State v. Marois

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

State v. Marois

509 A.2d 1160, 1986 Me. LEXIS 790

DecidedMay 15, 1986

StatusPublished

This text of 509 A.2d 1160 (State v. Marois) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Marois, 509 A.2d 1160, 1986 Me. LEXIS 790 (Me. 1986).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION.

After a jury-waived trial in Superior Court (Cumberland County) defendant Armand Marois was convicted of gross sexual misconduct, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 (Supp.1985-1986). On appeal he argues that the trial justice applied the wrong standard to determine whether the four-year-old prose-cutrix was competent to testify. As we have previously stated, M.R.Evid. 601 is the exclusive standard to be used to determine the competence of a witness to testify. See State v. Vigue, 420 A.2d 242, 246 (Me.1980). Therefore, defendant’s contention that the trial justice should have applied the pre-Rule 601 standard is plainly without merit. Considering the “totality of the voir dire” of the prosecutrix in this case, we can find no basis for holding that the trial justice abused his discretion in determining that she was competent to testify. Id.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

All concurring.

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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION.

After a jury-waived trial in Superior Court (Cumberland County) defendant Armand Marois was convicted of gross sexual misconduct, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 (Supp.1985-1986). On appeal he argues that the trial justice applied the wrong standard to determine whether the four-year-old prose-cutrix was competent to testify. As we have previously stated, M.R.Evid. 601 is the exclusive standard to be used to determine the competence of a witness to testify. See State v. Vigue, 420 A.2d 242, 246 (Me.1980). Therefore, defendant’s contention that the trial justice should have applied the pre-Rule 601 standard is plainly without merit. Considering the “totality of the voir dire” of the prosecutrix in this case, we can find no basis for holding that the trial justice abused his discretion in determining that she was competent to testify. Id.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

All concurring.

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509 A.2d 1160, 1986 Me. LEXIS 790, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-marois-me-1986.

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