State v. M. D.-F.

Opinion

564 August 26, 2026 No. 815

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of M. D.-F., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.

STATE OF OREGON,

Respondent,

v. M. D.-F., Appellant.

Multnomah County Circuit Court 25CC06082; A189029

Kami J. White, Judge. Submitted June 30, 2026. Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc. filed the brief for appellant.

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Megan Mizuta, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Egan, Presiding Judge, Jacquot, Judge, and Armstrong, Senior Judge.

JACQUOT, J. Affirmed.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 664 (2026) 565

JACQUOT, J. Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment civilly committing him to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days, based on appellant being a “person with mental illness.” ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 5.1 Specifically, appellant was found to be a danger to self as a result of a mental disorder. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 4. Appellant raises two assignments of error: He argues the trial court erred first in overruling appellant’s hearsay objection and second in concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence in the record that appellant has a mental disorder that caused appellant at the time of the hearing to be dangerous to self. Because admitting the hearsay was harmless, and there was sufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to conclude that appellant was a danger to himself, we affirm.

First, to determine whether the purportedly erroneous admission of evidence was harmless, we consider whether there is “some likelihood that the challenged evidence affected the verdict.” State v. Simon, 294 Or App 840, 849, 433 P3d 385 (2018), rev den, 365 Or 502 (2019). “In performing that analysis, we ‘consider the nature of the evidence in the context of the trial as a whole,’ taking into account ‘all portions of the record’ and ‘whether the [challenged ] evidence was cumulative of other evidence admitted without objection.’ ” State v. M. P., 312 Or App 411, 421, 493 P3d 1051 (2021) (quoting Simon, 294 Or App at 849).

Here, any error in admitting the challenged testimony —that appellant broke into his ex’s home and attempted to strangle her and had broken into other homes—was harmless because that testimony went to appellant’s dangerousness to others,2 and the trial court did not commit appellant 1 The legislature recently made significant amendments to the civil commitment statutes, which became operative on January 1, 2026. Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 66. Appellant was committed under the previous version of the statutes, so our analysis is based on the previous version of the statutes.

2 The trial court noted that appellant had previously attempted to enter other people’s homes with a knife in the context of explaining why there was nevertheless insufficient evidence for it to find that appellant was dangerous to others: “And there is evidence that he tried to enter other peoples’ residences and 566 State v. M. D.-F.

on that basis. To the extent that breaking into others’ homes with a knife exposed appellant to danger that might be perpetrated against him by homeowners or police, there is ample uncontested evidence in the record that his mental disorder caused him to behave in ways that exposed him to danger, to wit: his mother’s testimony that his theft behaviors had caused him to be shot at in her presence by a theft victim.

Regarding appellant’s second assignment of error, to meet the legal standard for a danger-to-self commitment, the state must prove that a person has a mental disorder that “would cause [them] to engage in behavior that is likely to result in physical harm to [themselves] in the near term.” State v. M. T., 308 Or App 448, 452, 479 P3d 541 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The threat of physical harm must be serious—that is, it must be life-threatening or involve some inherently dangerous activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It must “be more than speculative”—that is, “the evidence of such a threat must be particularized, demonstrating a highly probable risk of harm in the near future.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The danger also must be caused by the mental disorder, not merely coincide with it. State v. S. G., 338 Or App 6, 15-16, 565 P3d 49 (2025).

Here, the trial court found that legal standard to be met. On appeal, in a preserved claim of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law. Our task, therefore, is to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support civil commitment. State v. L. R., 283 Or App 618, 619, 391 P3d 880 (2017). “Ultimately, in view of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof that applies in civil commitment proceedings, the question for us as the reviewing court is whether a rational factfinder could have found that it was highly probable that appellant was a danger to [themselves] or others” as a result of a mental disorder. State v. S. A. R., 308 Or App 365, 366, 479 P3d 618 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

that he had a knife. But again, no explicit testimony about physical aggression or specific threats that would get over the hurdle * * * for the [c]ourt for a dangerousness to others finding.”

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 664 (2026) 567

Having reviewed the record and considered the parties ’ arguments, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient for civil commitment based on danger to self. In concluding that appellant was a danger to himself, the trial court relied on evidence that appellant put himself in harm’s way, specifically by wandering in traffic; misinterpreting others’ actions in ways that provoked retaliation, as illustrated by a fight he provoked while hospitalized; and engaging in a standoff with police. Additionally, admitting the hearsay over objection was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.