[Cite as State v. Mason, 2026-Ohio-2680.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-25-42
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
PHILLIP CHARLES MASON, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court No. 2024JE019
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: July 13, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Bradley P. Koffel for Appellant
Courtland R. Perry for Appellee Case No. 14-25-42
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Phillip C. Mason (“Mason”), appeals the October
15, 2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Union County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division. Based on the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} On November 7, 2024, Mason was charged with two counts of public
indecency in violation of R.C. 2907.09(B)(4), (C)(5), first-degree misdemeanors.
On November 21, 2024, Mason appeared and pleaded not guilty to the complaint.
{¶3} On January 1, 2025, Mason filed a motion to sever the counts for trial,
which the State opposed on January 13, 2025. On April 22, 2025, the trial court
denied Mason’s motion.
{¶4} On August 18, 2025, the State filed a superseding complaint,
consolidating the two charges into a single count of public indecency in violation of
R.C. 2907.09(B)(4), (C)(5), a first-degree misdemeanor.
{¶5} On August 19, 2025, Mason pleaded guilty, under a negotiated plea
agreement, to the sole count in the superseding complaint. The trial court accepted
Mason’s guilty plea, found him guilty, and ordered a presentence investigation
(“PSI”).
{¶6} On October 14, 2025, the trial court sentenced Mason to 180 days in
jail, with 90 days suspended conditioned on his compliance with the terms and
-2- Case No. 14-25-42
conditions of his community control sanctions. Further, the trial court classified
Mason as a Tier I sex offender.
{¶7} Mason filed his notice of appeal on October 23, 2025. He raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When Classifying The Appellant as a Tier I Sex Offender under R.C. 2709.09(D)(1) [sic].
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Mason argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by classifying him as a Tier I sex offender under R.C. 2907.09(D)(1).
Standard of Review
{¶9} Generally, we review a trial court’s misdemeanor sentence for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Gingerich, 2025-Ohio-4908, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). An abuse of
discretion suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
Analysis
{¶10} Before imposing a misdemeanor sentence, a trial court must consider
the overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing—protecting the public and
punishing the offender—along with the statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2929.21
and 2929.22. Gingerich at ¶ 8. However, a trial court is not required to state its
specific reasons for imposing a misdemeanor sentence. Id. at ¶ 10. Instead, this
court will presume the trial court properly considered the statutory criteria when the
-3- Case No. 14-25-42
sentence falls within the statutory limits and there is no affirmative showing that the
court failed to do so. Id.
{¶11} R.C. 2907.09(D) governs when a trial court may—or must—classify
a defendant as a Tier I sex offender following a conviction for public indecency
under subdivision (B)(4). Relevant to this appeal, R.C. 2907.09(D)(1)(b) explicitly
grants the trial court the discretion to impose a Tier I classification if the offender is
ten or more years older than the minor and has no prior convictions for public
indecency.
{¶12} At sentencing, the trial court explicitly acknowledged that a Tier I sex-
offender classification was discretionary in this case. The trial court ultimately
imposed the classification after determining that Mason was at least ten years older
than the victims and had no prior convictions for public indecency.
{¶13} On appeal, Mason argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
classifying him as a Tier I sex offender. Specifically, Mason asserts that the
classification is unnecessary to protect the public because his PSI, along with
independent evaluations from a forensic psychologist and a professional counselor,
concluded that he is at a low or below-average risk of reoffending, with his
counselor explicitly advising that registry placement is “contra-indicated.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 10). Furthermore, Mason emphasizes that he has no prior
criminal record, accepted responsibility by pleading guilty, demonstrated remorse,
and is actively engaged in successful mental health treatment. Finally, Mason
-4- Case No. 14-25-42
argues that the classification is arbitrary since the trial court fashioned a less
restrictive alternative to protect the public, specifically by permitting him to attend
his children’s events so long as he is supervised by another adult.
{¶14} Based on our review of the record before us, we conclude that the trial
court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably by exercising its
discretion to classify Mason as a Tier I sex offender. Although Mason relies heavily
on his “low risk” score in the PSI and the favorable evaluations from mental health
professionals to argue the classification was unnecessary, the trial court was not
bound by those specific risk assessments. In fact, despite the low quantitative risk
score, the adult probation department’s PSI writer specifically recommended that
the trial court classify Mason as a sex offender.
{¶15} Furthermore, in exercising its discretion under R.C. 2907.09(D) to
impose the sex offender classification, the record reflects that the trial court was
appropriately guided by the overarching goals of protecting the public and punishing
the offender, specifically weighing the severe impact the offense had on the victims.
Indeed, during the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard statements from the
victims’ mothers detailing the psychological trauma that Mason’s actions caused
the nine-year-old girls, including flashbacks and severe anxiety that necessitated
therapeutic and psychiatric intervention.
{¶16} The trial court also had a valid basis to question the sincerity of
Mason’s remorse. See State v. McColor, 2013-Ohio-1279, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.)
-5- Case No. 14-25-42
(“Although the word ‘remorse’ is not expressly used in R.C. 2929.22, the references
in the statute to the offender’s ‘character and condition,’ to the offender’s likelihood
of committing future crimes, and to the discretion the trial court has to consider ‘any
other factors that are relevant,’ signify that remorse, or the lack of remorse, are
legitimate factors to be considered at sentencing”). Although Mason pleaded guilty
to the superseding complaint, he subsequently minimized his conduct during his PSI
interview, claiming the exposure was merely an “accident” caused by a loose-fitting
swimsuit. Because this narrative contradicted the admitted facts of the offense, the
PSI writer concluded that Mason’s remorse appeared driven more by a fear of
consequences than by genuine regret.
{¶17} Finally, we reject Mason’s contention that the Tier I sex offender
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[Cite as State v. Mason, 2026-Ohio-2680.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-25-42
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
PHILLIP CHARLES MASON, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court No. 2024JE019
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: July 13, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Bradley P. Koffel for Appellant
Courtland R. Perry for Appellee Case No. 14-25-42
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Phillip C. Mason (“Mason”), appeals the October
15, 2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Union County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division. Based on the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} On November 7, 2024, Mason was charged with two counts of public
indecency in violation of R.C. 2907.09(B)(4), (C)(5), first-degree misdemeanors.
On November 21, 2024, Mason appeared and pleaded not guilty to the complaint.
{¶3} On January 1, 2025, Mason filed a motion to sever the counts for trial,
which the State opposed on January 13, 2025. On April 22, 2025, the trial court
denied Mason’s motion.
{¶4} On August 18, 2025, the State filed a superseding complaint,
consolidating the two charges into a single count of public indecency in violation of
R.C. 2907.09(B)(4), (C)(5), a first-degree misdemeanor.
{¶5} On August 19, 2025, Mason pleaded guilty, under a negotiated plea
agreement, to the sole count in the superseding complaint. The trial court accepted
Mason’s guilty plea, found him guilty, and ordered a presentence investigation
(“PSI”).
{¶6} On October 14, 2025, the trial court sentenced Mason to 180 days in
jail, with 90 days suspended conditioned on his compliance with the terms and
-2- Case No. 14-25-42
conditions of his community control sanctions. Further, the trial court classified
Mason as a Tier I sex offender.
{¶7} Mason filed his notice of appeal on October 23, 2025. He raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When Classifying The Appellant as a Tier I Sex Offender under R.C. 2709.09(D)(1) [sic].
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Mason argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by classifying him as a Tier I sex offender under R.C. 2907.09(D)(1).
Standard of Review
{¶9} Generally, we review a trial court’s misdemeanor sentence for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Gingerich, 2025-Ohio-4908, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). An abuse of
discretion suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
Analysis
{¶10} Before imposing a misdemeanor sentence, a trial court must consider
the overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing—protecting the public and
punishing the offender—along with the statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2929.21
and 2929.22. Gingerich at ¶ 8. However, a trial court is not required to state its
specific reasons for imposing a misdemeanor sentence. Id. at ¶ 10. Instead, this
court will presume the trial court properly considered the statutory criteria when the
-3- Case No. 14-25-42
sentence falls within the statutory limits and there is no affirmative showing that the
court failed to do so. Id.
{¶11} R.C. 2907.09(D) governs when a trial court may—or must—classify
a defendant as a Tier I sex offender following a conviction for public indecency
under subdivision (B)(4). Relevant to this appeal, R.C. 2907.09(D)(1)(b) explicitly
grants the trial court the discretion to impose a Tier I classification if the offender is
ten or more years older than the minor and has no prior convictions for public
indecency.
{¶12} At sentencing, the trial court explicitly acknowledged that a Tier I sex-
offender classification was discretionary in this case. The trial court ultimately
imposed the classification after determining that Mason was at least ten years older
than the victims and had no prior convictions for public indecency.
{¶13} On appeal, Mason argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
classifying him as a Tier I sex offender. Specifically, Mason asserts that the
classification is unnecessary to protect the public because his PSI, along with
independent evaluations from a forensic psychologist and a professional counselor,
concluded that he is at a low or below-average risk of reoffending, with his
counselor explicitly advising that registry placement is “contra-indicated.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 10). Furthermore, Mason emphasizes that he has no prior
criminal record, accepted responsibility by pleading guilty, demonstrated remorse,
and is actively engaged in successful mental health treatment. Finally, Mason
-4- Case No. 14-25-42
argues that the classification is arbitrary since the trial court fashioned a less
restrictive alternative to protect the public, specifically by permitting him to attend
his children’s events so long as he is supervised by another adult.
{¶14} Based on our review of the record before us, we conclude that the trial
court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably by exercising its
discretion to classify Mason as a Tier I sex offender. Although Mason relies heavily
on his “low risk” score in the PSI and the favorable evaluations from mental health
professionals to argue the classification was unnecessary, the trial court was not
bound by those specific risk assessments. In fact, despite the low quantitative risk
score, the adult probation department’s PSI writer specifically recommended that
the trial court classify Mason as a sex offender.
{¶15} Furthermore, in exercising its discretion under R.C. 2907.09(D) to
impose the sex offender classification, the record reflects that the trial court was
appropriately guided by the overarching goals of protecting the public and punishing
the offender, specifically weighing the severe impact the offense had on the victims.
Indeed, during the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard statements from the
victims’ mothers detailing the psychological trauma that Mason’s actions caused
the nine-year-old girls, including flashbacks and severe anxiety that necessitated
therapeutic and psychiatric intervention.
{¶16} The trial court also had a valid basis to question the sincerity of
Mason’s remorse. See State v. McColor, 2013-Ohio-1279, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.)
-5- Case No. 14-25-42
(“Although the word ‘remorse’ is not expressly used in R.C. 2929.22, the references
in the statute to the offender’s ‘character and condition,’ to the offender’s likelihood
of committing future crimes, and to the discretion the trial court has to consider ‘any
other factors that are relevant,’ signify that remorse, or the lack of remorse, are
legitimate factors to be considered at sentencing”). Although Mason pleaded guilty
to the superseding complaint, he subsequently minimized his conduct during his PSI
interview, claiming the exposure was merely an “accident” caused by a loose-fitting
swimsuit. Because this narrative contradicted the admitted facts of the offense, the
PSI writer concluded that Mason’s remorse appeared driven more by a fear of
consequences than by genuine regret.
{¶17} Finally, we reject Mason’s contention that the Tier I sex offender
classification was arbitrary because the trial court permitted him to attend his
children’s events under strict adult supervision. Rather than rendering the
classification arbitrary, this narrow exception demonstrates the trial court’s exercise
of its broad discretion to tailor a sentence to the specific case while still protecting
the public. See, e.g., State v. Briggs, 2017-Ohio-686, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.)
(acknowledging that “trial courts have broad discretion in misdemeanor sentencing
to fashion sentences that are appropriate to each case”).
{¶18} Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it classified Mason as a Tier I sex offender.
{¶19} Mason’s assignment of error is overruled.
-6- Case No. 14-25-42
{¶20} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
WILLAMOWSKI and WALDICK, J.J., concur.
-7- Case No. 14-25-42
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
DATED: /hls
-8-