State v. Mayor of Jersey City

24 N.J.L. 662
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 15, 1855
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 24 N.J.L. 662 (State v. Mayor of Jersey City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Mayor of Jersey City, 24 N.J.L. 662 (N.J. 1855).

Opinion

Elmer, J.

This certiorari brings up the proceedings of the mayor and common council of Jersey City, in assessing upon the real estate of the prosecutor, a portion of the expenses alleged to have been incurred is filling up Bright street from Grove to Jersey streets in said city, pursuant to the power given by the charter in Title VI., SS. 52 to 62, Acts of 1851, p. 414. The ordinance, which appears to have been regularly introduced and passed, is: “ That Bright street, from Grove to Jersey streets, be regulated, filled to the established grade, and the south side, between Barrow and Jersey streets, be flagged four feet wide, and bridge stone cross walks laid across Barrow street.”

It is now objected, on behalf of the prosecutor, that the ordinance itself is illegal and void. First, it is insisted that the charter gives no power to the council to fill up a street. In my opinion, this power is given in express terms. The powers of the council, in section forty-two, paragraph, six, are declared to be, to make and lay out streets, and regulate and govern the leveling, pitching, and constructing them; and in section fifty-two, it is declared that the expense for improvements in opening, altering, widening, filling up, <&e., streets, shall be assessed upon and paid by the lands and real estate benefited by the same.

Another objection to the ordinance is that it is too vague and indefinite. But this objection does not seem to me to be well taken. It does not specify when or how the street was to be filled up, but that was not necessary. The charter prescribes the mode of proceeding, and it was not until the -work was done that the property could be assessed to defray the expense. The street is sufficiently described, and the [664]*664points between which the filling up was to be done; and the height of filling required is specified, by reference to a grade before established, and well known. The property to be assessed was not required to be specified; that was to be ascertained by subsequent proceedings, in the manner prescribed by the charter.

Again it is objected to the ordinance that it does not appear that the consent of the owners of a majority of the lots to be assessed, was first obtained, and that without such consent, the ordinance to pa.ve or flag a part of the street was not valid. But the assessment brought up in this case was not for the expense of paving or flagging, no part of the property assessed being benefited by that, but for the expense of filling, as to which no consent was necessary. It is no objection to that part of the ordinance which was duly passed, that another part of it, in no wise affecting the property assessed, may have been invalid. I am, therefore, of opinion that the ordinance itself, so far as it affects the assessment in question, is in accordance with the charter, and must be sustained.

Several objections are made to the proceedings subsequent to the making of the ordinance, which 1 shall proceed to consider. First, it is insisted that the commissioners were not duly sworn. The charter prescribes that they shall take an oath, faithfully, honestly, and impartially to perform the duties required of them. The oath actually subscribed and taken by each of them, is: that I will faithfully, honestly, and impartially perform the duties required of me as commissioner of assessments, to assess the expenses of filling Bright street, between Grove street and Jersey avenue. And the objection is that the latter part of it limits the oath to the special duty of assessing the expenses, to the exclusion of the duty of making a proper report and map. It is obvious, however, that the words objected to are a mere description of the commissioner, which it was necessary to embrace in some part of-the oath. Tie was a commissioner to assess the expenses of filling Bright street, and of nothing; else. All his duties appertaining to that office are performed ir. making [665]*665the assessment. This case differs entirely from that of a surveyor, sworn as the surveyor of a particular township, which was hold to be a fatal variance on the ground that although elected, by that township, he was legally a surveyor of the whole county. 1 Green, 10.

Secondly, it is objected to the assessment, that the prosecutor’s sixteen lots are assessed in gross, and not separately. The words of the charter are that the commissioners shall determine what proportion of the expenses shall be assessed to each separate parcel or lot of land. It appears by the map, which is by law a part of the return, that those lots are all of similar dimensions, fronting on Bright street, and all adjoining, so as to make one “separate parcel.” They are therefore legally so assessed.

The third and fourth objections to the assessment, which I shall consider together, are that the commissioners did not in fact examine and determine the expenses incurred, and what proportion thereof should be assessed to each separate parcel or lot; and that no notice of their meeting to make such assessment was given to the owners. This court held in the case of The State v. Coleman, 1 Green, 98, that where commissioners were appointed to run, survey, m.ark, and ascertain a county line, it was necessary they should all be present and inspect the performance of the work, and exercise their collective judgment, and that .one could not act alone. The principle of that case is applicable to this. The commissioners are expressly required to examine into the whole matter and determine and report. The judgment to be reported must be their own judgment, founded on facts obvious to their senses, or ascertained by inquiry and examination. Although not authorized to call witnesses before them and examine them upon oath, it was clearly their duty, like the surveyors or freeholders who assess the damages an owner has sustained by laying out a road through his land, to examine the premises and the work actually performed, and to avail themselves of every accessible means of information calculated to aid them in making up their joint determination. They are to ascertain the actual expense in[666]*666curred, and not merely what the city may have paid. It is obviously proper that they should hear the parties interested; and I think such parties, if accessible by reasonable diligence, are entitled to. notice of the time and place of their meeting to fulfil their duties. This is not in terms required by the act, but it is a general principle of law, of too much importance to be overlooked, that no person shall be bound by proceedings of a judicial nature, affecting Ms person or property, without having an opportunity of being heard. 15 Wend. R. 375; Young v. Overseers of Hardiston, 2 Green 520; N. J. Turnpike Co. v. Hall, 2 Harr. 337; State v. Freeholders of Hudson, in Error, 4 Zab. Where the statute provides for a notice by advertisement or otherwise, such a, notice is sufficient. The charter in this ease requires that the proposition to make the improvements shall be advertised, so that parties interested may, if they desire, be heard on that question, before the council or their appropriate committee, and such an advertisement is due notice to a11 persons of the proceedings to pass the ordinance. But the assessment of the real estate for the expenses incurred, is a different matter, in regard to which no advertisement or other mode of notice is prescribed, so that the general rule of law requiring reasonable notice, must be applied.

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Bluebook (online)
24 N.J.L. 662, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-mayor-of-jersey-city-nj-1855.