State v. Lucks

531 P.2d 855, 56 Haw. 129
CourtHawaii Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 3, 1975
Docket5564, 5592
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 531 P.2d 855 (State v. Lucks) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Hawaii Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Lucks, 531 P.2d 855, 56 Haw. 129 (haw 1975).

Opinion

*130 OPINION OF THE COURT BY

RICHARDSON, C.J.

Michael Lucks and Alan Goldberg were indicted and found guilty by a jury of unlawfully cultivating marijuana in violation of HRS § 329-5 (Supp. 1971). 1 From the judgment of the trial court they appeal.

I. FACTS

The relevant facts are as follows: On June 8, 1972, narcotics officer Harvey Hee accompanied by Officer Bento, employees of the Honolulu Police Department, participated in the seizure of a number of marijuana plants, and the subsequent arrest of appellants Lucks and Goldberg.

On that date, apprised by an anonymous tip received by a fellow officer that marijuana was being grown in the backyard of 17 Ala Kimo Drive, Hee and Bento drove to the location, but were unable to view any of the alleged plants from the roadway. Stopping a mailman, Hee inquired as to whether there might not be some vantage point from which to observe the rear of 17 Ala Kimo. He learned that a private driveway leading to a home at 3320-A Nuuanu Pali Drive would offer him the desired access, since the backyard at 3320-A adjoined that of the yard under investigation.

The officers proceeded to Nuuanu Pali Drive and while driving slowly along the private drive past 3320-A Officer Hee *131 claimed he observed from a distance of between sixty-five and seventy-five feet, with the aid of a pair of binoculars, what appeared to be marijuana plants. 2

At this point the officers stopped their vehicle and turned into the residence at 3320-A. Hee walked to the front door of the two-story house and knocked on the upper door. Finding no one at home, he then tried the lower door, with the same result. Hee then proceeded to walk through the garage of 3320-A which opened onto the backyard, for the asserted purpose of seeing if the occupant was there. His intention, he explained at trial, was to obtain permission of the property owner at 3320-A to view the adjoining premises.

Although the yard was empty, Hee testified that he could hear people talking from the adjacent property. He walked to the fence and observed a man, later identified as Michael Lucks, watering three large, potted marijuana plants. Officer Hee also observed a man, later identified as Alan Goldberg, and heard him to say, apparently to Lucks, “You’d better leave the plants there. They need a lot of sun.”

When questioned as to any obstructions between himself and the plants at the time he viewed them Hee explained there were high, untrimmed, unkept hedges, through which he had to look in order to view the marijuana plants. Hee described a moss rock fence, about three feet in height, covered with heavy brush and shielded by a Plumeria tree. 3

Having seen the marijuana plants, the officers then drove back to Ala Kimo Drive, and for the first time learned that *132 they had been observing the backyard of 11 Ala Kimo, not that of 17 Ala Kimo.

While Officer Hee went to the front door, his partner proceeded to the backyard where he placed defendant Goldberg under arrest. Hee knocked on the front door, was admitted by Defendant Lucks and at that point placed Lucks under arrest.

Prior to the commencement of the proceedings below, the appellants moved the trial court to dismiss the indictment against them on the ground, inter aliab that the Hawaii Penal Code failed to define cultivation of marijuana as an offense, and therefore Section 101(2)(a) provided the appellants with a complete defense to the crime charged. They renew this contention on appeal, stating that the failure of the Code to expressly proscribe cultivation as an offense rendered the indictment below fatally defective, and therefore mandates that we reverse their conviction. For reasons hereinafter expressed we find the appellants’ argument unpersuasive. However, based on our review of the record, we hold that there was insufficient evidence to convict defendant Alan Goldberg of the crime charged and are thus compélled to reverse his conviction. As to defendant Michael Lucks, we affirm the conviction.

II. HAWAII PENAL CODE SECTION 101

Hawaii Penal Code Section 101 provides in pertinent part:

Sec. 101 — Applicability to offense committed before the effective date.
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), this Code does not apply to offenses committed before its effective date. Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date are governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose, as if this Code were not in force. For purposes of this section, an offense is committed before the effective date if any of the elements of the offense occurred before that date.
(2) In any case pending on or commenced after the effective date of this Code, involving an offense committed before that date:
*133 (a) Upon the request of the defendant a defense or mitigation under this Code, whether specifically provided for herein or based upon the failure of the Code to define an applicable offense, shall apply; 4

In the case at bar the indictment was presented and filed on July 12, 1972, and the trial commenced on August 6, 1973. Consequently at a threshold level Section 101 is applicable.

The opening sentence of this section announces its general purpose which is that “[prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date are governed by the prior law . . . .” The relevant exception in the case presently before us is subsection (2) which may be invoked at the request of the defendant without leave of the court. Cf. Hawaii Penal Code Section 101(2)(a). By way of invocation of this subsection the defendant may assert, either to defend or to mitigate the charge against him, any relevant provision prescribed for, or “based upon the failure of the Code to define an applicable offense.” With this language as a foundation, the appellants contend that the failure of the Hawaii Penal Code to define an applicable offense, i.e., cultivation of marijuana, results in a complete defense to the charge.

We view the term “applicable offense” as described in Penal Code Section 101(2)(a) to mean an offense that is applicable to a given set of factual circumstances that make up a criminal act. Surely from the standpoint of consistency there can be no doubt but that the planting and growing of marijuana is at least as pernicious as is possession of a single marijuana cigarette. One cannot say that the failure to proscribe cultivation per se under the new Code evidences a legislative intent to allow the planting and growing of marijuana inasmuch as the legislature has continued to forbid the possession of marijuana. Hawaii Penal Code §§ 1247 et seq.

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Bluebook (online)
531 P.2d 855, 56 Haw. 129, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-lucks-haw-1975.