[Cite as State v. Luckett, 2026-Ohio-2758.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NOS. CA2026-01-012 Appellee, : CA2026-01-013
vs. : OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY KAYLA M. LUCKETT, : 7/20/2026
Appellant. :
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM HAMILTON MUNICIPAL COURT Case No. CRB 2500667
City of Hamilton Law Department, and Brian K. Harrison, for appellee.
Engel & Martin, LLC, and Josh A. Engel, for appellant.
____________ OPINION
PIPER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Kayla M. Luckett, appeals her Hamilton Municipal Court
conviction after a jury returned verdicts finding her guilty of domestic violence and
violating a protection order. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Luckett's
conviction. Butler CA2026-01-012 CA2026-01-013
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On March 28, 2025, a complaint was filed charging Luckett with domestic
violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. The charge
stemmed from allegations that, on the morning of March 27, 2025, while driving on State
Route 4 in Hamilton, Luckett punched the victim, the father of her then seven-month-old
child, in the head. It was further alleged that, upon arriving at the victim's home that day,
Luckett then bit the victim's finger and the side of the victim's face. The altercation
between Luckett and the victim arose after Luckett accused the victim of cheating on her.
A domestic violence temporary protection order was subsequently issued by the trial court
pursuant to R.C. 2919.26. The order prohibited Luckett from initiating or having contact
with the victim, "even with the permission of the protected person."
{¶ 3} On April 19, 2025, Luckett sent a text message to the victim asking, "Did I
see you at moms." Shortly thereafter, on May 1, 2025, a complaint was filed charging
Luckett with violating the aforementioned domestic violence temporary protection order
under R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), a first-degree misdemeanor. The matter ultimately proceeded
to a one-day jury trial on January 12, 2026. During the trial, the jury heard testimony from
four witnesses, including the victim and Luckett. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
returned a verdict finding Luckett guilty of both charges. The trial court then held a
sentencing hearing, at which it imposed consecutive 180-day jail sentences for each
offense, with 160 of those days suspended, and placed Luckett on community control for
two years. The trial court also ordered Luckett to pay a total of $500 in fines plus court
costs.
Luckett's Appeal and Single Assignment of Error
{¶ 4} On January 16, 2026, Luckett filed a notice of appeal. After briefing,
-2- Butler CA2026-01-012 CA2026-01-013
Luckett's appeal was submitted to this court for consideration on June 3, 2026, and is
now properly before this court for decision. Luckett has raised one assignment of error in
support of her appeal. In that assignment, she challenges the jury's verdicts finding her
guilty of domestic violence and violating a protection order as being against the manifest
weight of the evidence. We disagree.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence Standard
{¶ 5} The manifest weight of the evidence standard is well settled. State v. Evans,
2026-Ohio-1237, ¶ 28 (12th Dist.). "[T]he manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of
review applies to the State's burden of persuasion." State v. McCollum, 2026-Ohio-393,
¶ 13 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. When determining
whether a jury's verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, this court, sitting
as the "thirteenth juror," reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, and considers the credibility of the witnesses who testified at trial. State v.
Brown, 2025-Ohio-2804, ¶ 30. We then determine, in resolving any conflicts in the
evidence, whether the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of
justice that requires reversal of the jury's verdict and an order for a new trial. State v.
Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17. Such a determination is rare, arising only in exceptional
cases where the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily against the jury's verdict and
in favor of acquittal. State v. Nkoyi, 2024-Ohio-3144, ¶ 41 (12th Dist.). "This may occur
only when there is unanimous disagreement with the jury's verdict." State v. Palma, 2025-
Ohio-1318, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.).
Domestic Violence in Violation of R.C. 2919.25(A)
{¶ 6} The jury found Luckett guilty of domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A). Under that statute, "[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause
-3- Butler CA2026-01-012 CA2026-01-013
physical harm to a family or household member." The phrase "family or household
member" includes "[t]he natural parent of any child of whom the offender is the other
natural parent or is the putative other natural parent." R.C. 2919.25(F)(1)(b). The term
"physical harm" is defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) as "any injury, illness, or other
physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration."
Luckett's Argument and Analysis
{¶ 7} Luckett argues that the jury's verdict finding her guilty of domestic violence
was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State relied almost
exclusively on the victim's trial testimony to prove its case. She further argues that the
jury's reliance on that testimony was error and that her conviction for domestic violence
must be reversed because it contained "numerous discrepancies," was "simply, at times,
not believable," and was "consistently contradicted" by her own trial testimony. However,
as the trier of fact, the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony elicited
at her trial. State v. Eads, 2025-Ohio-2815, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). This necessarily included
the testimony offered by the alleged victim, the father of her then seven-month-old child.
State v. Abbott, 2026-Ohio-2127, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). This is because, as it is now well
established, "the decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular
witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard
the witness." State v. Bedsole, 2022-Ohio-3693, ¶ 35 (12th Dist.). "A conviction is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence merely because there is conflicting evidence
before the trier of fact or because the trier of fact believed the testimony of the state's
witnesses." State v. MacPhereson, 2024-Ohio-5359, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). Therefore,
Luckett's first argument is without merit.
-4- Butler CA2026-01-012 CA2026-01-013
Violating a Protection Order in Violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1)
{¶ 8} The jury also found Luckett guilty of violating a protection order under R.C.
2919.27(A)(1). That statute, in relevant part, provides that no person shall recklessly
violate the terms of a protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 2919.26. Generally, a
protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 2919.26 is entered as part of the alleged
offender's pretrial conditions of release from jail during the pendency of certain criminal
proceedings. See Allan v. Allan, 2014-Ohio-5039, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.). "A person acts recklessly
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[Cite as State v. Luckett, 2026-Ohio-2758.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NOS. CA2026-01-012 Appellee, : CA2026-01-013
vs. : OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY KAYLA M. LUCKETT, : 7/20/2026
Appellant. :
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM HAMILTON MUNICIPAL COURT Case No. CRB 2500667
City of Hamilton Law Department, and Brian K. Harrison, for appellee.
Engel & Martin, LLC, and Josh A. Engel, for appellant.
____________ OPINION
PIPER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Kayla M. Luckett, appeals her Hamilton Municipal Court
conviction after a jury returned verdicts finding her guilty of domestic violence and
violating a protection order. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Luckett's
conviction. Butler CA2026-01-012 CA2026-01-013
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On March 28, 2025, a complaint was filed charging Luckett with domestic
violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. The charge
stemmed from allegations that, on the morning of March 27, 2025, while driving on State
Route 4 in Hamilton, Luckett punched the victim, the father of her then seven-month-old
child, in the head. It was further alleged that, upon arriving at the victim's home that day,
Luckett then bit the victim's finger and the side of the victim's face. The altercation
between Luckett and the victim arose after Luckett accused the victim of cheating on her.
A domestic violence temporary protection order was subsequently issued by the trial court
pursuant to R.C. 2919.26. The order prohibited Luckett from initiating or having contact
with the victim, "even with the permission of the protected person."
{¶ 3} On April 19, 2025, Luckett sent a text message to the victim asking, "Did I
see you at moms." Shortly thereafter, on May 1, 2025, a complaint was filed charging
Luckett with violating the aforementioned domestic violence temporary protection order
under R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), a first-degree misdemeanor. The matter ultimately proceeded
to a one-day jury trial on January 12, 2026. During the trial, the jury heard testimony from
four witnesses, including the victim and Luckett. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
returned a verdict finding Luckett guilty of both charges. The trial court then held a
sentencing hearing, at which it imposed consecutive 180-day jail sentences for each
offense, with 160 of those days suspended, and placed Luckett on community control for
two years. The trial court also ordered Luckett to pay a total of $500 in fines plus court
costs.
Luckett's Appeal and Single Assignment of Error
{¶ 4} On January 16, 2026, Luckett filed a notice of appeal. After briefing,
-2- Butler CA2026-01-012 CA2026-01-013
Luckett's appeal was submitted to this court for consideration on June 3, 2026, and is
now properly before this court for decision. Luckett has raised one assignment of error in
support of her appeal. In that assignment, she challenges the jury's verdicts finding her
guilty of domestic violence and violating a protection order as being against the manifest
weight of the evidence. We disagree.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence Standard
{¶ 5} The manifest weight of the evidence standard is well settled. State v. Evans,
2026-Ohio-1237, ¶ 28 (12th Dist.). "[T]he manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of
review applies to the State's burden of persuasion." State v. McCollum, 2026-Ohio-393,
¶ 13 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. When determining
whether a jury's verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, this court, sitting
as the "thirteenth juror," reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, and considers the credibility of the witnesses who testified at trial. State v.
Brown, 2025-Ohio-2804, ¶ 30. We then determine, in resolving any conflicts in the
evidence, whether the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of
justice that requires reversal of the jury's verdict and an order for a new trial. State v.
Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17. Such a determination is rare, arising only in exceptional
cases where the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily against the jury's verdict and
in favor of acquittal. State v. Nkoyi, 2024-Ohio-3144, ¶ 41 (12th Dist.). "This may occur
only when there is unanimous disagreement with the jury's verdict." State v. Palma, 2025-
Ohio-1318, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.).
Domestic Violence in Violation of R.C. 2919.25(A)
{¶ 6} The jury found Luckett guilty of domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A). Under that statute, "[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause
-3- Butler CA2026-01-012 CA2026-01-013
physical harm to a family or household member." The phrase "family or household
member" includes "[t]he natural parent of any child of whom the offender is the other
natural parent or is the putative other natural parent." R.C. 2919.25(F)(1)(b). The term
"physical harm" is defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) as "any injury, illness, or other
physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration."
Luckett's Argument and Analysis
{¶ 7} Luckett argues that the jury's verdict finding her guilty of domestic violence
was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State relied almost
exclusively on the victim's trial testimony to prove its case. She further argues that the
jury's reliance on that testimony was error and that her conviction for domestic violence
must be reversed because it contained "numerous discrepancies," was "simply, at times,
not believable," and was "consistently contradicted" by her own trial testimony. However,
as the trier of fact, the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony elicited
at her trial. State v. Eads, 2025-Ohio-2815, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). This necessarily included
the testimony offered by the alleged victim, the father of her then seven-month-old child.
State v. Abbott, 2026-Ohio-2127, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). This is because, as it is now well
established, "the decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular
witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard
the witness." State v. Bedsole, 2022-Ohio-3693, ¶ 35 (12th Dist.). "A conviction is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence merely because there is conflicting evidence
before the trier of fact or because the trier of fact believed the testimony of the state's
witnesses." State v. MacPhereson, 2024-Ohio-5359, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). Therefore,
Luckett's first argument is without merit.
-4- Butler CA2026-01-012 CA2026-01-013
Violating a Protection Order in Violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1)
{¶ 8} The jury also found Luckett guilty of violating a protection order under R.C.
2919.27(A)(1). That statute, in relevant part, provides that no person shall recklessly
violate the terms of a protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 2919.26. Generally, a
protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 2919.26 is entered as part of the alleged
offender's pretrial conditions of release from jail during the pendency of certain criminal
proceedings. See Allan v. Allan, 2014-Ohio-5039, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.). "A person acts recklessly
when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result
or to be of a certain nature." R.C. 2901.22(C).
{¶ 9} Luckett argues that the jury's verdict finding her guilty of violating a
protection order was against the manifest weight of the evidence because "the single,
isolated text message" she sent to the victim was an accident, "an inadvertent mistake,
completely lacking the perverse disregard or heedless indifference required to satisfy the
element of recklessness." However, given its verdict, the jury clearly rejected Luckett's
claim that the text message was sent accidentally and, without proof that she had acted
with the required mens rea of recklessness, found her guilty. In so holding, it bears
repeating that "the decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of
particular witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and
heard the witness." Bedsole, 2022-Ohio-3693, at ¶ 35, (12th Dist.). "A conviction is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence merely because there is conflicting evidence
before the trier of fact or because the trier of fact believed the testimony of the state's
witnesses." MacPhereson, 2024-Ohio-5359, at ¶ 21, (12th Dist.). Therefore, Luckett's
-5- Butler CA2026-01-012 CA2026-01-013
second argument is also without merit.
Conclusion
{¶ 10} For the reasons outlined above, and finding no merit in any of the arguments
raised by Luckett herein, Luckett's single assignment of error challenging the jury's verdict
finding her guilty of domestic violence and violating a protection order as being against
the manifest weight of the evidence is denied.
{¶ 11} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and SIEBERT, J., concur.
-6- Butler CA2026-01-012 CA2026-01-013
JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Hamilton Municipal Court for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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