State v. Matthews

2024 Ohio 5558

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Matthews, 2024-Ohio-5558.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-24-19 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

MAURICE R. MATTHEWS, OPINION

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 2022-CR-0192

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: November 25, 2024

APPEARANCES:

Mary Catherine Corrigan for Appellant

Samantha M. Hobbs and Raymond Kelly Hamilton for Appellee Case No. 14-24-19

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Maurice R. Matthews (“Matthews”) appeals the

judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the trial court

erred in denying the motion to dismiss he made pursuant to R.C. 2941.401; that he

was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel; and that his conviction

for burglary is not supported by sufficient evidence. For the reasons set forth below,

the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On August 22, 2022 at roughly 3:00 P.M., Matthews entered the Kay

Jewelers in Marysville, Ohio and spoke with the store manager, Sarah Willie

(“Willie”). After examining several items for around thirty to forty-five minutes,

Matthews indicated that he had to leave to pick up his girlfriend at Walgreen’s but

intended to return to Kay Jewelers later that day. At his request, several items were

placed on hold for him.

{¶3} At around 7:00 P.M., Willie and another employee, Tina Spurlock

(“Spurlock”) locked the front door and closed the store. Shortly thereafter,

Matthews knocked at the front door. Willie testified that she heard him say, “you

guys are closed, man, I really wanted to * * * buy that.” (Tr. 173). In response,

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Willie unlocked the front door and let him inside. She explained that she could still

make a sale because the register had not yet been closed out for the day.

{¶4} Spurlock went towards the back of the store while Willie and Matthews

went to one of the display cases. Matthews told Willie that he was no longer

interested in the pieces they had looked at earlier because these items were fitted

with lab-created stones. He then expressed interest in a diamond necklace that was

$7,999.99. As Willie was getting this piece out of the display case, Matthews

“yanked on the chain” and “grabbed” it from her. (Tr. 182). He then ran out of the

store with the necklace.

{¶5} Spurlock then called 9-1-1 and reported that a “grab-and-run” had

occurred. (Ex. 2). In response, the police were dispatched to the Kay Jewelers and

conducted interviews with Willie and Spurlock. After examining the security

camera footage, the police were able to identify Matthews. During the investigation,

Detective Dennis Flanagan (“Detective Flanagan”) discovered that Matthews had

been involved in several other theft offenses at other retail stores.

{¶6} On September 2, 2022, Matthews was indicted on one count of burglary

in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1), a second-degree felony, and one count of grand

theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony. On August 18,

2023, Matthews filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds

that the trial court subsequently denied. On September 25, 2023, Matthews filed a

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supplemental motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds. However, the trial court

denied the motion after concluding that the speedy-trial time allotted under R.C.

2941.401 had not expired.

{¶7} On September 14, 2023, the prosecution filed notice of intent to use

other acts evidence to establish a modus operandi under Evid.R. 404(B). These

other acts included several other incidents in which Matthews committed grab-and-

runs at various stores affiliated with Kay Jewelers. After a hearing on this matter,

the trial court found the State’s motion well-taken.

{¶8} On October 2, 2023, Matthews’s jury trial commenced. Willie and

Spurlock testified about the incident in Marysville. The State then called a loss

prevention manager at Signet Jewelers, Brian Finnicum (“Finnicum”), to describe

nine other incidents in which Matthews committed grab-and-runs at various stores

affiliated with Kay Jewelers. A store manager at a Kay Jewelers in Akron, Jill

Ernest (“Ernest”), also testified about a grab-and-run she witnessed Matthews

commit at her store on July 14, 2022. On October 3, 2023, the jury returned verdicts

of guilty on both charges against Matthews.

{¶9} The trial court issued its judgment entry of sentencing on February 1,

2024. Matthews filed his notice of appeal on February 15, 2024. On appeal, he

raises the following four assignments of error:

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First Assignment of Error

The trial court erred by denying the Appellant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to ORC 2941.401.

Second Assignment of Error

Trial counsel was ineffective for filing a discovery and bill of particulars demand 143 days after the appellant’s notice of place of imprisonment and request for disposition of indictment, information or complaint was filed.

Third Assignment of Error

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike mention of unrelated robbery charges.

Fourth Assignment of Error

The conviction for count one was against the sufficiency of the evidence.

We are going to consider the first and fourth assignments of error before proceeding

to the second and third assignments of error.

{¶10} Matthews argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to

dismiss the charges against him on speedy-trial grounds.

Standard of Review

{¶11} A trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial

violation presents mixed questions of fact and law. State v. Flynn, 2017-Ohio-1484,

¶ 10 (3d Dist.). For this reason, an appellate court “must give due deference to the

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trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence

but will independently review whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the

facts of the case.” State v. Shaffer, 2022-Ohio-421, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.

Hansen, 2013-Ohio-1735, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.).

Legal Standard

{¶12} Ohio’s general speedy-trial statute is set forth in R.C. 2945.71, et seq.,

and, where applicable, requires a defendant charged with a felony to be brought to

trial within two hundred seventy (270) days of his or her arrest. R.C. 2945.71(C)(2).

The statutorily allotted period of speedy-trial time may be extended by the tolling

events listed in R.C. 2945.72. State v. Cartlidge, 2020-Ohio-3615, ¶ 52 (3d Dist.).

“The occurrence of a tolling event does ‘not unconditionally extend the time limit

in which an accused must be brought to trial’ but only extends the time limit for the

length of the delay’ occasioned by tolling event. State v. Sessom, 2024-Ohio-130,

¶ 7 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Arrizola, 79 Ohio App.3d 72, 75 (3d Dist. 1992).

{¶13} However, R.C. 2941.401 contains “a ‘specific’ speedy-trial statute

applicable only to defendants who are imprisoned in correctional institutions in the

State of Ohio and facing charges for crimes separate from those for which they are

already imprisoned.” State v. Irish, 2019-Ohio-2765, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). This provision

reads, in its relevant part, as follows:

When a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution of this state, and when during the continuance

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of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the prisoner, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after the prisoner causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court in which the matter is pending, written notice of the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to be made of the matter, except that for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel present, the court may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the warden or superintendent having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time served and remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the adult parole authority relating to the prisoner.

***

If the action is not brought to trial within the time provided, subject to continuance allowed pursuant to this section, no court any longer has jurisdiction thereof, the indictment, information, or complaint is void, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice.

R.C. 2941.401. “[W]hen a person who is imprisoned in an Ohio correctional

institution is charged with a crime separate from the crime for which they are

imprisoned, R.C. 2941.401 applies to the exclusion of R.C. 2945.71.” Irish at ¶ 17.

{¶14} Under R.C. 2941.401, the statutory speedy-trial time “will not begin

to run until the defendant files a request for disposition in accordance with R.C.

2941.401.” Irish at ¶ 17. Once this protection is triggered, the tolling provisions in

R.C. 2945.72 govern the calculation of the speedy-trial time that accrues against the

period of one hundred eighty (180) days that is allotted under R.C. 2941.401. State

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v. Smith, 140 Ohio App.3d 81, fn. 1 (3d Dist. 2000). See also State v. Austin, 2019-

Ohio-686, ¶ 46 (5th Dist.); State v. Jama, 2024-Ohio-2657, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.).

{¶15} “Upon review of a speedy-trial issue, a court is required to count the

days of delay chargeable to either side and determine whether the case was tried

within applicable time limits.” State v. Sanchez, 2006-Ohio-4478, ¶ 8.

The computation of time for criminal statutes is governed by Crim.R. 45, which provides, ‘[i]n computing any period of time prescribed * * * by any applicable statute, the date of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included * * *.’

State v. Shafer, 2015-Ohio-2469, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting Crim.R. 45. “If any

ambiguity exists,” the reviewing court is to “construe the record in favor of the

accused.” Shafer at ¶ 12.

Legal Analysis

{¶16} On February 6, 2023, Matthews filed the notice required by R.C.

2941.401 and triggered the 180-day time limit. On June 29, 2023, defense counsel

filed a motion for discovery and a bill of particulars. “A defendant’s ‘demand for

discovery or a bill of particulars is a tolling event * * *.’” Sessom, 2024-Ohio-130,

¶ 12, quoting State v. Brown, 2002-Ohio-7040, ¶ 26. Between February 6, 2023 and

June 29, 2023, one hundred forty-three (143) days of speedy-trial time accrued.

{¶17} On August 11, 2023, the State filed a response to Matthews’s demand

for discovery. On August 18, 2023, Matthews filed a motion to dismiss on speedy-

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trial grounds. The filing of a motion to dismiss constituted a tolling event. See State

v. Boyd, 2023-Ohio-2079, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.); State v. Parker, 2020-Ohio-4607, ¶ 85

(6th Dist.); State v. Walker, 2013-Ohio-3522, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.); State v. Squillace,

2016-Ohio-1038, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). Between August 11, 2023 and August 18, 2023,

seven days of speedy-trial time accrued, bringing the total amount of speedy-trial

time to one hundred fifty (150) days.

{¶18} On August 21, 2023, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

However, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, defense counsel requested a

further pretrial hearing. State v. Michailides, 2018-Ohio-2399, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.);

State v. Ervin, 2021-Ohio-47, ¶ 4, 33 (4th Dist.). For this reason, the date of the

trial was continued at the Defense’s request, and the ruling on the motion to dismiss

did not cause the speedy-trial time to begin running. At the final pretrial hearing on

September 19, 2023, the parties scheduled the trial for October 2, 2023. In between

August 19, 2023 and September 19, 2023, zero (0) days of speedy-trial time accrued,

leaving the total amount of speedy-trial time at one hundred fifty (150) days.

{¶19} On September 25, 2023, Matthews filed another motion to dismiss on

speedy-trial grounds. State v. Carr, 2013-Ohio-5312, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.); State v.

Danzy, 2021-Ohio-1483, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.). In between September 19, 2023 and

September 25, 2023, six (6) days of speedy-trial time accrued, bringing the total

amount of speedy-trial time to one hundred fifty-six (156) days.

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{¶20} On September 29, 2023, the trial court denied Matthews’s motion to

dismiss. On October 2, 2023, the jury trial on the charges against Matthews

commenced. Between September 29, 2023 and October 2, 2023, three (3) days of

speedy trial time accrued, bringing the total amount of time to one hundred fifty-

nine (159) days.1 Thus, Matthews was brought to trial within the amount of time

allotted under R.C. 2941.401.

{¶21} In response to these calculations, Matthews asserts that the State took

an unreasonable amount of time to respond to his discovery request. For this reason,

he argues that the accrual of speedy-trial time should not have been tolled for the

entire forty-three (43) day period that elapsed between his request for discovery and

the State’s response.

A discovery request tolls speedy-trial time for a reasonable amount of time necessary to allow the state to respond to the request. What is reasonable will necessarily be a case-by-case determination and depend on the totality of the circumstances.

State v. Belville, 2022-Ohio-3879, ¶ 21. We note that the Ohio Supreme Court

recently found that a forty-three (43) day delay between the Defense’s discovery

request and the State’s response was not unreasonable. Id. at ¶ 14, 23. In the case

presently before us, we find no indication that this response time was unreasonable

1 The State filed a discovery request on August 11, 2023 and points out that the Defense never responded. On appeal, the State argues that the accrual of speedy trial time should have tolled indefinitely after the Defense failed to respond to this discovery request after thirty days. Appellant’s Brief, 4, citing State v. Palmer, 2007-Ohio-374, ¶ 24. However, the record indicates that Matthews was brought to trial within the statutorily allotted timeframe without accounting for this alleged delay, so we need not—and do not— consider this argument on appeal.

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given that the State was in the process of collecting other acts evidence related to

nine other grab-and-runs committed by Matthews.

{¶22} Further, courts have routinely allowed the State thirty days to respond

to a discovery request from the Defense. State v. Perdew, 2021-Ohio-3075, ¶ 53

(4th Dist.); State v. Crawford, 2019-Ohio-2660, ¶ 30 (6th Dist.); State v. Savors,

2022-Ohio-894, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.); Walker, 2013-Ohio-3522, at ¶ 15. Thus, even if

we did find that the forty-three (43) day period was unreasonable in this case and

reduced the amount of time that was tolled by Matthews’s discovery request to thirty

(30) days, only one hundred seventy-two (172) days of speedy-trial time would have

accrued in this case. See Belville at ¶ 25. For these reasons, we conclude that the

trial court did not err in denying Matthews’s motion to dismiss on speedy-trial

grounds. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶23} Matthews argues that his conviction for burglary is not supported by

sufficient evidence.

{¶24} A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge asserts that the State failed to

carry its burden of production at trial. State v. Richey, 2021-Ohio-1461, ¶ 16 (3d

Dist.). On review, an appellate court is not to consider whether the evidence

presented at trial should be believed but whether the evidence, if believed, could

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provide a legal basis for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant is guilty of

the crime charged. State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-3015, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.). Accordingly,

the applicable standard “is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the

essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.

Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, ¶ 62 (3d Dist.).

{¶25} Further, to establish a conviction for burglary in violation of R.C.

2911.12(A)(1), the State must prove that the defendant “by force, stealth, or

deception * * * [t]respass[ed] in an occupied structure * * *, when another person

other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the

structure * * * any criminal offense[.]” R.C. 2911.12(A)(1).

{¶26} In his first argument, Matthews asserts that the State did not present

evidence that he entered the store with the intent to commit a criminal offense inside.

However, the State called Ernest, Detective Robert Perkins (“Detective Perkins”),

and Finnicum to testify about a distinct modus operandi that Matthews followed in

nine grab-and-runs that he had previously committed in other jewelry stores. See

State v. Armstead, 2021-Ohio-4000, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.) (other acts evidence may be

introduced at trial if “the detailed facts of the charged and uncharged offenses

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strongly suggest that an innocent explanation is implausible.”), quoting 1 Wharton’s

Criminal Evidence, Section 4:31 (15th Ed. 2019).

{¶27} Ernest testified that Matthews came into a Kay Jewelers location that

she manages in Akron, Ohio on July 14, 2022. She testified that Matthews told a

salesperson that he was looking for jewelry for his partner and looked at several

expensive pieces for some time. When presented with two pieces of jewelry by the

salesperson, Matthews grabbed both items from her hands and ran out of the store.

{¶28} Detective Perkins investigated the incident at Ernest’s store and

several other grab-and-runs committed by Matthews. He testified that Matthews

engaged in the following modus operandi across these incidents:

[H]e came into the stores. Real friendly. Talking to the workers. Started looking like I’m going to buy something for a couple hundred dollars for somebody and took 15-20 minutes. Got to, like, almost know the people and then, kind of, progressed up, well, I guess I’m going to spend this or this and progressed up to some higher priced items and then once he got to something he liked, I guess, or the level he liked snatched and ran.

(Tr. 217). Finnicum testified that he worked in loss prevention for Signet Jewelers

and created business records that documented nine other grab-and-runs in which

Matthews followed this modus operandi.

{¶29} The testimony from Willie indicates that Matthews followed this same

pattern across the two visits he made to this store on the date of the theft. Willie

testified that, during his first visit, Matthews was interested in purchasing some

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affordable, laboratory-created jewelry for his daughter and discussed these items for

roughly thirty minutes. When he returned later, he told Willie that the laboratory-

created pieces they discussed earlier were “junk” and asked to see a necklace that

was more expensive. (Tr. 181). Willie testified that, once she got this piece out of

the display case, Matthews grabbed the $7,999.99 necklace from her hand and went

out the front door.

{¶30} In summary, the State produced evidence that Matthews acted

consistently with a distinct modus operandi that he had followed on other occasions.

From this evidence, a jury could conclude that Matthews entered the Kay Jewelers

store after closing with the intention of committing another grab-and-run, using the

mode of operation established by the State. Thus, this first argument is without

merit.

{¶31} Second, Matthews argues that the State did not present evidence that

he used “force, stealth, or deception” to enter the store. R.C. 2911.12(A)(1). In

response, the State argues that it produced evidence establishing that Matthews

obtained entry into the store through deception. At trial, Willie testified that

Matthews came into the store at roughly 3:00 P.M. and expressed interest in several

items. On Matthews’s request, Willie put these items on hold because he indicated

that he had to leave to pick up his girlfriend and might “come back.” (Tr. 170).

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{¶32} Willie and Spurlock testified that, at 7:00 P.M., they closed the store

by locking the front door. Willie stated that, shortly after closing, Matthews

knocked on the front door and said through the glass, “Oh, man, you guys are closed.

I can’t buy that.” (Tr. 192). She also testified that he said, “Man, I really wanted to

buy that.” (Tr. 174). Willie indicated that, since the register had not yet been closed

out, she could still make a sale after closing pursuant to company policy and decided

to let Matthews inside.

{¶33} Willie testified that, if she had not unlocked the door, Matthews

“would not have been able to come in * * *.” (Tr. 175). She then stated that she

allowed Matthews into the store because she “was under the impression that he was

wanting to purchase those pieces” that had been put on hold. (Tr. 175). She also

explained that the company policy gives employees the discretion to let a customer

in the store after closing “[a]s long as we have a register open * * * if they are, in

fact, wanting to purchase something.” (Tr. 191).

{¶34} Further, the State also introduced evidence of Matthews’s modus

operandi to establish that he entered the store with the intent to commit another grab-

and-run. From this evidence, a finder of fact could infer that Matthews gained entry

into the store by indicating that he wanted to purchase the jewelry that he had earlier

put on hold when he had no such intention. Thus, the State produced evidence from

which a jury could conclude that Matthews’s authorization to enter the closed store

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was gained through deception. See State v. Dukes, 2003-Ohio-2386, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.);

State v. Wright, 2022-Ohio-1537, ¶ 119-120 (6th Dist.); In re J.M., 2012-Ohio-

5283, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.). We conclude that this second argument is without merit.

Accordingly, the fourth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶35} Matthews argues that defense counsel was ineffective for filing

requests for discovery and a bill of particulars in this case.

{¶36} “Ohio law presumes that a licensed attorney’s representation was

competent.” State v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-625, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “In order to prove

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must carry the burden of

establishing (1) that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that this

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” State v. McWay, 2018-Ohio-3618,

¶ 24 (3d Dist.), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

{¶37} To establish deficient performance, the appellant must demonstrate

that defense “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Howton,

2017-Ohio-4349, ¶ 35 (3d Dist.), quoting Strickland at 687. In general, matters that

fall within the ambit of trial strategy or debatable tactics, even if unsuccessful, do

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Wears, 2023-Ohio-4363, ¶

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32 (3d Dist.). To establish prejudice, “the defendant must show a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” State v. Bibbs, 2016-Ohio-8396, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.).

{¶38} Matthews argues defense counsel was ineffective for filing requests

for discovery and a bill of particulars that tolled the accrual of his speedy trial time

and enabled the State to try these charges within the statutorily allotted timeframe.

As an initial matter, decisions about whether to file requests for discovery or a bill

of particulars fall within the realm of debatable tactics and will not generally

constitute deficient performance. State v. Winters, 2022-Ohio-2061, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.);

State v. Rollison, 2017-Ohio-8936, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.).

{¶39} Further, Matthews argues that he was prejudiced by the decision to file

these requests because his speedy trial time would otherwise have expired, leading

to the dismissal of the charges against him. However, this argument requires us to

assume that the State and the trial court would not have taken any steps to ensure

that Matthews was tried within the statutorily-allotted timeframe. State v. Saultz,

2011-Ohio-2018, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.); State v. Hilliard, 2006-Ohio-3918, ¶ 13 (9th

Dist.); State v. Neer, 2020-Ohio-279, ¶ 5-9 (10th Dist.). Since this argument relies

entirely on speculation, Matthews has failed to establish a reasonable probability

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exists that the outcome of this proceeding would have been different in the absence

of the identified requests. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶40} Matthews argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to

move to strike a comment made during Detective Flanagan’s testimony.

{¶41} We reincorporate the legal standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel claims as set forth under the second assignment of error.

{¶42} Matthews argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to

move to strike a reference to an unrelated robbery charge against him that Detective

Flanagan made during his testimony. On appeal, he identifies the following

exchange as the basis of this argument:

[Defense counsel:] Detective you indicated that you had matched the appearance of my client on other cases throughout Ohio. Is that correct?

[Detective Flanagan:] That is correct.

[Defense counsel:] And when you did that, what type of charges were in those cases?

[Detective Flanagan:] Um, the information that I received on your client was from a report that was sent to me by Detective Perkins. Those cases dealt with, I believe, all of them were felony theft offenses related to retail incidents.

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[Defense counsel:] So felony four’s?

[Detective Flanagan:] Yes, sir.

[Defense counsel:] No—no felonies of the second degree. No felonies of the third degree?

[Detective Flanagan:] I don’t recall coming across that. I believe there may have been through one department a robbery charge but I do not believe that was linked to any of the retail issues.

(Tr. 227). We note that the decision not to challenge isolated remarks is generally

a matter of trial strategy because objecting or moving to strike to such testimony

may only attract more attention to unfavorable evidence. State v. Messenger, 2021-

Ohio-2044, ¶ 68 (10th Dist.). Given the context of this challenged remark, we

conclude that Matthews had not established deficient performance.

{¶43} Further, the identified exchange also occurred just after the State had

introduced some evidence of nine other grab-and-run thefts committed by Matthews

to establish modus operandi pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B)(2). In addition to

eyewitness testimony from Spurlock and Willie, the State also introduced security

camera footage from Kay Jewelers that captured Matthews committing this offense.

For these reasons, Matthews has not demonstrated the outcome of this proceeding

would have been different in the absence of this isolated comment. Accordingly,

the third assignment of error is overruled.

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Conclusion

{¶44} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

WALDICK and MILLER, J.J., concur.

/hls

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