State v. Martinez

2025 Ohio 4786

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Martinez, 2025-Ohio-4786.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

MADISON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2024-11-021

: OPINION AND - vs - JUDGMENT ENTRY : 10/20/2025

ALEXIS A. MARTINEZ, :

Appellant. :

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CRI20240037

Nick Adkins, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel M. Price, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

The Law Office of Eric J. Allen, Ltd., and Eric J. Allen, for appellant.

____________ OPINION

M. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Alexis Martinez, appeals his conviction in the Madison County

Court of Common Pleas for possession of marijuana. Madison CA2024-10-021

{¶ 2} Appellant was indicted in May 2024 on one count of marijuana possession,

a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(f)(3). The charge

stemmed from the seizure of 51 pounds of marijuana recovered from the vehicle appellant

was driving. Appellant moved to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop. The

trial court held a hearing on the motion on August 9, 2024.

{¶ 3} At the hearing, Ohio State Highway Patrol Sergeant Drew Kuehne testified

that he was sitting in his patrol car in a crossover on I-70 on March 21, 2024. While

monitoring traffic, Sergeant Kuehne observed a white Chrysler Pacifica van travelling too

close to another vehicle in the left lane. As the Pacifica passed his patrol car, Sergeant

Kuehne noticed that its sole occupant had his hand on top of the steering wheel and his

left shoulder hunched up as though trying to conceal his face. The sergeant decided to

follow the Pacifica. As the sergeant caught up to the Pacifica, he observed it move over

to the middle lane directly in front of a semi-truck, causing the truck to slow down. Having

observed two traffic violations, Sergeant Kuehne initiated a traffic stop of the Pacifica.

{¶ 4} Appellant was the Pacifica's driver. Sergeant Kuehne approached the front

passenger side of the vehicle, asked for appellant's driver's license, and told appellant

about the traffic violations. Upon determining that the Pacifica was a rental, Sergeant

Kuehne also requested the rental agreement. Appellant provided a State of Washington

driver's license and rental documentation which indicated that the Pacifica had been

rented by a third party, not appellant, for a week for $1,388 and that it was scheduled to

be returned in Oregon five days after the traffic stop. Further, the rental documentation

provided by appellant did not include his name. During this encounter, appellant exhibited

signs of nervousness such as a trembling voice and stuttering to answer basic questions,

and Sergeant Kuehne observed appellant's carotid pulsing on the right size of his neck.

{¶ 5} Sergeant Kuehne asked appellant to step out of the Pacifica. The sergeant

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conducted a consensual pat-down of appellant for weapons and had him sit in the patrol

car's front passenger seat. Sergeant Kuehne sat in the driver's seat. Appellant was not

handcuffed or told he was under arrest, and the patrol car's front passenger door was not

locked. While Sergeant Kuehne was entering information on the patrol car's laptop and

waiting for dispatch to advise him regarding appellant's driver's license, the existence of

any outstanding warrants, and the rental agreement, he questioned appellant about his

travel plans. Appellant indicated that he was traveling from Oregon to West Viriginia to

stay with an uncle, that a friend had rented the Pacifica because he did not have much

money, and that he was driving instead of flying so he could see the states. During this

exchange, the sergeant noticed that appellant was sweating and "stomach breathing."

{¶ 6} While this exchange was taking place, a canine unit was dispatched to the

scene to conduct an open-air sniff around the Pacifica. After the canine alerted on the

Pacifica, indicating the presence of drugs, Sergeant Kuehne advised appellant that the

canine alert gave officers probable cause to search the Pacifica and that appellant was

detained but not under arrest. The sergeant then advised appellant of his Miranda rights.

Appellant indicated he understood his rights. Upon questioning, appellant admitted there

was a large quantity of marijuana in the Pacifica and that he had been paid $5,000 to

transport it. The Pacifica was taken to the highway patrol post. A search of the vehicle

yielded 51 pounds of marijuana in 51 one-pound vacuum-sealed individual bags that were

found in two large black trash bags.

{¶ 7} Following the presentation of the evidence, the trial court orally denied the

motion to suppress. The trial court journalized its decision and entry denying the

suppression motion on September 18, 2024. As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court

determined that Sergeant Kuehne had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop based upon

violations of R.C. 4511.34(A) and 4511.27(A)(1)—following too close and unsafe lane

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change, respectively—that there was no undue delay from the time of the initial stop until

the time the canine alerted on the Pacifica eight minutes later, and that appellant had

been properly Mirandized and waived those rights before making incriminating

statements.

{¶ 8} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on September 10, 2024. Sergeant

Kuehne, another state trooper, and Danielle Sandor, a criminalist with the Ohio State

Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory, testified on behalf of the State. Appellant did not testify

or present witnesses on his own behalf.

{¶ 9} The record shows that the substance found in the bags recovered from the

Pacifica was tested and analyzed by Sandor and Joann Lami, also a criminalist with the

Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory. Lami conducted a qualitative analysis of all 51 bags,

which included weighing and physically examining the substance in the bags. Using

hypergeometric sampling, Sandor randomly selected and conducted a quantitative

analysis of 18 of the 51 bags. Sandor and Lami then prepared a joint report which was

admitted into evidence without objection. Lami's portion of the report concluded that "a

total of 51 bags were present with a total combined weight of 23145.8 grams +/- 16.8

grams" and that her analysis "identified the presence of plant material of the genus

cannabis." Lami's portion of the report further concluded that at least 20,000 grams of the

substance tested was marijuana as legally defined in Ohio.

{¶ 10} Sandor testified that a quantitative analysis determines the amount of THC

and THCA in a plant material, that both hemp and marijuana fall into the cannabis plant

category, that hemp is a cannabis plant with less than .3 percent THC, and that marijuana

is anything above that THC concentration level. Sandor testified that all the bags she

tested were above .3 percent THC. The joint report shows that the THC concentration in

the 18 tested bags ranged from 9.6 percent to 21.8 percent.

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{¶ 11} The jury found appellant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced

appellant to an indefinite prison term of five to seven-and-one-half years.

{¶ 12} Appellant now appeals, raising two assignments of error.

{¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 1:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

{¶ 14} Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence obtained and seized during the traffic stop. Appellant does not challenge the

initial stop of the Pacifica or the probable cause to search the vehicle once the canine

alerted. Instead, appellant asserts that the duration of the traffic stop beyond the time

period necessary to issue a citation for the traffic violations without any reasonable,

articulable suspicion of additional criminal activity was unreasonable. Appellant further

asserts that the statements he made while seated in Sergent Kuehne's patrol car were

the product of custodial interrogation and warranted suppression because he was not

advised of his Miranda rights until after the canine alerted.

{¶ 15} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed

question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. When considering a

motion to suppress, the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh the

evidence to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Vaughn,

2015-Ohio-828, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.). Therefore, when reviewing the denial of a motion to

suppress, a court of appeals is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are

supported by competent, credible evidence. Id. "An appellate court, however,

independently reviews the trial court's legal conclusions based on those facts and

determines, without deference to the trial court's decision, whether as a matter of law, the

facts satisfy the appropriate legal standard." State v. Cochran, 2007-Ohio-3353, ¶ 12

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(12th Dist.).

Duration of the Traffic Stop

{¶ 16} "The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,

Article I of the Ohio Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, including

unreasonable automobile stops." Bowling Green v. Godwin, 2006-Ohio-3563, ¶ 11. When

the police stop a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred,

the stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id.

{¶ 17} When conducting a stop of a motor vehicle for a traffic violation, an officer

may detain the vehicle for a time sufficient to investigate the reasonable, articulable

suspicion for which the vehicle was initially stopped. State v. Hernandez, 2007-Ohio-

5190, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). The duration of the stop is limited to the time necessary to

effectuate the purpose for which the stop was made, but also includes the time necessary

to run a computer check on the driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates. Id.

However, the detention may continue beyond this time frame when additional facts are

encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity

beyond that which prompted the initial stop. Id.

{¶ 18} In addition, a lawfully detained vehicle may be subjected to a canine sniff of

the vehicle's exterior even without the presence of a reasonable suspicion of drug-related

activity. State v. Howard, 2006-Ohio-5656, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). Both Ohio courts and the

United States Supreme Court have determined that "the exterior sniff by a trained

narcotics dog to detect the odor of drugs is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment to the Constitution." Id.; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). Thus,

a canine sniff of a vehicle may be conducted during the time period necessary to

effectuate the original purpose of the stop. Howard at ¶ 17. Moreover, if a trained narcotics

dog alerts to the odor of drugs from a lawfully detained vehicle, an officer has probable

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cause to search the vehicle for contraband. Id.

{¶ 19} Upon reviewing the record, we find that Sergeant Kuehne did not

unreasonably detain appellant beyond that which was necessary to conduct the

investigation. Upon being pulled over for traffic violations, appellant provided a State of

Washington driver's license and rental documentation which indicated that the Pacifica

had been rented by a third party, not appellant. In addition, the rental documentation

provided by appellant did not include his name. After this initial contact, as the two men

sat in the patrol car and Sergeant Kuehne was entering information on the patrol car's

laptop and waiting for dispatch to advise him regarding appellant's driver's license, the

existence of outstanding warrants, and the rental agreement, the canine unit arrived on

the scene. Before Sergeant Kuehne was able to complete the routine checks described

above, the canine alerted on the Pacifica. The canine alert occurred eight minutes after

the sergeant had initiated the traffic stop.

{¶ 20} Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err in

finding that the duration of the traffic stop did not violate appellant's Fourth Amendment

rights and denying the motion to suppress on this basis.

Custodial Interrogation

{¶ 21} The Miranda warnings serve as prophylactic safeguards to protect a

person's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). The police are not required to issue Miranda

warnings to every individual they question. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495

(1977). Rather, such warnings must be issued only when the police subject a suspect to

"custodial interrogation." Miranda at 444; State v. Biros, 1997-Ohio-204, ¶ 40.

{¶ 22} A custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom

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of action in any significant way." Cleveland v. Oles, 2017-Ohio-5834, ¶ 9. The relevant

inquiry is not whether the individual feels free to leave but whether a reasonable person

in the suspect's position would have understood himself or herself to be in custody. Id. at

¶ 30-31. Questioning a suspect during a traffic stop in the front seat of a police vehicle

does not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation when (1) the intrusion was minimal,

(2) the questioning and detention were brief, and (3) the interaction was nonthreatening

or nonintimidating. Id. at ¶ 24.

{¶ 23} The record clearly shows that appellant did not admit there was a large

quantity of marijuana in the Pacifica and that he had been paid $5,000 to transport it until

after the canine alerted on the Pacifica and appellant was then advised of his Miranda

rights. Prior to appellant being Mirandized, the fact Sergeant Kuehne questioned him

while the two men sat in the patrol car does not mean that appellant was in custody.

Sergeant Kuehne conducted a consensual pat-down of appellant for weapons and had

him sit in the patrol car's front passenger seat. Sergeant Kuehne did not indicate he

wanted to search the Pacifica. The setting was in public view on the highway shoulder,

and the sergeant performed procedures typical of a traffic stop. Oles at ¶ 26. Appellant

was not handcuffed or told he was under arrest, and the patrol car's front passenger door

was unlocked. The interaction between appellant and Sergeant Kuehne was

nonthreatening and nonintimidating, and the questioning and appellant's detention in the

patrol car were both short in duration. Sergeant Kuehne questioned appellant about his

travel plans, including his destination, why he drove instead of flying, and the person he

was to visit. While these questions inquired into the nature and destination of appellant's

trip from Oregon to West Virginia, they were not inherently incriminating. Further, none of

the pre-Miranda statements from appellant directly led to the discovery of the marijuana

in the Pacifica.

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{¶ 24} Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we find that Sergeant

Kuehne's questioning of appellant in the front seat of the patrol car before the canine

alerted did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.

The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding that appellant's Fourth Amendment rights

were not violated and denying the motion to suppress on this basis.

{¶ 25} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 26} Assignment of Error No. 2:

THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY THE STATE OF OHIO WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

{¶ 27} Appellant argues that his conviction for marijuana possession is against the

manifest weight of the evidence because the State failed to prove that the substance

seized from the Pacifica was marijuana and not hemp.

{¶ 28} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, a reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether

in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new

trial ordered. State v. Peyton, 2017-Ohio-243, ¶ 42 (12th Dist.). An appellate court will

overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence only in extraordinary

circumstances when the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal.

Id.

{¶ 29} Appellant was convicted of possessing marijuana in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A), which provides, "No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a

controlled substance or a controlled substance analog." Under R.C. 2925.11(C)(3)(f),

possession of marijuana is a felony of the second degree if the amount of the drug

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involved equals or exceeds 20,000 grams but is less than 40,000 grams.

{¶ 30} Appellant challenges Sandor's testimony, asserting (1) that she testified

cannabis and hemp look alike, (2) that she could not find out where the samples came

from, (3) that she was not familiar with decarboxylation, and (4) that although the samples

she tested contained both THC and THCA, she could not define how much THCA was in

the samples.

{¶ 31} The record does not support appellant's assertions. Sandor testified that

cannabis and hemp "can look similar visually;" however, she was not asked to

differentiate between the two and it was Lami's task to conduct the qualitative analysis.

Regarding the origin of the samples, Sandor testified that she never knows where the

samples come from, i.e. where the substance was actually grown, but that regardless of

the origin, she can determine whether the sample is hemp or marijuana. Appellant fails

to show why or how this is of any significance.

{¶ 32} Contrary to appellant's suggestion, Sandor did not testify she did not know

what decarboxylation was. Rather, she testified she was familiar with it but not enough to

give an opinion as to whether it can change the structure of a substance. On direct

examination, Sandor testified she conducted the quantitative analysis, using an

instrument and technique called LC-DAD (Liquid Chromatography with Diode Array

Detector). Sandor explained that prior to conducting the analysis, the substance must first

be dried and is accordingly placed into an oven for no more than 24 hours at a

temperature of less than 500 degrees. Once dried, the substance is ground up into "a sort

of fine powder" to which solvents are added. The resulting substance is injected into a

column, which separates different compounds within the substance, and it then goes

through the DAD part, which passes ultraviolet light through the substance. Readings

from the LC-DAD are then plugged into an Ohio Revised Code "verified and approved

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worksheet that has locked cells," which calculates the total percentage of THC. Sandor

testified that THC and THCA are both included in the readings from the LC-DAD.

{¶ 33} On cross-examination, Sandor confirmed that readings from the LC-DAD

instrument provide the total concentration of THC and the total concentration of THCA in

the tested samples. The readings are then plugged into a formula set by the Ohio Revised

Code to determine the total amount of THC. In other words, the THC and THCA numbers

obtained from the LC-DAD are combined to arrive at the total amount of THC. Sandor

agreed that the joint report did not include the amount of THCA for each sample tested,

only the final amount of THC. Appellant did not present competing testimony. Based upon

its finding that appellant was guilty of marijuana possession, the jury clearly credited

Sandor's testimony and we defer to the jury's assessment of credibility.

{¶ 34} Furthermore, the joint report of Sandor and Lami concluded that the

substance seized from the Pacifica was marijuana based upon the amount of THC in the

samples tested, and further provided the weight of the substance. Under R.C. 2925.51(A),

a laboratory report from a qualifying facility—the Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime

Laboratory here—and signed by the person performing the analysis, "stating that the

substance that is the basis of the alleged offense has been weighed and analyzed and

stating the findings as to the content, weight, and identity of the substance and that it

contains any amount of a controlled substance . . . is prima-facie evidence of the content,

identity, and weight or the existence and number of unit dosages of the substance." The

State's supplementation of the criminalists' joint report with Sandor's testimony did not

waive the State's ability to rely on the report as prima facie evidence under R.C.

2925.51(A). State v. Schilling, 65 Ohio App.3d 154, 160 (5th Dist. 1989); State v. Isaac,

1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5061 (4th Dist. Sept. 29, 1993).

{¶ 35} In light of the foregoing, we find that the State presented evidence that the

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substance at issue was marijuana and not hemp. Appellant's conviction for marijuana

possession is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 36} Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 37} Judgment affirmed.

BYRNE, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.

It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Madison County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.

/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge

/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge

/s/ Mike Powell, Judge

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