State v. Macmoran

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: January 7, 2014
• Docket: 13-758
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-758 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 7 January 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Mecklenburg County No. 12 CRS 981 THADDEUS STEPHEN MACMORAN

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 31 January 2013

by Judge Forrest D. Bridges in Mecklenburg County Superior

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 November 2013.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Olga Vysotskaya, for the State.

Ryan McKaig, for defendant-appellant.

CALABRIA, Judge.

Thaddeus Stephen MacMoran (“defendant”) appeals from a

judgment entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of

statutory sexual offense against a person who is thirteen,

fourteen, or fifteen years old by a defendant who is at least

six years older than the victim (“statutory sexual offense”).

We find no error.

I. Background -2- Defendant was employed as a youth pastor at a church in

Charlotte, North Carolina, where he met thirteen-year-old E.H.

(“Eric”)1 and his family. Defendant became friends with the

family. Eric’s mother regarded defendant as part of the family,

and trusted him with her children.

Defendant paid particular attention to Eric, taking him on

outings and playing video games and basketball with him.

Sometimes defendant slept on the floor of Eric’s bedroom when he

stayed overnight with Eric’s family. During the summer of 2010,

when Eric was fourteen years old, defendant spent three

consecutive nights with the family. On the first night,

defendant touched Eric’s penis with his hand as Eric was

attempting to fall asleep. The following night, defendant again

touched Eric’s genitals, stroking his penis. The third night,

defendant briefly performed fellatio on Eric and requested Eric

perform fellatio on him. When Eric refused, defendant “got mad,

disappointed.” The last time defendant had physical contact

with Eric was in November 2011.

In addition to physical contact, defendant also had sexual

conversations and exchanged explicit text messages with Eric.

In late November 2011, Eric’s mother discovered sexually

1 We use this pseudonym to protect the juvenile’s privacy and for ease of reading. -3- explicit text messages from defendant on Eric’s cell phone and

confronted her son about the nature of the messages. Eric told

his mother about defendant’s behavior toward him, and she

subsequently reported defendant’s behavior to law enforcement.

Defendant was arrested and indicted for statutory sexual

offense, committing a crime against nature, and four counts of

indecent liberties with a child (“indecent liberties”). At

trial, Eric testified that defendant had touched his genitals on

approximately ten to fifteen occasions. Eric also testified

that he had not told anyone, not even his parents, about the

occurrences because he was scared and embarrassed about

defendant’s sexual advances toward him.

On 31 January 2013, the jury returned verdicts finding

defendant guilty of all offenses. The jury also found the

aggravating factor that defendant took advantage of a position

of trust or confidence to commit the offenses. The trial court

arrested judgment for the indecent liberties and crime against

nature offenses, and sentenced defendant to a minimum of 222

months and a maximum of 276 months in the custody of the North

Carolina Division of Adult Correction for the statutory sexual

offense. The trial court also ordered defendant to enroll in -4- satellite-based monitoring and register as a sex offender upon

his release from custody. Defendant appeals.

II. Mistrial

Defendant argues that the trial court should have declared

a mistrial ex mero motu after the district attorney asked Eric’s

mother her opinion regarding Eric’s honesty. He contends that

her answer amounted to an impermissible bolstering of Eric’s

testimony. We find no error.

Generally, the credibility of a witness may only be

supported after it has been attacked. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1,

Rule 608(a) (2011). However, “any error in admitting evidence

in violation of Rule 608 does not require a new trial unless

there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in

question not been committed, a different result would have been

reached at trial.” State v. Moore, 103 N.C. App. 87, 99, 404

S.E.2d 695, 702 (1991) (citations and internal quotations

omitted). “Not every disruptive event which occurs during trial

automatically requires the court to declare a mistrial.” State

v. Allen, 141 N.C. App. 610, 617, 541 S.E.2d 490, 496 (2000).

Our Courts have previously considered the effect of a

mother’s testimony regarding her children’s truthfulness in

cases concerning child sexual abuse. Because “most jurors are -5- likely to assume that a mother will believe accusations of

sexual abuse made by her own children, we cannot conclude that

the challenged portion of . . . testimony had any significant

impact on the jury’s decision to convict Defendant.” State v.

Dew, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 738 S.E.2d 215, 219 (2013) (citing

State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 466, 349 S.E.2d 566, 572 (1986)

(holding “[i]t is unlikely that the jury gave great weight to

the fact that a mother believed that her son was truthful.”)).

In addition, a trial court’s prompt corrective action can cure

the error caused by improper testimony. See State v. King, 343

N.C. 29, 44-45, 468 S.E.2d 232, 242 (1996) (trial court’s action

was sufficient to cure any prejudice when it sustained objection

to witness’s testimony, allowed motion to strike, and instructed

the jury not to consider the witness’s response); see State v.

Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 578-79, 364 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1988) (trial

court took prompt and sufficient corrective action by sustaining

defendant’s objection, allowing motion to strike, and

instructing the jury not to consider witness’s response).

In the instant case, after Eric’s mother testified

regarding Eric’s reaction to her discovery of defendant’s text

messages, the prosecutor asked whether she “[had] always known

[Eric] to be an honest kid[.]” Defendant immediately objected -6- and made a motion to strike. Although defendant failed to

request a mistrial and did not request a curative instruction,

the trial court provided detailed instructions to the jury at

the onset of trial regarding, inter alia, the significance of

the court granting defendant’s motion to strike. In those

instructions the trial court indicated that a motion to strike

is actually a motion to strike that answer from your memory. . . . [S]o if I grant a motion to strike . . . that is my signal to you simply disregard what you have just heard, the last answer. In other words, when you go back into the jury room to deliberate and you consider that collection of evidence that has been presented, there should not be included in that collection of evidence anything on which I granted a motion to strike. And if your fellow jurors start talking about an answer that was given but was stricken, please remember that, point that out to your fellow jurors and say, wait, we should not consider that, because that’s not part of the competent evidence in the case.

The trial court properly sustained defendant’s objection,

granted defendant’s motion to strike, and instructed the jury on

the meaning of a motion to strike. “Jurors are presumed to

follow a trial judge’s instructions.” State v. Phillips, 171

N.C. App. 622, 629, 615 S.E.2d 382, 386 (2005) (quoting State v.

Taylor, 340 N.C. 52, 64, 455 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1995)). Therefore,

since defendant failed to refute this presumption on appeal, and -7- the trial judge instructed the jury that stricken testimony was

not to be considered as competent evidence in the case, the

trial court did not err by not declaring a mistrial.

Defendant argues in the alternative that his trial counsel

committed ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move

for mistrial. To prevail on such a claim, defendant must show

that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient,” and that

“the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984).

Although defendant claims his trial counsel’s failure to move

for mistrial was prejudicial, he fails to explain how this

performance was prejudicial enough for the court to declare a

mistrial. Defendant’s claim is without merit.

III. Age Testimony

Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error

by allowing Eric and his mother to testify regarding defendant’s

age, and erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the

charges against him. We disagree.

Defendant did not object to Eric’s or his mother’s

testimonies about defendant’s age. Therefore, that testimony

may only be reviewed for plain error. See State v. Odom, 307

N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983). “Because plain error -8- is to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case,

the error will often be one that seriously affect[s] the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d

326, 334 (2012) (citations omitted).

Upon defendant’s motion to dismiss, “the trial court must

determine whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each

essential element of the offense charged and (2) that the

defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.” State v.

Bradshaw, 366 N.C. 90, 93, 728 S.E.2d 345, 347 (2012) (citations

omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d

164, 169 (1980).

To prove that a defendant is guilty of a statutory sexual

offense, the State must show, inter alia, that a person engaged

in a sexual act with a victim who is thirteen, fourteen, or

fifteen years old, and that the defendant is at least six years

older than the victim. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.7A(a) (2010).

The State is not required to offer the birth certificates of

defendant and victim to establish the ages of the parties, but

testimony is sufficient. State v. Cortes-Serrano, 195 N.C. App. -9- 644, 652-53, 673 S.E.2d 756, 761-62 (2009). However, a witness

may not testify to a matter unless there is evidence sufficient

to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the

matter. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 602 (2011).

As an initial matter, there is no dispute that defendant

was the perpetrator. Defendant’s dispute focuses on the State’s

failure to provide substantial evidence that defendant was at

least six years older than Eric. Defendant contends that the

testimony offered at trial was foundationless.

This Court has held that the jury may rely on their in-

court observations, supplemented by other direct or

circumstantial evidence, in determining a defendant’s age.

State v. Ackerman, 144 N.C. App. 452, 461-62, 551 S.E.2d 139,

145-46 (2001). In addition, “[t]he credibility of the witnesses

and the weight to be given their testimony is exclusively a

matter for the jury.” State v. Scott, 323 N.C. 350, 353, 372

S.E.2d 572, 575 (1988) (citation omitted).

In the instant case, the evidence showed that defendant was

a gainfully employed adult when he first came into contact with

Eric’s family, and was on friendly terms with the family for

about a year before he began seeing them socially outside the

church environment. At the time of trial in January 2013, Eric -10- was sixteen years old. Both Eric and his mother testified,

without objection, that defendant was approximately twenty-six

or twenty-seven years old at the time of trial. Both Eric and

his mother also testified from their personal knowledge

regarding defendant’s age, based upon their close friendly

relationship for over a year. The evidence showed the age

difference between defendant and Eric to be approximately ten

years, which satisfies the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

27.7A(a). Since the jurors’ in-court observations were

supplemented by circumstantial evidence of the approximate age

difference between defendant and Eric, the State presented

substantial evidence sufficient to support a finding that

defendant was at least six years older than Eric at the time of

the offenses. It was for the jury to determine “[t]he

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their

testimony[.]” Scott, 323 N.C. at 353, 372 S.E.2d at 575.

IV. Conclusion

The trial court took immediate action to cure any error

regarding the disputed testimony of Eric’s mother. Neither

defense counsel’s failure to move for nor the trial court’s

failure to declare a mistrial ex mero motu prejudiced the

defendant. Defendant also fails to demonstrate that the -11- testimony regarding his age constitutes plain error. Because

jurors are assumed to follow the trial court’s instructions, and

the jury is the ultimate judge of the credibility and weight of

witness testimony, defendant received a fair trial, free from

error. Id.; Phillips, 171 N.C. App. at 629, 615 S.E.2d at 386.

No error.

Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and HUNTER, JR., Robert N. concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).