SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CRAIG A. KARSNITZ, SUSSEX COUNTY COURTHOUSE RESIDENT JUDGE 1 THE CIRCLE, SUITE 2 GEORGETOWN, DE 19947 TELEPHONE (302) 856-5263
August 18, 2023
Rodolfo Martinez SBI# 00452236 James T. Vaughn Correctional Center 1181 Paddock Road Smyrna, DE 19977
Re: State of Delaware v. Rodolfo Martinez, Def. ID Nos. 1904013653 and 1904003476 (R-1)
Dear Mr. Martinez:
On February 19, 2020, after a colloquy with me, you pled guilty to Drug
Dealing Tier 4, Racketeering, and Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a
Person Prohibited. You were sentenced that same day to five years at Level 5 for
the Drug Dealing Charge and two years at Level 5 for the Racketeering Charge.
On August 24, 2022, I received your first pro se Motion for Postconviction
Relief under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (the “Motion”), dated
August 17, 2022, with respect to the above-referenced cases, together with a Brief
in Support of the Motion (the “Brief”). You state six grounds for relief. The first four grounds assert that your constitutional rights were violated under the Sixth
Amendment to the Unites States Constitution1 and the Delaware Supreme Court case
Reed v. State2 by the failure of Zachary George, Esquire, your defense counsel at
trial (“Trial Counsel”) to consider a motion to withdraw your guilty plea in order to
pursue several suppression motions and a potential trial defense under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,3 or to allow another lawyer to do so.
Your fifth ground asserts cumulative error under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution4 and the Delaware Constitution.5 Your sixth ground
asserts that any of the first four claims, standing alone, warrants withdrawal of your
guilty plea. Your Motion did not request the appointment of postconviction counsel,
nor was I obligated to appoint one.6
I first address the four procedural bars of Rule 61.7 If a procedural bar exists,
as a general rule I will not address the merits of the postconviction claim.8 A Rule
1 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 2 258 A.3d 807 (Del. 2021). The Reed case was heard by me. 3 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 4 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 5 Del. Const. Art. I, § 12. 6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3). 7 Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del.2002) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 8 Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del 2016); State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at*13 (Del. Super. April 28, 2009). 2 61 Motion can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, failure to raise
claims below, or former adjudication.9
First, a motion for postconviction relief exceeds time limitations if it is filed
more than one year after the conviction becomes final.10 In this case, your conviction
became final for purposes of Rule 61 30 days after I imposed sentence; i.e., March
19, 2020.11 You filed the Motion on August 24, 2022, long after the one-year
deadline. Therefore, consideration of the Motion would ordinarily be barred by the
one-year limitation.
Second, second or subsequent motions for postconviction relief are not
permitted unless certain conditions are satisfied.12 Since this is your first motion for
postconviction relief, consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.
Third, grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction” are barred unless certain conditions are satisfied.13 Your
grounds for relief are based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It is well-
settled Delaware law that, as collateral claims, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i). 10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1). 12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 13 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 3 are properly raised for the first time in postconviction proceedings.14 Therefore,
consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.
Fourth, grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including
“proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction
proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred.15 In the Motion, you
seek to relitigate issues you have already asserted in the case in various suppression
motions and a potential trial defense based on the seizure of certain items, all of which
motions I previously denied. Therefore, consideration of the Motion would ordinarily
be barred by this provision.
However, none of these four procedural bars apply either to a claim that a new,
retroactively applied rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.16 You
argue that Reed created a new, retroactively applied rule of constitutional law that
apples to your case and renders your conviction invalid. You further argue that, as a
result, the two procedural bars under Rule 61, which would otherwise apply, do not
apply, and I should consider the Motion on its merits.
14 State v. Schofield, 2019 WL 103862, at *2 (Del. Super. January 3, 2019); Thelemarque v. State, 2016 WL 556631, at *3 (Del. Feb. 11, 2016) (“[T]his Court will not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal.”); Watson v. State, 2013 WL 5745708, at *2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not consider a claim of ineffective assistance that is raised for the first time in a direct appeal.”). 15 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 16 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 4 On August 31, 2022, I directed that, because of this constitutional argument,
postconviction counsel be appointed to represent you as soon as practicable.17 I also
requested a response from the State to your Motion.18
Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, was appointed as your postconviction counsel
(“PCC”). However, when you conferred with Mr. Collins, you informed him that
you wished to proceed pro se, and thus his appointment as PCC was rescinded.
On April 19, 2023, I entered a Scheduling Order giving you until June 20,
2023 to file an amended Rule 61 Motion. I never received this amended Motion from
you, and therefore deem it waived. After an extension of the deadline, the State’s
Response, dated July 31, 2023, was received on August 1, 2023.
You assert that Trial Counsel failed to consider a motion to withdraw your
guilty plea, or to allow another lawyer to do so, in violation of Reed, and that this
failure constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the dual standards of
Strickland v. Washington19 and Ploof v. State.20 Reed was decided after your case,
so the threshold legal question is whether Reed established a new, retroactively
applied rule of constitutional law that applies to your case.
This Court resolved that issue in State v. Wonnum,21 in which it held:
17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3). 18 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(f)(1). 19 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 20 75 A.3d 840 (2013), which applied Strickland in Delaware. 21 2022 WL 681951 (Del. Super. March 8, 2022). 5 Reed established no new constitutional right and to the extent that it does, the facts of this case make Reed inapplicable to it.22
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CRAIG A. KARSNITZ, SUSSEX COUNTY COURTHOUSE RESIDENT JUDGE 1 THE CIRCLE, SUITE 2 GEORGETOWN, DE 19947 TELEPHONE (302) 856-5263
August 18, 2023
Rodolfo Martinez SBI# 00452236 James T. Vaughn Correctional Center 1181 Paddock Road Smyrna, DE 19977
Re: State of Delaware v. Rodolfo Martinez, Def. ID Nos. 1904013653 and 1904003476 (R-1)
Dear Mr. Martinez:
On February 19, 2020, after a colloquy with me, you pled guilty to Drug
Dealing Tier 4, Racketeering, and Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a
Person Prohibited. You were sentenced that same day to five years at Level 5 for
the Drug Dealing Charge and two years at Level 5 for the Racketeering Charge.
On August 24, 2022, I received your first pro se Motion for Postconviction
Relief under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (the “Motion”), dated
August 17, 2022, with respect to the above-referenced cases, together with a Brief
in Support of the Motion (the “Brief”). You state six grounds for relief. The first four grounds assert that your constitutional rights were violated under the Sixth
Amendment to the Unites States Constitution1 and the Delaware Supreme Court case
Reed v. State2 by the failure of Zachary George, Esquire, your defense counsel at
trial (“Trial Counsel”) to consider a motion to withdraw your guilty plea in order to
pursue several suppression motions and a potential trial defense under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,3 or to allow another lawyer to do so.
Your fifth ground asserts cumulative error under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution4 and the Delaware Constitution.5 Your sixth ground
asserts that any of the first four claims, standing alone, warrants withdrawal of your
guilty plea. Your Motion did not request the appointment of postconviction counsel,
nor was I obligated to appoint one.6
I first address the four procedural bars of Rule 61.7 If a procedural bar exists,
as a general rule I will not address the merits of the postconviction claim.8 A Rule
1 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 2 258 A.3d 807 (Del. 2021). The Reed case was heard by me. 3 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 4 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 5 Del. Const. Art. I, § 12. 6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3). 7 Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del.2002) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 8 Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del 2016); State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at*13 (Del. Super. April 28, 2009). 2 61 Motion can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, failure to raise
claims below, or former adjudication.9
First, a motion for postconviction relief exceeds time limitations if it is filed
more than one year after the conviction becomes final.10 In this case, your conviction
became final for purposes of Rule 61 30 days after I imposed sentence; i.e., March
19, 2020.11 You filed the Motion on August 24, 2022, long after the one-year
deadline. Therefore, consideration of the Motion would ordinarily be barred by the
one-year limitation.
Second, second or subsequent motions for postconviction relief are not
permitted unless certain conditions are satisfied.12 Since this is your first motion for
postconviction relief, consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.
Third, grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction” are barred unless certain conditions are satisfied.13 Your
grounds for relief are based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It is well-
settled Delaware law that, as collateral claims, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i). 10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1). 12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 13 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 3 are properly raised for the first time in postconviction proceedings.14 Therefore,
consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.
Fourth, grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including
“proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction
proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred.15 In the Motion, you
seek to relitigate issues you have already asserted in the case in various suppression
motions and a potential trial defense based on the seizure of certain items, all of which
motions I previously denied. Therefore, consideration of the Motion would ordinarily
be barred by this provision.
However, none of these four procedural bars apply either to a claim that a new,
retroactively applied rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.16 You
argue that Reed created a new, retroactively applied rule of constitutional law that
apples to your case and renders your conviction invalid. You further argue that, as a
result, the two procedural bars under Rule 61, which would otherwise apply, do not
apply, and I should consider the Motion on its merits.
14 State v. Schofield, 2019 WL 103862, at *2 (Del. Super. January 3, 2019); Thelemarque v. State, 2016 WL 556631, at *3 (Del. Feb. 11, 2016) (“[T]his Court will not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal.”); Watson v. State, 2013 WL 5745708, at *2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not consider a claim of ineffective assistance that is raised for the first time in a direct appeal.”). 15 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 16 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 4 On August 31, 2022, I directed that, because of this constitutional argument,
postconviction counsel be appointed to represent you as soon as practicable.17 I also
requested a response from the State to your Motion.18
Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, was appointed as your postconviction counsel
(“PCC”). However, when you conferred with Mr. Collins, you informed him that
you wished to proceed pro se, and thus his appointment as PCC was rescinded.
On April 19, 2023, I entered a Scheduling Order giving you until June 20,
2023 to file an amended Rule 61 Motion. I never received this amended Motion from
you, and therefore deem it waived. After an extension of the deadline, the State’s
Response, dated July 31, 2023, was received on August 1, 2023.
You assert that Trial Counsel failed to consider a motion to withdraw your
guilty plea, or to allow another lawyer to do so, in violation of Reed, and that this
failure constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the dual standards of
Strickland v. Washington19 and Ploof v. State.20 Reed was decided after your case,
so the threshold legal question is whether Reed established a new, retroactively
applied rule of constitutional law that applies to your case.
This Court resolved that issue in State v. Wonnum,21 in which it held:
17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3). 18 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(f)(1). 19 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 20 75 A.3d 840 (2013), which applied Strickland in Delaware. 21 2022 WL 681951 (Del. Super. March 8, 2022). 5 Reed established no new constitutional right and to the extent that it does, the facts of this case make Reed inapplicable to it.22
I am persuaded by the State’s argument that Reed does not expand the protections
of the Sixth Amendment, but rather clarifies the existing rules and applies existing
precedent. As such, it does not meet the Rule 61 requirement that would allow it to
defeat the procedural bars of Rule 61.
Even if Reed were deemed to apply a retroactively applicable constitutional
rule to your case, the facts of your case are different from those in Reed. In Reed,
the defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing, The defendant’s
counsel did not believe that there were grounds to justify withdrawal of the guilty
plea. I declined to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea sua sponte, since
he was represented by counsel. In your case, you pled and were sentenced
immediately. There is no evidence whatsoever in your case that you had any issue
with your plea, or any disagreement with Trial Counsel about your guilty plea, until
you filed your Rule 61 Motion. Then the Reed decision came down and offered you
a convenient escape from the procedural bars of Rule 61.
For the reasons discussed above, there is no need for me to hold an evidentiary
hearing23 to consider your constitutional argument. Your Rule 61 Motion is
procedurally barred and is DENIED.
22 Id. at *3. 23 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g)(3). 6 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
cc: Prothonotary Georgia C. Pham, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General Zachary George, Esquire