State v. Marhoun

323 N.W.2d 729, 1982 Minn. LEXIS 1738
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedAugust 24, 1982
Docket82-611
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 323 N.W.2d 729 (State v. Marhoun) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Marhoun, 323 N.W.2d 729, 1982 Minn. LEXIS 1738 (Mich. 1982).

Opinion

TODD, Justice.

Defendant has been indicted by a Chisago County grand jury of murder in the first degree, criminal sexual conduct in the first and second degree, and kidnapping. The state, pursuant to Minn.R.Crim.P. 29.03, subd. 1 (1980), appeals from the pretrial omnibus hearing order that (1) suppressed one of defendant’s statements to police on the ground that no Miranda warning was given, (2) suppressed evidence seized in a warranted search of defendant’s automobile, and (3) suppressed, on due process grounds, the eyewitness identification testimony of a person who claims she saw defendant with the victim shortly before the homicide is believed to have occurred. Acting pursuant to Rule 29.03, subd. 3, defendant has filed a cross-appeal seeking review of that part of the district court’s order which denied a motion to dismiss the charges on the ground of insufficient evidence to indict.

On the evening of July 15, 1981, defendant, who is from St. Paul, left a Duluth bar with a 30-year-old woman, who he met in the bar and persuaded to accompany him to see a sailboat at a nearby marina. Later defendant and this woman were observed in a local VFW club.

The woman never returned to her car that night or to her trailer and 2 days later the bartender at the bar filed a missing person report.

Police investigation resulted in the discovery of defendant’s name and on July 26 a Duluth police officer drove to St. Paul and talked with defendant, who voluntarily came to the St. Paul Police Department. Defendant denied knowing what had happened to the woman, saying that he returned to the bar and dropped her off near her car after they left the VFW club.

Two days later the woman’s decomposed body was found near a county road in Chis-ago County just a short distance west of 1-35. The body had been bound around the torso using nylon rope tied in sailor’s knots. The medical examiner could not determine the cause of death but opined that homicidal violence of an unknown type had been *731 used and that sexual misconduct had been involved.

On the 30th the Duluth police officer again drove to St. Paul and called defendant, asking him if he would talk with him at the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension offices. Defendant, knowing that he did not have to talk with the officer, agreed and met the officer at the offices a short time later. The defendant’s wife, who accompanied defendant, was told that she should wait in a separate room.

Defendant continued to deny his guilt in a session which lasted over 1½ hours. After the session his car was impounded and he and his wife were given a ride home.

A warranted search of the car was obtained the next day and arguably incriminating evidence was found in the search.

Police also obtained warrants to search other property belonging to defendant and more evidence was seized.

On August 19, police, who had been interviewing employees of restaurants, gas stations, and motels along the freeway, talked with an employee of a restaurant in Hinck-ley who identified pictures of defendant and the victim, saying that they had been in the restaurant late on the 15th.

Without detailing all the evidence adduced at the grand jury hearing, we agree with the district court that the evidence was sufficient to support the indictments.

However, we believe that the district court erred in suppressing the statement defendant gave on the 30th, the evidence seized in the search of defendant’s car, and the identification testimony of the restaurant employee.

Although the interrogation of defendant on the evening of the 30th occurred at B.C.A. offices, defendant came there voluntarily, knowing that he was under no legal compulsion to do so, just as on the 26th he had voluntarily submitted to questioning at the St. Paul Police Department. Defendant was also told in the middle of the interrogation that he was free to leave, but he chose not to do so. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the questioning was noncustodial and that therefore no Miranda warning was required. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977), is closely in point. 1

The affidavit in support of the warrant to search defendant’s ear 2 did not say how *732 police learned that the victim had disappeared or who saw her leave the bar with defendant on the 15th, but the affidavit established that Chisago County authorities found a decomposed body that was identified by the medical experts as the victim’s body and that the affidavit established that defendant himself admitted to police that he had left the bar with the victim on the 15th. Although the affidavit does not establish how police learned that the victim’s car had been abandoned by the bar on the 15th, the affidavit does reveal that somehow police obtained this information and that someone had filed a missing person report. Even information which does not meet the Aguilar test may sometimes be relied upon in connection with other information that does meet the test. State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113 (Minn.1978). We believe that this is such a case, given the fact that police had learned, presumably from the motel manager, that defendant did not return to the motel until around 7 a. m. on the morning of the 16th. Police also learned from defendant that he was interested in sailing. The affiant knew, from his military background, that the knots used in binding the victim were sailing knots.

In summary, the affidavit established that the Chisago County authorities had found a dead body of a missing woman, that she had been bound using sailor’s knots, that on the 15th defendant had left a Duluth bar with the victim to show her some boats, and that he was gone all night and did not return to his motel room until 7 a. m. the next day. Bearing in mind that we are dealing with probable cause, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we believe that the affidavit, while it could have been better drafted, contained sufficient reliable information to establish probable cause to search defendant’s car.

The final issue is the reliability of the eyewitness identification testimony. It is one thing to expect police to show an *733 array of pictures of look-alikes to people who they know have witnessed a crime. In this case, however, the police were unaware of whether there were any witnesses who may have seen defendant and the victim together somewhere along 1-35 on the way to Chisago County on the evening of the 15th or morning of the 16th. Just as it is proper for police to provide the media with a composite drawing of a person who has committed a crime, it is also proper for police to take a picture of a person whom they strongly suspect of having committed a crime and show it to people who might have seen the person in the area of the crime in the company of the victim.

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Bluebook (online)
323 N.W.2d 729, 1982 Minn. LEXIS 1738, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-marhoun-minn-1982.