[Cite as State v. Lizarraga, 2025-Ohio-3187.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF WAYNE )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 23AP0041
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE ELIAS LIZARRAGA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 2022 CRC-I 0071
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 8, 2025
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Elias Lizarraga, appeals the judgment of the Wayne County Court of
Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} This matter arises out of a controlled drug purchase executed by the Medway Drug
Enforcement Agency (“Medway) in Baughman Township. After meeting with Medway agents at
a secure location, a confidential informant travelled under surveillance to Lizarraga’s residence
and purchased methamphetamine from Lizarraga.
{¶3} On February 14, 2022, the Wayne County Grand Jury indicted Lizarraga on one
count aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), one count of aggravated
possession of methamphetamine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), and one count of having weapons
while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). The counts of aggravated trafficking
and aggravated possession were each accompanied by a three-year firearm specification pursuant 2
to R.C 2941.145(A) and a one-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.141(A). Lizarraga
pleaded not guilty to the charges and the matter ultimately proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found
Lizarraga guilty of aggravated possession of drugs and the attendant specifications, as well as
having weapons while under disability. The jury found Lizarraga not guilty of aggravated
trafficking in drugs. At sentencing, the State elected for the trial court to impose sentence on the
three-year firearm specification. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of five and a half
years imprisonment.
{¶4} On appeal, Lizarraga raises four assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST MR ELIAS LIZARRAGA.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. LIZARRAGA’S [CRIM.R. 29] MOTION FOR ACQUITAL.
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Lizarraga argues that the State failed to present
sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. In his fourth assignment of error, Lizarraga
maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.
{¶6} Crim.R. 29(A) provides, in relevant part:
The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state’s case. 3
{¶7} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence before the
trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279 (1991).
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶8} Lizarraga was convicted of one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation
of R.C. 2925.11(A), which states, “[n]o person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled
substance or a controlled substance analog.” Methamphetamine is a Schedule II controlled
substance. See Adm.Code 4729.9-1-02(C)(2).
{¶9} In connection to his conviction for aggravated possession of drugs, Lizarraga was
also found guilty and sentenced on a mandatory three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C.
2941.145(A), which states, in pertinent part, that the “[i]mposition of a three-year mandatory
prison term upon an offender under [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii)] is precluded unless the indictment,
count in the indictment, or information charging the offense specifies that the offender had a
firearm on or about the offender’s person or under the offender's control while committing the
offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated that the offender possessed
the firearm, or used it to facilitate the offense.”
{¶10} Lizarraga was also convicted of having weapons while under disability in violation
of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), which states that “[u]nless relieved from disability under operation of law
or legal process, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm . . . if . . . [t]he 4
person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any felony offense involving the illegal
possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse or has been
adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed by an adult,
would have been a felony offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration,
distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse.”
{¶11} R.C. 2923.11(B) provides as follows:
(1) “Firearm” means any deadly weapon capable of expelling or propelling one or more projectiles by the action of an explosive or combustible propellant. “Firearm” includes an unloaded firearm, and any firearm that is inoperable but that can readily be rendered operable.
(2) When determining whether a firearm is capable of expelling or propelling one or more projectiles by the action of an explosive or combustible propellant, the trier of fact may rely upon circumstantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the representations and actions of the individual exercising control over the firearm.
Background
{¶12} At trial, the State presented evidence during its case-in-chief in support of the
following narrative:
{¶13} Medway agents received a report from a confidential informant that Lizarraga was
dealing drugs out of his home on Tannerville Road in Baughman Township. The confidential
informant indicated that Lizarraga had agreed to sell the confidential informant two ounces of
methamphetamine for $800. Agent Carl Festa testified that after verifying the report, Medway set
up a controlled drug purchase at Lizarraga’s residence on September 7, 2021. Medway agents met
the confidential informant at a secure location that was within two miles of Lizarraga’s residence.
After searching the confidential informant to ensure that he was not in possession of any currency,
contraband, or weapons, the confidential informant was provided with $800 in cash in order to
facilitate the drug purchase. The Medway agents also equipped the confidential informant with a 5
body wire and a secondary recording device which allowed for covert audio and video
surveillance.
{¶14} The confidential informant drove to Lizarraga’s residence under surveillance.
When the confidential informant arrived at Lizarraga’s residence, law enforcement continued to
monitor the situation using live transmission equipment. The confidential informant found
Lizarraga waiting on the porch and the two men promptly entered the residence. After a short
time, the confidential informant handed Lizarraga the designated $800 cash and Lizarraga used a
digital scale to measure the specified amount of methamphetamine. Lizarraga placed the
methamphetamine into two plastic baggies and handed the baggies to the confidential informant.
Near the end of the transaction, Lizarraga and the confidential informant discussed the possibility
of future drug deals.
{¶15} A video of the controlled drug purchase was played at trial. Several screenshots
from the video were also introduced as exhibits. Agent Festa testified that it is common for drug
dealers to carry firearms and that, at one point during the video, Lizarraga and the confidential
informant began “talking about packing, [in] reference to a firearm.” In the video, Lizarraga can
be heard saying that because both men carry firearms, he would insist on conducting future
transactions outside under circumstances where his children were home. When the confidential
informant suggested that he only carried a BB gun, Lizarraga lifted his shirt to expose his
waistband and said, “I don’t play.” The video further showed that, when the confidential informant
exited the residence, there was a boy wearing a backpack in the driveway.
{¶16} After the controlled drug purchase, the confidential informant immediately drove
to meet the Medway agents, where he turned over approximately 56 grams of methamphetamine 6
that he had purchased from Lizarraga. The State presented evidence at trial that Lizarraga had
multiple prior felony convictions, including one conviction for felony possession of heroin.
Sufficiency Challenge
{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Lizarraga sets forth a broad argument pertaining to
the sufficiency of the evidence, stating that “the State failed to establish on the record sufficient
evidence to support the charges levied against [] Lizarraga[.]” Although Lizarraga offers a
summary of the evidence in support of his first assignment of error, Lizarraga has not tailored his
argument to a particular charge.
{¶18} As detailed in the foregoing paragraphs, the State presented evidence that, when
construed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to support Lizarraga’s convictions
for aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), and the attendant firearm
specification, as well as his conviction for having weapons while under disability in violation of
R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). It follows that the sufficiency challenge contained in Lizarraga’s first
assignment of error is without merit.
Crim.R. 29(A) Challenge
{¶19} In his fourth assignment of error, Lizarraga contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A). Lizarraga’s challenge to the trial
court’s denial of his motion for acquittal focuses on whether the State presented evidence that there
was a firearm involved in the controlled drug purchase. Lizarraga maintains that while he stated
during the transaction that he “packed,” he never indicated that a functional firearm was on his
person during the controlled drug purchase.
{¶20} We are mindful that “[c]ircumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently
possess the same probative value and therefore should be subjected to the same standard of proof.” 7
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, at paragraph one of the syllabus. Furthermore, this Court must construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State when reviewing the trial court’s denial of a
motion for acquittal. State v. Messer, 107 Ohio App.3d 51, 54 (9th Dist. 1995). Here, the State
presented a video of the controlled drug purchase where Lizarraga made a point to raise the topic
of carrying a firearm, stating, “Listen, I know you pack and I pack.” The confidential informant
attempted to downplay the subject by suggesting that he only carried a BB gun. Incredulous,
Lizarraga responded by saying, “I don’t play.” Lizarraga then turned to the confidential informant,
lifted his shirt, and exposed his waistband. While the video does not depict Lizarraga’s waist area,
one can draw a reasonable inference from this evidence that Lizarraga exposed his waistband to
show that he was in possession of a firearm as defined by R.C. 2923.11(B)(1). Accordingly, this
evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to sustain
Lizarraga’s conviction on the firearm specification contained in count two as well as the charge of
having weapons while under disability contained in count three.
{¶21} Lizarraga’s first and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING THE ADMISSION [OF] MR. ELIAS LIZARRAGA’S EXHIBITS.
{¶22} In his third assignment of error, Lizarraga contends that the trial court abused its
discretion when it did not permit the defense to introduce several exhibits depicting a text exchange
between the confidential informant and Lizarraga that occurred after the incident. This Court
disagrees.
{¶23} A trial court possesses broad discretion in determining the admission of evidence
and an appellate court should not disturb a trial court’s ruling regarding the admission of evidence
absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 265 (1984). An abuse of 8
discretion “implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.”
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶24} Evid.R. 401 states that “[r]elevant evidence” is evidence “having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” “Evidence which is not relevant
is not admissible.” Evid.R. 402.
{¶25} Lizarraga testified in his own defense at trial. During his testimony, Lizarraga
indicated that a family member put him in touch with the confidential informant, who was
interested in purchasing methamphetamine. Lizarraga testified that the man who acted as the
confidential informant was a drug addict with a volatile reputation and that, upon their encounter,
Lizarraga found the confidential informant to be in a state of desperation. Lizarraga testified that
he was no longer involved with drugs but he agreed to facilitate a one-time methamphetamine
transaction in order to rid himself of any trouble with the confidential informant. Lizarraga
approached a drug dealer who provided Lizarraga with the methamphetamine as well as a Smith
and Wesson .40 caliber handgun for protection. Lizarraga explained that he needed to protect
himself given that the confidential informant had demonstrated a habit of carrying a firearm,
including in the presence of children. Lizarraga testified that, after the controlled drug purchase
that gave rise to the charges in this case, the confidential informant reached out regarding
additional dealings but Lizarraga was not amenable.
{¶26} Near the end of the direct examination of Lizarraga, the defense attempted to
introduce four exhibits depicting a series of text messages that the confidential informant sent
Lizarraga on September 29, 2021, as well as one text message that the confidential informant sent
Lizarraga on October 2, 2021. The trial court ruled that the text messages were not relevant to the 9
charges in this case, at which time the defense proffered the exhibits. During the September 29,
2021 text exchange, the confidential informant expressed anger and frustration with Lizarraga for
not engaging in additional dealings. At one point, the confidential informant implied that
Lizarraga owed him money, texting. “either [] pay me or I beat yo ass[.] You have 24 hrs[.]”
When the confidential informant pressed the matter, Lizarraga texted, “I’m in Canton I’ll be thru
just know you better shoot first it’s over after that you think this shit is a fucking game.” The
confidential informant responded, “You made my dude pay so I need my money[.] Na bitch u
don’t know me[.]” The confidential informant subsequently texted, “Games always end and I’m
not on the losing side[.]” On October 2, 2021, the confidential informant sent Lizarraga another
text calling Lizarraga a profane name.
{¶27} On appeal, Lizarraga argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining
that the text messages were not relevant because they demonstrated an ongoing threat from the
confidential informant.
{¶28} Lizarraga’s argument is without merit. All of the charges in this case stemmed
solely from the controlled drug purchase that occurred on September 7, 2021. The text messages
that Lizarraga attempted to introduce occurred well after the events that gave rise to this case.
Accordingly, the text messages were not relevant given that they did not have “any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Evid.R. 401. Under these
circumstances, Lizarraga has not demonstrated that the trial court’s decision to exclude the text
messages was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. See Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219.
{¶29} Lizarraga’s third assignment of error is without merit. 10
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
MR. ELIAS LIZARRAGA’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION[.]
{¶30} In his second assignment of error, Lizarraga claims that his convictions were
against the weight of the evidence. This Court disagrees.
In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). An appellate court should exercise the
power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional
cases. Id.
{¶31} While Lizarraga does not dispute that he sold the confidential informant
approximately 56 grams of methamphetamine, he contends that the weight of the evidence does
not support his conviction for the firearm specification related to the drug charge or the charge of
having weapons while under disability. Lizarraga emphasizes that there was no visual evidence
presented at trial that showed a firearm during the controlled drug purchase. Lizarraga argues that
“lifting one’s shirt is [not] enough to prove that a weapon exists.” Lizarraga further suggests that
it was the confidential informant, and not Lizarraga, who engaged in threatening behavior both
during and after the incident.
{¶32} As discussed above, Lizarraga testified in his own defense. Lizarraga was unaware
that the man acting as the confidential informant was working with law enforcement. Lizarraga
expressed frustration that a family member put him in touch with the confidential informant, given
that the confidential informant was an addict who appeared to be acting out of desperation. 11
Lizarraga reached out to an old acquittance who dealt drugs and explained the situation. The drug
dealer warned Lizarraga to be careful around the confidential informant. Lizarraga testified that
the drug dealer agreed to provide Lizarraga with methamphetamine on the condition that Lizarraga
would repay the drug dealer after making the sale to the confidential informant. Lizarraga further
testified that, given the reputation of the confidential informant, the drug dealer decided to loan
Lizarraga the Smith and Wesson .40 caliber handgun for protection. Lizarraga accepted the
handgun out of concern for his children, stating that the confidential informant had demonstrated
a willingness to carry a weapon in the presence of children. With respect to what transpired during
the controlled drug purchase, Lizarraga testified, “I showed him mine,” in reference to the
handgun. When asked if that was a real firearm, Lizarraga responded in the affirmative. Lizarraga
explained that he did not feel safe being unarmed when he knew the confidential informant would
have a gun. Lizarraga further testified that the confidential informant was carrying a gun during
the controlled drug purchase.
{¶33} A thorough review of the record here reveals that Lizarraga’s convictions did not
result in a manifest miscarriage of justice. While Lizarraga argues that there was no visual
evidence of a firearm, the video of the controlled drug purchase showed that Lizarraga raised the
subject of carrying a firearm with the confidential informant and then lifted his waistband while
saying, “I don’t play.” Furthermore, Lizarraga admitted during his testimony that he obtained a
handgun from the drug dealer and that he showed the handgun to the confidential informant during
the controlled drug purchase. While Lizarraga suggested during his testimony that the confidential
informant was solely responsible for creating the dangerous dynamic, this Court is mindful that
“the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.” (Internal quotations
and citations omitted.) State v. Darr, 2018-Ohio-2548, ¶ 32 (9th Dist.). Furthermore, to the extent 12
that Lizarraga’s manifest weight challenge is predicated on the notion that the result of trial would
have been different if the trial court had not excluded the defense exhibits evidencing the text
exchange between Lizarraga and the confidential informant, this Court has determined that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding those exhibits. See Discussion of Assignment
of Error III, supra. Under the circumstances presented here, Lizarraga has not demonstrated that
this is the exceptional case where the jury clearly lost its way. Otten at 340.
{¶34} Lizarraga’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶35} Lizarraga’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Wayne County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 13
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT
STEVENSON, P. J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
KIMBERLY STOUT-SHERRER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ANGELA WYPASEK, Prosecuting Attorney, and JOSEPH SALZGEBER, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.