State v. Manns

2024 Ohio 23

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 5, 2024
• Docket: 29882
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Manns, 2024-Ohio-23.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 29882 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 CR 00557 : JAMES MANNS : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on January 5, 2024

MICHAEL O. MILLS, Attorney for Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee

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HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} James Manns appeals from a judgment entry of conviction on one count of

aggravated possession of drugs. Manns had entered a no contest plea after the trial court

denied his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we conclude that the trial court

did not err in overruling Manns’s motion to suppress, and the judgment of the trial court -2-

is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} This matter arose from a traffic stop in the early morning hours of a vehicle

in which Manns was a passenger, after the driver ran a red light and turned onto an

interstate entrance ramp from a straight lane in an area known for high drug activity. Both

occupants of the vehicle had out-of-state licenses, and the officer who made the stop

called for a canine unit and backup while he prepared the citation. When Manns exited

the vehicle to allow the dog to perform a sniff, drug paraphernalia fell from his lap, and he

admitted to officers that he had drugs in the front portion of his underwear.

{¶ 3} Manns was indicted on one count of aggravated possession of drugs. He

filed a motion to suppress which challenged the stop of the vehicle in which he had been

a passenger and the length of the detention. Following a hearing, the court overruled the

motion to suppress, finding that the traffic stop had not been prolonged beyond the time

reasonably required to issue a traffic citation and that Manns had been appropriately

detained based upon a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was in possession of

drug paraphernalia.

{¶ 4} Manns appeals from his conviction.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 5} Manns’s assignment of error challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion

to suppress. Manns argues that Deputy Blake Creager, who initiated the traffic stop,

lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him for the purpose of conducting a canine sniff

and to remove him from the vehicle. He asserts that the traffic stop was “improperly -3-

extended to facilitate the drug sniff.” According to Manns, Creager “had no reasonable

suspicion to remove him from the vehicle to conduct the more invasive search that

prevented him from remaining inside the vehicle.” The State responds that the stop was

not illegally prolonged to conduct the canine sniff because the officer was still completing

the citation when the canine unit arrived and that ordering Manns out of the vehicle was

permissible without reasonable suspicion of separate criminal activity.

{¶ 6} When addressing a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of

the trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve conflicts in the evidence

and determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their

testimony. State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 639 N.E.2d 498 (1994). In reviewing

a suppression decision, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if

they are supported by competent, credible evidence in the record. Id. Accepting those

facts as true, we must then independently determine whether the applicable legal

standard is satisfied as a matter of law and without deference to the trial court's legal

conclusion. Id.

{¶ 7} “A traffic stop may be premised upon any violation of the traffic law. However,

‘[a]n investigative stop must be temporary and must last no longer than is necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” State v. Hill, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26345, 2016-

Ohio-3087, ¶ 9, quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d

229 (1983). “When an officer detains a motorist for a traffic violation, the stop should

delay the motorist only for the amount of time necessary to issue a citation or warning.”

Id., citing State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 12. -4-

“The reasonable stop time includes the amount of time it takes to conduct a computer

check on the driver’s license, registration, and vehicle plates.” Id. The court must

evaluate the duration of the traffic stop in light of the totality of the circumstances and

determine if the officer diligently conducted the investigation and completed the tasks

within a reasonable time. Id.

{¶ 8} In Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d

492 (2015), the United States Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment

does not prohibit unrelated investigative activities during a traffic stop, including the use

of a canine unit, provided those activities do not prolong the stop. State v. Hall, 2017-

Ohio-2682, 90 N.E.3d 276, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), citing Rodriguez at 1615 (“An officer * * * may

conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But * * * he may

not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily

demanded to justify detaining an individual.”). Notably, the Rodriguez majority explicitly

rejected the government's argument that an officer may “incrementally” prolong a stop to

perform a drug sniff if he “is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related purpose of

the stop, and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration

of other stops involving similar circumstances.” Rodriguez at 1616. The Court

emphasized that reasonableness “depends on what the police in fact do,” and diligence

is measured “by noting what the officer actually did and how he did it.” Id. The “critical

question” in each case is “whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’ — i.e., adds time to —

‘the stop.’ ” Id.

{¶ 9} At the suppression hearing, Deputy Creager of the Montgomery County -5-

Sheriff’s Office testified that, in the early morning hours of November 13, 2022, he was

working alone in a marked cruiser when he initiated the traffic stop at issue herein.

Creager, who had five years of law enforcement experience at the time, was aware that

the area of the traffic stop -- in Harrison Township near the I-75 and I-70 interchange and

several hotels -- was known for high drug activity. Hollywood Gaming, a casino, was

located nearby in the City of Dayton, east of I-75, and Creager routinely encountered

people coming from the casino while on road patrol in the area. At the time of the traffic

stop, Creager was eastbound on Needmore Road just west of I-75. At 3:29 a.m., he

observed a GMC Envoy with Indiana plates illegally run a red light and turn left onto the

entrance ramp of I-75 from a straight lane. Creager activated his lights, which also

automatically activated the recording system in his cruiser. Creager turned on his body

camera and, when he approached the driver’s side of the vehicle, he advised the driver,

Angela Castleman, of the reason for the stop. Manns was the front passenger seat.

{¶ 10} Creager requested identification from both occupants; Castleman provided

an Indiana driver’s license and Manns provided a Florida license. Creager asked to

search the vehicle based upon the hour of day, the high drug activity known to be common

in the area, the vehicle’s Indiana plates, and his experience with drugs being brought to

Ohio specifically from Indiana. Castleman declined. Castleman told Creager that they

were coming from the casino, which made Creager suspicious, because if they had been

coming from the casino to I-75, they “should have been going westbound.”

{¶ 11} Creager then asked the occupants if there was anything illegal in the

vehicle; Manns responded that there was a pellet gun, but this did not concern Creager. -6-

Creager obtained the occupants’ Social Security numbers. While Creager walked toward

his cruiser, he requested a canine unit be brought to the scene via a radio attached to his

person.

{¶ 12} To prepare the traffic citation, Creager was required to check the validity of

the out-of-state licenses and to determine if there were any suspensions, the year, make

and model of vehicle, and the occupants’ addresses and phone numbers. In his cruiser,

Creager began the process through a database known as LEADS. He also used his in-

car radio to communicate with a “records channel” because the licenses were from out of

state.

{¶ 13} Because he had not obtained the phone numbers of Castleman and Manns,

Creager again approached the vehicle to do so. He stated that phone numbers were not

officially required, but it was department policy to obtain them. He then used the computer

in his cruiser to enter the information he had obtained to complete the traffic citation.

According to Creager, if an operator’s license number and Social Security number for an

Ohio driver were entered into the system, the software would “auto-populate” the

remaining fields to quickly complete the citation, but because the driver had an out-of-

state license, he had to manually enter the information into the citation. Creager stated

that he had been unable to complete the citation before the canine unit arrived

approximately 15 minutes after Creager initiated the stop, but that he was engaged in

doing so during that intervening time. On the recording of the encounter, which was

admitted at the suppression hearing, Creager can be heard expressing his frustration to

a fellow officer shortly before the canine unit arrived that he had to manually enter -7-

Castleman’s information because of her out-of-state license.

{¶ 14} Creager testified that he requested assistance (back-up) in processing the

stop due to concerns for his safety; Deputy Matthew Templin responded. According to

Creager, having another officer at the scene allowed that officer to “keep eyes on the

vehicle” while the other officer had his head down completing the citation, in case

someone tried to hurt him or drive away. Creager acknowledged that he had made a

remark to Templin about his and the canine unit’s traffic stop statistics, but he continued

to process the ticket while doing so. Creager stated, “I try to be as proactive as I can

every night.”

{¶ 15} Creager testified that for the canine to perform the “free air sniff” for

narcotics, the occupants had to exit the vehicle. Creager removed the driver, Templin

removed Manns, and both occupants were placed near Creager’s cruiser. Templin

advised Creager that, as Manns exited the vehicle, a drug smoking device fell from his

lap onto the ground. Templin then placed Manns in handcuffs and asked if he had

anything else on him; Manns indicated that he had drugs in the front portion of his

underwear. Manns’s handcuffs were removed to allow him to retrieve the drugs, which

he gave to Creager, and then he was handcuffed again. Creager testified that the canine

then alerted the officers to the presence of drugs in the vehicle, and the vehicle was

searched.

{¶ 16} On cross-examination, Creager denied requesting a canine because he or

the dog “needed stats”; he stated that he did so because he suspected there were drugs

in the vehicle. Creager acknowledged that he indicated that he would later reward himself -8-

with a coffee for an arrest, and that he speculated about obtaining a “motherload” from

the vehicle. Creager stated that he called the canine unit based upon his suspicions that

there were drugs or something illegal in the car.

{¶ 17} Deputy Templin testified that, at the time of the stop, he was aware of the

“Bulk Smuggling Task Force” and that the Miller Lane area, which was one exit north of

where Manns’s stop occurred, was known as a “[b]ig narcotics area.” When he arrived

at the scene, Templin approached the passenger side of Creager’s cruiser and observed

Creager typing the citation for the driver. Templin then approached the passenger side

of the vehicle where Manns was seated to remove him. When he did so, a glass pipe,

commonly used for ingesting narcotics in Templin’s training and experience, fell to the

ground and shattered; Templin placed Manns in handcuffs because narcotics are typically

found with drug paraphernalia. Manns was placed in Templin’s cruiser and taken to jail.

On cross-examination, Templin acknowledged that he acted as an extra set of eyes and

hands on the scene of the stop to remove Manns and allow the canine officer to perform

the sniff.

{¶ 18} In overruling the motion to suppress, the court noted that it had viewed the

video of the stop and saw and heard Dep. Creager communicating with dispatch and

typing on the in-cruiser computer; the court noted that the process took longer than normal

because the computer program “did not allow for self-population of the ticket” given the

out-of-state license and plates of the driver and vehicle. While defense counsel

questioned Creager’s need for phone numbers, the court noted Creager’s testimony that

“phone numbers are typically obtained despite not being required.” The court rejected -9-

Manns’s suggestion that Creager had delaying the process of preparing the ticket so the

canine unit could arrive.

{¶ 19} The court concluded that, regardless of Creager’s comments or motivation

about canine statistics and whether the stop might result in ”finding the ‘motherload’ ” of

illicit drugs, the video reflected that the driver of the Envoy had turned left from a non-

turning lane against a red light, and this traffic violation gave Creager reasonable

suspicion to justify a traffic stop. The court also found that the video demonstrated that

Creager had worked diligently on the traffic citation and there was no stalling as in State

v. Hall, 2017-Ohio-2682, 90 N.E.3d 276 (2d Dist.). It was significant to the court that the

canine arrived within 15 minutes of the initial traffic stop, which the court found was a

reasonable amount of time to issue a citation to a motorist with an out-of-state operator’s

license. The court concluded that the length of detention was reasonable, citing State v

Pack, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27890, 2019-Ohio-14.

{¶ 20} Regarding the seizure, the court noted that, after a valid stop, law

enforcement officers may have the occupants exit the vehicle. In this case, when exiting

the vehicle, a glass pipe fell from Manns’s lap to the ground. The court found that Dep.

Templin had recognized the item as drug paraphernalia from his training and experience.

The court noted the early morning hour, that the Envoy had been in an area that was

“close to the thoroughfares and motels where illicit drug trafficking is common,” and that

the driver’s “innocent explanation” of her presence in the area (being at the casino) was

“not entirely reasonable.” The court concluded that the deputies had had reasonable

articulable suspicion to believe that Manns “was engaged in criminal activity, to wit -10-

possession of drug paraphernalia” and could be detained.

{¶ 21} We see no error in the trial court’s suppression ruling. This case is

distinguishable from Hall, in which the officer confirmed Hall’s identity and requested a

canine unit, but then “did nothing to process the traffic stop for approximately eight

minutes,” although he had the information he needed to complete the citation. The canine

subsequently alerted to the presence of drug-related contraband. The evidence was

properly suppressed in that case because the United States Supreme Court made clear

in Rodriguez “that an officer may not prolong a traffic stop to perform a drug sniff even if

the ‘overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other

stops involving similar circumstances.’ ” Hall at ¶ 13, quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348,

135 S.Ct. at 1616, 191 L.Ed.2d 492.

{¶ 22} In Pack, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27890, 2019-Ohio-14, which the trial

court found to be similar to Manns’s case, approximately 17 minutes elapsed between

when an officer initiated the traffic stop and when the canine unit arrived; during that time,

the officer did not merely wait for the canine unit to arrive or stall for time. Id. at ¶ 28.

Instead, “in the interim between the beginning of the stop and the arrival of the canine

unit, [the officer] removed Pack from the van because he smelled alcohol, began

preparing Pack’s traffic citation, checked on the welfare of Mrs. Pack, and then went back

to the cruiser in order to finish the citation.” Id. We concluded that, under the totality of

the circumstances, the officer in Pack had not extended the detention beyond what was

reasonably necessary to resolve the issues associated with the stop and to issue a traffic

citation. Id. We therefore held in Pack that the 30-minute period between when the officer -11-

began writing the citation and when the canine unit alerted on Pack’s vehicle was

reasonable under the facts presented in that case. Id.

{¶ 23} In addition to reviewing the testimony herein, we have viewed Creager’s

dash camera video and the body camera videos of Creager and Templin, which were

admitted at the suppression hearing. As Creager testified, at approximately 3:29 a.m.,

he initiated the stop after observing the traffic violations. In requesting the canine unit,

Creager had noted the pre-dawn hour, that the area of the stop was known for illegal drug

activity, and the occupants’ somewhat implausible explanation that they had been coming

from the casino. He also knew from his law enforcement experience that drugs were

often transported to the area specifically from Indiana.

{¶ 24} A canine officer from the Huber Heights Police Department arrived at 3:43

a.m. The videos made clear that from the time Creager effectuated the stop until the

canine unit arrived approximately 15 minutes later, Creager had been engaged in the

preparation of the traffic citation, unlike in Hall. The removal of the occupants from the

Envoy was permissible and was not required to be supported by reasonable suspicion.

We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, the stop was reasonable, as in

Pack. In other words, the answer to the critical question before us -- namely whether

conducting the sniff added time to the stop -- is no.

{¶ 25} Manns’s assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 26} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.