State v. Martin
This text of 213 A.2d 459 (State v. Martin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether the four nudist magazines,2 taken as a whole, may, under permissible constitutional standards, be deemed to go substantially beyond customary limits of candor, that is to say, whether they are obscene in the statutory sense3 and therefore not within the protection contained in the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution and in 5 and 6 of article first of the Connecticut constitution. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485; State v. Sul, 146 Conn. 78, 85; State v. Andrews, 150 Conn. 92, 97. Whether this question is regarded as one of fact or of mixed fact and law, it is settled that it is one for appellate review on the relevant materials. State v. Andrews, supra, 100; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188.
The four magazines found to be obscene and condemned as a nuisance in the court below are representative nudist magazines. The trial court found [311]*311that they contain full-page, colored photographs of nude women on the front and back covers; about 60 percent of the publications are filled either with color photographs or black and white photographs of female nudes; about 95 percent of the photographs in these publications are those of nude females. No useful purpose would be served here in elaborating upon the court’s detailed findings on the photographs or upon the textual material contained in the publications. The court concluded that the magazines, “in addition to being obscene, are indecent and offensive to common propriety offending against morality and are lewd and immodest.”4 The court adjudged the magazines a nuisance and ordered their destruction.
In our view, we deem the case of Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372, per curiam, decisive of this appeal.5 The history of the Sunshine Booh [312]*312case unfolds an interesting, if not unusual, background. There, the postmaster general found the February, 1955, issue of “Sunshine and Health”6 and the January-February issue of “Sun Magazine”7 obscene and unmailable.8 The District Court affirmed the findings of the postmaster general. Sunshine [313]*313Book Co. v. Summerfield, 128 F. Sup. 564. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment of the District Court was reversed upon the ground that, inter alia, improper standards had been applied in making a determination of obscenity.9 Thereafter, the government moved for and was granted a rehearing by the court sitting en banc. See Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114, 116 n.4. Sitting en banc, the court, composed of eight judges,10 in a five-to-three decision took a position contrary to its earlier determination by the three-judge division and affirmed the judgment of the District Court.11 Ibid. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted, per curiam, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed; only Both was cited. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372.
This summary reversal has provoked lively discussion in the courts and among the commentators. To our own Supreme Court, it did not appear whether the United States Supreme Court made an independent examination of the allegedly obscene material in question; our court assumed that the United States Supreme Court applied the standard laid down in Roth. State v. Andrews, supra, 98. To the Supreme Court of California, it seemed clear that the “most plausible meaning of . . . [this summary reversal] in view of the citation of only Both . . . , must be that the materials there involved could not be held obscene.” Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 [314]*314Cal. 2d 901, 916. To the majority of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, it appeared “that the reversal was based on the concept that mere nudity is not obscenity or the decision may have been based on the fact that the text was not in fact obscene.” Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312, 321.12 To Judge Soper, the per curiam reversal was explicable “only on the theory that . . . [the lower courts] paid insufficient regard to the rule that in judging accused material attention should be directed not to detached and separate portions but to the whole material in its entire context.” Collier v. United States, 283 F.2d 780, 782; see Poss v. Christenberry, 179 F. Sup. 411, 416. To Professor Kalven, “the Court . . . [was] feeling the pressure generated by the two-level theory to restrict obscenity to the worthless and hence something akin to hard-core pornography.” Kalven, “The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity,” 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 43. To another commentator, it was not easy to discern the court’s basis for reversal because the standards set forth in the lower courts were consistent with the Both requirements; however, there was considerable dissension in the Court of Appeals on whether the magazines had been judged as a whole. Comment, “Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1957 Term,” 26 U. Chi L. Rev. 279, 312. To Professors Emerson and Haber, “[t]his [summary reversal] may mean either that the Court did not question the Post Office power but merely the finding of obscenity, or that since the material in question was not obscene the issue of the Post Office power over obscene material did not have to be decided.” 2 Emerson & Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States, [315]*315p. 873. It would seem to us that where, as in this case, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, per curiam, without argument or the submission of briefs, it must mean that the law was clear that the material was not obscene.13 In any event the reversal, grounded upon Both, brought an end to the litigation and permitted the magazines to go through the mails. See Paul & Schwartz, Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail, p. 152.
Nothing, of course, in this opinion is to be construed as indicating our approval or disapproval of these magazines. All we decide is whether the publications are obscene in the light of applicable standards and therefore subject to repression. Nor does our decision in this case require an expression of opinion, judicial or otherwise, concerning the relative merits of a gymnosophical society; for obviously, the answer to a sociological phenomenon of this kind lies outside our professional competence. Our determination of this case is restricted to the sole question whether the material in question is suppressible under applicable standards.
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213 A.2d 459, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 309, 1965 Conn. Cir. LEXIS 167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-martin-connappct-1965.