State v. Lesesne

Supreme Court of South Carolina

State v. Lesesne

100 S.E. 62, 112 S.C. 250, 1919 S.C. LEXIS 145

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedJuly 15, 1919

Docket10243

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 100 S.E. 62 (State v. Lesesne) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Lesesne, 100 S.E. 62, 112 S.C. 250, 1919 S.C. LEXIS 145 (S.C. 1919).

Pincite

Opinions

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Chiee Justice Gary.

1 Practically there are but two questions presented by the exceptions, the first of which is whether there was any testimony from which a reasonable inference could be drawn by the jury that there was a common design on the part of the defendants to make their escape prior to the time when the assault and battery was committed.

It may be stated as a general proposition that, if parties are engaged at night in the commission of an unlawful enterprise common to them all, they will endeavor to escape arrest, provided there are reasonable grounds for supposing *255 that their attempt may be successful. In such cases, the attempt to escape arrest may be regarded as incidental to the commission of the common and unlawful design.

In the case under consideration, however, there are facts from which a reasonable inference may be drawn that the defendants planned, before the officers appeared, to make their escape, in case of an attempted arrest. A negro woman was sitting at the front door apparently on guard, for she blew out the light. When the officer walked up the front step, all the defendants made a break and rah. The unanimity with which the defendants attempted to make their escape indicated either that they were obeying the impulse natural to them, or that they had planned to escape, before the arrests could be made by the officers.

The exceptions raising this question are overruled.

2 The next question is whether his Honor, the presiding Judge, charged the jury as requested by the appellants’ attorney. This question is raised by the second exception. His Honor, the presiding Judge, certainly did not, in express terms, refuse to charge the request. On the contrary, he stated that he thought it was covered by other parts of his charge. Furthermore, the request was but a corollary of the proposition, which he had already charged.

Appeal dismissed.

Messrs. Justices Watts, Fraser and Gage concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Chiee Justice Gary.

1 Practically there are but two questions presented by the exceptions, the first of which is whether there was any testimony from which a reasonable inference could be drawn by the jury that there was a common design on the part of the defendants to make their escape prior to the time when the assault and battery was committed.

It may be stated as a general proposition that, if parties are engaged at night in the commission of an unlawful enterprise common to them all, they will endeavor to escape arrest, provided there are reasonable grounds for supposing *255 that their attempt may be successful. In such cases, the attempt to escape arrest may be regarded as incidental to the commission of the common and unlawful design.

In the case under consideration, however, there are facts from which a reasonable inference may be drawn that the defendants planned, before the officers appeared, to make their escape, in case of an attempted arrest. A negro woman was sitting at the front door apparently on guard, for she blew out the light. When the officer walked up the front step, all the defendants made a break and rah. The unanimity with which the defendants attempted to make their escape indicated either that they were obeying the impulse natural to them, or that they had planned to escape, before the arrests could be made by the officers.

The exceptions raising this question are overruled.

2 The next question is whether his Honor, the presiding Judge, charged the jury as requested by the appellants’ attorney. This question is raised by the second exception. His Honor, the presiding Judge, certainly did not, in express terms, refuse to charge the request. On the contrary, he stated that he thought it was covered by other parts of his charge. Furthermore, the request was but a corollary of the proposition, which he had already charged.

Appeal dismissed.

Messrs. Justices Watts, Fraser and Gage concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

100 S.E. 62, 112 S.C. 250, 1919 S.C. LEXIS 145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-lesesne-sc-1919.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack