[Cite as State v. Madden, 2022-Ohio-2638.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-210537 TRIAL NO. B-2100164 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
KEAJZUAN MADDEN, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 3, 2022
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
The Law Office of John D. Hill and John D. Hill, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
WINKLER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellee Keajzuan Madden was indicted for aggravated
burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), with two firearm specifications. The trial court
granted his motion to suppress his statements to the police. The state has appealed
that decision under R.C. 2945.67 and Crim.R. 12(K). We find no merit in the state’s
assignment of error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
{¶2} In its sole assignment of error, the state contends that the trial court
erred in granting Madden’s motion to suppress. It argues that after invoking his right
to counsel, Madden waived that right by initiating further communication with the
police. This assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶3} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
law and fact. We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true if competent,
credible evidence supports them. But we must independently determine whether the
facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,
2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8; State v. Richardson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
200187, 2021-Ohio-2751, ¶ 13.
{¶4} A suspect who has “expressed his desire to deal with police only through
counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges or conversation with the police.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677,
108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The police may not reinitiate an
interrogation under the guise of a generalized discussion about the investigation.
State v. Van Hook, 39 Ohio St.3d 256, 259, 530 N.E.2d 883 (1988); State v. Williams,
1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-060631 and C-060668, 2007-Ohio-5577, ¶ 34. The suspect
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
himself must initiate dialogue with the authorities and must knowingly and voluntarily
waive his right to counsel. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-1046, 103 S.Ct.
2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983); Van Hook at 259; Williams at ¶ 34.
{¶5} The United States Supreme Court has established this rule as a “bright-
line test” for dealing with defendants who invoke their right to counsel. “Simply
stated, if a defendant requests counsel, the police must stop all questioning and
interrogation immediately.” State v. Knuckles, 65 Ohio St.3d 494, 495, 605 N.E.2d 54
(1992). Interrogation is “any words or actions on the part of the police * * * that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297
(1980).
{¶6} This rule involves two distinct inquiries. First, courts must determine
whether the accused unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. Second, if the accused
invoked his right to counsel, a court may admit the accused’s statements into evidence
only if he initiated further discussions with the police, and knowingly and intelligently
waived the right he had invoked. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83
L.Ed.2d 488 (1984); Knuckles at 496. The burden of showing that the defendant
waived his rights remains on the prosecution. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,
1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983).
{¶7} The record shows that Madden was under investigation for an incident
in which three men knocked on the door of a residence. When the victim opened the
door, the men rushed inside. They held her at gunpoint and demanded money.
Eventually, the men fled from the residence with the victim’s purse, approximately
$1,500 in cash, and a cell phone. Madden was subsequently arrested.
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶8} He was interviewed at the police station by two detectives. That
interview was recorded, and the video was admitted into evidence.
{¶9} Before starting the interview, the detectives read Madden his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and
had him sign a written acknowledgement of those rights. Madden explained that he
had come to Cincinnati from Mississippi to visit his wife. When the detectives began
asking about the incident in question, Madden claimed that he had not been involved.
After his continued denials, the detectives stated that they were going to interview
other suspects. They then left him alone in the interview room for approximately 55
minutes.
{¶10} The detectives then returned to the room and began interviewing
Madden in a more aggressive manner. They told him that two of his alleged co-
conspirators, his wife, and her cousin, had talked to them and had implicated Madden
as the ringleader. One of the detectives stated, “If you want the whole thing, I’ll type
it up and that’s what you’re going to get.” He added, “And when we go to court, I can
say, this is who cooperated, to the judge, this is who manned up, and this is who didn’t
man up.” Madden then asked to see a lawyer.
{¶11} The detective then stated, “If that’s what you want to do. I mean, I
would rather just get your side of the story.” Madden replied, “Uh huh,” and the
detective asked, “You don’t want to tell me your side of the story.” Madden stated that
he wanted to tell his side of the story, but with a lawyer present. The detective
responded, “That’s fine. All right. I’ll type up the paperwork. You’re going to go to
jail for aggravated robbery.”
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶12} The detectives then stood up in unison and started to walk out of the
room. Madden again said that he wanted to speak to a lawyer. The detectives told him
that they did not have time to wait for a lawyer to come to talk to Madden. They said
that they would charge him, and then he could have a lawyer appointed for him.
{¶13} Madden then asked, “How many years is it for this or whatever?” One
of the detectives told him that “it’s the same charge as murder. That’s why we wanted
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Madden, 2022-Ohio-2638.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-210537 TRIAL NO. B-2100164 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
KEAJZUAN MADDEN, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 3, 2022
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
The Law Office of John D. Hill and John D. Hill, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
WINKLER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellee Keajzuan Madden was indicted for aggravated
burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), with two firearm specifications. The trial court
granted his motion to suppress his statements to the police. The state has appealed
that decision under R.C. 2945.67 and Crim.R. 12(K). We find no merit in the state’s
assignment of error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
{¶2} In its sole assignment of error, the state contends that the trial court
erred in granting Madden’s motion to suppress. It argues that after invoking his right
to counsel, Madden waived that right by initiating further communication with the
police. This assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶3} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
law and fact. We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true if competent,
credible evidence supports them. But we must independently determine whether the
facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,
2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8; State v. Richardson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
200187, 2021-Ohio-2751, ¶ 13.
{¶4} A suspect who has “expressed his desire to deal with police only through
counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges or conversation with the police.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677,
108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The police may not reinitiate an
interrogation under the guise of a generalized discussion about the investigation.
State v. Van Hook, 39 Ohio St.3d 256, 259, 530 N.E.2d 883 (1988); State v. Williams,
1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-060631 and C-060668, 2007-Ohio-5577, ¶ 34. The suspect
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
himself must initiate dialogue with the authorities and must knowingly and voluntarily
waive his right to counsel. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-1046, 103 S.Ct.
2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983); Van Hook at 259; Williams at ¶ 34.
{¶5} The United States Supreme Court has established this rule as a “bright-
line test” for dealing with defendants who invoke their right to counsel. “Simply
stated, if a defendant requests counsel, the police must stop all questioning and
interrogation immediately.” State v. Knuckles, 65 Ohio St.3d 494, 495, 605 N.E.2d 54
(1992). Interrogation is “any words or actions on the part of the police * * * that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297
(1980).
{¶6} This rule involves two distinct inquiries. First, courts must determine
whether the accused unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. Second, if the accused
invoked his right to counsel, a court may admit the accused’s statements into evidence
only if he initiated further discussions with the police, and knowingly and intelligently
waived the right he had invoked. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83
L.Ed.2d 488 (1984); Knuckles at 496. The burden of showing that the defendant
waived his rights remains on the prosecution. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,
1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983).
{¶7} The record shows that Madden was under investigation for an incident
in which three men knocked on the door of a residence. When the victim opened the
door, the men rushed inside. They held her at gunpoint and demanded money.
Eventually, the men fled from the residence with the victim’s purse, approximately
$1,500 in cash, and a cell phone. Madden was subsequently arrested.
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶8} He was interviewed at the police station by two detectives. That
interview was recorded, and the video was admitted into evidence.
{¶9} Before starting the interview, the detectives read Madden his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and
had him sign a written acknowledgement of those rights. Madden explained that he
had come to Cincinnati from Mississippi to visit his wife. When the detectives began
asking about the incident in question, Madden claimed that he had not been involved.
After his continued denials, the detectives stated that they were going to interview
other suspects. They then left him alone in the interview room for approximately 55
minutes.
{¶10} The detectives then returned to the room and began interviewing
Madden in a more aggressive manner. They told him that two of his alleged co-
conspirators, his wife, and her cousin, had talked to them and had implicated Madden
as the ringleader. One of the detectives stated, “If you want the whole thing, I’ll type
it up and that’s what you’re going to get.” He added, “And when we go to court, I can
say, this is who cooperated, to the judge, this is who manned up, and this is who didn’t
man up.” Madden then asked to see a lawyer.
{¶11} The detective then stated, “If that’s what you want to do. I mean, I
would rather just get your side of the story.” Madden replied, “Uh huh,” and the
detective asked, “You don’t want to tell me your side of the story.” Madden stated that
he wanted to tell his side of the story, but with a lawyer present. The detective
responded, “That’s fine. All right. I’ll type up the paperwork. You’re going to go to
jail for aggravated robbery.”
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶12} The detectives then stood up in unison and started to walk out of the
room. Madden again said that he wanted to speak to a lawyer. The detectives told him
that they did not have time to wait for a lawyer to come to talk to Madden. They said
that they would charge him, and then he could have a lawyer appointed for him.
{¶13} Madden then asked, “How many years is it for this or whatever?” One
of the detectives told him that “it’s the same charge as murder. That’s why we wanted
to talk to you to get your side of the story.” The other detective added, “It’s a big
charge.” The first detective asked him if he wanted to “sit there and think about it for
a minute and I’ll come back and see you and see if you want to talk to me.” Madden
replied, “Yeah.”
{¶14} The detectives left the room for a few minutes. Upon reentering, the
first detective stated, “Do you want an attorney or do you want to talk to us?” When
Madden did not answer right away, the detectives told him that if Madden had an
attorney, they would call the attorney. If not, he would go to the jail, and then he would
get an attorney. They told him if he went to jail, he would see a judge the following
day. The first detective added that if he wanted an attorney, that was his right, and if
he wanted to talk, they would talk to him. Madden answered, “Alright.” The officer
asked if he should sit down, Madden answered, “Yes.” He then confessed to his
involvement in the robbery.
{¶15} The parties do not dispute that the detectives read Madden his Miranda
rights. In ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court stated, “Therefore, the sole
issue for the Court to decide is whether the Detectives interrogated Mr. Madden after
he invoked his right to counsel. This court determines that they did.” We agree.
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶16} The record shows that Madden unequivocally and unambiguously
invoked his right to counsel. See State v. Carr, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090109,
2010-Ohio-2764, ¶ 18-20. Nevertheless, the trial court found that the police asked
him several times whether he wanted to talk to them, and stated that they wanted to
talk to him, a finding supported by competent, credible evidence. Their statements
were calculated to elicit an incriminating response by Madden. The detectives made
numerous statements that went far beyond inquiries or statements relating to “routine
incidents of the custodial relationship,” which do not generally “initiate” a
conversation about the investigations. See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045, 103 S.Ct.
2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405.
{¶17} The state argues that after the detectives left the room the second time,
telling him to “think about it,” Madden initiated the discussion about the investigation
by asking what the penalty was for the offenses of which he was accused. But this
question only occurred after he had asked for an attorney three times. The detectives
continued to ask him to tell them his story and repeatedly told him about the severity
of the charges. Further, it only occurred after the detectives said they did not have
time to wait for him to talk to an attorney.
{¶18} In contrast is Williams, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-060631 and C-
060668, 2007-Ohio-5577, in which this court held that the defendant initiated the
dialogue and voluntarily waived his rights. In that case, the defendant asked for a
lawyer, and questioning ceased. Subsequently, the detective who had been
interviewing the defendant brought the defendant a jail uniform and did not
interrogate the defendant. The defendant, without any prompting, stated that he
wanted to talk to the detective. The detective told the defendant that if he wanted to
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
talk to him, the defendant would have to waive his rights. The defendant still indicated
his willingness to talk. We stated that the defendant “evinced a willingness and a
desire for generalized discussion about the investigation.” Id. at ¶ 36, quoting
Bradshaw at 1045-1046. In this case, Madden never indicated a willingness to discuss
the robbery without an attorney present.
{¶19} The bright-line test set out by the United States Supreme Court was to
prevent “the police from wearing down and confusing the defendant to obtain a waiver
of his rights.” Knuckles, 65 Ohio St.3d at 496, 605 N.E.2d 54, citing Smith, 469 U.S.
at 98, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488. The video recording shows that was exactly what
occurred in this case. Consequently, we overrule the state’s assignment of error and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
MYERS, P.J. and B0CK, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.