State v. Massey

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

State v. Massey

334 S.E.2d 71, 76 N.C. App. 660

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 17, 1985

Docket8513SC22

StatusPublished

Cited by24 cases

This text of 334 S.E.2d 71 (State v. Massey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Massey, 334 S.E.2d 71, 76 N.C. App. 660 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).

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Opinion

WELLS, Judge.

Each defendant has assigned error to the trial court’s failure to grant their motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. We agree with defendants and reverse.

A criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act or do a lawful act in an unlawful *662 way or by unlawful means. State v. LeDuc, 306 N.C. 62, 291 S.E. 2d 607 (1982). In order for a defendant to be found guilty of a conspiracy, it must be established by competent evidence that the defendant entered into an unlawful confederation for the criminal purposes alleged. Id. While a conspiracy may be established from circumstantial evidence, there must be such evidence to prove the agreement directly or such a state of facts that an agreement may be legally inferred. Id. Conspiracies cannot be established by a mere suspicion, nor does a mere relationship between the parties or association show a conspiracy. Id. If the conspiracy is to be proved by inferences drawn from the evidence, such evidence must point unerringly to the existence of a conspiracy. State v. Whiteside, 204 N.C. 710, 169 S.E. 711 (1933).

Clearly, there is no direct evidence of a conspiracy in this case, all of the State’s evidence being circumstantial. While it appears that a reasonable inference could be drawn from this evidence that defendant Massey burned the mobile home in which she was living, we cannot agree that the evidence supports a reasonable inference that either defendant conspired with each other or any other person to commit the crimes for which they stand convicted. There is no more than mere suspicion in this case, and suspicion, however strong, is simply not enough. See State v. LeDuc, supra, and cases cited and discussed therein. The fraudulent insurance claims charges are rooted in the conspiracy to burn charges; therefore, they must fall with the conspiracy.

For the reasons stated, the judgments against each defendant must be reversed and their sentences vacated.

Reversed and vacated.

Chief Judge Hedrick and Judge Webb concur.

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WELLS, Judge.

Each defendant has assigned error to the trial court’s failure to grant their motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. We agree with defendants and reverse.

A criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act or do a lawful act in an unlawful *662 way or by unlawful means. State v. LeDuc, 306 N.C. 62, 291 S.E. 2d 607 (1982). In order for a defendant to be found guilty of a conspiracy, it must be established by competent evidence that the defendant entered into an unlawful confederation for the criminal purposes alleged. Id. While a conspiracy may be established from circumstantial evidence, there must be such evidence to prove the agreement directly or such a state of facts that an agreement may be legally inferred. Id. Conspiracies cannot be established by a mere suspicion, nor does a mere relationship between the parties or association show a conspiracy. Id. If the conspiracy is to be proved by inferences drawn from the evidence, such evidence must point unerringly to the existence of a conspiracy. State v. Whiteside, 204 N.C. 710, 169 S.E. 711 (1933).

Clearly, there is no direct evidence of a conspiracy in this case, all of the State’s evidence being circumstantial. While it appears that a reasonable inference could be drawn from this evidence that defendant Massey burned the mobile home in which she was living, we cannot agree that the evidence supports a reasonable inference that either defendant conspired with each other or any other person to commit the crimes for which they stand convicted. There is no more than mere suspicion in this case, and suspicion, however strong, is simply not enough. See State v. LeDuc, supra, and cases cited and discussed therein. The fraudulent insurance claims charges are rooted in the conspiracy to burn charges; therefore, they must fall with the conspiracy.

For the reasons stated, the judgments against each defendant must be reversed and their sentences vacated.

Reversed and vacated.

Chief Judge Hedrick and Judge Webb concur.

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Bluebook (online)

334 S.E.2d 71, 76 N.C. App. 660, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-massey-ncctapp-1985.

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