State v. Marlett
This text of 2015 Ohio 3795 (State v. Marlett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[Cite as State v. Marlett, 2015-Ohio-3795.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellant : Appellate Case No. 26557 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2012-CRB-0933 : KYLE D. MARLETT : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court) : Defendant-Appellee : :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 18th day of September, 2015.
KENT J. DEPOORTER, Atty. Reg. No. 0058487, Assistant Prosecutor, Kettering Municipal Court, 7501 Paragon Road, Dayton, Ohio 45459 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
CHARLES W. SLICER, III, Atty. Reg. No. 0059927, 111 West First Street, Suite 518, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
.............
WELBAUM, J. -2-
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from a judgment of the
Kettering Municipal Court sealing defendant-appellee Kyle D. Marlett’s record of
conviction for criminal trespass immediately after sentencing. Specifically, the State
contends that, pursuant to R.C. 2953.32, Marlett was required to wait one year from his
misdemeanor conviction before applying to have the record sealed. For the reasons
outlined below, the judgment of the trial court sealing the record of Marlett’s conviction will
be vacated.
{¶ 2} Sometime prior to December 30, 2014, Marlett was found guilty of criminal
trespass, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, following a bench trial. According to the
State’s brief, Marlett had stolen some building materials from a construction site. Neither
the charging instrument, the judgment of conviction, nor the transcript of the bench trial is
part of the record before this court.
{¶ 3} On December 30, 2014, the trial court sentenced Marlett to pay a fine of
$100, which the trial court thereafter suspended. Counsel for the State was not present
during sentencing. Immediately after the sentence was announced, and before any final
judgment entry was filed, the following discussion took place between the trial court and
Marlett’s trial counsel:
COURT: Check to see if your motion’s [sic] come in. Go out with Rob,
and he’s gonna process, or have them process whatever they
need through the Clerk’s [sic] and you bring him right back in
and we’ll do the[—]
DEFENSE: It should be here by now. -3- COURT: Okay.
DEFENSE: Okay, great, thanks.
COURT: I’ll be back in Chambers, so just let Rob know, or somebody
come back and let me know, and I’ll come back and we’ll take
care of it.
Sentencing Trans. (Dec. 30, 2014), p. 3.
{¶ 4} While trial court did not specify the nature of the motion it was referring to
and was thereafter cut off before it could explain what it was going to do once the motion
was processed, we can glean from the record that the court was referring to an
application to seal Marlett’s record of conviction, because shortly after the court made the
foregoing comments, it came back on the record and stated the following to Marlett:
Mr. Marlett, same thing. I’m granting the request to seal [the] record of
conviction. You’ll get a certified copy. Keep it for future reference. Once
you walk out of the Courthouse, the record’s sealed technically.
Realistically, it’s gonna take that amount of time that I explained to the other
gentleman.
Hearing Trans. (Dec. 30, 2014), p.3.
{¶ 5} A judgment entry reflecting the court’s decision to seal the record was filed
the same day, December 30, 2014. The judgment entry incorrectly stated that Marlett
had been acquitted. In addition, the entry stated that “all official records pertaining to this
case shall be sealed and all indexed references thereto shall be deleted[.]”
{¶ 6} On January 7, 2015, the trial court filed an amended judgment entry that
referenced the sealing of the record and stated the following: -4- Further, the Court finds that the [case] qualifies for expungement pursuant
to §2953.31(A) of the Revised Code; that there is no pending criminal
proceeding against Defendant; that Defendant’s rehabilitation has been
attained to the satisfaction of the Court, and that the sealing of the record of
Defendant’s conviction is consistent with the public interest.
The amended entry also differed from the original entry in that it did not refer to an
acquittal, and the list of agencies upon which the order was to be served was more
extensive and specific than the original order.
{¶ 7} On January 13, 2015, the State appealed from both the trial court’s original
and amended judgment entries sealing Marlett’s record of conviction, raising the following
single assignment of error for review:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SIGNING AND
APPROVING THE ENTRY & ORDER SEALING THE RECORD OF
CONVICTION THAT DID NOT SATISFY THE PROPER REQUIREMENTS
UNDER OHIO REVISED CODE §2953.32.
{¶ 8} Under its sole assignment of error, the State contends that Marlett’s
application to seal the record of his conviction had been improperly granted because R.C.
2953.32 provides that an offender convicted of a misdemeanor is not eligible for sealing
his record until one year after his “final discharge.” The State also asserts that neither
Marlett nor the trial court notified the State of the application to seal before it was
addressed by the court, which deprived the State of its opportunity to object to the court’s
action.
{¶ 9} “The trial court’s preliminary determination as to whether the statutory -5- eligibility requirements for sealing a conviction apply is a question of law that this court
reviews de novo.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Widener, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2013 CA
29, 2014-Ohio-333, ¶ 8. If the conviction was eligible to be sealed, we then review the
trial court’s decision to grant or deny an application to seal a record of conviction for an
abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted.) Id. Accord State v. D.L., 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 26394, 2015-Ohio-1664, ¶ 7.
{¶ 10} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(A)(1), “an eligible offender may apply to the
sentencing court * * * for the sealing of the record of the case that pertains to the
conviction.” An “eligible offender” is “anyone who has been convicted of an offense in
this state or any other jurisdiction and who has not more than one felony conviction, not
more than two misdemeanor convictions, or not more than one felony conviction and one
misdemeanor conviction in this state or any other jurisdiction.” R.C. 2953.31(A).
{¶ 11} R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) further provides that an offender convicted of a
misdemeanor may apply to have his or her record sealed “at the expiration of one year
after the offender’s final discharge[.]” A court may seal an offender’s record of conviction
“ ‘only when all requirements for eligibility are met.’ ” State v. Radcliff, 142 Ohio St.3d 78,
2015-Ohio-235, 28 N.E.3d 69, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Boykin, 138 Ohio St.3d 97,
2013-Ohio-4582, 4 N.E.3d 980, ¶ 11. (Other citation omitted.)
{¶ 12} The language of R.C. 2953.32 makes clear that the trial court was not
authorized to consider Marlett’s motion to seal his record simultaneously with or
immediately after his conviction, as Marlett was not eligible for such relief until one year
after his “final discharge.” Moreover, regardless of whether Marlett served his motion on
the State, the trial court was still required under R.C.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2015 Ohio 3795, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-marlett-ohioctapp-2015.