State v. Lynch

2026 Ohio 553

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: 114955
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Lynch, 2026-Ohio-553.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 114955 v. :

JAMES ARMAND LYNCH, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 19, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-15-601167-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael R. Wajda and Michael Stechschulte, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

Pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A) and with leave of court, appellant the

State of Ohio appeals the trial court’s decision terminating James Armand Lynch from community-control sanctions. For the reasons that follow, this court reverses

the trial court’s judgment and remands the case for the trial court to consider

whether it retained the authority to conduct any community-control violation

proceedings, and if so, whether any tolling event occurred and what effect that event

has on Lynch’s community-control term.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

In 2016, Lynch pleaded guilty to attempted drug trafficking,

possessing criminal tools, and endangering children. The trial court ordered Lynch

to serve seven years in prison, consecutively to three, one-year concurrent sentences

imposed in separate and unrelated cases. On July 29, 2022, the trial court granted

Lynch judicial release, ordering him to serve two years of probation, i.e.,

community-control sanctions.

On June 12, 2023, the trial court scheduled a probation-violation

hearing for the following day.1 The order provided: “Community control sanctions

violation/probation violation hearing set for 6/13/2023 at 9:00 a.m. at the request

of the court.” The order did not provide any basis for the hearing or the alleged

violation. Moreover, the State did not file any notice or statement of violations, nor

did it move to revoke Lynch’s community control.

On June 13, 2023, Lynch did not appear in court, and the trial court

did not conduct a hearing. The trial court entered the following order:

1 It is noted that although the journal entry was prepared on June 7, 2023, it was

neither signed nor filed until June 12, 2023. On the 13th day of June, 2023, the defendant, James Armand Lynch, failing to appear in court as he/she was bound to do by the conditions of his/her recognizance, the court orders that the said recognizance, taken heretofore in this cause be, and the same is, forfeited absolutely. It is further ordered that the clerk shall forthwith give as provided by law, the surety of record, or the defendant if the defendant was released on personal bond, notice to appear in this court on or before the 12th day of August, 2023. If there is a surety, such surety shall produce the body of said defendant, or show why judgment shall not be entered against him/her for the amount of the recognizance given in this cause. If the defendant was released on a personal bond, the defendant shall show why judgment shall not be entered against him/her for the amount of the recognizance given in this cause. It is further ordered that a capias be issued for the said defendant. Defendant not present in court. Community control sanctions violation/probation violation hearing not held.

The trial court issued a separate arrest warrant on this same day.

On January 8, 2025, after community control would have expired,

Lynch moved to “withdraw hold and reinstate [his] bond with additional

conditions.” In his motion, Lynch, through counsel, stated that “[Lynch] previously

completed one (1) year of a two (2) year supervision term in the above captioned

matter. Nevertheless, a capias was issued on June 13, 2023 following defendant’s

failure to appear at a Community Control Sanctions violation hearing.” His motion

further advised that he was arrested in November 2024 on unrelated charges and

remained in the county jail.

The State opposed the motion, contending that Lynch was a “violent,

habitual and apparently unrehabilitated criminal who has never performed

successfully in the community, including while under Court supervision,” and

noting that Lynch committed new criminal offenses in February 2024 and September 2024. The State further argued that following the trial court’s decision

to grant him judicial release, Lynch “failed to appear for [a] violation hearing and

remained capias until he was arrested on his present charges.”

On February 24, 2025, the State supplemented its opposition to

Lynch’s motion. The supplement was in response to the trial judge meeting “with

[the prosecutor] and defense counsel in chambers on February 13, 2025,” during

which, “the Court expressed that it believe[d] [Lynch’s] probationary term lapsed.”

The State’s position was that when Lynch failed to appear at the probation-violation

hearing, his probationary term had tolled. The State acknowledged the Ohio

Supreme Court’s split decision in State v. Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706, which held that

tolling a probation term for absconding under R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) is not

automatically self-executing, but requires judicial factfinding and “due process.”

Notwithstanding the State’s belief that Rue was wrongly decided, it maintained that

the facts and procedural posture of the instant case were distinguishable from Rue

because, unlike in Rue, an arrest warrant was timely issued and Lynch received

sufficient notice that his failure to appear at the violation hearing would toll his

probationary term.

On February 25, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on Lynch’s

motion to withdraw the capias and reinstate bond. Lynch maintained that his

motion should be granted but also asserted that his two-year period of community-

control sanctions expired without extension by any tolling event. He advanced that

because the trial court’s June 2023 orders did not make any finding that he “absconded” or provide fair notice that his term of community control was therefore

tolled, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Rue mandated the trial court to find

that his period of community control terminated.

The State disagreed, contending that the trial court’s June 13, 2023

journal entry finding that Lynch failed to appear and subsequent arrest warrant

equated to an absconding finding and by operation of law, constituted a tolling event

under R.C. 2929.15(A)(1). The State maintained that Rue was nevertheless

distinguishable.

The trial court agreed with Lynch, finding that Rue required a

declaration that Lynch absconded and an “explicit[] indicat[ion]” that the

community control time was therefore tolled. The court stated that “neither of these

points were accomplished” in the court’s June 2023 journal entries. The trial court,

therefore, terminated Lynch’s probation.2

This appeal followed, with the State raising two assignments of error.

II. The Appeal

A. Application of Rue

In its first assignment of error, the State contends that the trial court

erred by incorrectly extending Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706, to apply to cases in which

violation proceedings had already been initiated before the expiration of a

community-control sanction, contrary to Rue’s express holding.

2 The record does not reflect that the trial court considered any probation reports

in rendering its decision. We typically review a judgment terminating probation under an

abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Carter, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5413, *6 (8th

Dist. Nov. 12, 1998). However, because the court based its decision on an

interpretation and application of the law, we review this appeal under a de novo

standard. State v. Straley, 2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 9.

The State continues to argue that Rue is distinguishable, raising the

same arguments as it did in the trial court. In further support of its position, the

State advances an additional argument that Rue applies “only when the five-year

statutory maximum has passed without the trial court making any reference to a

defendant’s abscondence.” Applying this distinction, according to the State, “means

that Lynch’s sanctions were tolled when the trial court issued a capias.”

R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) provides, in relevant part:

If the offender absconds or otherwise leaves the jurisdiction of the court in which the offender resides without obtaining permission from the court or the offender’s probation officer to leave the jurisdiction of the court, or if the offender is confined in any institution for the commission of any offense while under a community control sanction, the period of the community control sanction ceases to run until the offender is brought before the court for its further action.

In Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed

whether a trial court had the authority to conduct a community-control revocation

proceeding after an offender absconds from community control, but the

commencement of the revocation proceedings does not occur before the expiration

of the community-control term. The court held that “[t]olling for absconding under

R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) is not automatically self-executing. Absconding by itself has no legal force or effect on the running of the community-control term unless and until

the trial court declares that the defendant absconded.” Id. at ¶ 65. Because

absconding is not self-executing, the trial court must be authorized to make the

declaration that the defendant absconded. Id. at ¶ 59, 65. “A trial court is

‘authorized to conduct proceedings on the alleged community-control violations

even though they were conducted after the expiration of the term of community

control, provided that notice of violations was properly given and the revocation

proceedings were commenced before the expiration.’” (Emphasis added.) Rue at ¶

18, quoting State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 2011-Ohio-226, ¶ 13.

Accordingly, and based on our reading, Rue involved two separate

issues — the Hemsley threshold question of the trial court’s authority to conduct a

revocation proceeding after community control expires, and then whether under

R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) the trial court made any declarations at a revocation proceeding

about tolling and its effect.

The State contends that the trial court’s June 2023 journal entries

complied with Rue’s mandates because revocation proceedings were initiated when

the trial court issued the arrest warrant after Lynch failed to appear for the

community-control-violation hearing; thus the court retained authority to conduct

a revocation hearing even after his probationary period expired.

Lynch contends that merely issuing a timely arrest warrant is

insufficient under Rue. In support, Lynch relies on State v. Padgett, 2023-Ohio-

4357 (3d Dist.), and subsequent cases relying on Padgett. See, e.g., State v. Davila, 2024-Ohio-2672 (11th Dist.), and State v. Washington, 2024-Ohio-2670 (11th

Dist.).

In Padgett, the defendant was sentenced to three years of community

control in 2001. In 2003, the trial court issued a bench warrant for the defendant’s

arrest. The warrant included information that the defendant failed to abide by the

conditions of her supervision and her whereabouts were unknown. Eighteen years

later, in 2022, the defendant was located and served with the arrest warrant. The

following day, the probation department filed a notice of violation and moved to

revoke the defendant’s community control because the defendant failed to (1) report

to probation, (2) pay the court-ordered restitution, and (3) update her address.

At the hearing, the defendant contended that the trial court lacked

authority to proceed because her probation term had expired without any tolling

event or revocation proceedings commencing within community-control term. The

State contended during the revocation hearing that the arrest warrant issued for

Padgett in February 2003 preserved the trial court’s authority to proceed with the

revocation hearing. The trial court revoked the defendant’s community control and

ordered her to serve a jail sentence.

On appeal, the Third District rejected the State’s argument, finding

that although the arrest warrant contained language that the defendant failed to

abide by conditions of supervision and that her whereabouts were unknown,

“merely issuing the arrest warrant [did not] constitute[] a ‘determination’ by the trial

court in ‘timely initiated proceedings’ that the defendant had absconded, as required . . . in Rue.” Id. at ¶ 19. The Padgett Court further noted that “as . . . deemed

necessary in Rue, the arrest warrant contained no language that would have served

to put [the defendant] on notice, even constructively, that her term of community

control had been extended, or tolled, as a result of her failure to abide by the

conditions of her supervision.” Id.

Respectfully and as it will be discussed, we find Padgett and its

progeny unpersuasive because our reading of Rue suggests that an arrest warrant

filed prior to the expiration of community control could, in fact, initiate revocation

proceedings, thus preserving the trial court’s authority to conduct proceedings

beyond the community-control term.

In Rue, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that Rue’s 2018 revocation

proceedings were not initiated “until December 18, 2017, when a warrant for his

arrest was issued,” which was after Rue’s community control expired. (Emphasis

added.) Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706, at ¶ 55. By making this distinction, the Court

necessarily determined that the arrest warrant initiated the revocation proceedings.

Finding that the arrest warrant was issued after Rue’s probation that expired on

November 20, 2017, the Court concluded that the trial court lacked the authority to

make any judicial determinations about whether Rue’s community-control term

extended because of a tolling event. Id. at ¶ 56-59. “Tolling does not happen

automatically, it requires judicial action. And the proceedings to obtain that

declaration must be initiated before the community-control term expires.” Id. at

¶ 59. Applying that same rationale and starting point in this case, the trial

court issuing the warrant on June 13, 2023, which was prior to the expiration of

Lynch’s community-control term, initiated the revocation proceedings.

Accordingly, for this reason alone, Rue is procedurally distinguishable. Because

revocation proceedings were timely initiated, the first aspect of the Hemsley

threshold question is satisfied, and thus the trial court could have retained the

authority to determine whether a tolling event occurred and its effect, which could

extend his community-control term under R.C. 2929.15(A)(1). Rue at ¶ 56, and

Hemsley, 2011-Ohio-226, at ¶ 13.

The second aspect of Hemsley that is necessary for the court to retain

authority over an expired community-control term is whether “notice of violations

was properly given.” Id. In this case, the trial court did not consider or make any

finding whether Lynch properly received notice of the violations. Accordingly, the

trial court failed to follow Rue by not considering the court’s own authority to

determine whether a tolling event occurred or its effect.

The court misread Rue and focused on the lack of “absconding” or

“tolling” notifications in the 2023 journal entry issued after Lynch failed to appear

at the probation-violation hearing. Rather, under Rue, whether the defendant

absconds or community control is tolled is a determination made when “the

offender is brought before the court for its further action.” (Emphasis added.) Rue,

2020-Ohio-6706, at ¶ 32. The Court stated: By its express terms, the tolling of community controls stops not just when the defendant is brought before the court; it stops when the defendant is brought before the court for court action. The offender’s conduct by itself does not establish that tolling has occurred. It is court action that determines as a matter of law whether a tolling event, e.g., a willful failure to report, has occurred, thereby extending the offender’s community control.

(Emphasis sic.) Id.

Based on Rue, the trial court could not have conducted its “further

action” on determining whether a tolling event occurred until Lynch was brought

before the court — which did not occur until the court considered Lynch’s verbal

motion to terminate his probation on February 25, 2025. Accordingly, the trial court

was permitted to make any absconding and tolling findings, but only if it retained

the authority to do so. The trial court’s misreading of Rue resulted in an incomplete

analysis.

Finding that the revocation proceedings were timely commenced, the

trial court must then consider, under Hemsley, the aspect of notice. If the trial court

determines that notice of the violations was properly given, satisfying the second

aspect of Hemsley, then the court retained the authority to conduct proceedings on

the alleged community-control violations, even though Lynch’s stated period of

community control had since expired. This is the threshold determination as stated

in Hemsley and reaffirmed in Rue. Only then does the trial court have the authority

to proceed to the second aspect of Rue — whether under R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) a tolling

event occurred and the effect of that event. Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred in

terminating Lynch’s probation based on a misapplication of Rue and R.C.

2929.15(A)(1). We reverse and remand the case to the trial court to conduct further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The State’s first assignment of error is sustained.

B. Should Rue Be Overruled?

In its second assignment of error, the State contends that Rue should

be overruled because it was wrongly decided. It asserts that the majority in Rue

misread and misapplied the plain language of R.C. 2929.15(A)(1).

This court, as an intermediate court, is required to follow and apply

Ohio Supreme Court decisions, and we have no authority to modify, much less

overrule, any decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. Nevertheless, we recognize that

to preserve an issue for review by the Ohio Supreme Court, a litigant must first

present the issue to this court — a proposition that the State recognizes in this case.

Accordingly, because we are without authority to overrule Rue, the second

assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR