State v. Martin

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: June 16, 2023
• Docket: 2202010805
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) v. ) I.D. No. 2202010805 ) EDWARD MARTIN, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Submitted: April 21, 2023 Decided: June 16, 2023

Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.

Martin Cosgrove, Esquire, Amanda Nyman, Esquire, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware, Attorneys for the State of Delaware.

Daniel Strumpf, Esquire, James Murray, Esquire, Office of Defense Services, Georgetown, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant.

CONNER, J. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Edward Martin’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Suppress. The

Motion to Suppress seeks to exclude evidence obtained from Defendant’s residence,

Mazda 3, Chevrolet Equinox, SD memory cards and DNA due to unconstitutional

searches. After a thorough review of the parties’ submissions and oral argument, the

Motion to Suppress is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

At approximately 12:50 a.m. police responded to a shooting at Coastal

Taproom. Upon arrival police found Arrick Richards (the “victim”) on the floor

between the bar and billiards table with a gunshot wound to his upper chest. The

victim was transported to Beebe Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries shortly

after arrival. After the altercation, Defendant and his wife, Christie Martin, left

Coastal Taproom through the front doors and drove home together in a Chevrolet

Equinox.

At the scene police interviewed multiple witnesses and employees. From

those interviews police gleaned that an argument occurred between patrons in the

billiards table area. The incident was caught on Coastal Taproom’s surveillance

1 This factual background is based on testimony given at the preliminary hearing, search warrants, affidavits and the parties’ briefings. 1 cameras. With the help of the employees, surveillance video and credit card receipts,

the police quickly narrowed their suspect search to Defendant.

Through further investigative measures police were able to identify

Defendant’s address and another vehicle, a Mazda 3, as the last vehicle Defendant

was ticketed in. Police officers then headed to Defendant’s address in Millsboro,

Delaware. Two officers were conducting surveillance on Defendant’s residence

when they observed a vehicle matching the description of the Mazda 3 with a white

male operator turn into Defendant’s neighborhood. The officers followed the vehicle

and activated their lights. One officer observed the vehicle operator reaching or

moving something near the front passenger side. By the time the officer reached the

passenger side of the vehicle Defendant had his hands up and made a statement to

the effect of “you got the right guy.” Defendant was then taken into custody without

incident. A plain view inspection of the vehicle revealed a handgun on the front

passenger seat that was taken as evidence.

While standing outside Defendant’s residence, an officer looked in the culvert

pipe that ran under the driveway and discovered an empty handgun holster and a

large amount of 9-millimeter ammunition. According to the officer the evidence was

clean and freshly placed.

2 Also happening within this same timeframe was the arrest of Defendant’s

wife. Christie Martin returned to Coastal Taproom in a Chevrolet Equinox to retrieve

a cellphone she left behind. Upon approaching the doors of the establishment, police

officers questioned Christie about why she was there. Suspecting her to be under the

influence, officers conducted a DUI investigation and arrest. An employee of

Coastal Taproom recognized Christie and informed officers she was the woman that

was with Defendant during the shooting.

After Christie was arrested she was questioned by detectives about the

shooting. She stated her and Defendant arrived together and left together in a

Chevrolet Equinox. She also identified herself and Defendant in the surveillance

video but would not admit to knowing anything about the shooting. Christie told

officers that after leaving Coastal Taproom her and Defendant returned home to their

shared residence.

Defendant filed this Motion to Suppress on February 27, 2023. The State

responded on March 17, 2023. The Court scheduled a Suppression Hearing for

March 31, 2023. The parties declined the opportunity to present evidence and instead

used the hearing for oral argument.

3 STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a defendant challenges the validity of a search warrant with a motion

to suppress the defendant bears the burden of proving the challenged search or

seizure was unlawful.2 After a defendant challenges the validity of the search, the

reviewing Court employs a “four corners” test in which the Court must determine if

the affidavit “set[s] forth sufficient facts on its face for a judicial officer to form a

reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that seizable property

would be found in a particular place.”3 The warrant must also describe with

sufficient particularity the places to be searched.4

The magistrate’s initial determination of probable cause is owed great

deference.5 The magistrate’s findings will not be “invalidated by a hypertechnical,

rather than a common sense, interpretation of the warrant affidavit.”6

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, at the oral argument and in the State’s Response to

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, the State represented to the Court that it had no

2 State v. Sisson, 883 A.2d 868, 875 (Del. Super. 2005), aff’d, 903 A.2d 288 (Del. 2006). 3 State v. Chaffier, 2023 WL 1872284, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 9, 2023). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Cooper v. State, 228 A.3d 399, 404 (Del. 2020). 4 intention of introducing any evidence from either of Defendant’s cellphones. As

such, all of Defendant’s arguments pertaining to the two cell phones are moot.

I. Applicable Law

A majority of Defendant’s arguments stem from the search warrants being

general, overbroad, or unsupported by probable cause. A general warrant affords

police officers “blanket authority to indiscriminately search persons, houses, papers,

and effects.”7 To avoid these types of general searches, the particularity requirement

of the Fourth Amendment demands warrants describe “the things to be searched with

sufficient particularity and be no broader than the probable cause on which it is

based.”8

On the other hand, an overbroad warrant “describe[s] in both specific and

inclusive generic terms what is to be seized, but it authorizes the seizure of items as

to which there is no probable cause.”9 An overbroad warrant has also been defined

as one which “authorizes in clear or specific terms the seizure of an entire set of

items, or documents, many of which will prove unrelated to the crime under

investigation.”10

7 Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 296 (Del. 2016). 8 Id. at 298-99. 9 Id. at 296. 10 State v. Fink, 2002 WL 312882, at *4 (Del. Super. Feb. 25, 2002) (quoting Com. v. Santner, 454 A.2d 24, n.2 (Pa. Super. 1982)). 5 To establish probable cause there must be a logical nexus between the place

to be searched and the items sought.11 “[T]he information set forth within the

affidavit’s four corners, and any logical inference from the specific facts alleged,

must demonstrate why it was objectively reasonable for the police to expect to find

the items sought in those locations.”12

With a synopsis of the applicable law in mind, the Court will now turn to each

of Defendant’s arguments.

II. Residence

A. General

Defendant argues the search warrant regarding his residence was a general

warrant because it authorized the police to conduct an unrestrained rummaging of

the entire contents of his home.13 Defendant takes specific issue with language in the

warrant that states “any article, item and or document to provide information on the

reason for this criminal act.”14 Considered alone, it could be argued that the language

was general. However, when read in conjunction with the other seven items listed

11 Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 811 (Del. 2000). 12 Id. at 812. 13 Def. Mot. to Suppress ¶ 12. 14 Id. 6 under the “ITEMS TO BE SEARCHED FOR AND SEIZED” section of the

application, the language was not general.

Instructive on this matter is the Delaware Supreme Court case Fink v. State.15

In Fink, the defendant raised a similar issue, arguing the language “client files

including, but not limited to” was too broad in scope and did not limit the search to

items for which probable cause had been established.16 The Supreme Court ruled

otherwise, holding that the language was neither vague nor ambiguous.17

Additionally, the Supreme Court looked to the more specific terms in the warrant

and found those provided reasonable limitations on the scope of the search.18 The

warrant in Fink was not deemed a general warrant.19

Here, the search warrant did not contain any vague or ambiguous terminology.

It is clear the police officers were searching for evidence pertaining to the shooting

at Coastal Taproom. This is further narrowed by the search warrant specifically

referencing ballistics evidence, trace evidence, clothing Defendant and his wife were

wearing and anything containing blood stains. There was no uncertainty as to what

the police officers were supposed to be searching. The search warrant did not

15 Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781 (Del. 2003). 16 Id. at 786. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Id. 7 authorize blanket authority to search and was as particular as possible at that point

in the investigation.

Defendant also argues the search warrant was general because the warrant did

not define trace evidence and authorized police to seize “trace evidence including

but not limited to blood, hair, fibers, fluids, and fingerprints.”20 It appears trace

evidence was defined as the affiant listed multiple examples of it. The Court also

notes trace evidence is commonly referred to and does not require extensive

defining.

In State v. Hamilton, a search warrant for a residence contained the language

“[a]ny and all trace evidence to include but not be limited to blood, hair, fibers, fluids

and fingerprints.”21 The Court did not suppress any evidence seized and found the

warrant permissible.

Here, the language is essentially the same. The investigators did not have

unbridled discretion to search and seize any item. Furthermore, trace evidence, like

the types listed in the search warrant, was not outside the permissible scope and was

clearly defined. Accordingly, the language regarding the trace evidence was not

general.

20 Def. Mot. to Suppress ¶ 13. 21 State v. Hamilton, 2017 WL 4570818, at *21 (Del. Super. Oct. 12, 2017). 8 B. Overbroad

Defendant next argues the search warrant was overbroad because it authorized

police officers to search for items which were unsupported by probable cause.22

More specifically, Defendant argues the police officers exceeded the scope when

they “seized rifles, ammunition and other firearms accessories which were clearly

not used during the alleged offense or associated with a 9-millimeter handgun.”23

The warrant authorized police officers to search for “[b]allistics evidence

including weapons, ammunition, projectiles, and fired cartridge casings which may

have been used during this crime.”24 The alleged crime was a shooting at a bar.

Although a 9-millimeter shell casing was found inside the Coastal Taproom, police

were unaware of the exact weapon used in the shooting. Searching and seizing

ballistics evidence in an ongoing shooting investigation was not outside the scope of

probable cause. The warrant was not overbroad.

C. Unsupported by Probable Cause

Defendant argues the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause

because it failed to establish a nexus between the items sought and Defendant’s

22 Def. Mot. to Suppress ¶ 14. 23 Id. 24 Id. Ex. A. at 1. 9 residence.25 Defendant takes specific issue with the alleged lack of nexus between

his residence and the home surveillance system.26 The Court will discuss probable

cause for the surveillance camera footage under the “SD Memory Cards” section of

this opinion.

D. Findings

The Court finds the search warrant for Defendant’s residence was not general

or overbroad. The warrant did not grant police officers blanket authority to search

Defendant’s home nor did the warrant authorize the seizure of items unsupported by

probable cause. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress regarding his

residence is DENIED.

III. Mazda 3

Defendant argues the search warrant for the Mazda 3 was a general warrant

because it contained the language “including but not limited to, processing for latent

prints and possible DNA collection of non-human/physical items.”27 As previously

discussed, the including but not limited to language does not automatically render a

search warrant general. In Fink v. State, other language contained in the search

25 Def. Mot. to Suppress ¶ 16. 26 Id. 27 Id. ¶ 18. 10 warrant placed reasonable limitations on the scope of the search.28 Here, the

language succeeding “including but not limited to” limited the scope. Clearly, the

investigators were seeking DNA evidence and latent prints. Other items enumerated

in the warrant also limited the scope.29 The warrant did not provide investigators

with blanket authority to indiscriminately search the Mazda 3.

B. Overbroad

Defendant argues the search warrant was overbroad because it authorized

investigators to search for any ballistics evidence instead of ballistics evidence

related to a 9-millimeter handgun.30 As previously discussed, investigators were

unaware of the exact weapon used in the shooting. It was not outside the scope of

probable cause to search and seize ballistics evidence in an ongoing shooting

investigation. The warrant was not overbroad.

C. Unsupported by Probable Cause31

28 Fink, 817 A.2d at 786. 29 The search warrant for the Mazda 3 also authorized investigators to search for biological fluids, electronic devices, ballistics evidence, and clothing items Defendant and Defendant’s wife were seen wearing. 30 Def. Mot. to Suppress ¶ 19. 31 Defendant argues the search of his wallet violated his constitutional rights. However, the State represented to the Court at the oral argument that the search of the wallet was incident to Defendant’s arrest. According to an Investigative Narrative prepared by Trooper First Class White, Defendant was searched incident to arrest and his wallet with the Visa card inside of it was found on his person. After the search TFC White placed the wallet containing the Visa back inside the car on the front driver’s side seat. The Mazda 3 was later towed to Troop 7 where the wallet and Visa card were collected and entered as evidence, which is why the wallet and Visa card also appear on the evidence log. The wallet was not impermissibly seized from the Mazda 3. 11 Defendant argues the search of the Mazda 3 was unsupported by probable

cause because there was nothing linking the Mazda 3 to the shooting other than

Defendant driving it at the time of his arrest.32 Additionally, Defendant argues the

affidavit did not establish a nexus between the clothing items sought and the Mazda

3.33

Through investigative measures, the police were aware Defendant was

associated with a gray Mazda 3. The police were also aware Defendant returned

home after the shooting. Based on this information, officers headed to Defendant’s

residence. While patrolling the neighborhood, officers saw the Mazda 3 and a man

matching Defendant’s description in the driver’s seat. Defendant was subsequently

pulled over. After being pulled over, Defendant inquired about the status of the

victim and told the police officer he “had the right guy.” As the affidavit stated, these

events occurred just a short time after the shooting.34 It was logical for police officers

to assume they might find evidence in a vehicle driven by Defendant so close in time

to the crime.

Furthermore, a nexus existed between the Mazda 3 and the clothing. In the

warrant application, the affiant described certain clothing pieces investigators were

32 Def. Mot. to Suppress ¶ 20 33 Id. ¶ 21. 34 Id. Ex. B. 12 seeking. The affiant stated, “specifically a long sleeve men’s shirt, a pair of men’s

jeans, a white baseball style hat, and a black women’s shirt which exposes the

shoulder area.”35 Although the affiant could have been more particular when

explaining the need for those items of clothing, a logical inference can be drawn.

The affiant’s description of the clothing items would lead an objectively reasonable

person to infer those were the clothing items worn by Defendant and Defendant’s

wife and those clothing items might be present in the vehicle driven by Defendant

shortly after the shooting. A nexus was established between the Mazda 3 and the

clothing items.

Important to remember is the great deference given to the magistrate’s

probable cause determination.36 This Court's role is to review the magistrate’s

determination as a whole and from a commonsense standpoint, not conduct a

hypertechnical analysis of each allegation.37 The Court finds the search warrant for

the Mazda 3 was not general or overbroad. The warrant did not grant police officers

blanket authority to search Defendant’s vehicle nor did the warrant authorize the

seizure of items unsupported by probable cause. Additionally, a nexus was

35 Id. 36 Sisson, 883 A.2d at 880. 37 Id. at 876. 13 established between the Mazda 3 and the items sought. Therefore, Defendant’s

Motion to Suppress regarding the Mazda 3 is DENIED.

IV. Chevrolet Equinox

Defendant argues the seizure of a pool cue from the Chevrolet Equinox

exceeded the scope of the warrant.38 During oral argument, the State mostly agreed

that seizure of the pool cue exceeded the scope of the warrant. The Court agrees

seizure of the pool cue exceeded the scope and therefore Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress regarding the pool cue is GRANTED.

Defendant argues the search warrant was general because it authorized

investigators to search for “any article, item or document to provide information on

the reason for this criminal act.”39 The same analysis as above is applicable. The

warrant contained reasonable limitations on the scope of the search. Investigators

did not have unbridled discretion to search and seize.

38 Def. Mot. to Suppress ¶ 26. 39 Id. ¶ 23. 14 Defendant also argues the warrant was general due to the language “trace

evidence including but not limited to blood, hair, fibers, fluids and fingerprints.”40

Again, the analysis is the same as above. Trace evidence is commonly referred to

and appropriately defined. Furthermore, the Court in Hamilton did not suppress any

evidence seized from a search warrant that contained almost identical language.41

The investigators here did not have unbridled discretion to search and seize any item.

Accordingly, the language regarding the trace evidence was not general.

B. Findings

The search warrant for the Chevrolet Equinox was not a general warrant. A

commonsense analysis of the warrant as a whole shows the police officers were not

afforded blanket authority to search the Chevrolet Equinox. The warrant was

sufficiently particular and based on probable cause. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion

to Suppress regarding the Chevrolet Equinox is DENIED.

V. SD Memory Cards

A. “Sloppy” Language

Defendant takes issue with language in the search warrant for the SD Memory

Cards, specifically:

40 Id. ¶ 24. 41 Hamilton, 2017 WL 4570818, at *21-22. 15 The following data and the forensic examination thereof, stored by whatever means on two Samsung 128 Evo Select Mini SD memory cards, to include: pictures, images, video recordings, files, location service information, and internet websites, stored on the cellular telephone of unknown individual during the timeframe of 2000 hours on 02/19/22 through 0400 hours on 02/20/22.42

Defendant argues this language limited the police to search only the cell phones and

did not authorize the search of the SD Memory Cards.43 The Court notes the

language of the warrant appears to be a sloppy cut and paste job. However, the Court

does not agree that the language limited the search to only the cell phones. The

language specifically stated the investigators intended to search the data stored on

two Samsung 128 Evo Select Mini SD memory cards. Poor drafting alone does not

invalidate a warrant nor render it unconstitutional.

B. Unsupported by Probable Cause

As previously mentioned, the Court will now discuss the probable cause for

the search of the surveillance camera SD memory card footage. Defendant argues

there was a lack of probable cause to search the footage stored on the SD memory

card taken from inside the surveillance camera because the affidavit failed to

establish a nexus between the SD memory card footage and the residence.44

42 Def. Mot. to Suppress ¶ 44. 43 Id. ¶ 45. 44 Id. ¶ 16. 16 Based upon statements given by Defendant’s wife to investigators, the police

were aware that Defendant and his wife returned home after the shooting. The

affidavit of probable cause stated the purpose of viewing the SD memory card

surveillance footage was to establish a timeline of events from before and after the

shooting. Since investigators were aware that Defendant returned home following

the shooting, it was logical to assume Defendant’s actions were captured on the SD

memory card taken from the camera pointed directly at the driveway, street, and

front of Defendant’s residence. A nexus was established between the SD memory

card data and the residence.

Defendant also argues the affidavit failed to establish a factual basis upon

which a neutral magistrate could have concluded the surveillance data investigators

sought would be on the SD memory card located in Defendant’s pocket at the time

of his arrest.45 The Court disagrees. The affidavit specifically stated the SD memory

card recovered from Defendant’s pocket was similar to the one taken from the

surveillance camera. The SD memory card was found on Defendant’s person shortly

after the shooting occurred. It was logical for the magistrate to assume the similar

SD memory card found in Defendant’s pocket may have been removed from the

surveillance camera and contained video evidence.

45 Id. ¶ 46. 17 C. Findings

Again, it is not the role of this Court to conduct a hypertechnical analysis of

the magistrate’s findings. Here, the affidavit established probable cause for the

search of both the SD memory card taken from the surveillance camera and the SD

memory card taken from Defendant’s pocket. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress regarding the two SD Memory Cards is DENIED.

VI. DNA

A. Two DNA Warrants

Defendant’s DNA was originally taken pursuant to a search warrant executed

on February 20, 2022. The February DNA warrant contained an improper header in

the affidavit of probable cause section. The State decided to exercise caution and

executed a second search warrant for Defendant’s DNA that contained the correct

header throughout the entirety of the warrant application. The second warrant

application contained exactly the same information as the first warrant with the

exception of the corrected heading and an additional paragraph explaining the error.

The Court is unaware of any case law that supports the contention that a

scrivener’s error invalidates a search warrant. Additionally, both the first and second

DNA warrants established the required probable cause and were properly executed.

18 Defendant was unable to provide any support for his argument that obtaining a

second warrant invalidated the first warrant. As such, both warrants were valid.

B. Franks Hearing

Defendant contends a Franks hearing is needed because the police knowingly

or with reckless disregard for the truth relied on a false statement to establish

probable cause.46 Specifically, Defendant argues the affiant relied on stale

information and if the stale information was removed from the affidavit, no nexus

of probable cause could be established.47

The Court finds no need for a Franks hearing as no false information was

relied upon. It does not matter that the police became aware the .45 caliber Smith

and Wesson handgun recovered from the front seat of the Mazda 3 was not the

murder weapon. No where in the affidavit does the affiant state the Smith and

Wesson handgun was the murder weapon, nor is there any Delaware case law that

states the evidence police recover to take DNA samples from to compare to

Defendant’s DNA swab must be the murder weapon used in the crime. Additionally,

the gun recovered from the Mazda was legally seized evidence and was appropriate

for comparison to Defendant’s DNA.

46 Id. ¶ 49. 47 Id.¶ 50. 19 C. Unsupported by Probable Cause

As mentioned above, Defendant contends the search warrant for his DNA was

unsupported by probable cause because of the false information relied upon. The

information relied upon was not false. The affiant did not state that the gun recovered

from the Mazda was the murder weapon. The affiant simply stated Defendant’s

DNA would be compared to the gun recovered from the Mazda as well as various

other evidentiary items found at the crime scene.48

A finding of probable cause is not automatically rejected on nexus grounds

simply because the affiant does not state a DNA sample has already been recovered

from the crime scene.49 What is required for the probable cause nexus to be

established is a fair probability the seized DNA sample can be linked to the crime.50

Here, the affiant stated, among other things, he has been employed by the

Delaware State Police since 2003, has investigated numerous deaths, received

special training in searches and seizures, and has prepared and assisted with the

execution of search and seizure warrants.51 Furthermore, the affiant stated that:

through his training and experience, DNA can be transferred in many ways, to include basic physical contact, from an individual to a property item, or another

48 Id. Ex. G. 49 State v. White, 2017 WL 1842784, at *5 (Del. Super. May 8, 2017). 50 Id. 51 Def. Mot. to Suppress Ex. G. 20 individual. In this particular investigation, when any property item, such as a handgun, or any other physical item comes into contact with a human being, the transfer of DNA can occur through skin cells, oils, or other biological materials to include blood through physical contact.52

The affiant explained that Defendant had been linked to the crime scene from video

surveillance, witness statements and purchase transactions.53 Although the .45

caliber Smith and Wesson handgun recovered from the Mazda 3 was not the weapon

used during the crime, it was found on the passenger seat of the vehicle Defendant

was driving at the time of arrest. Common sense dictates it was likely Defendant

touched the gun and transferred his DNA to it. Additionally, as stated in the affidavit,

investigators had recovered other evidence from the crime scene that they could use

to compare with Defendant’s DNA.

The nexus requirement for a finding of probable cause existed. Due to

Defendant’s known presence at the scene of the crime and video surveillance

showing him firing a gun at the victim, a fair probability that Defendant’s DNA can

be linked to the crime has been established. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress regarding his DNA is DENIED.

52 Id. 53 Id. 21 CONCLUSION

When viewing each challenged warrant as a whole, a factual basis was

provided for a neutral magistrate to conclude evidence pertaining to the shooting

investigation would be found at each location. The challenged warrants were not

unconstitutionally general or overbroad.54 The Court finds each warrant to be valid.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the pool cue taken from the

Chevrolet Equinox is GRANTED. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress evidence taken

from his residence, Mazda 3, SD Memory Cards, DNA and the remainder of

evidence taken from the Chevrolet Equinox is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Mark H. Conner Mark H. Conner, Judge

cc: Prothonotary

54 With the exception of the pool cue seized from the Chevrolet Equinox. 22