[Cite as State v. Matthews, 2017-Ohio-214.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-15-068
Appellee Trial Court No. 2013CR0345
v.
Ronald Matthews, Sr. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: January 20, 2017
*****
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, David E. Romaker, Jr. and David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Stephen D. Long, for appellant.
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from an October 20, 2015 judgment of the Wood County
Court of Common Pleas, sentencing appellant to a two-year term of incarceration for
appellant’s conviction on one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the third degree, as enhanced based upon appellant’s prior
domestic violence convictions. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the
judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} Appellant, Ronald Matthews Sr., sets forth the following three assignments
of error:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S
MOTION IN LIM[I]NE AND IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO
INTRODUCE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL OF PRIOR
CONVICTIONS, OVER APPELLANT’S OBJECTION, THEREBY
DENYING HIM A FAIR TRIAL.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
APPELLANT’S MOTIONS FOR ACQUITTAL PURSUANT TO
CRIM.R. 29 AND APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE WITH REGARD TO PROOF
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF
PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND AS TO THE CONVICTION FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.
C. THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT
DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL.
2. {¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. Appellant
married the victim in the instant case in 2009. Appellant subsequently commenced an
extramarital affair and moved in with his girlfriend but remained married to the victim.
On occasion, appellant’s tumultuous relationship with his girlfriend would worsen and
appellant would then move back in with his wife. An incident that occurred during one
of these periods when appellant had left his girlfriend’s residence and resumed residency
in the marital home culminated in the present case.
{¶ 4} On June 23, 2013, the victim returned home from work and found appellant
highly intoxicated and involved in a verbal altercation over the telephone with his
estranged girlfriend. Appellant persistently attempted to get the victim involved in the
dispute. In addition, appellant requested that the victim go out and purchase more
alcohol for appellant to consume. The victim refused both requests.
{¶ 5} Appellant became enraged at the victim’s refusal to obey his demands and
stormed out of the house and went into the garage. Later that day, as the parties were
engaged in a heated exchange regarding appellant’s extramarital affairs and alcohol
consumption, the victim asked him to leave the home. Appellant refused and conveyed
to the victim that if she called the police he would retaliate by manufacturing allegations
to the responding officers that the victim engages in various forms of abuse of her two
children born of a prior marriage. Despite appellant’s threats, the victim managed to get
possession of the phone and she called for emergency help.
3. {¶ 6} Events escalated quickly and appellant grabbed the victim by the hair on the
back of her head, threw her to the floor of the kitchen, and began to kick and strike her
repeatedly. The victim’s 12-year-old son came to the aid of his mother, pulled appellant
off of his mother, and the victim and her son fled the house right as the police were
arriving on the scene.
{¶ 7} Upon their arrival, the victim advised police that appellant had just been
physically beating her. The victim’s son consistently advised that appellant had been
attacking his mother. The responding officer noted that upon arrival at the scene the
victim was crying, red-faced, hysterical, and had very disheveled hair. The officer
observed scratches on the victim’s arm and noted that it appeared as though the victim’s
ponytail on the back of her head had been recently pulled. Despite some bruises and
scratches, the victim did not seek medical treatment.
{¶ 8} During the course of this case, appellant conceded to having been convicted
on March 8, 1996, of domestic violence in the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas
concerning appellant’s second wife. The record of evidence in this matter encompasses
documentation pertaining to the 1996 conviction which reflects that it was a fourth-
degree felony, unequivocally reflecting that the 1996 conviction was not appellant’s first
domestic violence conviction.
{¶ 9} R.C. 2919.25(D)(3) establishes in relevant part, “[I]f the offender previously
has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of domestic violence * * * [A] violation of [the
domestic violence] section is a felony of the fourth degree.” In conjunction with this,
4. R.C. 2945.75(A)(1) establishes in relevant part, “The affidavit, complaint, indictment or
information either shall state the degree of the offense which the accused is alleged to
have committed * * * or [it] is effective to charge only the least degree of the offense.”
Taken together, these controlling statutes demonstrate that but for evidence of one past
domestic violation conviction, appellant would not and could not have been convicted of
fourth-degree felony domestic violence in the 1996 case.
{¶ 10} However, given appellant’s claimed lack of any recollection of having also
been convicted of domestic violence in 1982 in the Tiffin Municipal Court in connection
to his first wife, testimony and documentation were presented in the instant case by
several records clerks from the Tiffin Municipal Court demonstrating appellant’s 1982
domestic violence arrest, verifying that appellant’s social security number matched that
reflected on the 1982 domestic violence arrest record, and demonstrating that appellant’s
1982 domestic violence case concluded in a disposition and sentencing on November 1,
1982.
{¶ 11} On September 19, 2013, appellant was indicted on one count of domestic
violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) and (D)(4), as enhanced to a felony of the third
degree based upon appellant’s two past domestic violence convictions. A number of
pretrial conferences and numerous continuances ensued. On October 10, 2014, appellant
filed a motion in limine pertaining to the evidence of past domestic violence convictions.
On October 17, 2014, the state filed a memorandum in opposition.
5. {¶ 12} On October 30, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing on the pending
motion in limine. As referenced above, appellant conceded to the 1996 domestic
violence conviction involving his second wife, but denied recollection of the 1982
domestic violence conviction involving his first wife. However, the 1996 conviction
could have only been a felony of the fourth degree contingent upon the record reflecting a
prior domestic violence conviction.
{¶ 13} Nevertheless, given appellant’s claimed lack of memory, the state
presented the testimony of several witnesses who are employed as clerks in the records
Department of the Tiffin Municipal Court.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Matthews, 2017-Ohio-214.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-15-068
Appellee Trial Court No. 2013CR0345
v.
Ronald Matthews, Sr. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: January 20, 2017
*****
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, David E. Romaker, Jr. and David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Stephen D. Long, for appellant.
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from an October 20, 2015 judgment of the Wood County
Court of Common Pleas, sentencing appellant to a two-year term of incarceration for
appellant’s conviction on one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the third degree, as enhanced based upon appellant’s prior
domestic violence convictions. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the
judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} Appellant, Ronald Matthews Sr., sets forth the following three assignments
of error:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S
MOTION IN LIM[I]NE AND IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO
INTRODUCE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL OF PRIOR
CONVICTIONS, OVER APPELLANT’S OBJECTION, THEREBY
DENYING HIM A FAIR TRIAL.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
APPELLANT’S MOTIONS FOR ACQUITTAL PURSUANT TO
CRIM.R. 29 AND APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE WITH REGARD TO PROOF
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF
PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND AS TO THE CONVICTION FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.
C. THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT
DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL.
2. {¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. Appellant
married the victim in the instant case in 2009. Appellant subsequently commenced an
extramarital affair and moved in with his girlfriend but remained married to the victim.
On occasion, appellant’s tumultuous relationship with his girlfriend would worsen and
appellant would then move back in with his wife. An incident that occurred during one
of these periods when appellant had left his girlfriend’s residence and resumed residency
in the marital home culminated in the present case.
{¶ 4} On June 23, 2013, the victim returned home from work and found appellant
highly intoxicated and involved in a verbal altercation over the telephone with his
estranged girlfriend. Appellant persistently attempted to get the victim involved in the
dispute. In addition, appellant requested that the victim go out and purchase more
alcohol for appellant to consume. The victim refused both requests.
{¶ 5} Appellant became enraged at the victim’s refusal to obey his demands and
stormed out of the house and went into the garage. Later that day, as the parties were
engaged in a heated exchange regarding appellant’s extramarital affairs and alcohol
consumption, the victim asked him to leave the home. Appellant refused and conveyed
to the victim that if she called the police he would retaliate by manufacturing allegations
to the responding officers that the victim engages in various forms of abuse of her two
children born of a prior marriage. Despite appellant’s threats, the victim managed to get
possession of the phone and she called for emergency help.
3. {¶ 6} Events escalated quickly and appellant grabbed the victim by the hair on the
back of her head, threw her to the floor of the kitchen, and began to kick and strike her
repeatedly. The victim’s 12-year-old son came to the aid of his mother, pulled appellant
off of his mother, and the victim and her son fled the house right as the police were
arriving on the scene.
{¶ 7} Upon their arrival, the victim advised police that appellant had just been
physically beating her. The victim’s son consistently advised that appellant had been
attacking his mother. The responding officer noted that upon arrival at the scene the
victim was crying, red-faced, hysterical, and had very disheveled hair. The officer
observed scratches on the victim’s arm and noted that it appeared as though the victim’s
ponytail on the back of her head had been recently pulled. Despite some bruises and
scratches, the victim did not seek medical treatment.
{¶ 8} During the course of this case, appellant conceded to having been convicted
on March 8, 1996, of domestic violence in the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas
concerning appellant’s second wife. The record of evidence in this matter encompasses
documentation pertaining to the 1996 conviction which reflects that it was a fourth-
degree felony, unequivocally reflecting that the 1996 conviction was not appellant’s first
domestic violence conviction.
{¶ 9} R.C. 2919.25(D)(3) establishes in relevant part, “[I]f the offender previously
has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of domestic violence * * * [A] violation of [the
domestic violence] section is a felony of the fourth degree.” In conjunction with this,
4. R.C. 2945.75(A)(1) establishes in relevant part, “The affidavit, complaint, indictment or
information either shall state the degree of the offense which the accused is alleged to
have committed * * * or [it] is effective to charge only the least degree of the offense.”
Taken together, these controlling statutes demonstrate that but for evidence of one past
domestic violation conviction, appellant would not and could not have been convicted of
fourth-degree felony domestic violence in the 1996 case.
{¶ 10} However, given appellant’s claimed lack of any recollection of having also
been convicted of domestic violence in 1982 in the Tiffin Municipal Court in connection
to his first wife, testimony and documentation were presented in the instant case by
several records clerks from the Tiffin Municipal Court demonstrating appellant’s 1982
domestic violence arrest, verifying that appellant’s social security number matched that
reflected on the 1982 domestic violence arrest record, and demonstrating that appellant’s
1982 domestic violence case concluded in a disposition and sentencing on November 1,
1982.
{¶ 11} On September 19, 2013, appellant was indicted on one count of domestic
violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) and (D)(4), as enhanced to a felony of the third
degree based upon appellant’s two past domestic violence convictions. A number of
pretrial conferences and numerous continuances ensued. On October 10, 2014, appellant
filed a motion in limine pertaining to the evidence of past domestic violence convictions.
On October 17, 2014, the state filed a memorandum in opposition.
5. {¶ 12} On October 30, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing on the pending
motion in limine. As referenced above, appellant conceded to the 1996 domestic
violence conviction involving his second wife, but denied recollection of the 1982
domestic violence conviction involving his first wife. However, the 1996 conviction
could have only been a felony of the fourth degree contingent upon the record reflecting a
prior domestic violence conviction.
{¶ 13} Nevertheless, given appellant’s claimed lack of memory, the state
presented the testimony of several witnesses who are employed as clerks in the records
Department of the Tiffin Municipal Court. These witnesses presented the documentation
reflecting appellant’s 1982 arrest and conviction for domestic violence.
{¶ 14} Ultimately, on January 21, 2015, appellant’s motion in limine was denied.
On March 19, 2015, counsel for appellant sought leave to withdraw from the case. The
motion was granted and new counsel was appointed to represent appellant. On
September 2, 2015, the matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial.
{¶ 15} At trial, appellant’s third wife, the victim in this case, testified in detail
regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the June 23, 2013 domestic violence
incident. The victim’s son, who both witnessed the incident and assisted the victim in
escaping from the home on that day, consistently testified at trial regarding these events.
One of the Tiffin Municipal Court records clerks next testified in connection to court
records from the 1982 domestic violence conviction. Bolstering that testimony,
6. appellant’s first wife, the victim in the 1982 case, testified at trial in this case as to the
1982 case.
{¶ 16} The state next presented the testimony of appellant’s second wife, the
victim in the 1996 domestic violence case, who likewise testified at trial in this case as to
the 1996 case. Lastly, the responding officer in the instant case testified consistently with
the testimony of the victim and her son regarding the physical assault by appellant against
the victim on June 23, 2013. Appellant was found guilty.
{¶ 17} The matter was referred for presentencing investigation. On October 20,
2015, appellant was sentenced to a two-year term of incarceration, one year of
incarceration less than that recommended by the state in this matter. This appeal ensued.
{¶ 18} In the first assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial court erred
and abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion in limine seeking to exclude
evidence of appellant’s 1982 and 1996 domestic violence convictions involving
appellant’s first two wives. We do not concur.
{¶ 19} We note at the outset that appellant concurs that the subject of the first
assignment of error, the admission or exclusion of evidence, is one with which the trial
court is vested with broad discretion. In order for such a trial court decision to be shown
improper, it must be demonstrated that the disputed evidentiary decision was an abuse of
discretion. The term abuse of discretion requires showing more than a mere error of law
or judgment; it requires that it be shown that the trial court’s action was unreasonable,
7. arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d
1140 (1983).
{¶ 20} In support of the first assignment, appellant complains that the trial court
improperly permitted the, “State’s parading Mr. Matthews’ ex’s [wives] in front the jury
deciding his fate,” thereby suggesting that the trial court somehow permitted unlimited
adverse testimony to the prejudice of appellant. The record belies this suggestion.
{¶ 21} The record reflects that the testimony of appellant’s first two wives,
necessitated chiefly by appellant’s claimed inability to recollect being convicted of
domestic violence by the Tiffin Municipal Court in connection to his first wife, was
limited, narrow, and constrained to the events and facts precipitating appellant’s 1982 and
1996 domestic violence charges and convictions. Again, appellant himself conceded to
the 1996 domestic violence conviction court documentation which explicitly reflected
that the 1996 conviction was a fourth-degree felony, and therefore by operation of law, a
repeat domestic violence conviction.
{¶ 22} Appellant sweepingly protests that the trial court admission of the
testimony was “Kafkaesque” and concludes without relevant or compelling legal support,
“Clearly, allowing the ex-wives to testify over the objection of Mr. Matthews was
unreasonable, arbitrary and/or unconscionable on the part of the trial court. Therefore,
the trial court abused its discretion.”
{¶ 23} We cannot find the trial court’s decision to permit the testimony of the
victims in the prior cases to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable in the context
8. of appellant’s contradictory recollection of his prior convictions. We find appellant’s
first assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 24} In appellant’s second assignment of error, he asserts that his conviction was
not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Notably, appellant specifically puts forth the issue of the evidence of prior domestic
violence convictions, the subject of the first assignment of error, as the basis for the
sufficiency and manifest weight arguments.
{¶ 25} It is well-established that in cases where sufficiency of the evidence is
asserted, the relevant inquiry on appeal is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574
N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. With respect to the manifest weight
claim, the proper appellate court analysis is to determine whether, in reviewing the entire
record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considering witness
credibility in resolving evidentiary conflicts, the jury clearly lost its way and created such
a manifest miscarriage of justice necessitating the extreme remedy of reversal and a new
trial. State v. Pasiecznik, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-13-026, 2014-Ohio-342, ¶ 22.
{¶ 26} As relevant to the instant case, R.C. 2919.25(A) establishes in pertinent
part, “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or
household member.” In conjunction with this, R.C. 2919.25(D)(4) outlines the felony
enhancement provision applicable to this case. It states in relevant part, “If the offender
9. previously has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of two or more offenses of domestic
violence * * * is a felony of the third degree.”
{¶ 27} In applying the above-described governing standards and statutes, we find
that the record encompasses ample evidence in support of the disputed conviction.
During the jury trial, the trial court heard detailed testimony from the victim regarding
appellant’s physical beating of the victim, collaborating testimony from the victim’s
eyewitness son, collaborating testimony from the responding officer who arrived on
scene shortly after the incident, testimony from various records clerks in connection to
appellant’s past domestic violence cases, as well as direct testimony in the instant case
from appellant’s first and second wives, the victims in the 1982 and 1996 domestic
violence cases, respectively.
{¶ 28} The record is replete with evidence of appellant’s guilt in the current case.
The record is replete with testimonial evidence and document evidence of appellant’s
1982 and 1996 domestic violence convictions. Contrary to appellant’s protestations and
claims, the record of evidence does not reflect any “Kafkaesque” maltreatment of
appellant. We find appellant’s second assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 29} In the third assignment of error, appellant argues that he was subjected to
improper prejudicial impact through claimed cumulative trial court errors. We do not
concur.
{¶ 30} The cumulative error doctrine states that, “[A] conviction will be reversed
when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial court deprives the defendant of a fair trial
10. even though each of the numerous instances of trial court error does not individually
constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960
N.E.2d 955, ¶ 231.
{¶ 31} Based upon this court rejecting appellant’s claims of error by the trial court
in conducting the trial below, we therefore similarly conclude that the record is devoid of
evidence establishing cumulative prejudicial impact on appellant such that appellant was
precluded from a fair trial. We find appellant’s third assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 32} Wherefore, we find that substantial justice has been done in this matter.
The judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ JUDGE Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________ Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE CONCUR. _______________________________ JUDGE
11.