An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-410
Filed 17 September 2025
Rutherford County, Nos. 22CRS050742, 22CRS000746
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
WALTER ASHLEY LITTLEJOHN, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 3 February 2023 by Judge J.
Thomas Davis in Rutherford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
15 January 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Megan Shook, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender David S. Hallen, for defendant-appellant.
STADING, Judge.
Walter Ashley Littlejohn (“Defendant”) appeals from final judgment entered
upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of felonious restraint and attaining habitual
felon status; he also pleaded guilty to assault inflicting physical injury on a detention
facility employee. Defendant maintains the indictment was defective, necessitating
vacatur of his felonious restraint conviction, and contends the trial court erred in STATE V. LITTLEJOHN
Opinion of the Court
instructing the jury on felonious restraint. Defendant also asserts that even if the
trial court did not err in its instruction, his trial attorney rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel (“IAC”). Since Defendant’s appeal was untimely, he petitioned
our Court for certiorari. For the reasons below, we deny Defendant’s petition for writ
of certiorari (“PWC”).
I. Background
On 3 April 2022, Defendant was walking alone when a silver Jeep Renegade
pulled up alongside him. The Jeep was driven by Kenyon McEntire, with Jennifer
Gibson in the front passenger seat, and Stevon Wilkerson in the back seat. Defendant
and Ms. Gibson had ended their relationship a few weeks earlier. Defendant entered
the Jeep and sat in the back seat. Defendant told Ms. Gibson to sit in the back seat
with him. Ms. Gibson complied because Defendant was acting “irate,” and she was
“[t]rying to keep the situation calm.” The group rode to Ms. Gibson’s mother’s house.
Upon arrival, Mr. Wilkerson stepped out, and Defendant held Ms. Gibson and yelled
for Mr. McEntire to drive. Ms. Gibson stated she wanted to leave, but Defendant
prevented her from leaving the Jeep.
Mr. McEntire then drove away from the house with Defendant and Ms. Gibson
still in the back seat. During the drive, Defendant reportedly tried to open a “samurai
sword,” but was unable to do so in the confined space. When they reached a Super 8
Motel, Defendant got out, apologized for “what had happened in the past,” and
attempted to convince Ms. Gibson to accompany him inside the motel. Ms. Gibson
-2- STATE V. LITTLEJOHN
declined Defendant’s request. Mr. McEntire then drove everyone to his mother’s
house, where they were met by law enforcement. Defendant initially stood between
Ms. Gibson and a law enforcement officer, stating “she’s not talking to you.”
Defendant eventually moved aside when threatened with arrest for his obstruction of
an investigation. After speaking with Ms. Gibson, law enforcement officers arrested
Defendant.
On 19 September 2022, the Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted Defendant
for second-degree kidnapping and attaining the status of habitual felon. The matter
proceeded to trial on 2 February 2023. The jury found Defendant guilty of felonious
restraint, as a lesser included offense of kidnapping, and determined he had attained
habitual felon status. Before sentencing, Defendant pleaded guilty to assault
inflicting physical injury on a detention facility employee. On 3 February 2023, the
trial court imposed a sentence of 96 to 128 months in the Department of Adult
Correction for the felonious restraint conviction, and a concurrent term of 38 to 58
months for his guilty plea to assault inflicting physical injury on a detention facility
employee.
On 20 February 2023, Defendant sent a handwritten letter to the Rutherford
County Clerk of Superior Court requesting his trial transcript. The letter also stated
that Defendant was “filing on [his] own behalf a[n] . . . MAR[.]” On 2 March 2023,
the trial court entered appellate entries recognizing Defendant’s indigent status and
appointed the Appellate Defender’s Office to represent him. Defendant submitted an
-3- STATE V. LITTLEJOHN
additional letter on 26 March 2023, again requesting his trial transcripts. The letter
also stated he wanted “to be updated on what’s going on with [his] appeal.” On 13
June 2024, Defendant petitioned this Court for certiorari. The State subsequently
moved to dismiss Defendant’s appeal and responded to the PWC.
II. Jurisdiction
We must address whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain Defendant’s
appeal in light of his PWC and the State’s motion to dismiss. The State argues that
Defendant failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements necessary to confer
appellate review under North Carolina law, emphasizing that he never entered a
valid notice of appeal. In particular, the State notes that Defendant’s handwritten
letter to the Clerk of Superior Court failed to satisfy Rule 4 because it was untimely,
was never served on the State, and did not identify the court to which he was
appealing. See N.C. R. App. P. 4. After careful consideration, we deny Defendant’s
PWC and dismiss his appeal. See Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCA of the United
States, 384 N.C. 569, 573, 887 S.E.2d 848, 851 (2023).
It is well settled that “[c]ompliance with the requirements for entry of notice of
appeal is jurisdictional.” State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 266, 732 S.E.2d 571, 573 (2012).
“Rule 4 authorizes two modes of appeal for criminal cases.” Id. at 268, 732 S.E.2d at
574. A criminal defendant “may take appeal by . . . giving oral notice of appeal at
trial, or [by] filing notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court and serving copies
thereof upon all adverse parties within fourteen days after entry of judgment.” N.C.
-4- STATE V. LITTLEJOHN
R. App. P. 4(a)(1)–(2). “[T]he window for the filing of a written notice of appeal in a
criminal case opens on the date of rendition of the judgment or order and closes
fourteen days after entry of the judgment or order.” Oates, 366 N.C. at 264, 732 S.E.2d
at 572.
Still, this Court has the discretionary authority to issue a writ of certiorari
“when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action,”
such as where a criminal defendant’s notice of appeal fails to comply with Rule 4.
N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c) (2023) (“The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction . . . to issue the prerogative writs, including . . . certiorari[.]”).
“The writ of certiorari is one of the ‘prerogative’ writs that the Court of Appeals
may issue in aid of its own jurisdiction.” Cryan, 384 N.C. at 572, 887 S.E.2d at 851
(citation omitted). “Our precedent establishes a two-factor test to assess whether
certiorari review by an appellate court is appropriate. First, a writ of certiorari
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-410
Filed 17 September 2025
Rutherford County, Nos. 22CRS050742, 22CRS000746
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
WALTER ASHLEY LITTLEJOHN, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 3 February 2023 by Judge J.
Thomas Davis in Rutherford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
15 January 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Megan Shook, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender David S. Hallen, for defendant-appellant.
STADING, Judge.
Walter Ashley Littlejohn (“Defendant”) appeals from final judgment entered
upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of felonious restraint and attaining habitual
felon status; he also pleaded guilty to assault inflicting physical injury on a detention
facility employee. Defendant maintains the indictment was defective, necessitating
vacatur of his felonious restraint conviction, and contends the trial court erred in STATE V. LITTLEJOHN
Opinion of the Court
instructing the jury on felonious restraint. Defendant also asserts that even if the
trial court did not err in its instruction, his trial attorney rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel (“IAC”). Since Defendant’s appeal was untimely, he petitioned
our Court for certiorari. For the reasons below, we deny Defendant’s petition for writ
of certiorari (“PWC”).
I. Background
On 3 April 2022, Defendant was walking alone when a silver Jeep Renegade
pulled up alongside him. The Jeep was driven by Kenyon McEntire, with Jennifer
Gibson in the front passenger seat, and Stevon Wilkerson in the back seat. Defendant
and Ms. Gibson had ended their relationship a few weeks earlier. Defendant entered
the Jeep and sat in the back seat. Defendant told Ms. Gibson to sit in the back seat
with him. Ms. Gibson complied because Defendant was acting “irate,” and she was
“[t]rying to keep the situation calm.” The group rode to Ms. Gibson’s mother’s house.
Upon arrival, Mr. Wilkerson stepped out, and Defendant held Ms. Gibson and yelled
for Mr. McEntire to drive. Ms. Gibson stated she wanted to leave, but Defendant
prevented her from leaving the Jeep.
Mr. McEntire then drove away from the house with Defendant and Ms. Gibson
still in the back seat. During the drive, Defendant reportedly tried to open a “samurai
sword,” but was unable to do so in the confined space. When they reached a Super 8
Motel, Defendant got out, apologized for “what had happened in the past,” and
attempted to convince Ms. Gibson to accompany him inside the motel. Ms. Gibson
-2- STATE V. LITTLEJOHN
declined Defendant’s request. Mr. McEntire then drove everyone to his mother’s
house, where they were met by law enforcement. Defendant initially stood between
Ms. Gibson and a law enforcement officer, stating “she’s not talking to you.”
Defendant eventually moved aside when threatened with arrest for his obstruction of
an investigation. After speaking with Ms. Gibson, law enforcement officers arrested
Defendant.
On 19 September 2022, the Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted Defendant
for second-degree kidnapping and attaining the status of habitual felon. The matter
proceeded to trial on 2 February 2023. The jury found Defendant guilty of felonious
restraint, as a lesser included offense of kidnapping, and determined he had attained
habitual felon status. Before sentencing, Defendant pleaded guilty to assault
inflicting physical injury on a detention facility employee. On 3 February 2023, the
trial court imposed a sentence of 96 to 128 months in the Department of Adult
Correction for the felonious restraint conviction, and a concurrent term of 38 to 58
months for his guilty plea to assault inflicting physical injury on a detention facility
employee.
On 20 February 2023, Defendant sent a handwritten letter to the Rutherford
County Clerk of Superior Court requesting his trial transcript. The letter also stated
that Defendant was “filing on [his] own behalf a[n] . . . MAR[.]” On 2 March 2023,
the trial court entered appellate entries recognizing Defendant’s indigent status and
appointed the Appellate Defender’s Office to represent him. Defendant submitted an
-3- STATE V. LITTLEJOHN
additional letter on 26 March 2023, again requesting his trial transcripts. The letter
also stated he wanted “to be updated on what’s going on with [his] appeal.” On 13
June 2024, Defendant petitioned this Court for certiorari. The State subsequently
moved to dismiss Defendant’s appeal and responded to the PWC.
II. Jurisdiction
We must address whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain Defendant’s
appeal in light of his PWC and the State’s motion to dismiss. The State argues that
Defendant failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements necessary to confer
appellate review under North Carolina law, emphasizing that he never entered a
valid notice of appeal. In particular, the State notes that Defendant’s handwritten
letter to the Clerk of Superior Court failed to satisfy Rule 4 because it was untimely,
was never served on the State, and did not identify the court to which he was
appealing. See N.C. R. App. P. 4. After careful consideration, we deny Defendant’s
PWC and dismiss his appeal. See Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCA of the United
States, 384 N.C. 569, 573, 887 S.E.2d 848, 851 (2023).
It is well settled that “[c]ompliance with the requirements for entry of notice of
appeal is jurisdictional.” State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 266, 732 S.E.2d 571, 573 (2012).
“Rule 4 authorizes two modes of appeal for criminal cases.” Id. at 268, 732 S.E.2d at
574. A criminal defendant “may take appeal by . . . giving oral notice of appeal at
trial, or [by] filing notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court and serving copies
thereof upon all adverse parties within fourteen days after entry of judgment.” N.C.
-4- STATE V. LITTLEJOHN
R. App. P. 4(a)(1)–(2). “[T]he window for the filing of a written notice of appeal in a
criminal case opens on the date of rendition of the judgment or order and closes
fourteen days after entry of the judgment or order.” Oates, 366 N.C. at 264, 732 S.E.2d
at 572.
Still, this Court has the discretionary authority to issue a writ of certiorari
“when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action,”
such as where a criminal defendant’s notice of appeal fails to comply with Rule 4.
N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c) (2023) (“The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction . . . to issue the prerogative writs, including . . . certiorari[.]”).
“The writ of certiorari is one of the ‘prerogative’ writs that the Court of Appeals
may issue in aid of its own jurisdiction.” Cryan, 384 N.C. at 572, 887 S.E.2d at 851
(citation omitted). “Our precedent establishes a two-factor test to assess whether
certiorari review by an appellate court is appropriate. First, a writ of certiorari
should issue only if the petitioner can show ‘merit or that error was probably
committed below.’” Id. (citation omitted). And “[s]econd, a writ of certiorari should
issue only if there are ‘extraordinary circumstances’ to justify it.” Id. (citation
omitted). “There is no fixed list of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that warrant
certiorari review, but this factor generally requires a showing of substantial harm,
considerable waste of judicial resources, or ‘wide-reaching issues of justice and liberty
at stake.’” Id. at 573, 887 S.E.2d at 851. “Ultimately, the decision to issue a writ of
-5- STATE V. LITTLEJOHN
certiorari rests in the sound discretion of the presiding court.” Id. (citing Ricks, 378
N.C. at 740, 862 S.E.2d at 838).
Here, Defendant’s notice of appeal failed to comply with Rule 4 since it was
filed more than fourteen days after “entry of the judgment[.]” Oates, 366 N.C. at 264,
732 S.E.2d at 572. It also failed to specify the court to which the appeal was taken
and was never served on the opposing party. See N.C. R. App. P. 4(b), (c). In his
petition, Defendant argues that his intent to appeal is demonstrated by the letter he
submitted to the trial court, notwithstanding his Rule 4 violations. Cf. State v.
Springle, 244 N.C. App. 760, 763, 781 S.E.2d 760, 765 (2016) (citation omitted)
(ellipses in original) (“[A] defect in a notice of appeal should not result in loss of the
appeal as long as the intent to appeal . . . can be fairly inferred from the notice and
the appellee is not misled by the mistake.”); cf. State v. High, 230 N.C. App. 330, 333,
750 S.E.2d 9, 12 (2013) (granting certiorari where the defendant’s pro se notice of
appeal was timely, but lacked proper notice and court designation). Though, to
entertain Defendant’s appeal, he must satisfy the Cryan two-part test illustrated
above. 384 N.C. at 572, 887 S.E.2d at 851.
Our review of Defendant’s PWC leaves us little choice but to deny the petition.
Defendant neither cited the appropriate standard of review nor made arguments in
support thereof. See id. at 570, 887 S.E.2d at 849 (“When contemplating whether to
issue a writ of certiorari, our state’s appellate courts must consider a two-factor test.
That test examines (1) the likelihood that the case has merit or that error was
-6- STATE V. LITTLEJOHN
committed below and (2) whether there are extraordinary circumstances that justify
issuing the writ.”). In our discretion, we deny appellate review and dismiss
Defendant’s appeal.
III. Conclusion
For the preceding reasons, we deny Defendant’s PWC and dismiss his appeal
without prejudice as to Defendant’s statutory right to raise his IAC claim in a motion
for appropriate relief with the trial court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(b)(3) (2023);
see also State v. Hahn, ___ N.C. App. ___, 916 S.E.2d 76 (2025) (unpublished).
DISMISSED.
Judge ARROWOOD concurs.
Judge COLLINS concurs in result only.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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