[Cite as State v. Maurer, 2016-Ohio-1380.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 103162
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
ROBBIE MAURER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED; REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-09-525017-A
BEFORE: Kilbane, J., Keough, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 31, 2016 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Erin R. Flanagan Erin R. Flanagan, Esq., Ltd. 75 Public Square Suite 1325 Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Khalilah A. Lawson Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center - 9th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robbie Maurer (“Maurer”), appeals from the
judgment of the trial court ordering payment of restitution and costs. Having reviewed
the record and the controlling case law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court;
however, we remand this matter for correction of the journal entry nunc pro tunc to reflect
the sentence announced during the sentencing hearing.
{¶2} On June 12, 2009, Maurer was indicted in a 12-count indictment in
connection with allegations that he stole his former roommate’s credit cards and made
unauthorized purchases. Counts 1-4 charged Maurer with fourth-degree felony theft, in
violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1). Counts 5-8 charged Maurer with forgery, a
fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.31(A). Counts 9 and 10 charged him with
receiving stolen property, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A).
Counts 11 and 12 charged him with identity fraud, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of
R.C. 2913.49(B)(1).
{¶3} On November 4, 2009, Maurer entered into a plea agreement with the state.
He pled guilty to Count 1 (theft), Count 5 (forgery), and Count 11 (identity fraud), and
the state dismissed the remaining charges. The court inquired about restitution, and the
prosecuting attorney stated that documentation of the exact amount would be provided at
the sentencing hearing. The court then stated:
THE COURT: And of course — how much — do you have an estimation of what the restitution would be here?
THE DEFENDANT: I am guessing in my head, under a thousand dollars. THE COURT: Well, whatever it is, we’ll get the figure, [and it] will be part of this order; do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
{¶4} The journal entry issued on this date likewise indicates that Maurer pled
guilty to theft as charged in Count 1, forgery as charged in Count 5, and identity fraud as
charged in Count 11. The journal entry pertaining to the plea further states “restitution
to be paid to Chase Bank and Citi Bank.”
{¶5} Maurer was instructed to appear for a presentence investigation interview
on December 7, 2009, but he failed to do so, and also he failed to appear for sentencing
on December 9, 2009. Sentencing was rescheduled for January 12, 2010, but Maurer
again failed to appear. Over five years later, in March 2015, Maurer was a passenger in
a vehicle that was stopped for a traffic offense in Arizona. A routine check for
outstanding warrants revealed that a capias had been issued for Maurer in Cuyahoga
County. Subsequently, he was extradited from Arizona to Cuyahoga County
approximately two weeks later.
{¶6} The trial court then held a sentencing hearing on May 12, 2015. The trial
court reviewed the presentence investigation report, noted that Maurer had made $391 in
unauthorized credit card charges, and that the cost of extradition from Arizona was
$1,959.35. The prosecuting attorney stated:
So in regards to restitution, the State would ask that restitution be paid to
the credit cards as stated in the previous sentencing — or plea in the amount of $391.54. The State is also asking for extradition costs in the amount of
$1,959.35. I did contact the victim. I have not heard back from him in
regards to the restitution amount to determine what amount of that money
goes to either Chase or Citibank. That was not made clear by any reports.
I just want to make that note.
{¶7} The court then stated:
I am going to find that you owe restitution in the amount of $391.54. Those have been documented to my satisfaction that they relate to the credit card debt. That amount will be paid to the probation department for the benefit of Chase Bank and Citibank, and that amount applies in the aggregate to both the victims. * * *
The purpose of the probation is to take care of the restitution amount, and also I’m going to order extradition costs. I don’t think the State of Ohio or the county prosecutor should pay nearly $2,000 because you didn’t take the time or exercise sufficient effort to resolve this issue at the time. So, in addition to the restitution amount, the extradition costs will be paid at $1,959.35.
In addition, you’re going to pay costs and fees, supervision fees, and the cost of this case. I’m giving you three years to pay that, and I expect you to do that on a regular basis based on a payment plan that you can set up with the probation department in Phoenix once this is arranged, or you may have to arrange that here before you go down. You can talk to the probation department about doing that.
I understand the financial difficulties that you’re in presently, but three years would seem to be a sufficient amount of time to pay[.]
(Emphasis added.)
{¶8} The trial court did not order Maurer to serve an additional term of
incarceration; rather, it imposed a jail term of 53 days, the time he had already served,
plus three years of community control sanctions. The trial court noted, however, that Maurer was now living in Arizona and it graciously permitted Maurer to serve his term of
probation in Arizona.
{¶9} The court’s sentencing entry provided:
[On] Counts 1, 5, [and] 11, 3 years ccs — concurrent to each other. 53
days in jail as credit for time served. Defendant to receive jail time credit
for 53 day(s) to date. The court finds that a community control sanction
will adequately protect the public and will not demean the seriousness of
the offense. It is therefore ordered that the defendant is sentenced to 3
year(s) of community control, under supervision of the Adult Probation
Department * * * [.] This Defendant lives in Arizona. * * * Court
allows the Defendant to return to Phoenix, Arizona, his residence. It is not
necessary but if it becomes so, this Court orders the Probation Department
to transfer this case to Phoenix for probation, if accepted. The purpose of
probation is to repay the amounts stated in this journal entry. * * *
Restitution ordered in the amount of $1,959.35 to Chase Bank and Citibank,
payable through the Probation Department.
{¶10} Maurer now appeals, assigning the following three errors for our review: Assignment of Error One
The sentencing court erred to Mr. Maurer’s prejudice by requiring a restitution amount unsupported by any documentary evidence.
Assignment of Error Two
The sentencing court erred to Mr. Maurer’s prejudice by ordering restitution to an unknown third party after it had been established that the alleged victim had received full reimbursement from the victim’s credit card companies. Assignment of Error Three
The sentencing court erred to Mr. Maurer’s prejudice by ordering
reimbursement of extradition costs to the State of Ohio or the county
prosecutor.
Restitution Amount
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Maurer argues that the court did not
adequately establish the amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty. In
opposition, the state argues that this issue has been waived for all but plain error and that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
{¶12} We review of a trial court’s order of restitution for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 102220, 102221, 102222, and 102223,
2015-Ohio-2522, ¶ 12, citing State v. Milenius, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100407,
2014-Ohio-3585, ¶ 10, and State v. Marbury, 104 Ohio App.3d 179, 661 N.E.2d 271 (8th
Dist.1995). As noted by the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Lalain, 136 Ohio St.3d
248, 2013-Ohio-3093, 994 N.E.2d 423, ¶ 24:
A trial court has discretion to order restitution in an appropriate case and
may base the amount it orders on a recommendation of the victim * * * but
the amount ordered cannot be greater than the amount of economic loss
suffered as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense.
{¶13} Restitution is governed by R.C. 2929.18(A), which states in part as follows: Financial sanctions that may be imposed pursuant to this section include, but are not limited to, the following:
(A)(1) Restitution by the offender to the victim of the offender’s crime or any survivor of the victim, in an amount based on the victim’s economic loss. If the court imposes restitution, the court shall order that the restitution be made to the victim in open court, to the adult probation department that serves the county on behalf of the victim, to the clerk of courts, or to another agency designated by the court. If the court imposes restitution, at sentencing, the court shall determine the amount of restitution to be made by the offender. If the court imposes restitution, the court may base the amount of restitution it orders on an amount recommended by the victim, the offender, a presentence investigation report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other information, provided that the amount the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense. If the court decides to impose restitution, the court shall hold a hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount. All restitution payments shall be credited against any recovery of economic loss in a civil action brought by the victim or any survivor of the victim against the offender.
{¶14} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.01(L), “economic loss” means
any economic detriment suffered by a victim as a direct and proximate
result of the commission of an offense and includes any loss of income due
to lost time at work because of any injury caused to the victim, and any
property loss, medical cost, or funeral expense incurred as a result of the
commission of the offense.
{¶15} In this matter, the prosecuting attorney informed the trial court that the
restitution amounts were $255.29 and $136.25, or a total of $391.54 in unauthorized
purchases from the roommate’s credit cards. During sentencing, Maurer’s counsel conceded that “we believe that the first two numbers given by the prosecutor are accurate,
since they relate to the credit card purchases that my client made.” Maurer himself
conceded that the restitution amount would be less than one thousand dollars. At no
point did Maurer dispute the amount or request a hearing. Therefore, we find no plain
error in the trial court’s conclusion at the sentencing hearing that Maurer must pay
restitution in the amount of $391.54 for the unauthorized use of the credit cards.
Therefore, the first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶16} We note, however, that in its sentencing entry, the court stated, “restitution
ordered in the amount of $1,959.35 to Chase Bank and Citibank, payable through the
Probation Department.” The court’s sentencing entry does not conform to the court’s
statement during the hearing that Maurer was required to pay $391.54 to Chase and
Citibank and also pay $1,959.35 in extradition costs. The entry lists the extradition cost
of $1,959.35 as the “restitution” amount without listing the $391.54 to be paid to the
banks. Because of this discrepancy, the matter must be remanded for a nunc pro tunc
correction of the entry to conform to the sentence announced at the sentencing hearing.
Restitution to Banks
{¶17} In his second assignment of error, Maurer argues that the trial court erred in
ordering restitution to the banks that issued the victim’s credit cards. Maurer notes that
under State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, 35 N.E.3d 512,
“sentencing is a creature of the legislature [so] * * * courts are limited to imposing sentences that are authorized by statute[.]” Therefore, Maurer contends that because the
banks are not “victims” within the meaning of R.C. 2929.18, restitution to the banks is
erroneous.
{¶18} The question of who constitutes a “victim” under the statute is a question of
law that is reviewed de novo. State v. Hunter, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25521,
2013-Ohio-3759, ¶ 7; State v. Harris, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-14-069, 2015-Ohio-4412,
¶ 8. However, because of the absence of an objection below, we review the instant
matter for plain error.
{¶19} A “victim” is defined by R.C. 2930.01(H)(1) as “[a] person who is identified
as the victim of a crime or specified delinquent act in a police report or in a complaint,
indictment, or information that charges the commission of a crime and that provides the
basis for the criminal prosecution[.]”
{¶20} Prior to 2004, R.C. 2929.18 provided that “restitution * * * may include a
requirement that reimbursement be made to third parties for amounts paid to or on behalf
of the victim * * * for economic loss resulting from the offense.” Following
amendments in 2004, R.C. 2929.18 now provides in relevant part as follows:
(A) Financial sanctions that may be imposed pursuant to this section include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Restitution by the offender to the victim of the offender’s crime or any
survivor of the victim, in an amount based on the victim’s economic loss.
If the court imposes restitution, the court shall order that the restitution be
made to the victim in open court, to the adult probation department that serves the county on behalf of the victim, to the clerk of courts, or to
another agency designated by the court.
{¶21} Applying the pre-2004 language, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v.
Kreischer, 109 Ohio St.3d 391, 2006-Ohio-2706, 848 N.E.2d 496, held that former R.C.
2929.18(A)(1) authorized trial courts to exercise discretion when imposing financial
sanctions on a defendant and permitted those sanctions to include reimbursement to third
parties for amounts paid on behalf of a victim. The Kreischer court additionally stated
that the 2004 amendments to R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) “delet[ed] all references to restitution
for third parties.” Id. at ¶ 1.
{¶22} In light of the 2004 changes to R.C. 2929.18, numerous courts have
concluded that where a bank’s customer is the named victim of a crime, and the bank
reimburses that customer, the bank is not a “victim” of the crime. State v. Crum, 5th
Dist. Delaware No. 12 CAA 08 0056, 2013-Ohio-903, ¶ 12; State v. Stump, 4th Dist.
Athens No. 13CA10, 2014-Ohio-1487, ¶ 12; State v. Kiser, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
24419, 2011-Ohio-5551, ¶ 16; State v. Dull, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-12-33,
2013-Ohio-1395, ¶ 11; State v. Kelly, 4th Dist. Pickaway Nos. 10CA28 and 10CA29,
2011-Ohio-4902, ¶ 7.
{¶23} However, in State v. Bartholomew, 119 Ohio St.3d 359, 2008-Ohio-4080,
894 N.E.2d 307, syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) permits
a trial court to order a criminal defendant to pay restitution to Ohio’s reparations fund,
since the fund is a permissible “agency designated by the court” under R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). In so concluding, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the notion that “trial
courts no longer have the authority to order that restitution be paid to anyone other than
the victim or a survivor of the victim,” since “amendments to R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) did not
eliminate all third-party payees.” Id. at 362. The court also stated that “it is beyond
cavil that the purpose of R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) is to require the offender to reimburse the
victim — or whatever entity paid the victim — for the economic loss caused by the
crime.” Id. at 361. The Bartholomew court clarified its holding in Kreischer, and
stated:
[W]e were perhaps not as precise as we should have been. The amendments to R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) did not eliminate all third-party payees. [A] trial court under the current version of R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) retains the discretion to order that restitution be paid to certain third parties, namely, an adult probation department, the clerk of courts, or another agency designated by the court.
* * * [R.C. 2929.18 was modified by clarifying that] restitution is discretionary and repealing the language that pertains to the restitution order requiring that reimbursement be made to third parties, including governmental agencies or persons other than governmental agencies, for amounts paid to or on behalf of the victim or any survivor of the victim for economic loss[.]
{¶24} Therefore, the Bartholomew court concluded,
[I]t is clear that the General Assembly intended to eliminate any perception that restitution to third parties was mandatory. If the General Assembly had truly intended that restitution could be paid only to a victim, it would have eliminated adult probation departments, clerks of courts, and other agencies as designated by the court as possible payees.
{¶25} Moreover, R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) does not specifically restrict the parties from
agreeing to an award of restitution that is not provided for in the statute. State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24288, 2012-Ohio-1230, ¶ 14, citing State v. Stewart,
3d Dist. Allen No. 16-08-11, 2008-Ohio-5823. Consequently, where a defendant orally
agrees to pay restitution to a known third-party claimant, and also acquiesces to the
inclusion of the restitution agreement in the plea, then this agreement is enforceable.
Johnson at ¶ 15 (“R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) does not prohibit an award of restitution to an
insurance company when the award is made pursuant to the express plea agreement
between the state and the defendant.”); State v. Burns, 2012-Ohio-4191, 976 N.E.2d 969,
¶ 20 (6th Dist.) (restitution award to insurance companies is not contrary to any existing
provision in the R.C. 2929.18). Id. In accordance with this principle, where a bank
reimburses a customer–victim but the bank is not named in the indictment, it is not a
“victim” under R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). State v. Harris, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-14-069,
2015-Ohio-4412, ¶ 8. However, if the defendant agreed to pay the third-party restitution
as part of his plea agreement, that agreement is enforceable. Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶26} In this matter, the person named in the indictment as the victim is Maurer’s
roommate, not Chase Bank or Citibank. We note, however, that during the plea
proceedings, Maurer agreed that once the fraud amount was determined by the banks, this
amount would be included within the court’s restitution order. Maurer’s counsel
conceded the amounts and raised no objection. In addition, the journal entry for the plea
indicates that “restitution is to be paid to Chase Bank and Citi Bank.” Therefore, we
find no plain error. The second assignment of error is without merit. {¶27} Nonetheless, as explained in our analysis of the first assignment of error, the
matter must be remanded for correction of the journal entry nunc pro tunc to reflect the
sentence announced during the sentencing hearing.
Restitution For Extradition Costs
{¶28} In his third assignment of error, Maurer argues that the trial court erred in
ordering him to pay the cost of his extradition from Arizona to Cuyahoga County.
{¶29} With certain exceptions, such as embezzlement of public funds, vandalism,
or destruction of governmental property, governmental agencies have not been found to
constitute “victims” entitled to restitution for their efforts to fight crime using public
funds. State v. Toler, 174 Ohio App.3d 335, 2007-Ohio-6967, 882 N.E.2d 28, ¶ 12 (3d
Dist.); State v. Ham, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-09-01, 2009-Ohio-3822, ¶ 48. We note,
however, that R.C. 2949.14 sets forth the procedure for collection of extradition costs
from felony offenders, through payment to the clerk of courts as costs, stating:
Upon conviction of a nonindigent person for a felony, the clerk of the court
of common pleas shall make and certify under the clerk’s hand and seal of
the court, a complete itemized bill of the costs made in such prosecution,
including the sum paid by the board of county commissioners, certified by
the county auditor, for the arrest and return of the person on the requisition
of the governor, or on the request of the governor to the president of the
United States, or on the return of the fugitive by a designated agent pursuant to a waiver of extradition except in cases of parole violation. The clerk
shall attempt to collect the costs from the person convicted.
{¶30} In addition, under R.C. 2947.23(A)(1) and 2949.14, a trial court is routinely
permitted to impose the cost of extradition upon nonindigent felony defendants. State v.
Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25316, 2013-Ohio-1925, ¶ 15.
{¶31} At sentencing in this matter, the court stated:
The purpose of the probation is to take care of the restitution amount, and also I’m going to order extradition costs. I don’t think the State of Ohio or the county prosecutor should pay nearly $2,000 because you didn’t take the time or exercise sufficient effort to resolve this issue at the time. So, in addition to the restitution amount, the extradition costs will be paid at $1,959.35.
{¶32} The court’s sentencing order included the extradition amount of $1,959.35,
but it listed the amount as “restitution ordered in the amount of $1,959.35 to Chase Bank
and Citibank, payable through the Probation Department.”
{¶33} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, we remand
this matter for correction of the journal entry nunc pro tunc to reflect the sentence
announced during the sentencing hearing.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR