I’m not sure you can get
back three years’ worth of stuff.” Tr. 54. Therefore, while the trial court generally admitted
evidence police had been investigating Appellant for three years, the trial court did not
admit detailed evidence of three years of suspected drug trafficking activity.
{¶21} We find evidence of Appellant’s drug trafficking activity prior to April 8, 2024
was admissible for a permitted purpose under Evidence R. 404(B). First, to the extent
general information regarding the investigation was admitted, it explained the conduct of
the officers in the instant case, specifically why Appellant was under surveillance on the
date in question, why a K-9 officer was called to the scene, and why Luckeydoo’s behavior
was under close observation.
{¶22} Further, the State was required to prove the following elements of drug
trafficking:
(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
(2) Prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for
distribution, or distribute a controlled substance or a controlled substance
analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that
the controlled substance or a controlled substance analog is intended for
sale or resale by the offender or another person. {¶23} R.C. 2925.03(A)(2).
{¶24} In the instant case, the drugs were found on Luckeydoo. Evidence
Appellant was involved in transporting drugs from Chicago to Newark for resale, and
evidence he was therefore aware the drugs in Luckeydoo’s possession were intended for
resale, was directly relevant to prove his intent, knowledge, or plan to engage in drug
trafficking, and not merely drug possession. In addition, we find the evidence was not
inadmissible under Evid.R. 403, particularly in light of the presumption in a bench trial,
the trial court considers the evidence only for a permissible purpose. We find the trial
court did not err in admitting evidence of Appellant’s prior involvement in drug activity.
{¶25} Finally, Appellant argues the admission of other acts evidence resulted in
him standing trial for unindicted offenses, in violation of Due Process. We disagree. The
evidence was merely supportive of the indicted offenses of trafficking in cocaine and
possession of cocaine, and did not constitute trial and conviction for unindicted crimes.
{¶26} The first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶27} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues because trial court
found him guilty prior to his presentation of his case, he was not tried by an impartial trier-
of-fact. We disagree.
{¶28} A criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a
defendant due process of law. State v. LaMar, 2002-Ohio-2128, ¶ 34. Judicial bias has
been described by the Ohio Supreme Court as “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue
friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a
fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.” State ex rel. Pratt v.
Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, paragraph four of the syllabus (1956). A judge is presumed
to follow the law and not to be biased, and therefore the appearance of bias or prejudice
must be compelling to overcome these presumptions.” In re Disqualification of George,
2003-Ohio-5489, ¶ 5.
{¶29} At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Appellant moved for a
directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to Crim. R. 29. After the parties argued the motion,
the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: All right. I agree. I –uh—find the State has met its
burden here, proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to both charges.
Uh—my calculation of these weights has it at over 27 grams. Uh – so, I’ll
enter guilty findings in count 1, Possession of Cocaine
MR. DEPUE: Your Honor, that –
MR. WOLFE: That was just the Rule 29, Your Honor
MR DEPUE: Yes.
THE COURT: Oh, I’m sorry. Correct. Rule 29 is overruled.
{¶30} Tr. 90-91.
{¶31} At this point in the trial, counsel called Appellant to the stand to testify, and
the trial proceeded.
{¶32} In State v. Wieser, 2018-Ohio-3619 (3rd Dist.), the trial court found the
defendant guilty following consideration of a Crim. R. 29 motion for directed verdict of acquittal. After the trial court was reminded a guilty verdict was premature, the court
apologized. On appeal, Wieser argued she was not tried by an unbiased tribunal. The
Court of Appeals rejected Wieser’s argument, finding the trial court apologized for its
error, clarified it was denying the Crim. R. 29 motion, and permitted the defense to present
its evidence, although Wieser elected not to present evidence. Id. at ¶ 24. Further, the
court noted Weiser did not request a mistrial or object to proceeding with the trial on the
basis the trial court was biased because of the premature finding of guilt. Id.
{¶33} While the instant case is distinguishable from Wieser in that Appellant
presented evidence after the trial court’s premature finding of guilty, we find this distinction
to be legally insignificant. It is apparent from the record the trial court’s mistake was
merely a slip of the tongue. The trial court immediately apologized, corrected its error,
and allowed Appellant to present his evidence. Appellant did not object or move for a
mistrial. We find the record does not demonstrate Appellant was tried by a biased
tribunal.
{¶34} The second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶35} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the State presented
insufficient evidence to support his convictions because the State could not aggregate
the weight of the drugs found from two different searches in two different locations. He
argues he could not have simultaneous constructive possession over drugs found in two
different locations, and further the evidence does not support a finding the drugs
exceeded a weight of twenty-seven grams because the State was not permitted to
aggregate the weight of the drugs. We disagree. {¶36} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, paragraph two of
the syllabus (1991).
{¶37} Appellant’s argument relies for its validity on the premise the drugs found
on Luckeydoo following the traffic stop were aggregated with the drugs found in the pocket
of a jacket during the search of his apartment to reach the threshold of twenty-seven
grams necessary to sustain a conviction of a first-degree felony offense of possession
and/or trafficking in drugs. While an officer testified he believed the charges were based
on the aggregate weight of drugs found on Luckeydoo’s person and the drugs found in
the apartment, the record demonstrates the State presented sufficient evidence of the
weight of the drugs based solely on the drugs seized following the traffic stop.
{¶38} State’s Exhibit 11, the lab report from testing of the two types of cocaine
(powder and crack) found on Luckeydoo after the traffic stop, demonstrates Luckeydoo
was carrying 27.1169 grams of cocaine on her person at the time of the traffic stop. In
finding Appellant guilty, the trial court stated it believed the drugs found in the jacket
pocket could be applied; however, the court noted the amount found in the traffic stop
alone met the threshold of twenty-seven grams based on State’s Exhibit 11. Tr. 111-112.
Because the amount of cocaine seized from the traffic stop was sufficient to meet the
threshold weight of twenty-seven grams, we need not reach the issue of whether the State
could legally aggregate the drugs found in both locations into a single charge, and we need not reach the issue of whether Appellant could simultaneously constructively
possess drugs in both locations.
{¶39} Further, to the extent Appellant argues the State failed to prove he
constructively possessed the drugs found on Luckeydoo’s person, we disagree. To
establish constructive possession, the evidence must prove the defendant was able to
exercise dominion and control over the contraband. State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316,
348 N.E.2d 351 (1976). Appellant admitted to police he gave the drugs to Luckeydoo.
This was sufficient evidence to demonstrate he had constructive possession of the drugs
found on Luckeydoo after the traffic stop in which she was the passenger in a car driven
by Appellant.
{¶40} The third assignment of error is overruled.
IV.
{¶41} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues the judgment is against
the manifest weight of the evidence because there was no evidence by which the trial
court could determine Appellant exercised dominion and control over drugs found at two
different times in two different locations. We disagree.
{¶42} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and “in reviewing the entire record,
weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses,
and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury ‘clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App. 3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). {¶43} As discussed in Appellant’s third assignment of error, the trial court
specifically found State’s Exhibit 11, the lab report containing the test results of the two
types of cocaine taken from Luckeydoo following the traffic stop, was sufficient to
establish the threshold weight of twenty-seven grams. We find the trial court did not lose
its way in finding Appellant possessed and trafficked in twenty-seven grams or more of
cocaine based solely on the drugs seized from the traffic stop, and the judgment is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶44} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶45} The judgment of the Licking County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, J. Baldwin, P.J. and King, J. concur