State v. Mayfield

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: DA 24-0478
• Status: Published
• Author: Bidegaray

Opinion

06/02/2026

DA 24-0478 Case Number: DA 24-0478

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2026 MT 120

CITY OF HELENA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

MATTHEW GORDON MAYFIELD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. ADC-2024-73 Honorable Mike Menahan, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Tammy A. Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator, Dimitrios Tsolakidis, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Thad Tudor, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Rebecca Dockter, Helena City Attorney, Helena, Montana

For Amici Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression and American Civil Liberties Union of Montana:

Alex Rate, American Civil Liberties Union of Montana, Missoula, Montana

Jeffrey M. Murphy, Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Submitted on Briefs: April 22, 2026 Decided: June 2, 2026

Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Matthew Mayfield appeals from the Order of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis

and Clark County, which affirmed his misdemeanor conviction of DUI per se from

municipal court for operating a noncommercial vehicle with an alcohol concentration of

.08 or more under § 61-8-1002(1)(b), MCA. We reverse and remand with instructions to

dismiss the charge with prejudice under § 46-13-401(2), MCA.

¶2 On appeal, we address the following issue:

Whether the City demonstrated good cause under § 46-13-401(2), MCA, for the City-requested continuances that delayed Mayfield’s misdemeanor trial beyond the six-month statutory deadline.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 On April 22, 2023, around 2:00 a.m., Matthew Mayfield (Mayfield) stopped for gas

at the Friendly’s Gas Station in Helena, Montana. Nearby, Officer Jordan Seder (Officer

Seder) and Officer Jacob Hamilton (Officer Hamilton) of the Helena Police Department

were conducting a DUI investigation of an unrelated motorist Brandon Morgan (Morgan).

Mayfield stood approximately thirty to forty feet away and observed the scene as Morgan

performed a horizontal gaze (HGN) test.

¶4 As the investigation progressed, Morgan began questioning Officer Seder about the

results of the eye test and refused to perform an additional “walking test.” Mayfield,

observing from a distance, signaled to Morgan by making a slashing movement across his

throat with his hand. Mayfield then approached the investigation and shouted, “This test

needs to come to an end.”

2 ¶5 Officer Seder warned Mayfield that he would be obstructing if he continued to

interfere. Mayfield allegedly responded to the officers by telling them to “get fucked” and

calling Officer Seder a “piece of shit.” Mayfield also implored Morgan to stop responding

to the Officers’ questions.

¶6 While Officer Seder continued his investigation of Morgan, Officer Hamilton, the

cover officer, engaged Mayfield. The two walked toward Mayfield’s car and engaged in a

conversation that lasted approximately seven to eight minutes.

¶7 Following the interaction, Officer Hamilton and Officer Seder agreed to arrest

Mayfield for obstructing a peace officer. Mayfield continued to use vulgar language

towards the Officers.

¶8 After Mayfield was handcuffed and placed in a squad car, Corporal Mark Baker

arrived and suggested initiating a DUI investigation against Mayfield. Officer Hamilton

initially stated he did not smell alcohol on Mayfield, despite being in close proximity. Later

however, Officer Hamilton claimed he smelled a strong odor of alcohol once he was inside

the police vehicle with Mayfield.

¶9 The next morning, Hamilton obtained a search warrant for Mayfield’s blood which

showed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .114.

¶10 On April 24, 2023, Mayfield entered a plea of not guilty to obstructing a peace

officer and DUI. At an omnibus hearing on May 24, 2023, Mayfield requested a jury trial.

On May 26, 2023, Mayfield filed his first motion to suppress and dismiss, arguing the

initial arrest for obstructing was unlawful. On June 1, 2023, the court issued a notice that

the jury trial was set for August 3, 2023. On June 20, 2023, following a June 8, 2023

3 hearing, the Municipal Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law denying

Mayfield’s motion to suppress, finding that probable cause had been established. On

July 6, 2023, Mayfield moved to suppress DUI evidence on the grounds that the initial

arrest lacked probable cause which the court again denied on July 18, 2023.

¶11 The speedy-trial chronology controls this appeal. On July 20, 2023, the City

requested its first continuance of the August 3 trial date because “the City’s toxicologist

will not be available as she is scheduled to be in another trial and has an additional conflict

on the afternoon of the trial date.” The City, in its motion, expressly recognized that the

speedy-trial deadline was October 21, 2023. Mayfield did not object, and the Municipal

Court reset trial for September 14, 2023.

¶12 On September 1, 2023, the City notified Mayfield that it would again seek a

continuance because the toxicologist was unavailable. That same day, Mayfield filed

an objection, noting that the trial already had been continued once for that reason.

Mayfield also filed a motion in limine, challenging the timeliness of the blood draw. On

September 7, 2023, the City filed its second motion to continue, stating that “the City’s

toxicologist is unavailable” and noting it provided Mayfield the blood toxicology results

in May 2023, but Mayfield raised no objection until he filed his motion in limine, two

weeks before the trial. The City did not explain why the toxicologist was unavailable for

the second trial setting. The Municipal Court reset trial for November 9, 2023.

¶13 On September 15, 2023, Mayfield filed a motion to schedule a hearing on his motion

in limine and two new motions to suppress evidence—one to suppress evidence obtained

4 pursuant to an improper search warrant and the other to suppress evidence for lack of

particularized suspicion. That same day, the court reset the jury trial for November 9, 2023.

¶14 On October 19, 24, and 26, the court issued orders denying Mayfield’s newest

motions to suppress and his motion in limine. On October 26, 2023, the City became aware

of a scheduling conflict with the phlebotomist who drew Mayfield’s blood on the date of

the incident. The City asked Mayfield to stipulate to the foundational witness, but Mayfield

declined. On October 27, 2023, the City filed its third motion to continue because “the

City’s foundational witness for the chain of custody of the blood sample is out of state and

unavailable to testify.” The City did not identify the witness, explain why the witness was

out of state, state when the witness would return, or describe any effort to secure the

witness’s attendance. Mayfield objected because he wished to proceed to trial. The

Municipal Court granted the motion and reset trial for January 9, 2024.

¶15 On November 22, 2023, with the new trial date eighty days past the statutory speedy

trial deadline, Mayfield moved to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial under

§ 46-13-401(2), MCA. The Municipal Court denied the motion on December 21, 2023,

attributing some delay to Mayfield’s motions practice and finding good cause based on

witness unavailability.

¶16 On January 9, 2024, the City dismissed the obstructing charge and tried Mayfield

on the DUI counts. The jury convicted Mayfield of DUI per se under § 61-8-1002(1)(b),

MCA. The District Court affirmed. On speedy trial, the District Court correctly concluded

that Mayfield’s motion practice did not cause the second continuance because “the City

moved to continue the trial three times based on unavailability of its witnesses.” The

5 District Court nevertheless held that the City showed good cause for each continuance.

Mayfield appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶17 On appeal from a municipal court, the district court functions as an intermediate

appellate court. City of Bozeman v. Cantu, 2013 MT 40, ¶ 10, 369 Mont. 81, 296 P.3d 461.

When the district court is subsequently appealed, we review the case as if the appeal had

originally been filed in this Court and apply the appropriate standard of review. Cantu,

¶ 10.

¶18 Whether the statutory misdemeanor speedy-trial right under § 46-13-401(2), MCA,

has been violated presents a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Wolverine,

2024 MT 31, ¶ 14, 415 Mont. 201, 543 P.3d 597; City of Red Lodge v. Pepper, 2016 MT

317, ¶ 12, 385 Mont. 465, 385 P.3d 547. We review any underlying factual findings for

clear error. Pepper, ¶ 12. A finding is clearly erroneous if substantial evidence does not

support it, if the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if our review leaves

us with a definite and firm conviction that the court made a mistake. City of Helena v.

Roan, 2010 MT 29, ¶ 7, 355 Mont. 172, 226 P.3d 601.

¶19 Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, which supplies the governing standard, provides:

After the entry of a plea upon a misdemeanor charge, the court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the prosecution to be dismissed, with prejudice, if a defendant whose trial has not been postponed upon the defendant’s motion is not brought to trial within 6 months.

Thus, a misdemeanor charge must be dismissed with prejudice when the defendant was not

brought to trial within six months after entering a plea, unless the trial was postponed on

6 the defendant’s motion or the State shows good cause for the delay. Section 46-13-401(2),

MCA; Pepper, ¶ 14; State v. Ronningen, 213 Mont. 358, 360, 691 P.2d 1348, 1349 (1984).

The State bears the burden to show good cause. Wolverine, ¶ 18; City of Helena v.

Broadwater, 2014 MT 185, ¶ 19, 375 Mont. 450, 329 P.3d 589. Good cause means a

legally sufficient reason for the delay under the totality of the facts and circumstances of

the case. Wolverine, ¶ 17; Roan, ¶ 13.

DISCUSSION

¶20 Whether the City demonstrated good cause under § 46-13-401(2), MCA, for the City-requested continuances that delayed Mayfield’s misdemeanor trial beyond the six-month statutory deadline.

¶21 Under § 46-13-401(2), MCA, a misdemeanor charge must be dismissed with

prejudice if the defendant was not brought to trial within six months, unless the trial was

postponed on the defendant’s motion or the State shows “good cause.” Pepper, ¶ 14. It is

undisputed that Mayfield did not move to postpone his trial and that the City requested all

three continuances. The District Court agreed, stating that it was “indisputable” that the

City moved to continue trial three times based on witness unavailability. The question,

then, is whether the City carried its burden to demonstrate good cause for the City-caused

delay that carried the trial beyond the six-month deadline. We conclude it did not.

¶22 We have repeatedly found witness unavailability can constitute good cause. See

Pepper, ¶ 17; State v. Krenning, 2016 MT 202, ¶ 12, 384 Mont. 352, 383 P.3d 721; Roan,

¶ 14. However, witness unavailability does not establish good cause automatically. The

State must provide enough record-supported information to allow the trial court to

determine whether the witness’s absence supplies a legally sufficient reason for delay

7 under the totality of the circumstances. Wolverine, ¶¶ 17-18, 25-26; Broadwater, ¶ 19. We

find that a conclusory assertion that a witness is “unavailable,” without more, does not

satisfy that burden.

¶23 We need not decide whether the first continuance, standing alone, satisfied good

cause. In its first motion, the City stated that the toxicologist was scheduled to be in another

trial and had an additional conflict on the afternoon of the August 3 trial date. Mayfield

did not object. That showing had more substance than the City’s later motions, though it

still provided limited detail. Assuming without deciding that the first continuance was

supported by good cause, the City still had to justify the later City-requested continuances

that moved Mayfield’s trial beyond the six-month deadline.

¶24 The second continuance is dispositive. The Municipal Court attributed the delay

associated with the November 9 trial setting to Mayfield’s untimely motion practice. The

record does not support that attribution. The City notified Mayfield on September 1, 2023,

that it intended to seek a continuance because the toxicologist was unavailable. The City

then moved on September 7, 2023, to continue the September 14 trial because “the City’s

toxicologist is unavailable.” Mayfield did not file the later untimely suppression motion

until September 15, 2023. The City therefore sought the second continuance before the

filing that the Municipal Court later identified as the cause of delay. Mayfield’s later

motion did not cause the City’s September 7 request or the resulting trial reset.

¶25 Furthermore, the City’s second motion for continuance stated only that the

toxicologist was “unavailable.” It did not explain why the toxicologist was unavailable,

whether the conflict was unavoidable, when the toxicologist would be available, whether

8 the City had attempted to secure an alternative trial date within the statutory period, or what

other steps the City took to protect Mayfield’s speedy-trial right. A bare assertion of

unavailability does not give the trial court a record from which to make a meaningful

good-cause determination. Wolverine, ¶¶ 25-26; Broadwater, ¶ 19.

¶26 The third continuance presents a closer question. The City’s October 27 motion

stated only that “the City’s foundational witness for the chain of custody of the blood

sample is out of state and unavailable to testify.” The motion did not identify the witness,

state why the witness was out of state, explain why the witness could not testify, state when

the witness would return, or describe what steps the City took to avoid another continuance.

Standing alone, that motion suffered from the same lack of specificity as the second

continuance.

¶27 The City later explained that the witness was out of state for training and that

Mayfield declined to stipulate to the foundational testimony. We need not decide whether

that later explanation, if properly considered, would have established good cause for the

third continuance. Even assuming the City showed good cause for the third continuance,

that explanation does not cure the second continuance. The second continuance already

moved the trial beyond the October 21, 2023 statutory deadline, and the City supported

that continuance only with the unexplained assertion that the toxicologist was

“unavailable.” Likewise, Mayfield’s refusal to stipulate does not provide good cause for

the earlier delay. A defendant has no obligation to stipulate to adverse foundational

testimony to preserve the statutory right to a speedy misdemeanor trial.

9 ¶28 The City’s stipulation effort may bear on its diligence as to the third continuance,

but it does not explain the toxicologist’s second unexplained unavailability and cannot

supply good cause for all City-caused delay beyond the statutory deadline. Wolverine

and Broadwater control the level of specificity required to establish good cause for a

continuance, establishing that vague, formulaic reasons and boilerplate excuses cannot

establish good cause. In Wolverine, the State sought a continuance because the defendant

was “in federal custody.” Wolverine, ¶ 6. We held that explanation insufficient because

the State did not identify the jurisdiction holding the defendant, when she would be

released, or what the State had done to secure her presence. Wolverine, ¶¶ 25-26. In

Broadwater, we rejected a “crowded docket” explanation because the City presented no

evidence of steps it took to ensure a timely trial and because accepting such a generalized

reason would allow the exception to swallow the statutory rule. Broadwater, ¶¶ 18-19.

¶29 The same principle applies here. At least as to the second continuance, “the City’s

toxicologist is unavailable” was a conclusion, not a legally sufficient explanation.

The statement left the court to presume good cause rather than determine it. Section

46-13-401(2), MCA, requires the State to show good cause; it does not require the

defendant to disprove it. Wolverine, ¶ 18; Broadwater, ¶ 19.

¶30 The City’s contrary authorities do not support affirmance. In Roan, the record

showed that the witness was undergoing a difficult pregnancy, which clearly established

good cause under the circumstances. Roan, ¶ 14. In Pepper, the City explained that a

witness had moved to Arizona and that it needed additional time to purchase an airline

ticket. Pepper, ¶¶ 8-9, 17. In Krenning, the State explained that the arresting officer was

10 on paid administrative leave because of an internal investigation into his off-duty conduct.

Krenning, ¶¶ 4, 12-13. In State v. Knippel, 2018 MT 144, ¶¶ 14-18, 391 Mont. 495,

419 P.3d 1229, the record showed that the victim had moved to Colorado, refused to testify

in person, and required a deposition procedure. In State v. Johnson, 2000 MT 180, ¶¶ 9, 20,

300 Mont. 367, 4 P.3d 654, the State identified why its witnesses were unavailable and

when they would return.

¶31 Those cases share a common feature missing here: the prosecution gave the trial

court a concrete explanation for the witness’s absence. Here, the City did not do that for

the second continuance. Because the second continuance independently moved trial

beyond the statutory deadline without an adequate good-cause showing, we need not decide

whether the City’s later explanation would have justified the third continuance. The City’s

generalized witness-unavailability assertions in its second motion to continue resemble

Wolverine and Broadwater more than Roan, Pepper, Krenning, Knippel, or Johnson.

¶32 The City also argues Mayfield waived his specificity challenge because he did not

demand a fuller explanation when he objected to the continuances. We disagree. Mayfield

moved to dismiss under § 46-13-401(2), MCA, and argued that the City had not shown

good cause for delaying trial beyond six months. That motion preserved the issue. More

fundamentally, § 46-13-401(2), MCA, places the burden on the State to show good cause.

Wolverine, ¶ 18; Broadwater, ¶ 19. The defendant need not identify every missing fact in

the State’s continuance motion before invoking the statute’s mandatory remedy.

¶33 The District Court’s totality-of-the-circumstances rationale swept too broadly.

Witness necessity matters, but necessity alone does not explain absence. The City’s

11 stipulation effort may bear on its diligence as to the third continuance, but it does not justify

the second continuance. Because the City failed to show good cause for all City-caused

delay beyond the six-month deadline, § 46-13-401(2), MCA, required dismissal with

prejudice.

¶34 Mayfield also argues that the officers arrested him without probable cause and in

violation of his right to free speech, and that the DUI evidence should have been suppressed

as fruit of the unlawful arrest. Because § 46-13-401(2), MCA, requires dismissal with

prejudice, any opinion on the suppression issue would not affect the disposition. We

therefore decline to address Mayfield’s constitutional and probable cause arguments. See

State v. Spagnolo, 2022 MT 228, ¶ 10, 410 Mont. 457, 520 P.3d 330 (explaining that this

Court avoids constitutional questions when a case can be decided on nonconstitutional

grounds).

CONCLUSION

¶35 Under these circumstances we find that the City failed to carry its burden to show

good cause for the delays beyond the six-month statutory speedy-trial deadline.

Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s order affirming the Municipal Court and

remand with instructions to dismiss the charge with prejudice.

/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON