State v. Lucero

Opinion

372 August 19, 2026 No. 790

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHRISTINA MARIE LUCERO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Multnomah County Circuit Court 22CR40144; A184690

Kenneth Avery Stafford, Judge. Submitted April 14, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Erik Blumenthal, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Lauren P. Robertson, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, O’Connor, Judge, and Walters, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM Affirmed.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 372 (2026) 373

PER CURIAM Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, ORS 166.250. On appeal, defendant argues that ORS 166.250 violates the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to her. Defendant’s facial challenge is foreclosed by State v. Vinge, 337 Or App 621, 628, 564 P3d 186, rev den, 374 Or 373 (2025). As for defendant’s argument that application of the statute violated the Second Amendment by depriving her of her firearm rights based on a stalking protective order (SPO) from 19 years earlier when she was still a minor, we conclude that argument is not preserved.1 Defendant never made that argument in the trial court, and in fact, actively objected to any mention of the SPO. We further conclude that her argument does not qualify for plain-error review. See State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013) (to establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate, among other things, that the error was “obvious”). Defendant has not identified an obvious violation of her Second Amendment rights. The evidence established that she carried a concealed firearm in her vehicle where it was readily accessible, without a concealed handgun license and in violation of ORS 166.250(1)(b). See Vinge, 337 Or App at 625-27 (explaining that ORS 166.250’s prohibition on possessing a concealed firearm without a license is consistent with the nation’s tradition of firearm regulation and not unconstitutional).

Affirmed.

1 In the trial court, defendant argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to her because she had complied with all the requirements for a concealed handgun license, although she had not actually obtained one.