#30654-a-SRJ 2025 S.D. 15
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CHAD DALE MARTIN, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
THE HONORABLE SANDRA H. HANSON Judge
CHRISTOPHER MILES of Minnehaha County Public Defender’s Office Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant and appellant.
MARTY J. JACKLEY Attorney General
JENNIFER M. JORGENSON Assistant Attorney General Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS JANUARY 13, 2025 OPINION FILED 03/12/25 #30654
JENSEN, Chief Justice
[¶1.] Chad Martin was indicted on multiple felony and misdemeanor
charges following a high-speed chase during which he struck another vehicle,
injuring one of its occupants. Martin pleaded guilty to one count of vehicular
battery and one count of aggravated eluding. He also admitted to a part II habitual
offender information. The circuit court sentenced Martin to twenty years in the
state penitentiary with eight years suspended on the vehicular battery conviction
and imposed a suspended two-year sentence on the aggravated eluding conviction.
Martin appeals, claiming the circuit court abused its discretion by considering
uncharged conduct at sentencing. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
[¶2.] On August 25, 2023, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Sioux Falls police
officers on patrol near 14th Street and South Phillips Avenue observed a blue
Saturn Outlook matching the description in a “be on the lookout” (BOLO) bulletin
issued by law enforcement. The BOLO stated the vehicle had been stolen from its
registered owner earlier in the afternoon while the owner was standing nearby.
The vehicle’s owner approached the vehicle and attempted to remove the suspect by
reaching into the vehicle to strike him. With the owner still partially inside the
vehicle, the suspect then attempted to flee in the vehicle and struck a woman on
foot near the scene.
[¶3.] When officers observed the vehicle later that evening, they ran the
vehicle’s plates, which confirmed it as stolen. They followed the vehicle as it turned
southbound onto South Cliff Avenue. The officers activated their emergency lights
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to initiate a traffic stop, but the vehicle accelerated and turned westbound onto East
16th Street in an apparent attempt to evade law enforcement. Given the
circumstances of the vehicle’s theft, the officers notified Metro Communications that
they were initiating a pursuit.
[¶4.] A high-speed chase ensued through residential areas, during which the
suspect vehicle ran multiple stop signs and traffic lights. The vehicle eventually
returned to Cliff Avenue, reaching speeds of approximately 75 miles per hour. At
the intersection of East 12th Street and Cliff Avenue, the vehicle nearly crashed,
clipping another vehicle, but regained control. At the intersection of 10th Street
and Cliff Avenue, the vehicle ran a red light and collided with another vehicle
lawfully proceeding through a green light, disabling both vehicles. S.A.R., an
occupant of the vehicle struck during the collision, sustained injuries and was
transported to a local hospital, where she was diagnosed with a broken collarbone.
[¶5.] The driver exited the stolen vehicle and fled on foot. After a brief
pursuit, officers apprehended and identified him as Chad Martin. Officers observed
Martin’s bloodshot, glossy eyes, suggesting impairment. Standard field sobriety
tests were not performed due to the nature of the incident and Martin’s flight risk.
[¶6.] A Minnehaha County grand jury returned an indictment charging
Martin with several felony and misdemeanor offenses including vehicular battery in
violation of SDCL 22-18-36, a Class 4 felony, and aggravated eluding in violation of
SDCL 32-33-18.2, a Class 6 felony. All the charges were based on the events
surrounding the high-speed pursuit with law enforcement that resulted in the
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collision with S.A.R.’s vehicle. The State did not charge Martin for the events
involving the theft of the vehicle earlier that same day.
[¶7.] The State also filed a part II information pursuant to SDCL 22-7-8
alleging Martin had been convicted in South Dakota of three or more prior felony
offenses, including one or more crimes of violence. 1 Martin was arraigned on
September 11, 2023, and entered a not guilty plea to all of the charges.
[¶8.] On October 30, 2023, the parties appeared and presented a plea
agreement on the record. Under the agreement, Martin would plead guilty to
vehicular battery and aggravated eluding and admit to the part II information. In
exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charges and agreed to recommend
that penitentiary time be capped at a maximum of twelve years for both charges,
with any additional suspended time left to the circuit court’s discretion.
[¶9.] After Martin entered his guilty pleas, the State provided a factual
basis, detailing law enforcement’s high-speed pursuit of the stolen vehicle and the
injuries sustained by S.A.R. when Martin ran a red light during the pursuit. The
State did not describe the events surrounding the initial theft of the vehicle but
referenced it stating: “The officers that were attempting to do the stop were able to
get authorization to pursue the vehicle. While that is not the normal police
department policy, the circumstances under which this vehicle had been stolen
made it a higher risk so they were able to get authorization to pursue.”
1. The part II information alleged Martin had been convicted of seven prior felonies between 2015 and 2022. One of these prior felonies was a crime of violence, enhancing the potential punishment to the level of a Class C felony under SDCL 22-7-8, carrying a maximum sentence of life in prison. See SDCL 22-6-1. -3- #30654
[¶10.] Martin agreed the factual basis supported his pleas but denied stealing
the vehicle earlier in the day. His counsel further stated that Martin believed he
had permission to use the vehicle from someone he knew and denied knowing that
it was stolen. The circuit court accepted Martin’s pleas, and at Martin’s request,
sentencing was delayed. The court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) to be
prepared for sentencing.
[¶11.] The PSI included the police reports, which described in detail both the
high-speed pursuit and the initial theft of the vehicle earlier in the afternoon, as the
official version of the offense. Martin also provided his version of the offense, in
which he admitted to driving the stolen vehicle during the high-speed pursuit but
denied involvement in the initial theft of the vehicle. Although he claimed during
his plea hearing that he believed he had permission to use the vehicle, his version of
the offense in the PSI stated that he observed the vehicle running and unoccupied
for twenty minutes, and then took it. Martin admitted he had a bloody lip when
apprehended, but claimed this occurred during the collision with S.A.R.’s vehicle.
[¶12.] According to the police reports of the initial theft, at approximately
4:30 p.m. on August 25, 2023, Sioux Falls police were dispatched to the area of West
1st Street and North Prairie Avenue following reports of a stolen vehicle and a
woman struck by the vehicle. The owner, A.C., told police he had left his vehicle
running with the keys in the ignition while speaking to M.A., a woman walking
with her child in a stroller. A.C. observed an unknown man enter his vehicle and he
attempted to stop him by striking the suspect through the open window. A.C.
described the suspect as a Native American male with a crew cut, wearing a maroon
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shirt, possibly in his 30s, and of stocky build. 2 The suspect put the vehicle in drive,
briefly dragging A.C. before he fell to the ground.
[¶13.] In an attempt to assist, M.A. positioned herself approximately twenty
feet in front of the vehicle. Without swerving, the suspect drove forward, striking
M.A. and sending her airborne over the hood of the vehicle. M.A., having landed in
the middle of the street, suffered a sore wrist, a noticeable bump on her head, and
road rash, while A.C. sustained scrapes to his arms and knees.
[¶14.] The responding officers interviewed four other witnesses who
corroborated the description of the incident provided by A.C. and M.A. One of these
witnesses was a nearby resident with exterior cameras that captured the incident.
While the footage confirmed the sequence of events, officers were unable to obtain a
clear description of the driver beyond what had been provided by A.C.
[¶15.] The police reports of the subsequent high-speed pursuit indicate that
at approximately 10:34 p.m. that same day, law enforcement located Martin driving
the stolen vehicle. The rest of the information in these reports is consistent with
the events detailed in the State’s factual basis during the plea hearing.
[¶16.] In addition to the details of the offense, the PSI provided Martin’s
personal history, including his unstable upbringing and home life. It revealed a
significant criminal record beginning in his youth, with seven prior felonies and
ongoing supervision by the Department of Corrections at the time of the current
2. The PSI report indicates that Martin is a Native American male and 26 years old. During Martin’s initial appearance on August 28, the State acknowledged that it did “not have enough information right now to know if this defendant is the same suspect who originally took the vehicle,” but noted that “he does match the general description[.]” -5- #30654
offense. Martin reported frequent institutionalization since his teenage years. The
PSI also highlighted a history of substance abuse, with Martin admitting to
consuming alcohol several times a week, marijuana daily, and methamphetamine
weekly. Martin did not object to any of the information in the PSI report.
[¶17.] During sentencing, the State recounted Martin’s possession of the
stolen vehicle, high-speed flight from law enforcement, collisions with multiple
vehicles, and subsequent attempt to flee on foot. The State also noted Martin’s
blood test results taken a few hours after his arrest, which showed a BAC of .03 and
the presence of methamphetamine, amphetamine, carboxy THC,
dextromethorphan, and Delta-9 THC. The State emphasized Martin’s extensive
criminal history, substance abuse, and repeated poor decisions. Based on this and
the other sentencing factors, the State requested a twelve-year sentence with
additional suspended time.
[¶18.] Martin’s counsel requested a lesser sentence, highlighting Martin’s
remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and his challenging upbringing. His counsel
noted that “it is quite clear through his PSI that he did not have a stable home” and
“[h]e didn’t grow up with positive influences[.]” Martin’s counsel argued the
sentence should consider Martin’s difficult background and allow for personal
growth. Martin also addressed the court, expressing remorse for the high-speed
chase that resulted in another person’s injury.
[¶19.] The circuit court advised that it had considered all relevant factors and
in pronouncing the sentence, the court also stated it was considering uncharged
conduct set forth in the police reports, which it described as:
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[W]hen the events that led to all of these circumstances started, there was an incident where it looked like [Martin] entered a vehicle while the victim was distracted and drove away with the victim hanging out of the car window, trying to hit at him, and that person got injuries while doing that. Then while [Martin] was driving away, there was a woman . . . the vehicle struck her . . . sen[ding] her airborne over the hood of the vehicle and she got significant injuries to her head, wrist, hip, and other road rash[.]
[¶20.] The court also addressed Martin’s criminal history, noting that at least
one of his prior seven felonies involved a violent crime and expressing concern about
his parole violations, substance abuse, and inability to maintain employment or
housing. The court characterized the recent events as an escalation, stating:
There is repeated criminal offenses, especially in terms of taking cars from people, and this last one, basically, an active carjacking with someone trying to hang onto the car to prevent him from getting away with it, at least that is what the report indicates to me. And so even though Mr. Martin may not want to act like a bad person, his actions do present a danger to the public.
[¶21.] At this point, Martin’s counsel interjected, reiterating that Martin
denied involvement in the vehicle theft and the woman’s injury, stating: “[T]he
allegations regarding taking the vehicle, we have never entered any sort of facts
that support that. . . . [W]e do admit to the taking of the vehicle when it was parked
idling, but do dispute the allegations regarding hours prior.”
[¶22.] The court acknowledged the denial but emphasized its reliance on the
PSI, and the statements from counsel and Martin, stating: “I understand that is not
what Mr. Martin agrees occurred, but the [c]ourt is not limited to what he stipulates
to in support of a guilty plea when the [c]ourt renders a sentence.” The court
further explained that a PSI is generally a reliable source of information, noting
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“that there was quite a distinction between what [Martin] described as the events
that led up to these circumstances” and what the official reports indicated about
how this all began. Additionally, the court reiterated its concerns regarding
Martin’s criminal history, viewing this most recent event as an escalation and a
threat to public safety.
[¶23.] The circuit court sentenced Martin to twenty years in the state
penitentiary with eight years suspended on the vehicular battery conviction and a
suspended two-year sentence on the aggravated eluding conviction. The court
ordered the sentences to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a prior
sentence for which Martin was on parole at the time.
[¶24.] At the end of the sentencing hearing, Martin asked the circuit court,
“[w]ell, was I just -- was I just sentenced on -- like, a -- what was -- what was the
basis of where I was just sentenced? You brought up something totally different
from what I am facing and what I am charged with.” After an off-the-record
discussion occurred between Martin and his counsel, Martin’s counsel informed the
court that they did not have any other questions.
[¶25.] Martin appeals his sentence, arguing the circuit court abused its
discretion in considering the uncharged conduct at sentencing.
Standard of Review
[¶26.] “[W]e review the sentencing court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Peltier, 2023 S.D. 62, ¶ 29, 998 N.W.2d 333, 342 (alteration in original)
(citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is a fundamental error of judgment, a
choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full
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consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.” State v. Lanpher, 2024 S.D. 26, ¶ 25, 7
N.W.3d 308, 317 (citation omitted). “This Court . . . will not overturn the circuit
court’s abuse of discretion unless that ‘error is demonstrated and shown to be
prejudicial error.’” State v. Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 27, 963 N.W.2d 326, 332
(quoting State v. Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 26, 958 N.W.2d 734, 740).
Analysis
[¶27.] “Sentencing courts possess broad discretion ‘[w]ithin constitutional and
statutory limits’ to determine ‘the extent and kind of punishment to be imposed.’”
Id. ¶ 28, 963 N.W.2d at 333 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Rice, 2016 S.D.
18, ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d 75, 83). “The circuit court should weigh, on a case-by-case
basis, the traditional sentencing factors of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and incapacitation without giving any particular factor preeminence[.]” State v.
Black Cloud, 2023 S.D. 53, ¶ 66, 996 N.W.2d 670, 686 (citation omitted). The court
“must consider sentencing evidence tending to mitigate or aggravate the severity of
a defendant’s conduct and its impact on others. Sentencing courts are often
required, in this regard, to accurately assess the ‘true nature of the offense.’” State
v. Banks, 2023 S.D. 39, ¶ 18, 994 N.W.2d 230, 235 (citation omitted).
[¶28.] In assessing the nature of the offense, a sentencing court has “wide
discretion with respect to the type of information used as well as its source.” State
v. Arabie, 2003 S.D. 57, ¶ 21, 663 N.W.2d 250, 257 (citation omitted). “This broad
range of information may include evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, as
the rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings.” Banks, 2023 S.D. 39,
¶ 19, 994 N.W.2d at 235. Thus, a court may rely on an extensive sentencing record
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and is not confined “to the information contained in a stipulated factual basis
statement used to support a defendant’s guilty plea.” State v. Caffee, 2023 S.D. 51,
¶ 28, 996 N.W.2d 351, 360 (citation omitted). Courts may also consider uncharged
conduct if the State proves it by a preponderance of the evidence and the defendant
has an opportunity to contest it. See State v. McKinney, 2005 S.D. 74, ¶ 18, 699
N.W.2d 460, 466 (“[A] defendant must have the opportunity to contest the
uncharged conduct.”); and Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 31, 963 N.W.2d at 333 (“Courts
may even consider conduct that was uncharged . . . as long as the State proves the
conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.”). See also Wabasha v. Leapley, 492
N.W.2d 610, 612 (S.D. 1992) (“Due process requires a defendant who contests the
accuracy of factual information relied upon by a sentencing court be given an
opportunity to rebut or explain that information.”).
[¶29.] Martin contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in
considering the uncharged conduct relating to the initial theft of the vehicle without
an express finding that the conduct was proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Martin argues that, despite his denial of the uncharged conduct, the circuit court
considered and relied upon the uncharged conduct in making its sentencing
decision, and the court therefore should have made explicit findings that the State
had proven the uncharged conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.
[¶30.] Yet, this Court has “never required detailed findings of fact to justify a
sentence.” State v. Bear Robe, 2024 S.D. 77, ¶ 16, 15 N.W.3d 460, 466. Further, we
have also recognized that when a court does not explicitly state the standard of
proof it applied, there is a rebuttable presumption it used the appropriate standard.
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Hoffman v. Hollow Horn, 2024 S.D. 59, ¶ 15 n.6, 12 N.W.3d 322, 327 n.6.
Accordingly, even if a sentencing court considers uncharged conduct without
explicitly finding it was proven by a preponderance of the evidence, this Court will
not disturb a sentence within the statutory maximum if the record contains
sufficient evidence to support such a finding and the defendant had an opportunity
to contest it.
[¶31.] The record reflects that the circuit court received three accounts of how
Martin came to possess the stolen vehicle—one from the police reports attached to
the PSI and two conflicting accounts from Martin. We have never required
sentencing courts to accept implausible accounts or conduct “mini-trials” to prove or
disprove a defendant’s version of events. See State v. Carsten, 264 N.W.2d 707,
709–10 (S.D. 1978). 3 The record also shows that Martin had an opportunity to
contest the uncharged conduct and his denial was explicitly noted by his counsel. 4
The circuit court “was well within the proper sphere of its sentencing discretion
3. Indeed, this Court has upheld sentences where the court considered the defendant’s truthfulness about the convicted offense. See State v. Miles, 2021 S.D. 13, ¶¶ 20–21, 956 N.W.2d 61, 67–68 (holding that the sentencing court properly considered the defendant’s lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility when it rejected his “incredulous” explanation in the PSI that he may have accidentally downloaded child pornography while intoxicated). See also State v. Murphy, 506 N.W.2d 130, 133 (S.D. 1993); and State v. Garber, 2004 S.D. 2, ¶ 33, 674 N.W.2d 320, 328.
4. Martin briefly states that “the circuit court did not provide a meaningful opportunity for [him] to contest the uncharged conduct[,]” but he neither develops this argument in his brief nor cites any supporting authority. See Duerre v. Hepler, 2017 S.D. 8, ¶ 28, 892 N.W.2d 209, 220 (“It is well-settled that the failure to brief an issue and support an argument with authority waives the right to have this Court review it.”). Martin does not claim the PSI was withheld or that he and his counsel did not have an opportunity to review it prior to the sentencing hearing. -11- #30654
when it elected to reject” Martin’s account and his disavowal of any connection to
the vehicle’s theft earlier in the day. Carsten, 264 N.W.2d at 710. In finding Martin
perpetrated the original theft, the court clearly credited the detailed police reports
and other information available to the court over Martin’s version of events, and
determined that he had engaged in the uncharged conduct earlier in the afternoon.
[¶32.] While there was no direct evidence identifying Martin as the
perpetrator, the totality of the evidence—including his undisputed possession of the
recently stolen vehicle, reckless flight from law enforcement, and conflicting
explanations as to how he obtained the vehicle—provided a sufficient evidentiary
basis for the court to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he
committed the theft detailed in the police reports. See State v. Podzimek, 2019 S.D.
43, ¶¶ 32–33, 932 N.W.2d 141, 149 (recognizing that the identity of the offender can
be proven by circumstantial evidence); State v. Deubler, 343 N.W.2d 380, 382 (S.D.
1984) (holding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support conviction of
grand theft when it included proof that defendant was apprehended driving the
stolen vehicle, and that he gave contradicting stories as to how he came into
possession); and State v. Dowty, 2013 S.D. 72, ¶ 19 n.9, 838 N.W.2d 820, 827 n.9
(quoting State v. Larkin, 87 S.D. 61, 67, 202 N.W.2d 862, 865 (1972)) (“[P]ossession
of recently stolen property is, in itself, a circumstance from which guilt may be
presumed.”).
[¶33.] Martin relies on United States v. Schaefer, 291 F.3d 932, 938–39 (7th
Cir. 2002), to support his claim that the circuit court erred in failing to make a
specific finding that the uncharged conduct relied upon by the court was proven by
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a preponderance of the evidence. He notes that this Court has itself relied on
Schaefer to recognize that sentencing courts may consider uncharged conduct in
order to familiarize themselves with a defendant. See Arabie, 2003 S.D. 57, ¶ 21,
663 N.W.2d at 257; State v. McCrary, 2004 S.D. 18, ¶ 8, 676 N.W.2d 116, 120;
McKinney, 2005 S.D. 74, ¶ 18, 699 N.W.2d at 466. However, the nature of the
uncharged conduct in Schaefer and its significance under the federal sentencing
guidelines is entirely distinct from the uncharged conduct at issue in this case. 5
[¶34.] Martin also contends that specific fact finding is required under our
recent decision in State v. Feucht, 2024 S.D. 16, ¶ 30, 5 N.W.3d 561, 570. In Feucht,
we vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because the
circuit court did not explicitly list the aggravating factors supporting a departure
from presumptive probation under SDCL 22-6-11. As we noted in that case, when
SDCL 22-6-11 was enacted “it imposed new sentencing requirements on circuit
courts for offenders convicted of certain offenses.” Id. ¶ 18, 5 N.W.3d at 567.
[¶35.] However, beyond such legislative mandate, this Court has “never
required a sentencing court to file detailed findings of fact to justify a sentence[,]” or
5. Schaefer relied upon the federal sentencing guidelines, which were mandatory at the time. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005) (subsequently holding the federal sentencing guidelines to be advisory rather than mandatory.) Schaefer vacated the federal district court’s enhanced sentence for wire fraud because the sentencing court failed to make the necessary factual findings that other alleged uncharged conduct, in the form of other prior financial transactions, involved unlawful wire fraud. Unlike in Schaefer, where multiple transactions over a substantial period complicated the loss calculation for a specific enhancement under the federal sentencing guidelines, the uncharged conduct here was considered by the circuit court in exercising its discretion to fashion an indeterminate sentence. -13- #30654
to consider uncharged conduct. State v. Deleon, 2022 S.D. 21, ¶ 24, 973 N.W.2d 241,
247 (quoting State v. Bult, 1996 S.D. 20, ¶ 12, 544 N.W.2d 214, 217). While
Martin’s conviction for aggravated eluding is a Class 6 felony subject to the
sentencing presumption in SDCL 22-6-11, the circuit court was not required to find
aggravating circumstances because it imposed a fully suspended sentence for that
conviction.
[¶36.] The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by considering the
uncharged conduct at sentencing without making explicit findings. Further, its
sentencing decision was not based solely on the uncharged conduct. The court also
considered Martin’s extensive criminal history, parole violations, and substance
abuse. The court emphasized Martin’s past conviction for a violent felony and the
circumstances of his most recent offense—a high-speed pursuit with law
enforcement through residential areas that ended in a collision with another
vehicle—concluding that his behavior posed a danger to the public. The court
imposed a sentence “within the statutory maximum, and there is no indication that
the sentence was outside the range of permissible choices.” State v. Henry, 2024
S.D. 30, ¶ 28, 7 N.W.3d 907, 913–14. The circuit court appropriately considered
multiple sentencing factors beyond the uncharged conduct, reflecting a proper
exercise of its discretion.
[¶37.] We affirm.
[¶38.] KERN, SALTER, DEVANEY, and MYREN, Justices, concur.
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