No. 800 August 26, 2026 453
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LAURIE DANIALLE MARLIN,
Defendant-Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 23CR10954; A182291
Steve H. Hoddle, Judge. Submitted May 9, 2025. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Andrew D. Robinson, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the briefs for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge.
HELLMAN, J. Affirmed.
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HELLMAN, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction on one count of forgery in the second degree (Count 1), ORS 165.007, which was merged with one count of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (Count 2), ORS 165.017, raising two assignments of error. In a combined argument, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts, because the state’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the alleged crimes occurred in Oregon and that she knew that the check in question was forged. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for judgment of acquittal on both issues. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. FACTS
In February 2023, defendant attempted to cash a check at an Umpqua Bank location. The check was written on R’s account and listed R’s address in Myrtle Creek, Oregon. The teller believed that the check looked altered, so she called R. The teller then told defendant she was unable to cash the check. The teller kept the check and defendant left. At trial, R confirmed that he had signed the check but testified that “[t] here’s been some changes[,]” including to the payee and the amount. A few days after defendant had attempted to cash the check, a Douglas County Sheriff’s deputy went to defendant ’s home to interview her about the check. Defendant told him that she had received the check from a friend, E, and that she had previously cashed checks for E without any issues. For that conduct, the Douglas County District Attorney’s Office charged defendant with forgery in the second degree and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. The trial was held in Roseburg, Oregon.
At the conclusion of the state’s case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. Counsel argued that, “There was no testimony this happened in Douglas County, Oregon at all. There was certainly nothing to show an intent to injure and defraud or that [defendant] knew that it was forged. This is speculation on top of speculation. And I believe a judgment of acquittal on both Counts 1 and 2 is appropriate.”
Cite as 352 Or App 453 (2026) 455
On the issue of whether the conduct occurred in Oregon, the trial court observed that the state no longer had to prove venue in Douglas County. Defense counsel agreed but argued that “Oregon still is” something that the state had to prove.
In response, the state pointed to the fact that the deputy testified that he “works for the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office * * * which is located here and he’s doing his work here.” The state started to argue that “[w]e don’t typically investigate crimes outside of—,” but the trial court interrupted, stating, “Well, I get that but that’s not in evidence . So I mean we’re confined to what the evidence is[.]”
On the issue of defendant’s intent and knowledge, the state argued that “passing a bad check is intent to defraud. How else are you gonna pass a bad check?” The trial court responded that the state “still need[ed] to present the jury with some evidence that she knew” and questioned “what evidence, if any, points to the fact that she would know.” In response, the state pointed to defendant’s “actions after the check was kept,” including that she drove off instead of trying to talk to the teller. The state also argued that “intent seems like a fundamentally tricky thing to prove,” to which the trial court responded that “that doesn’t lower your burden.”
The trial court ultimately denied the motion for judgment of acquittal, ruling that “* * * [A]s to the Oregon piece, and, and, and I would certainly hear more, more argument but at this point with venue being gone as one of the elements, and, and in my pre-Jury Instructions it’s still in there but the State does not have to prove venue. The, the jurisdictional piece, while I’m sure it’s there, certainly there’s no evidence of it in trial.
“But at, at, at this point at [judgment of acquittal] I’m going to, I, I’m not going to, I’m not going to grant a judgment of acquittal on the Oregon piece at this point[.]”
The trial court did leave open the possibility that the issue of whether the conduct occurred in Oregon could be revisited , stating that:
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“* * * [I]f there is some sort of authority out there * * * we can certainly pull that back. But at this point being in the middle of a jury trial * * * without clear authority I’m not going to grant the judgment of acquittal on that case.” On the intent and knowledge issue, the trial court summarily concluded that “in the light most favorable to the State, * * * a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt” that the elements of the crime were established. The trial court also indicated that it would make a further record on the motions after the close of the evidence.
Thereafter, defendant testified in her own defense.
She explained that her friend E reached out to her around 4:00 p.m. and asked her to cash a check for him before the bank closed at 5:00 p.m. Defendant also introduced a text exchange between herself and E, regarding the check, in which E told defendant that the check would be made out to her, and it was coming from his friend J’s father. In that exchange, defendant asked some questions about the check because, as she testified, she wanted to “cover [her] bases” and know “more about it, and what [she] was doing, and who it was for, and that type of thing.” Defendant picked up E “[i] n Tri City,” and he directed her to an Umpqua Bank location about three or four miles away.
On the way, defendant asked E additional questions about the check, and E explained that the check came from an elderly gentleman for whom he did yard work. The man had Parkinson’s and was “hurting” so he was unable to take E to the bank himself. Defendant went through the bank’s drive-through and handed the check to a teller. The teller declined to cash the check and told defendant that the bank had to keep it.
After the defense rested, the trial court asked defense counsel if he had any additional authority on “the Oregon issue.” Defense counsel responded that he did not, and the trial court ruled that “State v. Mills[, 354 Or 350, 312 P3d 515 (2013),] * * * sort of changed the way it was done in that the State no longer had to prove venue. And, and so I, at this point I am going to deny the motion for a judgment of acquittal on that.” The trial court provided no further
Cite as 352 Or App 453 (2026) 457
explanation on its ruling on the sufficiency of evidence on the intent and knowledge elements.
The jury found defendant guilty on both counts.
The trial court thereafter entered a judgment convicting her on Count 1 and merging Count 2 with Count 1. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Territorial Jurisdiction 1. Standard of Review As we explain in more detail below, whether the crime took place in Oregon presents a factual issue that implicates a legal question of subject matter jurisdiction. ORS 131.205 - 131.235 (defining Oregon’s territorial jurisdiction ); State v. Williams, 326 Or App 64, 76, 530 P3d 919 (2023) (concluding that “territorial jurisdiction is a type of subject matter jurisdiction”). We review the trial court’s decision on subject matter jurisdiction for errors of law. Williams, 326 Or App at 67.
In this case, that review involves assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Thus, we view the underlying evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether that evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, permitted the trial court to determine that the state established that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, specifically, territorial jurisdiction. State v. Wallace, 373 Or 122, 125-26, 561 P3d 602 (2024) (stating general standard); see also Williams, 326 Or App at 83 (explaining that “the burden of proving jurisdictional facts in Oregon criminal cases ultimately lies with the state” (emphasis in original)). In doing so, we review the entire record, not just the evidence that the state presented in its case-in-chief.1 See State v. Shifflett, 285 Or App 654, 1 This expanded review is often referred to as the “waiver rule” because courts have held that in choosing to put on a defense case, a defendant “waives” the right to hold the state to its burden of proof based on the state’s case-in-chief. State v. Gardner, 231 Or 193, 195, 372 P2d 783 (1962). Under the “waiver rule,” a defendant who wants an appellate court to consider the sufficiency of the state’s case, standing alone, must elect not to present any evidence in their defense. Id. As part of her argument, defendant urges us to abandon the waiver rule or, at the least, to not apply it in the context of territorial jurisdiction. Although the waiver 458 State v. Marlin
659, 398 P3d 383 (2017) (“[W]hen a defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case-in-chief, and then presents evidence in his defense, we consider the whole record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict against the defendant.”); State v. Schneider, 229 Or App 199, 201, 211 P3d 306 (2009) (holding that we “consider the whole record” to assess the sufficiency of the evidence, even when the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case); State v. Lamphere, 233 Or 330, 331-32, 378 P2d 706 (1963) (in reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, “the appellate court will consider all the evidence and will not reverse the trial court if the record as a whole contains sufficient evidence to support a verdict against [the] defendant”).
2. Territorial Jurisdiction in General2 ORS 131.215(1) provides that “a person is subject to prosecution under the laws of this state for an offense that the person commits by the conduct of the person” if “[e]ither the conduct that is an element of the offense or the result that is an element occurs within this state.” “This state” means “the land and water and the airspace above the land and water with respect to which the State of Oregon has legislative jurisdiction.” ORS 131.205. Those statutes reflect the common-law understanding that “Oregon courts’ jurisdiction over criminal offenses is limited by Oregon’s territorial boundaries.” Williams, 326 Or App at 73-74. The question of “territorial jurisdiction” is “a type of subject matter jurisdiction,” id. at 76, on which the state carries the burden of proof, id. at 83; see also State v. Hill, 277 Or App 751, 766, 373 P3d 162, rev den, 360 Or 568 (2016) (“[T]he burden of
rule, which originated in civil law, is arguably inconsistent with the state’s burden of proof in a criminal case and is an outlier to the rule that we review a trial court’s decision on the basis of the record that was before the trial court at the time that it made its ruling, defendant’s arguments do not provide a basis for us—as an intermediate appellate court—to deviate from nearly 70 years of precedent and directly controlling Supreme Court authority.
2 Establishing territorial jurisdiction (that the crime occurred in the state of Oregon) is different from establishing venue (that the crime occurred in a particular county), which the state no longer must prove as a material allegation . See Mills, 354 Or at 351 (overruling case law and holding that the Oregon Constitution does not require venue as alleged in a charging document to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
Cite as 352 Or App 453 (2026) 459
proving jurisdictional facts in Oregon criminal cases ultimately lies with the state.”).3 3. Application The first step in a territorial jurisdiction analysis is to determine the applicable “conduct that is an element” or “result that is an element” of the offense, as stated in ORS 131.215. Here, as charged in Count 1, the state had to prove that defendant “utter[ed] a written instrument which [she] knew to be forged” and did so “with [the] intent to injure or defraud.” ORS 165.007(1)(b). The “written instrument” alleged was the check. See ORS 165.002(1) (defining a written instrument as “any paper, document, instrument, article or electronic record containing written or printed matter or the equivalent thereof, whether complete or incomplete, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person”). The “utterance” alleged was defendant’s tender of the check to the bank teller. See ORS 165.002(7) (defining “utter” as meaning “to issue, deliver, publish, circulate, disseminate, transfer or tender a written instrument or other object to another”). For Count 2, the state had to prove that defendant “possesse[d] a forged instrument” and that she “kn[ew] it to be forged” and had the “intent to utter” it. ORS 165.017(1). A “forged instrument” is a “written instrument which has been falsely made, completed or altered.” ORS 165.002(8). Here, the alleged forged instrument was the check.
Thus, for Count 1, the state had to prove that when defendant tendered the check to the teller, she did so in Oregon. Similarly, for Count 2, the state had to prove that when defendant possessed the check, she did so in Oregon.
The second step of the analysis is to determine whether the evidence established that the relevant conduct
3 We note that in Williams, we identified the state’s burden of proof for establishing territorial jurisdiction as either beyond a reasonable doubt or a preponderance of the evidence, with most jurisdictions having concluded that the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. 326 Or App at 84. We did not resolve the question in Williams, and we do not need to do so here, because we ultimately conclude that the evidence was sufficient under either standard.
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occurred in Oregon. Here, there was no direct testimony at trial that the acts of possession and tender occurred in Oregon. As a result, we are left to assess whether the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence can meet the state’s burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction.4 The relevant evidence on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is as follows: (1) the address listed on the check was in Myrtle Creek, Oregon; (2) E texted defendant around 4:00 p.m. and wanted to get to the bank before 5:00 p.m.; (3) defendant picked up E in Tri City, which was three or four miles from the bank; (4) defendant tried to cash the check at Umpqua Bank; (5) after the bank teller would not cash the check, the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office conducted the investigation into defendant’s possible criminal conduct; (6) the case was charged and prosecuted by the Douglas County District Attorney’s Office; and (7) the trial took place in Roseburg, Oregon.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant’s conduct occurred in Oregon. State v. Stutte, 339 Or App 87, 95, 568 P3d 247 (2025) (“A reasonable logical probability that follows from a stated narrative or historical fact is a reasonable inference.”). Jurors are permitted to use their common sense and experiences when evaluating the evidence, State v. Hines, 84 Or App 681, 683-84, 735 P2d 618, rev den, 303 Or 590 (1987); State v. Campbell, 348 Or App 306, 310-11, 590 P3d 612 (2026), and these jurors were so instructed. It is thus reasonable that these jurors, who were residents of Douglas County, Oregon, 4 We observe that the state created an incredibly thin record in this case. At trial, the prosecutor failed to introduce any direct evidence on the issue in his case-in-chief. After the trial court rejected his attempt to rely on facts not in the record about the jurisdiction of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office, the prosecutor failed to make any other arguments about the sufficiency of the record on the jurisdictional issue. Moreover, even after being put on notice that defendant was challenging territorial jurisdiction, the prosecutor failed to adduce direct evidence of that fact, through a simple question to any witness or otherwise. On appeal, the state puts forth a conclusory three-sentence argument on the issue, which relies only on the Myrtle Creek address, the pickup location in “Tri City,” and the involvement of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office. That argument did not aid in our analysis. We caution that, in another case, this kind of overall minimal presentation would likely be insufficient to achieve the state’s goals.
Cite as 352 Or App 453 (2026) 461
and who were hearing the case in Roseburg, Oregon, would understand that “Tri City” referred to the town in Douglas County, Oregon. It is also reasonable that these jurors could conclude that the Umpqua Bank was in Oregon, given the time (under one hour) and distance (three to four miles) that defendant traveled between picking up E in Tri City and arriving at the bank before it closed.
Those facts distinguish this case from Williams, for example, because there was no evidence that some or all of the criminal conduct took place close to a state border, such that defendant could have crossed it in the time that it took her to drive to the bank.5 Thus, this is not a case in which the jury would have had to rely on impermissible speculation or inference stacking to determine that the bank was in Oregon. Cf. State v. Means, 213 Or App 268, 272-74, 160 P3d 1001 (2007), abrogated on other grounds by Mills, 354 Or 350 (in the context of a venue challenge, determining that testimony that unauthorized credit card charges originated in “Overlook, in Portland” was insufficient to establish venue in Multnomah County because there was “no evidence showing where Overlook is in relation to Multnomah County, or even that it is a neighborhood” and reliance on that evidence would be “little more than guesswork”); State v. Tirado, 118 Or App 294, 296-97, 846 P2d 1201 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by Mills, 354 Or 350 (in the context of a venue challenge, concluding that it would require impermissible inference stacking to establish venue in Jackson County where there was only evidence that the defendant was stopped on “Avenue ‘G,’ one-half mile from the White City Veteran’s Administration Domiciliary” and arrested on “Highway 62”). We find support for our conclusion in other cases involving venue challenges, which permitted jurors to use common sense and experience to draw direct inferences about the location of a crime. See e.g., State v. Davis, 248 Or App 263, 270, 273 P3d 251 (2012), rev den, 354 Or 656 (2013), abrogated on other grounds by Mills, 354 Or 350
5 In Williams, the defendant had traveled across the Oregon-Washington border during the 3.5-hour window within which the criminal conduct occurred. 326 Or App at 66. Because the record therefore demonstrated that the conduct “may have taken place” in Washington, we concluded that the state had failed to establish that the Oregon trial court had territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 86.
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(in the context of a venue challenge, determining that the jury could reasonably infer that Medford was located in Jackson County); State v. Jones, 240 Or 129, 135, 400 P2d 524 (1965), abrogated on other grounds by Mills, 354 Or 350 (in the context of a venue challenge, determining that it was a reasonable inference that “the Union county about which the officer testified was the Union county in Oregon in which the jurors lived and the case was being tried”).
Because there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could determine that the criminal conduct occurred in Oregon, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the question of territorial jurisdiction. B. Mental State 1. Standard of Review As we explained above, in considering a challenge to the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we view the underlying evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Wallace, 373 Or at 125-26. Where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to an essential element of a crime, our task is to determine whether that evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, could permit a rational factfinder to find the essential element proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lupoli, 348 Or 346, 366, 234 P3d 117 (2010). And that review includes the entire record, not just the evidence that the state presented in its case-in-chief. Shifflett, 285 Or App at 659.
2. Application To prove second-degree criminal possession, the state had to establish that defendant knew that the check was forged. ORS 165.017(1). To prove second-degree forgery, the state had to prove that defendant intended to defraud or injure someone and that she knew that the check was forged. ORS 165.007(1)(b). The state can prove mental state via circumstantial evidence. State v. Rogers, 301 Or App 393, 398, 457 P3d 363 (2019).
Here, the check was in evidence. The name on the “pay to” line was blurred, and it appears that two different
Cite as 352 Or App 453 (2026) 463
pens were used to write on the check. The memo line on the check reflected “balance due on acc[oun]t,” which was inconsistent with the reason for the check that E told defendant . Moreover, E told defendant two potentially conflicting reasons for getting the check: that it was money from a friend’s father and that it was payment for yard work from an elderly person. Defendant was suspicious of the check and asked questions, both in the text exchange and during the drive to the bank, about the origin of the check. After defendant gave the check to the teller and the teller refused to cash it or return it, defendant drove away without engaging with the teller. Those facts would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that defendant possessed the required intent and knowledge for her second-degree criminal possession and forgery verdicts. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Affirmed.