State v. Levert

Ohio Supreme Court

State v. Levert

389 N.E.2d 848, 58 Ohio St. 2d 213, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 204, 1979 Ohio LEXIS 417

CourtOhio Supreme Court

DecidedMay 23, 1979

DocketNo. 78-1083

StatusPublished

Cited by12 cases

This text of 389 N.E.2d 848 (State v. Levert) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Levert, 389 N.E.2d 848, 58 Ohio St. 2d 213, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 204, 1979 Ohio LEXIS 417 (Ohio 1979).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

Appellant avers that the compulsory process clause of Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio guarantees him the right to have the jury hear the results of his polygraph examination. In essence, we are urged to extend the holding in State v. Souel (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 372 N. E. 2d 1318, wherein the prerequisites for the admissibility of polygraph evidence are set forth. We are unconvinced that a departure from the safeguards enumerated in Souel is required or would be wise at this time.

Appellant contends further, without citing supporting authority, that the exclusion of his polygraph expert’s testimony at trial violated the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, our research discloses no authority from which a violation of appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights, under the instant circumstances, can or should be found. Cf. Washington v. Texas (1967), 388 U. S. 14.

Appellant argues also that the trial court committed prejudicial error in allowing the hearsay testimony of Kam-insky. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this testimony was. erroneously admitted. See State v. Davis (1967), 10 Ohio St. 2d 136, 226 N. E. 2d 736; Jones v. State (1946), 184 Tenn. 128, 196 S. W. 2d 491.

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Per Curiam.

Appellant avers that the compulsory process clause of Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio guarantees him the right to have the jury hear the results of his polygraph examination. In essence, we are urged to extend the holding in State v. Souel (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 372 N. E. 2d 1318, wherein the prerequisites for the admissibility of polygraph evidence are set forth. We are unconvinced that a departure from the safeguards enumerated in Souel is required or would be wise at this time.

Appellant contends further, without citing supporting authority, that the exclusion of his polygraph expert’s testimony at trial violated the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, our research discloses no authority from which a violation of appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights, under the instant circumstances, can or should be found. Cf. Washington v. Texas (1967), 388 U. S. 14.

Appellant argues also that the trial court committed prejudicial error in allowing the hearsay testimony of Kam-insky. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this testimony was. erroneously admitted. See State v. Davis (1967), 10 Ohio St. 2d 136, 226 N. E. 2d 736; Jones v. State (1946), 184 Tenn. 128, 196 S. W. 2d 491.

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Bluebook (online)

389 N.E.2d 848, 58 Ohio St. 2d 213, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 204, 1979 Ohio LEXIS 417, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-levert-ohio-1979.

Opinion

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