State v. Mangar
This text of State v. Mangar (State v. Mangar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-508
Filed 18 March 2026
Cabarrus County, Nos. 22CR050845-120, 22CR050846-120, 22CR050847-120, 22CR050848-120
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ANDRE VIVIAN MANGAR, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 7 November 2024 by Judge
Michael D. Duncan in Cabarrus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 28 January 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Anne Goco Kirby, for the State-appellee.
Goodman, Carr, Laughrun, Levine & Greene, P.A., by W. Rob Heroy, for defendant-appellant.
GORE, Judge.
Defendant appeals from convictions for felony flee to elude arrest, two counts
of felony hit-and-run, and multiple counts of assault with a deadly weapon. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2023). The State concedes,
and we agree, that one hit-and-run conviction must be arrested under State v. STATE V. MANGAR
Opinion of the Court
Watlington, 298 N.C. App. 584, review denied, 920 S.E.2d 859 (N.C. 2025), which
holds that the unit of prosecution for felony hit-and-run is the number of times a
defendant leaves a crash scene, not the number of victims injured. Defendant also
challenges the trial court’s refusal to instruct on lesser-included offenses and its
admission of Rule 404(b) evidence. We conclude the trial court did not err on these
issues. We therefore arrest judgment on defendant’s second felony hit-and-run
conviction and remand for resentencing.
I.
On 15 February 2022, State Trooper Mitchell Geracz observed defendant’s
Lincoln Navigator traveling over 100 miles per hour on Interstate 85. Trooper Geracz
activated his lights and siren, clocking defendant’s speed at 113 miles per hour.
Defendant initially slowed, then accelerated back to 110 miles per hour.
The pursuit continued onto Highway NC 73, where defendant traveled 90–100
miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone, repeatedly crossing into oncoming traffic.
Defendant ran a red light at 80 miles per hour, then crossed a double yellow line and
concrete median, crashing head-on at full speed into a sedan. The impact caused the
sedan to strike a Honda CRV. Defendant fled on foot. The crashes caused serious
injuries to multiple victims.
Officers found defendant at his residence 3.9 miles from the crash site shortly
after midnight. Inside the Navigator, officers recovered a rental agreement bearing
defendant’s name and his personal belongings. DNA from the driver’s airbag
-2- STATE V. MANGAR
matched defendant’s profile. Vehicle infotainment data showed the Navigator
traveled from Raleigh-Durham Airport to the crash site at speeds averaging over 100
miles per hour.
The jury convicted defendant of one count of misdemeanor assault with a
deadly weapon (22CR50845); one count of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious injury and one count of misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon
(22CR50846); two counts of felony hit-and-run (22CR50847); and felony flee to elude
arrest (22CR50848). The trial court imposed consecutive active sentences totaling
74–129 months. Defendant timely appealed.
II.
Defendant argues his two felony hit-and-run convictions violate double
jeopardy principles. The State concedes this issue under State v. Watlington, which
held that N.C.G.S. § 20-166 defines its unit of prosecution by the act of leaving a crash
scene, not by the number of injured victims. 298 N.C. App. at 600.
Here, defendant’s Navigator crashed head-on into the sedan, and that impact
caused the sedan to strike the Honda CRV almost instantaneously. This constituted
a single crash event. Defendant then fled on foot. Because defendant left the scene
of only one crash, he may be convicted of only one count of felony hit-and-run. We
arrest judgment on defendant’s second conviction (22CR50847, Count 2).
III.
A.
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Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct on misdemeanor
hit-and-run because insufficient evidence showed he knew or reasonably should have
known the crash resulted in serious injury. Defendant failed to preserve this issue;
during the charge conference, defense counsel argued only that evidence supported
finding no serious injuries occurred, not that defendant lacked knowledge of such
injuries. We therefore review for plain error only.
“Where the evidence is sufficient to support the offense submitted to the jury,
it is not plain error for the trial court to refuse to submit a lesser charge.” State v.
Wright, 210 N.C. App. 52, 68 (2011).
The evidence overwhelmingly established defendant knew or reasonably
should have known the crash resulted in serious injury. Defendant fled police at over
100 miles per hour, crossed a concrete median, and crashed head-on at full speed into
oncoming traffic. The collision deployed multiple airbags, sent the Navigator into a
ditch, caused the sedan to strike a third vehicle, and scattered heavy debris across
the roadway. No reasonable person experiencing such a violent collision could fail to
know serious injuries likely resulted. The trial court did not commit plain error.
B.
Defendant argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury as a matter of
law that the Navigator was a deadly weapon, pointing to infotainment data showing
speeds as low as 5.7 miles per hour. This issue is also reviewed for plain error because
defendant failed to challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting a deadly weapon
-4- STATE V. MANGAR
instruction below.
“[A]n automobile can be a deadly weapon if it is driven in a reckless or
dangerous manner.” State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 164 (2000). The evidence showed
defendant traveled at 80–113 miles per hour, wove through traffic, crossed into
oncoming lanes, ran a red light, and crashed head-on into an oncoming vehicle. The
5.7 mile-per-hour reading occurred at the same timestamp indicating a “dead stop”
at 9:16 p.m., suggesting a post-impact reading. The trial court properly concluded as
a matter of law that the Navigator was a deadly weapon.
IV.
Defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting testimony that he was
arrested for an outstanding warrant. We review for abuse of discretion. State v.
Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130 (2012). Rule 404(b) permits admission of other acts
evidence for proper purposes including motive. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2023).
The trial court admitted evidence of the warrant solely to establish a possible
motive for defendant to flee. Trooper Geracz testified he arrested defendant pursuant
to an outstanding warrant. The State did not introduce the warrant itself or present
evidence of the underlying offense. The trial court gave limiting instructions both
immediately after the testimony and in the final charge.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this
evidence. Even if the admission were error, any such error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of guilt: dashboard camera video,
-5- STATE V.
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State v. Mangar, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-mangar-ncctapp-2026.