State v. Mayor of Hudson

29 N.J.L. 104
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedNovember 15, 1860
StatusPublished

This text of 29 N.J.L. 104 (State v. Mayor of Hudson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Mayor of Hudson, 29 N.J.L. 104 (N.J. 1860).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Ogden, J.

Upon the return of the writs in these cases, which purported to bring before the court the proceedings and copies of all papers in the possession of defendants touching the matters in controversy, two classes of objections were argued by council, which it was insisted, in behalf of the prosecutors, are fatal to the assessments — one, involving the proceedings anterior to those which particularly regard the assessments, the other directed against the legality of the assessments themselves.

Upon a careful examination of the points which were made against the validity of the ordinances respecting the regulation and grading of Palisade avenue, the ñrst approved the 16th of November, 1855, the second approved [106]*106the 20ih of December, 1855, the third approved the 10th of March, 1856, the fourth approved on the 1st of May, 1856, and the fifth approved on the 18th of July, 1856, I am of the opinion that the attention of property holders interested in the improvement of the avenue, from the Paterson plank road intersection to the northerly side of the Newark avenue, were sufficiently called to the subject by legal advertisement of the propositions for regulating, &c., the different sections or parts of the avenue which are embraced within the line of the assessment, to enable those who were disposed to object to be duly heard before an appropriate committee, appointed by the mayor and common council of the city. The committee met from time to time at the places designated in the several notices, and no person appearing before them to make objections, ordinances were passed for the improvement of the respective sections to which the several petitions applied.

The work had not been commenced on the 17th of July, 1856, and at a regular meeting of the common council, held on that day, they passed one general ordinance “ to provide for the regulation of the whole avenue” between the limits which were fixed in the proceedings upon the several petitions, and thereby repealed the ordinances which had been passed concerning the regulating, grading, &c., of the different parts thereof. There does not appear to have been.a petition covering the whole line, nor any fifth notice or advertisement published before the said ordinance was passed.

The object of an advertisement was the giving of information that an improvement was asked for which would affect the interests of the owners of real estate that would be benefited by the same, so that they would appear before the council, or its committee, and make objections or suggestions. It would be an unfair interpretation of the intent of the legislature, as indicated in the 42d seel ion of the charter, to say that the petitioners for [107]*107improvements, in opening and in grading and paving streets, can confine the common council to the particular manner of improvement which they may choose to ask for. If such is a fair construction of the section, and several combinations of property holders should present to the council their separate applications for the improvement of a street from one given point to another, but each naming a particular and distinct mode of improvement, the common council could not act, because they could not adopt each plan, and thus all improvement could ho prevented.

The proposition should be for some class or classes of improvement, which must be advertised; but. the mode in which the improvement shall be made, and its extent, should be left to the discretion of the common council; therefore the fact that some of the petitions asked for plank sidewalks of a given width and description, and others did not, cannot invalidate the last general ordinance, which provides for the laying of sidewalks on both sides of the avenue. The right of the common council to alter the grade for the avenue, as established by supervisors under the former charter, was discussed under this branch of objection ; but I do not think that the ordinance, which repealed the former grade, and adopted one made by Mr. Hexamer, should be brought in question in a collateral manner. It was not introduced nor passed at any of the meetings of the board when the question of the improvements was acted on, and is not necessarily involved in the determination of the validity of those ordinances. No grade is referred to in the petitions; and if the substitution of a new grade for the old one tended materially to affect the rights of the property holders on the avenue, they should have questioned that ordinance in a legal manner before the sum of over $22,000 had been expended by the public authorities in improving the avenue in conformity with that grade. Knowing, as they were bound to know, that all the expenses for the im[108]*108provements • were required by the charter to be assessed upon and paid by the owners of the lands and real estate to be benefited by the same, in proportion to the benefit received, it would be a fraud upon the public authorities, and through them upon the tax-payers of the city, if after an improvement had been made at a great expense upon a particular grade, without objection from or suggestion made by any of the parties to be benefited, that those upon whom the charter fixes t.he payment of the costs of such improvement could throw off their liability, and make the expenses thereof a- public burthen. If they were dissatisfied with the change of the grade, they should have had the ordinance which effected it brought up for review before it became too late for the authorities to correct any mistake which they may have. made in their proceedings. Some seventeen months elapsed between the time of the passage of that resolution or ordinance and the meeting, when the street committee reported to the common - council that the improvements upon the avenue were completed and were accepted by them, and two years elapsed’ before the allowance of these certioraris were applied for. I am clearly of- opinion that the parties acquiesced in the alterations too long to be permitted -to impeach the ordinance in ■ a collateral manner. Such a practice would unsettle all proceedings of municipal authorities, and would involve their acts in inextricable difficulties and embarrassments.

Under the seeond class of objections, several matters were urged as invalidating the assessments, which I will consider seriatim, because the view’s of the court upon each that is ' tenable may be of value to the parties in their Subsequent action:

First. Were the commissioners of assessment appointed in conformity with the charter ?

It is provided, in the-42d section of the charter, “that the expenses of such improvements, when completed, shall be ascertained and’- assessed by three impartial com[109]*109missioners, not interested therein, who shall be appointed by the common council from the residents of the city.” It appears, from the returns in these cases, that on the first day of July, 1857, the common council passed “An ordinance to establish a board of commissioners of assessments,” who should act in all eases of assessments; and that, on the 1st of October, 1857, the mayor nominated, and the council elected, John G. Ackerman, Jacob Newkirk, and Adolph W. Martin such commissioners.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
29 N.J.L. 104, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-mayor-of-hudson-nj-1860.