State v. Lingle
This text of 461 So. 2d 1046 (State v. Lingle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE of Louisiana
v.
Scott LINGLE.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
*1047 Robert Glass, Glass & Reed, New Orleans, for defendant-applicant.
William Guste, Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., E. Sue Bernie, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-respondent.
WATSON, Justice.
The question in this murder case is defendant's right to production of the state's crime scene technician's report. Scott Lingle was indicted on March 18, 1982, for the second degree murder of Janet McCleod. After extensive pretrial discovery, Lingle's first trial ended in mistrial on January 31, 1984, when the jury could not reach a verdict.
Pending the second trial, defense counsel obtained a subpoena duces tecum directing Officer Gilbert Luke of the New Orleans Police Department Crime Laboratory to produce the crime scene technician's report which he had prepared. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 719.[1] The state's motion to quash the subpoena was granted because the trial court found no intent by the state to use the report at trial. A writ was denied by the Court of Appeal on the ground that LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 723[2] prohibits the inspection of such a report. This court granted an alternative writ requiring the district attorney either to respond to the subpoena duces tecum or have the trial stayed and the writ application granted.[3] 456 So.2d 1388 (La., 1984).
The crime scene technician's report prepared by officer Luke lists the photographs and physical evidence obtained at the *1048 scene. It also contains fingerprint information. There are diagrams indicating the dimensions of the house and yard where the murder occurred and the precise location of all evidence found at the scene.
Discoverable reports under Article 719 include those resulting from "physical or mental examination", as well as "scientific tests or experiments." The issue, therefore, is whether the report subpoenaed contains results of such examinations, tests or experiments which are either (1) intended for use at trial, or (2) exculpatory.
An underlying issue is whether discovery in criminal cases is to be strictly construed. The short answer is that criminal justice requires a fair construction, one that does not hide or conceal relevant evidence, and also does not afford an opportunity to raise false or specious defenses.
In State v. Walters, 408 So.2d 1337 (La., 1982) the state's argument for a strict construction of the discovery articles in the Code of Criminal Procedure was rejected. Production of the names and addresses of potential state witnesses was approved under the peculiar circumstances of the case. The court observed: "... a mainstay of concepts of fundamental fairness, due process, and the constitutional right to counsel [has been] that defendant and his attorney have the opportunity to prepare adequately for trial...." 408 So.2d 1337 at 1340. See also Jencks v. U.S., 353 U.S. 657, 77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.2d 103 (1957). Walters recognized the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure as the source provision for the Louisiana discovery articles.[4]
One purpose of Louisiana's criminal discovery is to afford the defendant a chance to prepare adequately for trial and to eliminate unwarranted prejudice which could arise from surprise testimony. State v. Walters, supra; State v. Toomer, 395 So.2d 1320 (La., 1981). Indeed, the object of all of our criminal laws is to achieve justice:
"The provisions of this Code are intended to provide for the just determination of criminal proceedings. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable delay." LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 2.
The objective[5] recordation of the crime scene as it physically existed before being dismantled is necessary for defense preparation[6] while discovery of its contents will not hamper the state's case.[7] The statutory interpretation urged by the state must be rejected in favor of a fair construction. The terms "physical or mental examination" and "scientific tests and *1049 experiments" in Article 719 include this crime scene technician's report.[8]
The state contends that it does not intend to use the report at trial although the diagrams were introduced at the first trial. The "intended for use at trial" language has been interpreted under the Federal Rules to include documents to be marked as evidence as well as those relied on or referred to by any government witness. U.S. v. Countryside Farms, Inc., 428 F.Supp. 1150 (1977). LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 725 requires defendant to disclose reports of physical examinations intended for use at trial and those "... prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when such results or reports relate to his testimony."[9] The duty to disclose information by the defense may not be more burdensome than the reciprocal duty placed on the state.[10] Thus the "intended for use at trial" language in Article 719 must be read to include the requirement of Article 725 that reports be disclosed if related to the witness' testimony at trial. Luke testified at the first trial and it is likely that he will be called at the second trial and requested to testify about the examination he recorded in the crime scene technician's report. Therefore, consideration of whether the evidence is exculpatory is not necessary.
The Court of Appeal refused to supply the report for the additional reason that it was a "work product" of the prosecutor's case. The "work product" limitation in pretrial criminal discovery is provided in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 723. It contains a list of the articles to which the limitation does not apply. Strict interpretation would render Article 719 meaningless. The Federal Rules[11] are drafted to limit the "work product" exception. "[I]t has no application whatsoever to a statement of defendant, defendant's prior record, or reports of examinations and tests since their discovery is authorized by subdivisions (A), (B) and (D) of Rule 16(a)(1)." Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 2d, Vol. 2, § 254, p. 71. The Article 723 work product limitation does not apply to the discoverable results or reports provided the defense in Article 719.
For the foregoing reasons, the quashing of the order is set aside and the state is ordered to comply with the subpoena duces tecum.
DIXON, C.J., and LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., dissents and assigns reasons.
CALOGERO, J., recused.
*1050 DIXON, Chief Justice (concurring).
I respectfully concur.
Only because of our finding that this "crime scene report" is "necessary for defense preparation" do I agree that it is subject to discovery; it is, for that reason, discoverable under C.Cr.P. 718. I cannot subscribe to the interpretation of "physical examination" in C.Cr.P. 719 adopted by the majority.
LEMMON, Justice, concurring.
The report at issue, consisting of photographs and diagrams of the crime scene and the list and location of evidence obtained at the scene, is a method used by the district attorney to record and preserve the scene of the crime for use by investigators and expert witnesses.
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461 So. 2d 1046, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-lingle-la-1985.