An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-190
Filed 15 July 2026
Surry County, No. 23CR301418-850
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
DAVID RAY LUNSFORD, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 28 March 2024 by Judge Angela
B. Puckett in Surry County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9
September 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Joseph Finarelli, for the State.
William D. Spence for Defendant-Appellant.
CARPENTER, Judge.
David Ray Lunsford (“Defendant”) appeals from judgment entered after a jury
found him guilty of one count of first-degree kidnapping, one count of first-degree
rape, two counts of first-degree forcible sex offense, and one count of crime against
nature. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying Defendant’s
motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree kidnapping; and (2) failing to intervene STATE V. LUNSFORD
Opinion of the Court
during the State’s closing argument. After careful review, we discern no error.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
On 15 May 2023, a Surry County grand jury indicted Defendant for one count
of first-degree kidnapping, one count of first-degree rape, two counts of first-degree
forcible sex offense, and one count of crime against nature. On 25 March 2024,
Defendant’s case went to trial, and the evidence tended to show the following.
On 6 May 2023, seventeen-year-old Ann1 drove herself to a public Greenway
trail to jog. Upon her arrival at the Greenway, Ann parked her vehicle near the
restroom and went inside. When she exited the restroom, Ann observed Defendant
sitting at a picnic table nearby. Defendant was thirty-seven years old, had a
“scraggly” beard, “did not look clean,” and had a demeanor that “didn’t seem right.”
When he saw Ann, Defendant commented on Ann’s appearance, calling her “hot or
attractive” or “something to that nature.”
Defendant then approached Ann, who tried to walk away. Defendant followed
Ann and continued to talk to her. Ann eventually stopped to talk to Defendant, and
Defendant made a motion with his hand, slightly lifting his shirt. When Defendant
did so, Ann observed a knife tucked into his waistline. Ann felt “trapped” upon seeing
the knife, and she thought she “didn’t have any other way to go, or [she] had no other
options.” So Ann walked with Defendant along the trail.
1 Pseudonym used to protect the identity of the minor child and for ease of reading. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b)(3) (2025).
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Because Ann wanted to politely “get away” from Defendant, she told Defendant
she wanted “to go to the gas station to get a drink.” Defendant insisted on
accompanying Ann to the gas station. Ann felt “very scared” and was afraid to tell
him no. Thereafter, Defendant got in the front passenger seat of Ann’s vehicle, and
she drove them to the Grab & Go gas station. Ann “felt trapped” when Defendant got
inside her vehicle.
When they arrived at the Grab & Go gas station, Defendant followed Ann
inside. Ann continued to be polite to Defendant. Inside the gas station, Defendant
stood close to Ann, and she did not feel like she could run away from him. Although
Ann informed Defendant that she was a minor, Defendant insisted on purchasing
alcohol for her with her money. Defendant purchased the alcohol, and they returned
to Ann’s vehicle.
Ann drove Defendant back to the trail, and they walked along the Greenway
again. As they walked, Defendant insisted that Ann drink the alcohol. Defendant
instructed Ann to pour the alcohol in her water bottle, so passersby would not know
she was drinking alcohol. Ann was polite to Defendant because she thought it would
“have been a lot worse if [she] would have defended [herself] or tried to go against
[Defendant’s] opinion or what he wanted.” Ann poured the alcohol in her water bottle
and continued to walk along the trail with Defendant.
As they walked, Ann discreetly captured photos of Defendant on her phone and
sent them via Snapchat to her boyfriend to notify him of her location with Defendant.
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When Defendant observed Ann on her phone, he appeared “frustrated” and “like . . .
it was the last thing he wanted [her] to do.” Even though she “didn’t want to,” Ann
drank the alcohol. She “felt like that was [her] only option.” At one point, Ann tried
to “run or go to [her] car,” but she slipped and cut her hand. Shortly thereafter,
Defendant took Ann’s keys from her hands even though she tried to stop him. Ann
got in her vehicle with Defendant because she felt like “there wasn’t another option.”
As Defendant drove Ann’s vehicle, Defendant told Ann that he wanted to go
somewhere isolated. Defendant drove Ann to a Big Lot’s parking lot, which “didn’t
have [ ] many people” around. Ann testified that the alcohol made her feel “fuzzy”
and “cloudy[,]” and that she “was a little bit more slow reacting . . . .” After Defendant
parked, he became “touchy” and “tried putting his hands on” Ann. Defendant touched
her “between [her] legs” against her will. She asked him if he could “please not do
that . . . .” Defendant ignored Ann and told her that he wanted to “f*** the s*** out
of” her. Defendant kept touching Ann, and Ann tried to push him away. Defendant
said he wanted her to do “things to him orally.”
After he began touching Ann, Defendant unbuttoned his jeans. Defendant
pulled his pants down and exposed his penis. Defendant told Ann that he wanted her
“to give him what he wanted” and then forced her to touch his penis with her hand.
Specifically, Defendant held Ann’s hand with his hand and placed it on his penis.
After forcing Ann to touch his penis, Defendant held her head and forced her to do
“orally things to him.” Defendant then touched Ann’s vagina and removed her
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tampon while forcing her to perform oral sex. At that time, Defendant had his knife
inside Ann’s vehicle.
Defendant stopped touching Ann when a person walked by Ann’s vehicle. Ann
did not believe she could have exited her vehicle at this time without being harmed
by Defendant. Defendant then drove Ann to a second location because he wanted to
go somewhere isolated. The second location was an area “around trees” with “running
water.” When they first arrived at the second location, Ann felt like she was “about
to get killed.”
After parking, Defendant began touching Ann again, and she asked him to stop
several times. Defendant ignored Ann’s repeated protests. Defendant pushed the
passenger seat down and forced himself on top of Ann. Defendant forced his penis
inside Ann’s vagina. As Ann kept saying no, Defendant covered her mouth.
Defendant eventually stopped, got off Ann, and put his pants back on.
Defendant drove them back to the Greenway. After Defendant and Ann returned to
the public trail, Ann’s boyfriend arrived in his truck and approached Defendant
carrying a baseball bat. After almost getting into a physical altercation with Ann’s
boyfriend, Defendant walked away. Ann’s boyfriend drove Ann in her vehicle to the
car shop where he worked. Once at the car shop, Ann went into the bathroom and
cried, and law enforcement arrived to speak to Ann. A deputy with the Surry County
Sheriff’s Office asked Ann whether she was sexually assaulted, and Ann “motioned
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yes.” An ambulance transported Ann to the hospital, where a nurse conducted sexual
assault exams.
At trial, Defendant testified that Ann consented to traveling to various
locations with him and to engaging in intercourse. At the close of the evidence,
Defendant moved to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence, which the trial
court denied.
During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor made the following
statements:
Today you get to do something. . . . Please do not send him back to the Greenway. If you do, don’t let your kids go for a jog. . . . Maybe those days of letting our kids go out and build forts and play football by themselves, maybe those days are over[.] . . . You can do something. One of Surry County’s daughters has been hurt. . . . When I was ten or 11, I played football until it got dark. . . . My parents never once worried about me unless I was [not] home by curfew. . . . Why is that Greenway even there? To attract ne’er-do-wells or so that the people of Surr[]y County have a place to go, to get outdoors, to ride their bikes walk their dogs go for a jog, to clear their heads. . . . [Ann] is timid and sweet and polite and easily manipulated and easily controlled. . . . [Ann] still got kidnapped. . . . You saw what a sweet girl [Ann] is.
Defendant objected to the statement about going for a jog, which the trial court
sustained. Defendant also objected to the football statement, which the trial court
overruled. Defendant did not object to the other remarks, and the trial court did not
intervene on its own accord.
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The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced
Defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment of 276 to 392 months for first-degree
rape, 276 to 392 months for one count of first-degree forcible sex offense, 276 to 392
months for the second count of first-degree forcible sex offense, and a consolidated
sentence of twenty-nine to forty-seven months for the first-degree kidnapping and
crime against nature convictions. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b)(1) and 15A-
1444(a) (2025).
III. Issues
The issues are whether the trial court erred by: (1) denying Defendant’s motion
to dismiss the charge of first-degree kidnapping; and (2) failing to intervene during
the State’s closing argument.
IV. Analysis
A. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the
charge of first-degree kidnapping because the State presented insufficient evidence
that Ann was “removed from one place to another without her consent.” We disagree.
“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). “ ‘Under a de novo
review, [this Court] considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
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judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33,
669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C.
642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).
With a motion to dismiss, “ ‘the question for the Court is whether there is
substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser
offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.
If so, the motion is properly denied.’ ” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d
451, 455 (2000) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)).
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d
164, 169 (1980) (internal citation omitted).
The evidence must “ ‘be considered in the light most favorable to the State; the
State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be
drawn therefrom . . . .’ ” State v. Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 574–75, 780 S.E.2d 824, 826
(2015) (quoting Powell, 299 N.C. at 99, 261 S.E.2d at 117). If the State presents
“substantial evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a combination, to support
a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant
committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.” Id.
at 575, 780 S.E.2d at 826 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“ ‘Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case; rather, they
are for the jury to resolve. Defendant’s evidence, unless favorable to the State, is not
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to be taken into consideration.’ ” State v. Agustin, 229 N.C. App. 240, 242, 747 S.E.2d
316, 318 (2013) (quoting State v. Franklin, 327 N.C. 162, 172, 393 S.E.2d 781, 787
(1990)).
First-degree kidnapping occurs when: (1) “[a]ny person who shall unlawfully
confine, restrain or remove from one place to another, any other person 16 years of
age or over without the consent of such person . . .”; (2) if the “confinement, restraint
or removal is for the purpose of . . . facilitating the commission of any felony . . .”; and
(3) the “person kidnapped either was not released . . . in a safe place or had been
seriously injured or sexually assaulted . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39(a)–(b) (2025).
Here, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See
Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 378, 526 S.E.2d at 455. At trial, Ann consistently testified that
she only accompanied Defendant to the various locations because she feared
Defendant’s knife. In addition, Ann stated that she did not feel as though she could
run away from Defendant without being harmed. Viewing this evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, see Winkler, 368 N.C at 574–75, 780 S.E.2d at 826, a
“reasonable mind” could find that Ann felt threatened by Defendant and did not
consent to going to the various locations with him, see Smith, 300 N.C. at 78–79, 265
S.E.2d at 169. Although Defendant testified that Ann consented to traveling to the
various locations with him, this contradiction was properly left for the jury to resolve.
See Agustin, 229 N.C. App. at 242, 747 S.E.2d at 318. Accordingly, the trial court did
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not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree
kidnapping. See Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 378, 526 S.E.2d at 455.
B. Closing Argument
Defendant next argues the trial court erred by not intervening during certain
portions of the State’s closing argument. Because he objected to some of the
challenged statements, Defendant argues the trial court erred by overruling his
second objection and by failing to intervene ex mero motu on the other statements.
We disagree.
Generally, the purpose of a “closing argument is to provide the jury with a
summation of the evidence . . . .” State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 127, 558 S.E.2d 97,
103 (2002). “[T]rial counsel are granted wide latitude in the scope of jury argument,
and control of closing arguments is in the discretion of the trial court.” State v.
Soyars, 332 N.C. 47, 60, 418 S.E.2d 480, 487 (1992).
Counsel, however, “may not become abusive, inject his personal experiences,
express his personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence or as to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant, or make arguments on the basis of matters outside the
record . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1230(a) (2025). Thus, “[t]he trial court has a duty,
upon objection, to censor remarks not warranted by either the evidence or the law, or
remarks calculated to mislead or prejudice the jury.” State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509,
516, 212 S.E.2d 125, 131 (1975). “In determining possible prejudice arising from
improper arguments, we consider an allegedly improper statement in its broader
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context, as ‘particular prosecutorial arguments are not viewed in an isolated
vacuum.’ ” State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 603, 652 S.E.2d 216, 227 (2007) (quoting
State v. Moseley, 338 N.C. 1, 50, 449 S.E.2d 412, 422 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1091, 115 S. Ct. 1815, 131 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1995)).
1. Football Statement
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the
statement about football. We disagree.
“The standard of review for improper closing arguments that provoke timely
objection from opposing counsel is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to sustain the objection.” Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106. “A trial
court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are
‘manifestly unsupported by reason.’ ” Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 523, 631 S.E.2d
114, 118 (2006) (quoting Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980)).
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant’s
objection to the State’s statement that “[m]aybe those days of letting our kids go out
and build forts and play football by themselves, maybe those days are over[.] . . . You
can do something. One of Surry County’s daughters has been hurt.” See Jones, 355
N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106. Indeed, the prosecutor did not explicitly remark on
Defendant’s guilt but rather lamented about a lack of safety on the Greenway. Thus,
the statement was not improper. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1230(a). Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Defendant’s objection. See Jones,
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355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106; Monk, 286 N.C. at 516, 212 S.E.2d at 131.
2. Curfew Statement
Defendant failed to object to the remaining statements he challenges on
appeal. Defendant next contends the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero
motu on the prosecutor’s statement about his curfew. We disagree.
It may be proper for the trial court to intervene ex mero motu to correct an
unchallenged remark during closing arguments. Monk, 286 N.C. at 516, 212 S.E.2d
at 131. In those instances, we review: “(1) whether the argument was improper; and,
if so, (2) whether the argument was so grossly improper as to impede the defendant’s
right to a fair trial.” State v. Huey, 370 N.C. 174, 179, 804 S.E.2d 464, 469 (2017). To
be grossly improper, the argument must have “strayed far enough from the
parameters of propriety that the trial court, in order to protect the rights of the
parties and the sanctity of the proceedings, should have intervened on its own
accord . . . .” Jones, 355 N.C. at 133, 558 S.E.2d at 107. For example, a closing
argument is grossly improper if the State calls a witness, opposing counsel, or a
defendant a liar “when there has been no evidence to support the allegation.” State
v. Hembree, 368 N.C. 2, 19, 770 S.E. 77, 89 (2015) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Here, the trial court did not err in failing to intervene ex mero motu to the
State’s remark that “[w]hen I was ten or 11, I played football until it got dark. . . . My
parents never once worried about me unless I was [not] home by curfew.” See Monk,
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286 N.C. at 516, 212 S.E.2d at 131. In short, the prosecutor’s experience playing
football as a child did not infringe on Defendant’s rights at trial, see Jones, 355 N.C.
at 133, 558 S.E.2d at 107, like calling Defendant a liar would have, see Hembree, 368
N.C. at 19, 770 S.E.2d at 89. Thus, while the prosecutor improperly “inject[ed] his
personal experiences” into the State’s closing argument, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1230, his remarks did not stray “far enough from the parameters of propriety” to
warrant intervention, see Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 107. Accordingly,
based on the context of the trial, see Peterson, 361 N.C. at 603, 652 S.E.2d at 227, the
trial court did not err, see Monk, 286 N.C. at 516, 212 S.E.2d at 131.
3. Name Statement
Defendant also asserts the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu
on the State’s remark that called him a derogatory name. We disagree.
If the State specifically refers to the defendant by a derogatory name in closing
arguments, that statement may be grossly improper. See, e.g., Jones, 355 N.C. at
133, 558 S.E.2d at 107 (determining the State improperly referred to the defendant
as “this quitter, this loser, this worthless piece of – who’s mean . . . He’s as mean as
they come. He’s lower than the dirt on a snake’s belly”); State v. Wyatt, 254 N.C. 220,
222, 118 S.E.2d 420, 421 (1961) (holding the State improperly described defendants
as “two of the slickest confidence men”); State v. Tucker, 190 N.C. 708, 713–14, 130
S.E. 720, 722 (1925) (concluding the State impermissibly said the defendants
“look[ed] like . . . bootleggers”); State v. Davis, 45 N.C. App. 113, 114–15, 262 S.E.2d
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329, 329–30 (1980) (explaining the State improperly called the defendant a “mean
S.O.B.”).
Here, the trial court did not err in failing to intervene ex mero motu to the
prosecutor saying, “Why is that Greenway even there? To attract ne’er-do-wells or so
that the people of Surr[]y County have a place to go, to get outdoors, to ride their
bikes walk their dogs go for a jog, to clear their heads[?]” See Monk, 286 N.C. at 516,
212 S.E.2d at 131. Unlike the State in Davis calling the defendant a “mean S.O.B.”
or in Jones calling the defendant “worthless,” the prosecutor here did not refer to
Defendant specifically. See Davis, 45 N.C. App. at 114–15, 262 S.E.2d at 329–30;
Jones, 355 N.C. at 133, 558 S.E.2d at 107. Instead, the State was referring to the
general purpose of the Greenway and posed a rhetorical question to the jury about
whether the Greenway was built to “attract ne’er-do-wells.” Thus, even if the
prosecutor specifically called Defendant a “ne’er-do-well,” this statement was not the
type of inflammatory name calling that is grossly improper. See, e.g., Jones, 355 N.C.
at 133, 558 S.E.2d at 107; Wyatt, 254 N.C. at 222, 118 S.E.2d at 421; Tucker, 190 N.C.
at 713–14, 130 S.E. at 722; Davis, 45 N.C. App. at 114–15, 262 S.E.2d at 329–30.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err. See Monk, 286 N.C. at 516, 212 S.E.2d at 131.
4. Timidity Statement
Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu on
the State’s statement about Ann’s timidity and politeness. We disagree.
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Although attorneys during closing arguments may not express their personal
opinions, State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 330, 350, 595 S.E.2d 124, 137 (2007), “prosecutors
are allowed to argue that the State’s witnesses are credible[,]” State v. Augustine, 359
N.C. 709, 725, 616 S.E.2d 515, 528 (2005). An attorney also “ ‘can argue to the jury
that they should not believe a witness[.]’ ” State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 455, 533
S.E.2d 168, 227 (2000) (quoting State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 217, 241 S.E.2d 65,
70 (1978)).
Here, the trial court did not err in failing to intervene ex mero motu on the
State’s remark that Ann “[wa]s timid and sweet and polite and easily manipulated
and easily controlled.” See Monk, 286 N.C. at 516, 212 S.E.2d at 131. Because the
State could argue about the credibility of a witness, the State’s remark was not
improper, let alone grossly improper. See Augustine, 359 N.C. at 725, 616 S.E.2d at
528; Huey, 370 N.C. at 179, 804 S.E.2d at 469. The trial court, therefore, did not err.
See Monk, 286 N.C. at 516, 212 S.E.2d at 131.
5. Statements about Ann
Defendant also appears to challenge the trial court’s lack of intervention
regarding two additional statements from the State during closing argument, which
we decline to review.
Here, Defendant abandoned his arguments to the State’s remarks about Ann
being kidnapped and sweet. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) (2025) (“Issues not presented
and discussed in a party’s brief are deemed abandoned.”). In Appendix B of his brief,
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Defendant attached and flagged all the challenged statements made by the trial court
but failed to argue or otherwise discuss the statements about Ann. Although
counsel’s annotations helped identify relevant passages, Defendant made no
argument why the statements were grossly improper. See e.g., State v. Knight, 245
N.C. App. 532, 539, 785 S.E.2d 324, 331 (2016), aff’d as modified, 369 N.C. 640, 799
S.E.2d 603 (2017). By failing to analyze them, Defendant has abandoned these
challenges. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(a).
V. Conclusion
In sum, as the State presented substantial evidence that Ann did not consent
to traveling with Defendant to the various locations, the trial court did not err by
denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree kidnapping.
Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Defendant’s
objection to the State’s remark during closing arguments and did not err by failing to
intervene ex mero motu on the other challenged remarks.
NO ERROR.
Judges COLLINS and FLOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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