State v. Maldonado

Opinion

No. 787 August 19, 2026 353

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ADRIAN SIDNEY MATA MALDONADO, Defendant-Appellant.

Marion County Circuit Court 23CR17473, 23CR13576; A182881 (Control), A182882

J. Channing Bennett, Judge. SubmittedJune 17, 2025. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Stacy M. Du Clos, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the briefs for appellant.

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Peenesh Shah, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge.

POWERS, J. Affirmed.

354 State v. Maldonado

POWERS, J. In this consolidated criminal appeal, defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of second- degree assault with a firearm and unlawful use of a weapon with a firearm (UUW), based on a theory that he aided and abetted two teenagers, T and R, in a shooting that resulted in an injury to D. In his first two assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts because there was insufficient evidence that defendant intended to promote or facilitate those particular crimes. While this case was under advisement, the trial court entered an amended judgment that mooted defendant’s third through sixth assignments of error, and thus we do not address them. As explained below, we conclude that, under our standard of review, there was sufficient evidence to deny the motion for judgment of acquittal, and accordingly, we affirm.

Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background details, we do not set forth a recitation in this nonprecedential memorandum opinion. We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995).

To prove that a defendant is guilty of a crime on an aid and abet theory, the state must provide evidence that, “[w]ith the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime,” the defendant “[a]ids or abets or agrees or attempts to aid or abet such other person in planning or committing the crime.” ORS 161.155(2)(b). The statute requires a “specific intent: the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime committed by another.” State v. Lopez-Minjarez, 350 Or 576, 582, 260 P3d 439 (2011). Thus, here, the state had to prove that defendant specifically intended to promote or facilitate T and R in the commission of second-degree assault and UUW. That is, the state had to prove that defendant intended to aid and abet T and

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R in “[i]ntentionally or knowingly caus[ing] physical injury to another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon” and “possess[ing] with intent to use unlawfully against another, any dangerous or deadly weapon.” See ORS 163.175 (providing elements of second-degree assault); ORS 166.220 (providing elements of UUW).

On appeal, defendant argues that there was legally insufficient evidence for a factfinder to have found that he had the specific intent for T and R to commit second-degree assault and UUW. As an initial matter, defendant does not dispute that there was evidence that defendant, T, and R were in the same gang and thus knew each other. Defendant also does not dispute that the record supports that he drove the vehicle around North Salem High School, that T and R jumped out of the vehicle and fired shots, resulting in an injury to D’s leg, and that defendant then drove T and R away from the scene. Therefore, defendant’s arguments on appeal focus on whether there was sufficient evidence that defendant was aware of T’s and R’s plan to shoot D and thus whether defendant intended to promote or facilitate their conduct.

On appeal, defendant first argues that the evidence of defendant’s shared gang affiliation with T and R was insufficient to establish defendant’s intent. Second, defendant maintains that there was no evidence that he was aware that T or R had firearms in the vehicle. Finally, defendant asserts that the evidence that he, T, and R wore masks or stockings, that they drove around the high school looking for someone, and that defendant stopped the vehicle and then drove T and R away at best demonstrates an intent to do “something,” but not the specific intent for T and R to shoot someone with a firearm, let alone D specifically. The state remonstrates that the evidence, considered together, was sufficient to create a reasonable inference that defendant was aware of the plan and intended to aid and abet the crimes.

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a factfinder to find that defendant had the requisite intent to aid and abet T and R in committing second-degree assault and UUW. Although we agree with defendant’s argument 356 State v. Maldonado

that the shared gang affiliation alone is insufficient to establish intent, there was other evidence of the circumstances surrounding the shooting that, taken together, was sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to have found that defendant had the requisite intent. Specifically, the state introduced a photo exhibit at trial showing that about an hour before the shooting, defendant, T, and R were together and getting into the vehicle. Another exhibit shows that, a little later, T was walking and holding his waistband in such a way that, according to a detective’s testimony, looked like T was “concealing something.” The detective elaborated that it “would cause me alarm if somebody’s approaching me like that for sure,” and that he would be concerned that the person had a weapon. T then got into the front passenger seat of the vehicle that defendant was driving. That evidence was sufficient for a factfinder to infer that defendant knew that T had a firearm.

This would be a different case if the state had to prove intent when defendant, T, and R first got into the vehicle. Here, however, evidence of the sequence leading up to the shooting itself further supports a reasonable inference that defendant was aware of the plan and intended to promote or facilitate the crimes. First, there was evidence that the vehicle passed by the school three times before the shooting, and a detective testified that, based on the surveillance of the vehicle circling around, the occupants of the vehicle “were looking for someone or something.” Second, D recalled that the car “screeched” to a stop right before T and R “hopped out” of the car and “started shooting.” D further testified that the two shooters were behind the car when they started shooting. There was additional evidence that defendant, T, and R were all wearing ski masks or stockings covering their faces. Finally, an eyewitness testified that immediately after the shooting, she saw two people get back into the vehicle. The evidence that defendant drove the car in a manner that appeared that he was looking for someone, and the quick and coordinated nature of the shooting itself, was sufficient for a factfinder to infer that defendant, T, and R had a plan and executed that plan. Thus, those facts, taken in the light most favorable to the state, combined with the reasonable inference that defendant knew that at least

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 353 (2026) 357

T had a firearm, were sufficient to support a finding that defendant not only knew about the plan but had the specific intent to aid and abet T’s and R’s crimes.

In sum, when considering the entirety of the evidence , a factfinder was not required to, but it could have found that defendant was aware of and intended to be part of a plan to stop the vehicle in front of the school so that T and R could commit a shooting, and then drive the two of them away afterward.1 Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts.

Affirmed.

1 To the extent that the parties argue about whether the transferred-intent theory applies to the identity of the victim in this case, we need not address that specific argument. The evidence that defendant, T, and R drove around the school “looking for someone” and then committed a shooting at the school that resulted in D being injured creates a reasonable inference that D was the intended target of the shooting. Although D testified that he did not believe that he was the initial target, a factfinder was not required to credit that testimony. Therefore, we need not consider whether transferred intent applies to the charged crimes in this case.