THIRD DIVISION DILLARD, P. J., GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
June 29, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0251. THE STATE v. BROWNLEE.
GOBEIL, Judge.
The trial court granted appellee Marquavius Brownlee’s motion to suppress
statements he made in an interview conducted by agents with the Georgia Bureau of
Investigation (“GBI”). The State appeals, arguing that, in finding that Brownlee’s
statements were involuntary, the trial court misapplied the holding in Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 US 493 (87 SCt 616, 17 LE2d 562) (1967). For the reasons explained below,
we reverse.
“In reviewing a trial court’s determination regarding whether a statement is
voluntary, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts.” State
v. Aiken, 282 Ga. 132, 136(2) n. 21 (646 SE2d 222) (2007).
The record shows that in April 2022, the GBI began investigating Brownlee for
allegations of child molestation. At the time, Brownlee was on administrative leave
from his position as a deputy with the Cherokee County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”).
As part of their investigation, GBI Special Agents Kelly Aldrich and Dustin Hamby
traveled to Brownlee’s residence, where his wife and children were present, and they
“asked if he would mind coming to the sheriff’s office with [them] so that [they] could
talk to him in a quiet place.” Brownlee agreed to be interviewed at the CCSO. At this
time, Brownlee was not under arrest, and he drove himself to the sheriff’s office. The
room where agents questioned Brownlee was an internal affairs office within the
CCSO that was equipped with video recording equipment. A video recording of this
interview was played at the hearing on the motion to suppress, but Brownlee did not
testify at the hearing.
At the outset of the interview, Agent Hamby informed Brownlee: “At any time
if you don’t want to be here, or if you want to stop talking, that’s totally up to you.
You’re not in custody. ... All you’ve got to do is say ‘when’ [to get out].” Aldrich
2 explained that she wanted to “make it very clear to Mr. Brownlee that he did not have
to speak to” the agents. Specifically, Aldrich informed Brownlee: “You’re not in
custody, but you’re an officer and I want you to understand that you do have rights.”
She then read Brownlee an “admonishment” to inform him that the agents were
conducting a criminal investigation that had nothing to do with his job. The
admonishment provides as follows:
This investigation is to determine whether any criminal laws have been violated that resulted in this investigation. It is not an administrative or disciplinary inquiry. You are not being compelled to give any statement or answer any questions. Your cooperation in this investigation is voluntary.
After she read the admonishment, Aldrich asked Brownlee: “Do you want to talk us
about what happened with [the victim]?” Brownlee responded: “Yes.”
When Agent Hamby asked Brownlee what he thought would happen at the
conclusion of the agents’ investigation, Brownlee made a statement about going back
to work to make money for his family and stated: “At the end of the day, I’m walking
from this.” He denied repeatedly any allegations of wrongdoing and volunteered to
3 take a polygraph. Agent Hamby advised him: “Don’t take the polygraph if you can’t
pass it.”
At the conclusion of the interview, Aldrich requested consent to search
Brownlee’s phone. She told him that he could either give her the phone, or she would
obtain a search warrant, and he handed his phone over to the agents and signed a
consent form for the search. He then got in his car and drove home. At no point
during the interview did Brownlee ask for a lawyer or refuse to answer any questions.
Aldrich was aware that Brownlee was on administrative leave from CCSO at the time
she conducted the interview, but she had not spoken to Brownlee’s superior officer.
Agent Hamby was also aware that Brownlee was on administrative leave, but a CCSO
internal affairs investigation had not yet commenced. Hamby testified that the agents
did not promise anything to Brownlee in exchange for his speaking to them, nor did
Hamby have any information about what would happen to Brownlee if he did not
speak to the GBI agents. The agents did not read Miranda1 warnings because Brownlee
was not under arrest and the interview was voluntary.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 4 Brownlee submitted to a polygraph with the GBI on May 2, 2022, and he
informed his superior officer that “he thought it went well.” The officer inquired with
GBI about the polygraph results, and an agent informed him that the test showed signs
of deception. Brownlee’s employment with CCSO ultimately was terminated because,
in violation of CCSO policy, he misrepresented the results of the polygraph exam to
his superior officer after being informed by Aldrich that he had failed the test. The
CCSO personnel handbook, which was admitted at the hearing, provides in relevant
part:
Employees are expected to cooperate with all legally authorized agencies and their representatives in the pursuit of their official duties. It is imperative that employees assist colleagues fully and completely with respect and consideration at all times.
The conduct code also directs employees to “truthfully answer all questions
specifically directed and narrowly related to the agency’s scope of employment and
operations.”
In December 2022, Brownlee was charged by indictment with two counts each
of aggravated child molestation and child molestation, and one count each of enticing
a child for indecent purposes and violation of oath by public officer. Brownlee filed a
5 motion to suppress, and the State requested a hearing. Following the hearing, at which
Aldrich and Hamby were the only witnesses, the trial court granted Brownlee’s
motion, ruling that any statements made by him during the interview were coerced
such that they could not be used against him in a criminal trial. Ultimately, the court
found that, “by taking Brownlee, who they knew was on [a]dministrative [s]uspension
to a dedicated and difficult to access interview room in the heart of Internal Affairs,
the Special Agents set up a scenario that reinforced Brownlee’s belief that his
cooperation was essential to getting his job back.” This appeal followed.
In its sole claim of error, the State argues that the trial court erred by
suppressing Brownlee’s statements. Given that the GBI agents did not threaten
Brownlee’s employment and that Brownlee did not testify at the hearing, the State
reasons that there is no record evidence from which the trial court could determine
that Brownlee feared adverse employment consequences if he did not cooperate with
the criminal investigation.
In Garrity, 385 US at 500, the United States Supreme Court held that
statements made by police officers under express threat of termination from
employment constitute coerced confessions that cannot be used in a subsequent
6 criminal proceeding. Georgia courts employ a “totality-of-the-circumstances test ...
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THIRD DIVISION DILLARD, P. J., GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
June 29, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0251. THE STATE v. BROWNLEE.
GOBEIL, Judge.
The trial court granted appellee Marquavius Brownlee’s motion to suppress
statements he made in an interview conducted by agents with the Georgia Bureau of
Investigation (“GBI”). The State appeals, arguing that, in finding that Brownlee’s
statements were involuntary, the trial court misapplied the holding in Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 US 493 (87 SCt 616, 17 LE2d 562) (1967). For the reasons explained below,
we reverse.
“In reviewing a trial court’s determination regarding whether a statement is
voluntary, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts.” State
v. Aiken, 282 Ga. 132, 136(2) n. 21 (646 SE2d 222) (2007).
The record shows that in April 2022, the GBI began investigating Brownlee for
allegations of child molestation. At the time, Brownlee was on administrative leave
from his position as a deputy with the Cherokee County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”).
As part of their investigation, GBI Special Agents Kelly Aldrich and Dustin Hamby
traveled to Brownlee’s residence, where his wife and children were present, and they
“asked if he would mind coming to the sheriff’s office with [them] so that [they] could
talk to him in a quiet place.” Brownlee agreed to be interviewed at the CCSO. At this
time, Brownlee was not under arrest, and he drove himself to the sheriff’s office. The
room where agents questioned Brownlee was an internal affairs office within the
CCSO that was equipped with video recording equipment. A video recording of this
interview was played at the hearing on the motion to suppress, but Brownlee did not
testify at the hearing.
At the outset of the interview, Agent Hamby informed Brownlee: “At any time
if you don’t want to be here, or if you want to stop talking, that’s totally up to you.
You’re not in custody. ... All you’ve got to do is say ‘when’ [to get out].” Aldrich
2 explained that she wanted to “make it very clear to Mr. Brownlee that he did not have
to speak to” the agents. Specifically, Aldrich informed Brownlee: “You’re not in
custody, but you’re an officer and I want you to understand that you do have rights.”
She then read Brownlee an “admonishment” to inform him that the agents were
conducting a criminal investigation that had nothing to do with his job. The
admonishment provides as follows:
This investigation is to determine whether any criminal laws have been violated that resulted in this investigation. It is not an administrative or disciplinary inquiry. You are not being compelled to give any statement or answer any questions. Your cooperation in this investigation is voluntary.
After she read the admonishment, Aldrich asked Brownlee: “Do you want to talk us
about what happened with [the victim]?” Brownlee responded: “Yes.”
When Agent Hamby asked Brownlee what he thought would happen at the
conclusion of the agents’ investigation, Brownlee made a statement about going back
to work to make money for his family and stated: “At the end of the day, I’m walking
from this.” He denied repeatedly any allegations of wrongdoing and volunteered to
3 take a polygraph. Agent Hamby advised him: “Don’t take the polygraph if you can’t
pass it.”
At the conclusion of the interview, Aldrich requested consent to search
Brownlee’s phone. She told him that he could either give her the phone, or she would
obtain a search warrant, and he handed his phone over to the agents and signed a
consent form for the search. He then got in his car and drove home. At no point
during the interview did Brownlee ask for a lawyer or refuse to answer any questions.
Aldrich was aware that Brownlee was on administrative leave from CCSO at the time
she conducted the interview, but she had not spoken to Brownlee’s superior officer.
Agent Hamby was also aware that Brownlee was on administrative leave, but a CCSO
internal affairs investigation had not yet commenced. Hamby testified that the agents
did not promise anything to Brownlee in exchange for his speaking to them, nor did
Hamby have any information about what would happen to Brownlee if he did not
speak to the GBI agents. The agents did not read Miranda1 warnings because Brownlee
was not under arrest and the interview was voluntary.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 4 Brownlee submitted to a polygraph with the GBI on May 2, 2022, and he
informed his superior officer that “he thought it went well.” The officer inquired with
GBI about the polygraph results, and an agent informed him that the test showed signs
of deception. Brownlee’s employment with CCSO ultimately was terminated because,
in violation of CCSO policy, he misrepresented the results of the polygraph exam to
his superior officer after being informed by Aldrich that he had failed the test. The
CCSO personnel handbook, which was admitted at the hearing, provides in relevant
part:
Employees are expected to cooperate with all legally authorized agencies and their representatives in the pursuit of their official duties. It is imperative that employees assist colleagues fully and completely with respect and consideration at all times.
The conduct code also directs employees to “truthfully answer all questions
specifically directed and narrowly related to the agency’s scope of employment and
operations.”
In December 2022, Brownlee was charged by indictment with two counts each
of aggravated child molestation and child molestation, and one count each of enticing
a child for indecent purposes and violation of oath by public officer. Brownlee filed a
5 motion to suppress, and the State requested a hearing. Following the hearing, at which
Aldrich and Hamby were the only witnesses, the trial court granted Brownlee’s
motion, ruling that any statements made by him during the interview were coerced
such that they could not be used against him in a criminal trial. Ultimately, the court
found that, “by taking Brownlee, who they knew was on [a]dministrative [s]uspension
to a dedicated and difficult to access interview room in the heart of Internal Affairs,
the Special Agents set up a scenario that reinforced Brownlee’s belief that his
cooperation was essential to getting his job back.” This appeal followed.
In its sole claim of error, the State argues that the trial court erred by
suppressing Brownlee’s statements. Given that the GBI agents did not threaten
Brownlee’s employment and that Brownlee did not testify at the hearing, the State
reasons that there is no record evidence from which the trial court could determine
that Brownlee feared adverse employment consequences if he did not cooperate with
the criminal investigation.
In Garrity, 385 US at 500, the United States Supreme Court held that
statements made by police officers under express threat of termination from
employment constitute coerced confessions that cannot be used in a subsequent
6 criminal proceeding. Georgia courts employ a “totality-of-the-circumstances test ...
for determining whether the statements that a public employee makes during an
investigation into his activities are voluntary.” Aiken, 282 Ga. at 135(2). Where, as
here, there is no express threat of termination from employment,
the court may examine whether the defendant subjectively believed that he could lose his job for failing to cooperate and whether, if so, that belief was reasonable given the state action involved. In determining whether the defendant’s belief was objectively reasonable, the court may examine whether the defendant was aware of any statutes, ordinances, manuals, or policies that required cooperation and provided generally, without specifying a penalty, that an employee could be subject to discipline for failing to cooperate.
Id. at 135-36(2).
As noted above, Brownlee did not testify at the hearing. Therefore, the State
contends that several of the trial court’s findings are unsupported by any evidence.
For example, the trial court found that Brownlee “knew of the cooperation
requirement in the personnel policy.” However, neither Brownlee nor any
representative from the CCSO testified as to Brownlee’s knowledge or understanding
of the personnel handbook, and the copy of the handbook admitted at the hearing is
7 not signed by Brownlee. In addition, the trial court inferred that the location of the
interview — in a room within the CCSO Internal Affairs Office — added to
Brownlee’s belief that he felt forced to cooperate, but the record is devoid of evidence
to support this finding.
Here, the lack of evidence that Brownlee subjectively believed that his
employment was in jeopardy if he failed to answer the GBI agents’ questions, coupled
with the admonishment informing him that the investigation was criminal in nature,
had nothing to do with his job, and he did not have to speak with the agents, does not
support the conclusion that Brownlee’s statements were involuntary. Compare Shields
v. State, 368 Ga. App. 586, 588-90(1) (890 SE2d 505) (2023) (holding that statements
made by defendant, who was member of US Army, were voluntary, even though
interview was conducted in commander’s office and military protocol required
defendant to remain in office until dismissed by commander; interview was conducted
after commander and Army Criminal Investigation Division agent left room,
defendant was informed he was free to leave at any time, and defendant presented no
evidence of either an overt threat or subjective belief that failure to cooperate would
result in employment termination); Bell v. State, 352 Ga. App. 802, 812-15(2)(c) (835
8 SE2d 697) (2019) (affirming trial court’s finding that no Garrity violation occurred
despite defendant’s testimony that he feared he would face termination for failing to
answer investigator’s questions; defendant’s subjective belief was unreasonable
because he knew he was being asked to give a voluntary statement in a criminal
investigation — rather than an internal affairs investigation, he knew he was not
required to submit to a criminal investigation, and he knew that policy manual
provided for termination only upon refusal to cooperate with internal investigation);
State v. Stinson, 244 Ga. App. 622, 625 (536 SE2d 293) (2000) (reversing trial court’s
exclusion of statement under Garrity where defendant did not present evidence of
either an overt threat to terminate his employment or that he subjectively believed he
would be terminated if he failed to answer questions), with Thompson v. State, 288 Ga.
165, 168-69 (702 SE2d 198) (2010) (affirming trial court’s grant of officer’s motion to
suppress where he testified that he was aware of police department manual which
stated that the failure to answer questions in an internal affairs investigation could
result in employment termination and he felt compelled to cooperate with
investigations for fear of losing his job).
9 In light of the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Brownlee’s
motion to suppress.
Judgment reversed. Dillard, P. J., and Pipkin, J., concur.