STRUCKMEYER, Justice.
David Marcus, a licensed physician, was informed against by the County Attorney of Maricopa County on three counts of illegal sale of narcotic drugs, a violation of A.R.S. § 36-1002.02.
Defendant duly moved to quash the information, which motion was denied. Shortly before trial, he orally renewed his motion and the trial judge certified this compound question as important and doubtful:
“May a licensed physician who sells drugs (defined as narcotic drugs) in his office to a person whom he is not attending as a patient be found guilty of violating A. R.S. Sec.
36-1002.02
or is the sale of drugs by a licensed physician regulated exclusively by A.R.S. Sec. 32-1965 ?”
A.R.S. § 36-1002.02 is part of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act originally enacted in 1935. In so far as it relates to the problems of this case, it prohibits the sale of any narcotic drug other than upon the written prescription of a physician and except as otherwise provided in Article I of Ch. 9, Title 36.
The exception is found in A.R.S. § 36-1007, subsec. A, § 11, Ch. 26, L. ’35.
Ҥ 36-1007. Professional use of narcotic drugs
“A. A physician, osteopath or a dentist, in good faith and in the course of his professional practice only, may prescribe, administer and dispense narcotic drugs, or he may cause the same to be administered by a nurse or interne under his direction and supervision.”
By the quoted enactment a physician may dispense narcotic drugs in good faith and in the course of his professional practice.
Hence, A.R.S. § 36-1002.02 excepts from sales on written prescription narcotic drugs dispensed in good faith and in the course of a physician’s professional practice.
It is the defendant’s position that A.R.S. § 36-1002.02 is inconsistent with A. R.S. §§ 32-1964
and 32-1965.
These latter sections were enacted in 1951 as part of tire Pharmacy Act, and have remained substantially the same today although A.R.S. § 32-1964 was amended somewhat in 1967. It is urged that the terms “dangerous drugs” and “any dangerous drugs” are all
inclusive; that is, that they must necessarily include narcotics and hence, the latter sections repealed the provisions of A.R. S. § 36-1002.02. Ostensibly the two enactments § 32-1964 and § 36-1002.02 are
inconsistent but while it is a general principle that the most recent Act controls over the earlier Act, such is not invariably binding. Gustafson v. Rajkovich, 76 Ariz. 280, 263 P.2d 540, 40 A.L.R.2d 520. The controlling principle is that where a special provision of a statute deals with the same subject as a general statute, the special provision prevails. Trickel v. Rainbo Baking Company of Phoenix, 100 Ariz. 222, 412 P.2d 852; Enloe v. Baker, 94 Ariz. 295, 383 P.2d 748; Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court, etc., 91 Ariz. 163, 370 P.2d 652; Knape v. Brown, 86 Ariz. 158, 342 P.2d 195. We said for example, in Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra:
“ * * * In so far as the provisions of a special statute are inconsistent with those of a general statute on the same subject, the special statute will control, Knape v. Brown, 86 Ariz. 158, 342 P.2d 195 (1959); Whitfield Trans. Inc. v. Brooks, 81 Ariz. 136, 302 P.2d 526 (1956). The general statute remains applicable, however, to all matters not dealt with in the specific statute, Kay v. Hillside Mines, 54 Ariz. 36, 91 P.2d 867 (1939); Mercado v. Superior Court of Pima County, 51 Ariz. 436, 77 P.2d 810 (1938) ; State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458, 32 P.2d 799 (1934).” 91 Ariz. at 171, 370 P.2d at 657.
As can be seen by § 32-1964, the legislature has included certain known dangerous drugs and made provisions for others to be added by the board of pharmacy on designation under the provisions of the federal food, drug & cosmetic act. However, the legislature did not include narcotic drugs. It could hardly have been unaware in 1951 that narcotics were dangerous drugs and hence, in omitting from the list of proscribed drugs those classified as narcotics, it must have intended that their use be controlled elsewhere than under § 32-1964 and § 32-1965, as they were under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act adopted in 1935.
A.R.S. § 36-1002.02 of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act as it applies to physicians was not repealed by the adoption of the Pharmacy Act, § 32-1964 and § 32-1965. § 32-1964 is a general statute covering all dangerous drugs except those which specifically relate to narcotics. If it could be considered that there is a nominal area of inconsistency in the two Acts arising by reason of the use of the all embracing words in the Pharmacy Act “any dangerous drugs” the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 32-1002.02 pertaining to the dispensing of narcotic drugs must govern.
The defendant’s argument for either an express or implied repeal of § 36-1002.02 in so far as it applies to physicians is highly technical and refined. It does not require a point by point discussion here. As an example, it is defendant’s position that certain amendments in 1961 to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act expressly repealed § 36-1002.02 as it applies to physicians. Defendant points to A.R.S. § 36-1002.01, subsec. A which reads:
Ҥ 36-1002.01. Possession of narcotic drugs for sale; penalty
“A.
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STRUCKMEYER, Justice.
David Marcus, a licensed physician, was informed against by the County Attorney of Maricopa County on three counts of illegal sale of narcotic drugs, a violation of A.R.S. § 36-1002.02.
Defendant duly moved to quash the information, which motion was denied. Shortly before trial, he orally renewed his motion and the trial judge certified this compound question as important and doubtful:
“May a licensed physician who sells drugs (defined as narcotic drugs) in his office to a person whom he is not attending as a patient be found guilty of violating A. R.S. Sec.
36-1002.02
or is the sale of drugs by a licensed physician regulated exclusively by A.R.S. Sec. 32-1965 ?”
A.R.S. § 36-1002.02 is part of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act originally enacted in 1935. In so far as it relates to the problems of this case, it prohibits the sale of any narcotic drug other than upon the written prescription of a physician and except as otherwise provided in Article I of Ch. 9, Title 36.
The exception is found in A.R.S. § 36-1007, subsec. A, § 11, Ch. 26, L. ’35.
Ҥ 36-1007. Professional use of narcotic drugs
“A. A physician, osteopath or a dentist, in good faith and in the course of his professional practice only, may prescribe, administer and dispense narcotic drugs, or he may cause the same to be administered by a nurse or interne under his direction and supervision.”
By the quoted enactment a physician may dispense narcotic drugs in good faith and in the course of his professional practice.
Hence, A.R.S. § 36-1002.02 excepts from sales on written prescription narcotic drugs dispensed in good faith and in the course of a physician’s professional practice.
It is the defendant’s position that A.R.S. § 36-1002.02 is inconsistent with A. R.S. §§ 32-1964
and 32-1965.
These latter sections were enacted in 1951 as part of tire Pharmacy Act, and have remained substantially the same today although A.R.S. § 32-1964 was amended somewhat in 1967. It is urged that the terms “dangerous drugs” and “any dangerous drugs” are all
inclusive; that is, that they must necessarily include narcotics and hence, the latter sections repealed the provisions of A.R. S. § 36-1002.02. Ostensibly the two enactments § 32-1964 and § 36-1002.02 are
inconsistent but while it is a general principle that the most recent Act controls over the earlier Act, such is not invariably binding. Gustafson v. Rajkovich, 76 Ariz. 280, 263 P.2d 540, 40 A.L.R.2d 520. The controlling principle is that where a special provision of a statute deals with the same subject as a general statute, the special provision prevails. Trickel v. Rainbo Baking Company of Phoenix, 100 Ariz. 222, 412 P.2d 852; Enloe v. Baker, 94 Ariz. 295, 383 P.2d 748; Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court, etc., 91 Ariz. 163, 370 P.2d 652; Knape v. Brown, 86 Ariz. 158, 342 P.2d 195. We said for example, in Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra:
“ * * * In so far as the provisions of a special statute are inconsistent with those of a general statute on the same subject, the special statute will control, Knape v. Brown, 86 Ariz. 158, 342 P.2d 195 (1959); Whitfield Trans. Inc. v. Brooks, 81 Ariz. 136, 302 P.2d 526 (1956). The general statute remains applicable, however, to all matters not dealt with in the specific statute, Kay v. Hillside Mines, 54 Ariz. 36, 91 P.2d 867 (1939); Mercado v. Superior Court of Pima County, 51 Ariz. 436, 77 P.2d 810 (1938) ; State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458, 32 P.2d 799 (1934).” 91 Ariz. at 171, 370 P.2d at 657.
As can be seen by § 32-1964, the legislature has included certain known dangerous drugs and made provisions for others to be added by the board of pharmacy on designation under the provisions of the federal food, drug & cosmetic act. However, the legislature did not include narcotic drugs. It could hardly have been unaware in 1951 that narcotics were dangerous drugs and hence, in omitting from the list of proscribed drugs those classified as narcotics, it must have intended that their use be controlled elsewhere than under § 32-1964 and § 32-1965, as they were under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act adopted in 1935.
A.R.S. § 36-1002.02 of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act as it applies to physicians was not repealed by the adoption of the Pharmacy Act, § 32-1964 and § 32-1965. § 32-1964 is a general statute covering all dangerous drugs except those which specifically relate to narcotics. If it could be considered that there is a nominal area of inconsistency in the two Acts arising by reason of the use of the all embracing words in the Pharmacy Act “any dangerous drugs” the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 32-1002.02 pertaining to the dispensing of narcotic drugs must govern.
The defendant’s argument for either an express or implied repeal of § 36-1002.02 in so far as it applies to physicians is highly technical and refined. It does not require a point by point discussion here. As an example, it is defendant’s position that certain amendments in 1961 to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act expressly repealed § 36-1002.02 as it applies to physicians. Defendant points to A.R.S. § 36-1002.01, subsec. A which reads:
Ҥ 36-1002.01. Possession of narcotic drugs for sale; penalty
“A. Except as otherwise provided in this article, every person who possesses for sale any narcotic drug other than marijuana shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than five years nor more than fifteen years, and shall not be eligible for release upon completion of sentence, or on parole, or on any other basis until he has served not less than five years in prison.”
We think this statute is entirely consistent with the provisions of the Pharmacy Act and the other provisions of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. The two statutes, A.R.S. § 36-1002.01 and § 36-1002.-02 do not embrace the same subject matter. § 36-1002.01 prohibits the possession for sale of any narcotic drug. It creates a separate, distinct offense from those found in § 36-1002.02. Each of the two sections provides its own punishment for a violation. Each can be enforced without reference to the other and stands independent of the other. § 36-1002.01 does not conflict with the Pharmacy Act § 32-1964 and
§ 32-1965 for the reason that it is expressly limited, to narcotic drugs.
The first part of the certified question is answered in the affirmative and the second part is answered in the negative.
UDALL, C. J., LOCKWOOD, V. C. J., and McFARLAND and HAYS, JJ., concur.