[Cite as State v. Little, 2025-Ohio-5436.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2024-CA-58 Appellee : : Trial Court Case Nos. 21-CR-739; 22- v. : CR-057; 23-CR-019 : WILLIE JOE LITTLE : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & OPINION ...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on December 5, 2025, the judgments
of the trial court are vacated, and the appellant is ordered discharged.
Costs to be paid by appellee.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
RONALD C. LEWIS, JUDGE
TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION CLARK C.A. No. 2024-CA-58
CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY, Attorney for Appellant ROBERT C. LOGSDON, Attorney for Appellee
LEWIS, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Willie Joe Little appeals from his convictions in the Clark
County Court of Common Pleas following his no-contest pleas. For the following reasons,
we vacate Little’s convictions, and he is ordered discharged.
I. Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} This appeal involves three indictments, which resulted in three criminal cases
against Little. On November 15, 2021, in Clark C.P. No. 21-CR-739, Little was indicted by
a Clark County grand jury on two counts of having weapons while under a disability, third-
degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A). The indictment included a forfeiture
specification regarding two pistols. The indictment related to events that allegedly occurred
on November 3, 2021. Little was arrested on November 24, 2021, pleaded not guilty to the
two charged offenses, and was released on his own recognizance.
{¶ 3} On January 25, 2022, in Clark C.P. No. 22-CR-57, Little was indicted by a Clark
County grand jury on the following twelve felony counts: (1) aggravated trafficking in drugs
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); (2) aggravated possession of drugs in violation of
R.C. 2925.11(A); (3) trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); (4) possession
of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A); (5) trafficking in heroin in violation of
R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); (6) possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A); (7) trafficking
in a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); (8) possession of a
fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A); (9) trafficking in a fentanyl-related
2 compound in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); (10) possession of a fentanyl-related
compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A); (11) trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in
violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); and (12) possession of a fentanyl-related compound in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). Firearm specifications were added to counts one through
seven, and a forfeiture specification was added to counts one through eight. The indictment
related to events that allegedly occurred on September 23, November 1, and November 3,
2021. Little was arrested on January 27, 2022, and was released on his own recognizance.
He pleaded not guilty to the counts in the indictment.
{¶ 4} The trial court scheduled an April 19, 2022 jury trial in Case No. 21-CR-739 and
a May 3, 2022 jury trial in Case No. 22-CR-57.
{¶ 5} On March 14, 2022, Little filed a motion to suppress and a request for a hearing
in Case No. 22-CR-57. On April 14, 2022, Little filed a notice of substitution of counsel and
a motion for a continuance to reset the cases for a pretrial hearing in both Case Nos. 21-
CR-739 and 22-CR-57.
{¶ 6} On April 18, 2022, the trial court granted the motion for a continuance and
issued notices of hearing in which it scheduled a July 7, 2022 jury trial in Case No. 21-CR-
739 and a July 19, 2022 jury trial in Case No. 22-CR-57.
{¶ 7} The State filed an April 18, 2022 motion to consolidate the two cases.
According to the State’s motion, the indictment in Case No. 21-CR-739 stemmed from
evidence seized during a residential search warrant at Little’s residence. The State
explained, “During the search, there were multiple other substances found within the
residence that were believed to be illicit, but at the time of the indictment, had not yet been
confirmed by BCI.” After receiving the BCI reports, Little was indicted in Case No. 22-CR-
57 for the possession and trafficking of those illicit substances. Therefore, the State asked
3 the trial court to consolidate the two cases and allow them to proceed under one case
number. On June 21, 2022, the trial court granted the State’s motion to consolidate.
{¶ 8} On June 29, 2022, the State filed a motion to continue the suppression hearing
due to the fact the State’s lead witness was scheduled to testify in another matter at the time
the suppression hearing was originally scheduled. On July 6, 2022, the trial court granted
the State’s motion to continue and scheduled the suppression hearing for August 29, 2022.
{¶ 9} Little subsequently filed a motion to continue the suppression hearing. On
September 7, 2022, the trial court granted the motion and scheduled the suppression
hearing for October 14, 2022. Following the suppression hearing, the trial court overruled
Little’s motion to suppress.
{¶ 10} On October 20, 2022, the trial court issued a notice of a December 13, 2022
jury trial.
{¶ 11} The trial in Case Nos. 21-CR-739 and 22-CR-57 commenced on December
13, 2022. The next day, the State presented continuing testimony of the lead detective,
during which he testified that he had downloaded information from Little’s phone. He further
testified that there were text messages on the phone that indicated Little was involved in
trafficking in drugs. Following a recess, Little’s counsel moved to dismiss the case, or in
the alternative for a mistrial, on the ground that he had not been provided copies of those
text messages in discovery. The State’s counsel responded by stating that all the discovery
was made available to Little’s counsel but could not say with certainty whether the text
messages in question had actually been provided to the defense. The trial court granted
the motion for a mistrial and journalized its decision on December 29, 2022. In the entry
granting the motion for mistrial, the court stated that the case would be reassigned for trial
4 and the “time toward speedy trial is tolled due to the continuance of the trial being the result
of the defendant’s motion.”
{¶ 12} On January 10, 2023, Little was indicted by a Clark County grand jury in Clark
C.P. No. 23-CR-19 on the following counts: (1) trafficking in cocaine, a fifth-degree felony
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1); (2) possession of cocaine, a fifth-degree felony in violation
of R.C. 2925.11(A); (3) trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, a fifth-degree felony in
violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1); and (4) possession of a fentanyl-related compound, a fifth-
degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). The counts related to events that allegedly
occurred on November 1, 2021.1 Little was arrested on January 13, 2023, pleaded not
guilty, and was released on his own recognizance.
{¶ 13} On January 18, 2023, the State filed a motion to consolidate all three cases.
According to the State, on the first day of the December 2022 trial, prior to the jury being
empaneled, Little filed a successful motion to dismiss two counts in the indictment in Case
No. 22-CR-57 related to a second controlled buy for which the State did not yet have drug
results. The State later received drug results from BCI, which it used to present the case
to the grand jury, resulting in the indictment in Case No. 23-CR-19. According to the State,
the indictment in Case No. 23-CR-19 was part of the previously indicted cases and stemmed
from the same investigation. Therefore, the State asked the trial court to consolidate the
cases and allow them to proceed under one case number. The trial court granted the
motion to consolidate on February 14, 2023, and set a jury trial for April 18, 2023.
{¶ 14} On April 10, 2023, Little filed a request for discovery, a motion to dismiss the
indictment, and a motion to continue the trial “to allow for a motion hearing and to track with
1 The indictment listed the relevant date as November 1, 2022. The State later moved to amend the indictment to reflect the correct date of November 1, 2021. The trial court granted the State’s motion to amend.
5 the Pre-Trial schedule of the additional two indictments of Defendant.” The record does not
contain any information as to what Little meant by “the additional two indictments of
Defendant” and there is no order in the record granting or overruling the motion to continue.
{¶ 15} On April 24, 2023, the trial court issued a notice of hearing in which it set the
matter for a scheduling conference on May 12, 2023. Following the scheduling conference,
the trial court issued a June 7, 2023 entry stating that Little was informed at the scheduling
conference of the new July 13, 2023 trial date.
{¶ 16} On June 23, 2023, a handwritten letter purportedly authored by Little was filed
in Case No. 21-CR-739 and listed the following case numbers at the top of the letter: 21-
CR-739, 22-CR-57, 23-CR-19, 23-CR-88, and 23-CR-173. The letter stated that Little’s
constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated because he had been in jail since
February 2, 2023. At the time the letter was filed, Little was represented by counsel.
{¶ 17} The jury trial did not go forward on July 13, 2023. There is nothing in the
record explaining why the jury trial did not go forward on that date.
{¶ 18} On October 13, 2023, Little filed a motion in limine “requesting that all written,
video and audio evidence produced by a now deceased confidential informant and/or
containing statements by any party not subject to cross examination be excluded from entry
into evidence at trial of this matter and that the State be barred from referring to same during
voir dire, opening or closing statements or in the body of the case.” The record does not
contain a ruling by the trial court on this motion.
{¶ 19} On March 7, 2024, the trial court issued a notice of hearing in which it set a
pretrial hearing for May 2, 2024, and a jury trial for May 21, 2024.
{¶ 20} On May 8, 2024, the trial court denied Little’s April 10, 2023 motion to dismiss
the indictment in Case No. 23-CR-19. According to the court, “[b]ecause the dismissal was
6 made prior to the jury being sworn, and was granted for a lack of lab reports being provided,
the Court finds the dismissal was without prejudice and the State was able to reindict the
defendant.” The record contains no explanation for the lengthy delay in ruling on Little’s
April 10, 2023 motion to dismiss.
{¶ 21} Little failed to appear for his May 21, 2024 trial. On that day, the trial court
ordered that a capias be issued for Little’s arrest.
{¶ 22} On May 28, 2024, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting a review of
the case for June 13, 2024. Following the review hearing with the parties, the trial court set
a trial for August 12, 2024.
{¶ 23} On August 12, 2024, the parties appeared for trial. Prior to the seating of the
jury, Little raised an oral motion to dismiss the cases due to a violation of his right to a speedy
trial. According to Little’s trial counsel, the matter was not timely brought to trial and the
amount of time that had passed after the December 2022 mistrial “exceeds the definition of
reasonable.” Plea Hearing Tr. 6. The trial court denied the motion. The State and Little
then entered into a plea agreement. In return for the State recommending the dismissal of
the remaining charges, Little agreed to plead no contest to one count of having weapons
under disability in Case No. 21-CR-739, two counts of trafficking in a fentanyl-related
compound in Case No. 22-CR-57, and one count of trafficking in a fentanyl-related
compound in Case No. 23-CR-19.
{¶ 24} Following a plea hearing, the trial court found Little guilty of the four charges
and sentenced him as follows: (1) 30 months in prison for having weapons under disability
in Case No. 21-CR-739; (2) 24 months in prison for Count 7 and 12 months in prison for
Count 9 in Case No. 22-CR-57; and (3) 12 months in prison for Count 3 in Case No. 23-CR-
19. The trial court ordered the two sentences in Case No. 22-CR-57 to run concurrently
7 with each other and concurrently with the sentence in Case No. 23-CR-19. The court
ordered the sentence in Case No. 21-CR-739 to be served consecutively to the sentences
ordered in Case Nos. 22-CR-57 and 23-CR-19, resulting in an aggregate prison sentence
of 54 months. Little was given one day of jail-time credit in Case No. 21-CR-739 and 0 days
in the other two cases. Little filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgments.
II. The Trial Court Reasonably Informed Little that He Was Waiving His Right
to a Jury Trial
{¶ 25} Little’s first assignment of error states:
LITTLE’S NO CONTEST PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY,
AND INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN.
{¶ 26} Little argues that the trial court failed to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)
when it did not inform him of his constitutional right to a jury trial. Appellant’s Brief, p. 3.
Although he concedes that his plea was entered the day a jury trial was set to begin, Little
contends the trial court’s advisement that he had a right to “a trial” did not satisfy the
requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).
{¶ 27} The State responds that “the record from the day of the plea is replete with
mentions of a jury trial.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 5. According to the State, “the plea form
stated plainly that waiving a jury trial was inherent in the plea. Further, the fact that this was
the morning of trial and the jury was waiting to be brought in supports that . . . [Little] was
aware that he had the right to a jury trial and was waiving that right by entering a plea.” Id.
{¶ 28} “Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires that the defendant be advised of the right to a
jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, and the right to require
the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 19.
8 “A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11 as it pertains to the waiver of these
constitutional rights.” State v. Howard, 2016-Ohio-426, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Barker,
2011-Ohio-4130, ¶ 15, citing Veney at ¶ 18. “A guilty plea is constitutionally infirm when
the defendant is not informed in a reasonable manner that his plea waives those rights.”
State v. Eggers, 2013-Ohio-3174, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473
(1981).
{¶ 29} “Failure to use the exact language contained in Crim.R. 11(C), in informing a
criminal defendant of his constitutional right to a trial and the constitutional rights related to
such trial, including the right to trial by jury, is not grounds for vacating a plea as long as the
record shows that the trial court explained these rights in a manner reasonably intelligible to
that defendant.” Ballard at paragraph two of the syllabus. Therefore, the Ohio Supreme
Court has “recognized that a trial court can still convey the requisite information on
constitutional rights to the defendant even when the court does not provide a word-for-word
recitation of the criminal rule, so long as the trial court actually explains the rights to the
defendant.” Veney at ¶ 27, citing Ballard at paragraph two of the syllabus. Moreover, “an
alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy may be clarified by reference to
other portions of the record, including the written plea, in determining whether the defendant
was fully informed of the right in question.” Barker at ¶ 25.
{¶ 30} In Ballard, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a defendant’s guilty plea even
though the court failed to specifically mention the right to a jury trial by name but rather
informed the defendant that “neither judge nor jury could draw any inference if the
[defendant] refused to testify” and then stated that defendant “was entitled to a fair and
impartial trial under law.” Ballard at 481. The Supreme Court concluded that, taken
9 together, these advisements were sufficient to inform the appellant of his right to a jury trial.
Id.
{¶ 31} Similarly, in State v. Courtney, 2014-Ohio-1659 (2d Dist.), we held that a trial
court sufficiently explained the defendant’s right to a jury trial during its plea colloquy when
it stated that the defendant had “the right to a trial” and explained, “‘At that trial you would
have the right to require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every
element of the offense to which you are pleading guilty, and you could only be convicted
upon the unanimous verdict of a jury.’” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 9. In so holding,
we explained that “an average person of [defendant]’s age and intelligence would know that
a trial requiring a ‘unanimous verdict of a jury’ to convict necessitates a jury trial . . . .” Id.
{¶ 32} At the beginning of Little’s plea hearing, the trial court explained that “[w]e are
here for a criminal jury trial today. . . . It’s my understanding at this time that there may be
a potential resolution to this matter.” Plea Hearing Tr. 9. Moreover, the following
exchange occurred during the plea colloquy:
THE COURT: Next, I want to go over your constitutional rights, sir. Mr. Little,
you have a right to have a trial in these matters. Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: At that trial you have a right to confront and cross-examine all
of the witnesses that are called to testify against you. Do you understand
that?
THE COURT: You have a right to use the Court’s subpoena power to
subpoena your own witnesses to testify in your behalf. Do you understand
10 DEFENDANT: Yes.
...
THE COURT: Mr. Little, at this time I’m going to ask you - - actually, at this
time you’re not admitting to the facts, so I am going to move on to the plea
form. Mr. Little, did you have an opportunity to review the plea form with your
attorney?
THE COURT: Do you believe you understood everything in this plea form?
Id. at 24-27.
{¶ 33} At the time of the plea hearing, Little was 51 years old. He had completed the
tenth grade in high school. A jury trial had been set to commence immediately before the
plea hearing began. At the beginning of the plea hearing, the trial court explained the fact
that the parties were there for a jury trial but there may be a resolution of the matter. The
court then proceeded with a plea colloquy in which it informed Little that he had a
constitutional right to a trial that he was giving up by pleading no contest. Little stated that
he understood this. The court also asked whether Little had read the plea form, understood
it, and signed it. Little responded yes to those questions. The plea form stated that Little
was giving up his right to a jury trial.
{¶ 34} Based on the record before us, we conclude that Little was informed in a
reasonable manner that pleading no contest would waive his right to a jury trial. See State
v. Smiddy, 2015-Ohio-4200, ¶ 6, 15 (2d Dist.) (holding that the reference to a “unanimous
verdict of a jury” during the plea colloquy prevented any ambiguity relating to defendant
giving up his right to a jury trial and that even if there was any ambiguity, it would have been
11 resolved by the written plea agreement that defendant signed). Therefore, his pleas were
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Little’s Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial Was Violated
{¶ 35} Little’s second and third assignments of error are interrelated and state:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT GRANTING
LITTLE’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WAS A TOLLING EVENT FOR
SPEEDY TRIAL PURPOSES.
LITTLE’S CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES MUST BE VACATED
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED HIS STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
{¶ 36} Little contends that the length of delay in each of his three cases was
“exceptionally high given the relative simplicity of the cases.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 10.
According to Little, he “was clearly prejudiced by the delay. He was subject to the anxiety
and concern that naturally arise from being aware of pending criminal charges against him
for over three years in case number 0739, almost three years in case number 0057, and
almost two years in case number 0019.” Id. at 14. Accordingly, “Little asks this court to
vacate his convictions and sentences and discharge him from these cases.” Id.
{¶ 37} The State responds that the 270 days provided in R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) did not
expire in any of the three cases. The State further argues that a reasonable amount of time
passed between the December 2022 mistrial and August 12, 2024, the day on which Little
pleaded no contest. Therefore, the State contends that Little’s constitutional and statutory
rights to a speedy trial were not violated in any of his three criminal cases.
{¶ 38} “Review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact.
Therefore, we defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by competent,
12 credible evidence, but we review the application of the law to those facts de novo.” State
v. Long, 2020-Ohio-5363, ¶ 15, citing State v. Barnes, 2008-Ohio-5472, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.).
“De novo review requires an ‘independent review of the trial court's decision without any
deference to the trial court's determination.’” State v. Clay, 2016-Ohio-424, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.),
quoting Jackson v. Internatl. Fiber, 2006-Ohio-5799, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 39} “The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made obligatory on the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees an
accused this same right.” State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 425 (1999), citing State v.
MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1976). “This constitutional mandate was codified in Ohio
by the enactment of R.C. 2945.71, which designates specific time limits for bringing a
defendant to trial.” State v. Louis, 2020-Ohio-951, ¶ 28 (2d Dist.). “Thus, for purposes of
bringing an accused to trial, the statutory speedy trial provisions of R.C. 2945.71 et seq. and
the constitutional guarantees found in the United States and Ohio Constitutions are
coextensive.” State v. O’Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 9 (1987).
{¶ 40} “[A]lthough the statutory and constitutional speedy trial provisions are
coextensive, the constitutional guarantees may be found to be broader than speedy trial
statutes in some circumstances.” Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that
“‘there may be situations wherein the statutes do not adequately afford the protection
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, in which case it is our duty to see that an
accused receives the protection of the higher authority . . . .’” Id., quoting State v. Ladd,
56 Ohio St.2d 197, 201 (1978). “‘[B]ecause constitutional speedy trial guarantees may be
found to be broader than speedy trial statutes,’ a constitutional right to a speedy trial must
13 be analyzed separately from a statutory speedy trial right.” State v. Frazier, 2023-Ohio-
4222, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Williams, 1994 WL 135309, *2 (9th Dist. Apr. 20, 1994).
a. Little’s Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial
{¶ 41} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), a felony defendant must be brought to trial
within 270 days after the defendant's arrest. “For purposes of calculating speedy-trial time,
‘each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall
be counted as three days.’ R.C. 2945.71(E). Thus, subject to certain tolling events, a
jailed defendant must be tried within 90 days.” State v. Ramey, 2012-Ohio-2904, ¶ 15.
The day of arrest is not counted when calculating a defendant’s speedy trial time. State v.
Cimpaye, 2020-Ohio-2740, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Cline, 2003-Ohio-4712, ¶ 27
(2d Dist.), rev’d on other grounds, 2004-Ohio-5701.
{¶ 42} “[T]he prescribed times for trial set forth in R.C. 2945.71 are not absolute in all
circumstances, but a certain measure of flexibility was intended by the General Assembly
by the enactment of R.C. 2945.72, wherein discretionary authority is granted to extend the
trial date beyond the R.C. 2945.71 time prescriptions.” State v. Wentworth, 54 Ohio St.2d
171, 173 (1978), citing State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d 208 (1976), and State v. Davis, 46 Ohio
St.2d 444 (1976). “Accordingly, R.C. 2945.72 contains an exhaustive list of events and
circumstances that extend the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial.”
Ramey at ¶ 24. These include the following relevant circumstances: (1) any period of delay
occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the accused; (2) the period of any continuance
granted on the accused’s own motion; and (3) the period of any reasonable continuance
granted other than upon the accused’s own motion. R.C. 2945.72(D), (H).
{¶ 43} “Upon review of a speedy-trial issue, a court is required to count the days of
delay chargeable to either side and determine whether the case was tried within applicable
14 time limits.” State v. Sanchez, 2006-Ohio-4478, ¶ 8. “A defendant establishes a prima
facie speedy trial violation when his motion reveals that a trial did not occur within the time
period prescribed by R.C. 2945.71.” State v. Hill, 2020-Ohio-2958, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), citing
State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio St.3d 28, 31 (1986). “If a defendant ‘establishes a prima facie
case of a violation of his right to a speedy trial, the burden then shifts to the State’ to
demonstrate either that the statutory limit was not exceeded, or that the State’s time to bring
the defendant to trial was properly extended.” State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 12
(2d Dist.), quoting State v. Nichols, 2005-Ohio-1771, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.), citing Butcher at 30-
31.
i. Case Nos. 21-CR-739 and 22-CR-57
{¶ 44} According to Little, his statutory speedy trial time in Case Nos. 21-CR-739 and
22-CR-57 was not extended by the December 2022 mistrial because a mistrial is not a tolling
event. We agree that a mistrial is not a tolling event pursuant to R.C. 2945.71 because
following a mistrial, R.C. 2945.71 does not apply, and the standard to be applied for speedy
trial purposes is “reasonableness under federal and state constitutions.” State v. Fanning,
1 Ohio St.3d 19, 21 (1982). Therefore, to determine whether Little’s statutory right to a
speedy trial was violated in Case Nos. 21-CR-739 and 22-CR-57, we must simply analyze
whether the 270 days expired before the December 2022 trial commenced. If they did
expire, then his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. If they did not expire, then his
statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated and we will conduct a separate analysis
below relating to whether the delays occurring after the mistrial were reasonable under
federal and state constitutions. Fanning at 21.
{¶ 45} In Case No. 21-CR-739, Little was arrested on November 24, 2021, and he
was not brought to trial until December 13, 2022. The period between these two dates is
15 384 days. Little was released on his own recognizance during this period and was not in
custody. The record establishes that the speedy-trial time was tolled for 213 days from
March 14, 2022, to October 14, 2022, due to (1) Little’s filing of a motion for continuance, a
motion to suppress, and a motion to continue the suppression hearing; and (2) the State’s
filing of a motion to continue the suppression hearing for a reasonable time due to the
absence of a key witness. After subtracting these 213 days of tolled time from the 384 days
that expired, we conclude that the December 13, 2022 trial began well within the 270 days
provided by statute. Moreover, given that Little was arrested in Case No. 22-CR-57 well
after he was arrested in Case No. 21-CR-739, and the same tolling period occurred in both
cases, Little’s statutory right to a speedy trial was also not violated in Case No. 22-CR-57.
{¶ 46} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err
in finding that Little’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated in Case Nos. 21-CR-
739 and 22-CR-57.
ii. Case No. 23-CR-19
{¶ 47} Our analysis of the statutory speedy trial issue in Case No. 23-CR-19 is slightly
more complex than our analysis in Case Nos. 21-CR-739 and 22-CR-57. There was no
mistrial that occurred during the pendency of Case No. 23-CR-19. Indeed, Little was
arrested in Case No. 23-CR-19 approximately one month after the December 2022 mistrial.
However, the State argued—and the trial court found—that the counts alleged in the January
2023 indictment were essentially a reindictment of counts that were dismissed without
prejudice from the indictment in Case No. 22-CR-57. Indeed, the State later explained to
the trial court that the four counts in the indictment in Case No. 23-CR-19 were “a re-
indictment of Counts Eleven and Twelve from 22-CR-0057 that were dismissed during
Defendant’s first trial as we did not have drug results.” Plea Hearing Tr. 4. Therefore, the
16 speedy trial time that had accrued in Case No. 22-CR-57 at the time of the mistrial must be
tacked on to the time that accrued in Case No. 23-CR-19 after Little was indicted in that
case. State v. Broughton, 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 261 (1991) (“[A]ny time period that has
elapsed under the original indictment should be tacked on to the time period commencing
with the second indictment.”).
{¶ 48} Based on our review of the record, the following days accrued toward Little’s
statutory speedy trial time in Case No. 22-CR-57: (1) 45 days from January 28, 2022, to
March 13, 2022; and (2) 59 days from October 15, 2022, to December 12, 2022. Adding
those two periods together results in a total of 104 days that had expired, leaving 166 days
to bring Little to trial in Case No. 23-CR-19. Another 5 days expired from January 13, 2023,
to January 17, 2023, and another 54 days from February 15, 2023, to April 9, 2023.
Therefore, as of April 10, 2023, when Little filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in Case
No. 23-CR-19, 163 speedy trial days had expired, leaving 107 days to bring Little to trial.
{¶ 49} As we noted above, Little filed an April 10, 2023 motion to dismiss the
indictment and later filed an October 13, 2023 motion in limine. The trial court never ruled
on the motion in limine and did not rule on the motion to dismiss the indictment until May 8,
2024. The State contends that “120 days has been seen by many districts as a reasonable
time to rule upon a motion . . . .” Appellee’s Brief, p. 8, citing State v. Howard, 2010-Ohio-
501, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Staffin, 2008-Ohio-338 (4th Dist.), and State v. Fields,
2006-Ohio-223 (5th Dist.). From April 10, 2023, to May 8, 2024, 395 days expired. The
motions pending before the trial court were not complicated and there is no evidence in the
record that the trial court was waiting on the parties to file additional motions, evidence, or
arguments during this delay. And the record is devoid of an explanation for the lengthy time
it took for the trial court to issue a decision on the April 10, 2023 motion to dismiss. The
17 trial court ultimately issued a one-page decision denying the motion to dismiss. Even if we
were generous and allowed two separate 120-day tolling periods for the trial court to rule
upon the motion to dismiss and the motion in limine, that would still result in 155 speedy trial
days expiring during this 395-day delay. As a reminder, as of April 10, 2023, only 107 days
remained of the original 270 days. The record contains no other potential tolling events
during the period from April 10, 2023, to May 8, 2024. Therefore, the 270 days in which the
State was required to bring Little to trial had expired well before the scheduled May 21, 2024
trial.
{¶ 50} The record establishes that Little failed to appear for the scheduled May 21,
2024 trial. As a result, the trial court issued a capias for Little’s arrest and rescheduled the
May 2024 trial. The question arises whether Little’s failure to appear for his scheduled trial
excused the State’s failure to bring him to trial within the 270 days provided in R.C. 2945.71.
{¶ 51} In State v. Bauer, 61 Ohio St.2d 83 (1980), the Court addressed what effect a
defendant’s failure to appear for trial had on his statutory right to a speedy trial. There, the
defendant failed to appear for a May 1977 trial. He was subsequently apprehended a
month later and was placed in custody. The trial was rescheduled for September 1977.
Four days before the rescheduled trial, defendant’s counsel filed a motion to discharge
defendant under the provisions of R.C. 2945.73. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendant argued on appeal that the time running under the statute should have been tolled
only between his initial trial date and his recapture. Therefore, defendant believed his
statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated.
{¶ 52} The Court did not agree with defendant’s proposed approach. The Court
explained, “We find this solution unworkable and inconsistent with the efficient
administration of justice. There is no justification for a rule which could require a court to
18 reschedule, within a few days after his rearrest, the trial of a defendant who has forfeited his
appearance bond.” Bauer at 85. The Court noted that a defendant “will not be permitted
to enjoy the protection of these statutes, as to a time period prior to his failure to appear,
when by his actions he has waived their benefits.” Id. at 84. The Supreme Court
concluded, “a defendant who fails to appear at a scheduled trial, and whose trial must
therefore be rescheduled for a later date, waives his right to assert the provisions of
R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 for that period of time which elapses from his initial arrest to
the date he is subsequently rearrested.” (Emphasis added.) Id. In other words, the
statutory speedy trial clock is reset to one on the day a defendant is rearrested after failing
to appear for a trial date.
{¶ 53} At first blush, the Bauer decision seems to cure the State’s failure to bring him
to trial within the requisite 270-day period in Case No. 23-CR-19. If his statutory speedy-
trial clock began anew when he was rearrested, it is undisputed that his statutory right to a
speedy trial was not violated when he showed up for trial in August 2024, less than 90 days
after his rearrest. However, we do not believe the holding in Bauer applies to Little’s
situation.
{¶ 54} In Bauer, the Court stressed, “It is clear that [defendant] was afforded his
statutory right to a speedy trial initially, but through his own design he chose to shun this
right and impede the prompt administration of this cause.” Bauer at 84. Unlike the
defendant in Bauer, Little’s statutory speedy trial time had already expired as of the May 21,
2024 trial. Therefore, he was not “afforded his statutory right to a speedy trial initially.”
Unlike the situation in Bauer, there is no need in the instant appeal to preclude a defendant
from attempting to game the system by not showing up for trial and then using the
subsequent delay resulting from his own actions to claim that he was not brought to trial
19 within the requisite 270 days. The First District succinctly stated this limitation on the
holding in Bauer:
It is thus clear that the waiver rule announced in Bauer must be limited
to those cases in which a trial date has initially been set within the statutory
limits, and the defendant thereafter causes a delay frustrating the
commencement of trial on that date. Viewed in this light, the rule has
significance in the instant cause only if the trial date set for the appellant at the
time he violated his bond fell within two hundred seventy statutory days of his
arrest.
State v. Barrow, 1981 WL 9821, *2 (1st Dist. June 3, 1981).
{¶ 55} Little was not brought to trial in Case No. 23-CR-19 within the requisite 270
days. Therefore, Little’s statutory right to a speedy trial was violated, and the trial court
erred in overruling Little’s motion to dismiss in Case No. 23-CR-19.
b. Little’s Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial
{¶ 56} We must now determine whether Little’s constitutional right to a speedy trial
was violated. Given the closeness in time between the December 2022 mistrial (Case Nos.
21-CR-739 and 22-CR-57) and the January 10, 2023 indictment (Case Number 23-CR-19),
and the fact that the three cases were consolidated on February 14, 2023, we analyze all
three cases together.
{¶ 57} “To determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has
been violated, a court should apply the four-factor balancing test adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101
(1972).” State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). “The factors include: (1) the
length of the delay ‘between accusation and trial’; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the
20 defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the
defendant.” Id., citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992), and State v.
Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 88.
{¶ 58} “None of the factors is controlling because a ‘balancing test necessarily
compels’ a court to evaluate an alleged speedy trial violation ‘on an ad hoc basis,’ meaning
that the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Barker
at 530. However, “the length of the delay is a particularly important factor as it ‘is to some
extent a triggering mechanism.’” State v. Lee, 2024-Ohio-1802, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting
Barker at 530. This is because “‘[u]ntil there is some delay which is presumptively
prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.’”
Id., quoting Barker at 530. “The length of delay becomes presumptively prejudicial as it
approaches one year in length.” Id., citing Doggett at 652, fn. 1.
{¶ 59} When reviewing the second Barker factor, the reason for the delay in bringing
the defendant to trial, “[o]nly the portion of the delay which is attributed to the government's
neglect is to be weighed in a defendant's favor.” State v. Triplett, 78 Ohio St.3d 566, 569
(1997), citing Doggett at 658. “Deliberate dilatory acts are weighted heavily against the
state, while negligent acts are weighted less heavily against the state.” State v. Duncan,
2021-Ohio-3229, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.), citing Barker at 531. “[I]ntertwined within this Barker
analysis is whether the defendant shares any responsibility for the delay.” State v. Rentas,
2022-Ohio-2412, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.), citing Triplett at 570.
{¶ 60} With regard to the third Barker factor—whether the defendant asserted his
right to a speedy trial—we note that “‘[i]t is well established under our law that the right to a
speedy trial conferred by the Constitution is not self-executing.’” State v. Perkins, 2009-
Ohio-3033, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting Partsch v. Haskins, 175 Ohio St. 139, 140 (1963).
21 “‘Affirmative action on the part of an accused in the nature of a demand to be tried is
necessary to invoke the protection of the Constitution. . . . In other words, there can be
no denial where there has been no demand.’” Id., quoting Partsch at 140.
{¶ 61} Finally, the fourth Barker factor—whether the defendant was prejudiced by the
delay—“should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial
right was designed to protect.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. These interests are: “(i) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
(iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Id. The third interest is “the
most serious . . . because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews
the fairness of the entire system.” Id.
{¶ 62} Based on our review of the record, the first Barker factor weighs in favor of a
finding that Little’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated in all three of his criminal
cases at issue in this appeal. There was a delay of over 20 months between the December
2022 mistrial and his August 2024 no contest pleas, which raises a presumption of prejudice.
Further, a closer look at this 20-month period reveals that there was an over one-year delay
while motions were pending before the trial court.
{¶ 63} On April 10, 2023, Little filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, motion for
discovery, and motion to continue the April 18, 2023 scheduled trial. On April 24, 2023, the
trial court issued a notice for a May 12, 2023 hearing and scheduling conference.
According to a June 7, 2023 entry issued by the trial court, the May 12, 2023 conference
was held, and a jury trial was scheduled for July 13, 2023.
{¶ 64} On June 23, 2023, a handwritten letter purportedly authored by Little was filed
in Case No. 21-CR-739. Little was represented by counsel at this time. In the letter, Little
stated that he believed his right to a speedy trial was being violated and that he had been in
22 jail for several months. The State did not file a motion to strike the letter from the record,
and the trial court never addressed the June 23, 2023 letter.
{¶ 65} No jury trial occurred on July 13, 2023. There is nothing in the record
explaining why the jury trial did not proceed at that time.
{¶ 66} Little’s counsel filed a motion in limine on October 13, 2023. The trial court
did not issue any ruling on the motion in limine.
{¶ 67} The three cases essentially laid dormant until the trial court issued a March 7,
2024 notice in which it identified May 21, 2024 as the date for the jury trial. On May 8, 2024,
the trial court finally issued an order denying Little’s April 10, 2023 motion to dismiss the
indictment. The trial court did not provide any explanation for the over one-year delay in
ruling on Little’s motion to dismiss.
{¶ 68} In summary, over one year passed from the time Little filed his motion to
dismiss the indictment and the date on which the trial court finally overruled the motion.
The record contains no explanation for this delay. There also is no explanation in the record
as to why the July 13, 2023 trial did not go forward as scheduled. Further, seven months
passed between the date on which Little filed a motion in limine and the May 21, 2024 trial
date and the trial court ultimately made no ruling on the motion in limine. Under these facts,
we conclude the first Barker factor weighs in favor of Little.
{¶ 69} Regarding the second Barker factor, there is no explanation in the record for
why there was an over one-year delay between the filing of Little’s April 2023 motions and
the May 2024 order overruling one of the motions. On August 12, 2024, shortly before trial
was set to begin, the trial court explained why it had decided to overrule Little’s motion to
dismiss on speedy-trial grounds:
23 The Court, in reviewing that matter, again an oral motion here today,
the Court, while acknowledging that it has taken some time to get this matter
to a trial date, the Court would place on record that a number of those dates
had to be continued for motions to continue, other motions that were filed in
this matter.
I would also note that this matter was set back, I believe in May of this
year at which time Mr. Little failed to appear and capiases had to be issued for
Mr. Little’s arrest. Then getting it back on the Court’s docket with scheduling
with the attorneys, this was the next reasonable and quickest time to get it
back on the Court’s docket. Again, the Court set it on a Monday so that we
would have no other conflicts with Mr. Little being out of custody on these three
matters. So, therefore, the Court is going to overrule the motion to dismiss
on a speedy trial grounds.
Plea Hearing Tr. 7.
{¶ 70} “‘On appeal, the prosecution has the burden of explaining the cause for pre-
trial delay.’” State v. Jackson, 2016-Ohio-5196, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), quoting Redd v. Sowders,
809 F.2d 1266, 1269 (6th Cir. 1987). In its appellate brief, the State attempts to explain
some of the one-year delay that occurred between April 2023 and May 2024. According to
the State, Little’s April 10, 2023 motion to continue “requested that the cases before the
court in this appeal be delayed to stay on the same pretrial schedule as the two cases that
were later dismissed after a suppression.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 7. The State contends the
one-year delay in the three cases before us on appeal was caused by motions that Little
filed in Clark C.P. No. 23-CR-173. The record before us does not contain any information
relating to Case No. 23-CR-173. The State attached to its appellate brief a copy of the
24 online docket for Case No. 23-CR-173 and asks us “to take judicial notice of this docket to
demonstrate the reason for delay” in the three cases at issue in this appeal. Appellee’s
Brief, p. 7-8. We are disinclined to take judicial notice of an online docket from another
case when there is nothing in our record that establishes what connection the other case
has to the three cases at issue in this appeal, especially when the State and the trial court
had ample opportunity to include such information in the record while Little’s three cases
were pending at the trial court level.
{¶ 71} Even if we took judicial notice of the online docket for Case No. 23-CR-173,
however, it would not change our analysis in this matter. There is nothing in the record
before us that establishes that the trial court delayed matters in Case Numbers 21-CR-739,
22-CR-57, and 23-CR-19 due to events that were taking place in Case No. 23-CR-173. For
example, there is no order in the record before us staying the three case numbers at issue
in this appeal until the resolution of Case No. 23-CR-173 or stating that all four of the cases
would proceed on a parallel track. And the trial court did not issue an order ruling on or
addressing Little’s April 10, 2023 motion for a continuance. Rather, it scheduled a July 13,
2023 jury trial after having a May 12, 2023 scheduling conference with the parties. The
record does not contain a transcript from the scheduling conference. Further, there is no
order in the record before us consolidating Case No. 23-CR-173 with any of the three cases
at issue in this appeal.
{¶ 72} If the State believed the over one-year delay in the three cases at issue in this
appeal was caused by events that occurred in Case No. 23-CR-173 that were attributable
to Little, it should have made this argument at the trial court level and made a record to
support this argument. Similarly, if the trial court was relying on events in Case No. 23-CR-
173 to overrule Little’s motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds, the trial court should have
25 stated as much. Instead, the trial court focused on the fact that Little failed to appear for
the May 21, 2024 trial. Based on the record before us, we conclude the second Barker
factor supports a finding that Little’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.
{¶ 73} The third Barker factor also weighs in favor of Little. On August 12, 2024, the
parties appeared in court for the jury trial. Immediately before the trial court began seating
prospective jurors, Little asked the trial court to dismiss the cases on speedy trial grounds
because the time that had expired since the December 2022 mistrial “exceeds the definition
of reasonable.” Plea Hearing Tr. 6. Therefore, Little asserted his right to a speedy trial.
Little also sent a June 2023 handwritten letter to the trial court in which he raised his right to
a speedy trial. Notably, he was represented by trial counsel at that time, and the State
could have filed a motion to strike the letter as inappropriate given the fact that any filings
on behalf of Little should have been made by his counsel rather than in a pro se fashion.
The State did not file a motion to strike the letter. Regardless, the record is clear that Little
asserted his right to a speedy trial.
{¶ 74} The fourth Barker factor requires us to look at whether Little was prejudiced by
the lengthy delay. Neither the trial court nor the parties made much of an effort to develop
the record on this final Barker factor. But Little argues on appeal that he “was subject to
the anxiety and concern that naturally arise from being aware of pending criminal charges
against him for over three years” and “[t]hat anxiety is only amplified by the stress of having
to go through two days of trial only to have a mistrial declared in December, 2022.”
Appellant’s Brief, p. 14. Little also notes that “[t]here can be no doubt that the passage of
time, over three years in case number 0739, would affect the memories of the witnesses
who would have been called to trial on August 14, 2024.” Id. The State did not address in
its appellate brief whether Little was prejudiced by the lengthy delay.
26 {¶ 75} Based on our review of the record and our weighing of the four Barker factors,
we conclude that Little’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated in Case Nos. 21-
CR-739, 22-CR-57, and 23-CR-19. The second and third assignments of error are
sustained.
{¶ 76} Finally, we would be remiss if we did not remind parties and trial courts to do
their best to build a complete record while the case is at the trial court level. With very few
exceptions, we are limited to reviewing what is in the record before us. We are then tasked
with reaching the correct legal result based on the record and the applicable law. If parties
and trial courts do not build an accurate and complete record, the chances increase that we
could reach an incorrect legal result. This is especially true in appeals involving defendants’
statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial, which often require us to parse through
the record looking for explanations for various delays. While we acknowledge that parties
and trial courts are busy juggling many complex matters, the failure to bring defendants to
trial in a speedy fashion is a serious matter that cannot be ignored. If there are legitimate
reasons for not bringing defendants to trial in a timely fashion, these reasons need to be
clearly documented in the record. Parties of a case should not rely on an appellate court
to take judicial notice of facts that they had ample opportunity to place into the record while
the cause was pending before the trial court.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 77} Having sustained Little’s second and third assignments of error, we vacate
Little’s convictions in Case Numbers 21-CR-739, 22-CR-57, and 23-CR-19, and he is
ordered discharged from these cases.
.............
TUCKER, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.