State v. Lenzer

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Lenzer, 2026-Ohio-2915.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250517 TRIAL NO. B-2401977 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY

JEFFREY LENZER, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the cause is remanded. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 7/29/2026 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Lenzer, 2026-Ohio-2915.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250517 TRIAL NO. B-2401977 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : OPINION

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 29, 2026

Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and John D. Hill, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Glaser Law Office and Angela J. Glaser, for Defendant-Appellant. [Cite as State v. Lenzer, 2026-Ohio-2915.]

MOORE, Judge.

{¶1} Following a jury trial, Jeffrey Lenzer was found guilty of two counts of

rape and two counts of sexual battery against his then 17-year-old stepdaughter. The

sexual-battery counts were merged with the rape counts for sentencing, and Lenzer

was sentenced for two counts of rape. Lenzer now appeals, and argues that his

convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest

weight of the evidence, and that the court erred in how it merged the sexual-battery

counts. Because only Lenzer’s sentencing challenge is meritorious, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed and the cause is remanded for the court to correct its sentencing

entry nunc pro tunc.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} On September 6, 2024, Lenzer was indicted on four counts. Counts 1

and 2 alleged that he committed rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). Counts 3 and

4 alleged that Lenzer committed sexual battery, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5). In

the State’s bill of particulars, it alleged that the rape counts pertained to Lenzer’s acts

of digitally penetrating and performing oral sex on his stepdaughter M.S. As to the

sexual-battery counts, the State alleged that Lenzer was in loco parentis when he

assaulted M.S.

{¶3} The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The State called M.S., M.S.’s

mother, and a neighbor. The State also called Stephanie Helton, who conducted M.S.’s

forensic interview at the Mayerson Center for Safe and Healthy Children (“Mayerson

Center”), and Sergeant James Whitacre of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department.

Lenzer did not call any witness, nor did he testify on his own behalf.

{¶4} M.S. testified that on December 20, 2022, she was at home alone with

Lenzer. She recalled that she had left her room and was on her way to the kitchen, OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

when Lenzer invited her to lie on the couch with him and watch a movie.

{¶5} M.S. described Lenzer as lying on his side, with his back against the

couch’s back cushions. M.S. agreed and laid on her back, but ensured that the two were

not touching. Lenzer pulled a blanket over the two and M.S. pretended to fall asleep.

M.S. testified that Lenzer began touching her legs, removing her pants, and pulling

apart her legs, at which point she reached for her phone and began recording the

incident. M.S. testified that Lenzer began assaulting her. During the entire encounter,

M.S. pretended to be asleep, and she testified that she did not stop Lenzer’s advances

because she was fearful of what he might do to her. At no point did Lenzer make any

threats or exert any force to restrict her. The State played M.S.’s video in court, after

which M.S. identified Lenzer as the assailant.

{¶6} M.S. also testified about the events that followed the assault. M.S. stated

that she showered, immediately spoke with her next-door neighbor about the assault,

and that later that afternoon she told her mother.

{¶7} M.S.’s mother testified that once she returned home on December 20,

M.S. told her what had happened and showed her the video of the assault. M.S.’s

mother testified that while she could not see the assailant’s face, she concluded it was

Lenzer based on the assailant’s hairline, hair color, and haircut, and that the assailant

was wearing a pair of black and white pajama pants. She testified that she had

purchased Lenzer an identical pair of pajama pants.

{¶8} Helton and Sergeant Whitacre testified about their efforts once the

investigation commenced. Helton recalled conducting M.S.’s interview at the

Mayerson Center. The interview was played in court and admitted into evidence.

Sergeant Whitacre testified that after reviewing M.S.’s Mayerson interview, he

contacted M.S., her family, and Lenzer. Sergeant Whitacre testified that while he was

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

interviewing Lenzer, Lenzer admitted that he and M.S. were watching television that

day.

{¶9} The jury found Lenzer guilty on all counts. The court imposed a

sentence of nine to 13.5 years for the rape in Count 1, concurrent to the nine-year

sentence imposed for the rape in Count 2. The court’s sentencing entry stated that the

sexual-battery counts were merged into Count 2. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

{¶10} Lenzer raises three assignments of error. Lenzer asserts that (1) his

convictions for rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) were not supported by sufficient

evidence because the State failed to establish that he used force, (2) his convictions

were against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (3) the trial court erred when it

merged both of the sexual-battery counts into Count 2, and that the court should have

merged the sexual battery in Count 3 with the rape in Count 1.

A. Sufficiency

{¶11} A sufficiency challenge requires that we review “whether the evidence

presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any

rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” State v. Dunn, 2024-Ohio-5742, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Dent, 2020-Ohio-6670,

¶ 15.

{¶12} R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) governs the offense of rape. An individual commits

rape in violation of the statute when they “engage in sexual conduct with another when

the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.”

{¶13} We have considered similar challenges concerning the absence of force

when reviewing convictions and adjudications under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). See In re

J.A., 2023-Ohio-4388, ¶ 29-39 (1st Dist.); State v. Mitchell, 2022-Ohio-3713, ¶ 10-13

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

(1st Dist.). In both cases, we recognized that R.C. 2901.01(A)(1) defines force as “any

violence, compulsion, constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a

person or thing.” Id. at ¶ 30, citing State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51 (1992), paragraph

one of the syllabus.

{¶14} However, courts are not limited to only considering the presence of

physical force. The Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56,

58-59 (1998), that force may be subtle, psychological, and can be a proxy for physical

force, especially where a parent abuses a child. The Court in Schaim recognized that a

difference exists between the coercion necessary to constitute force when the situation

concerns an adult assaulting a child. Schaim at 58-59. “[B]ecause of the child’s

dependence on his or her parents, a child of tender years has no real power to resist

his or her parent’s command, and every command contains an implicit threat of

punishment for failure to obey.” Id. This line of reasoning was reiterated by the Court

when it held that “it is nearly impossible to imagine the rape of a child without force

involved.” State v. Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 323, 327 (1998); see State v. Cowan, 2024-

Ohio-2028, ¶ 30 (quoting Dye and holding that defendant forcibly raped the child, for

whom his girlfriend was the guardian, when he assaulted her while she was asleep).

“‘The youth and vulnerability of children, coupled with the power inherent in a

parent’s position of authority, creates a unique situation of dominance and control in

which explicit threats and displays of force are not necessary to effect the abuser’s

purpose.’” Eskridge at 59, quoting State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 47 (1987) (The

North Carolina Supreme Court held that sexual activity between an adult and their

child is unique because “the parent wields authority as another assailant might wield

a weapon” and that a parent’s authority alone may compel a child into submission.).

{¶15} We hold that the State put forth sufficient evidence to satisfy the force

6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

element of rape. While Lenzer did not physically overpower M.S. or make any verbal

threats, Lenzer employed his authority as M.S.’s stepfather and created a situation of

dominance and control when he instructed M.S. to lie on the couch next to him. Lenzer

proceeded to assault his stepdaughter, who he believed was asleep. M.S. testified that

while she was feigning sleep, she was fearful of the repercussions she would face if she

spoke out. The State put forth sufficient evidence to prove the force element of R.C.

2907.02(A)(2).

{¶16} Therefore, Lenzer’s first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Manifest Weight

{¶17} Lenzer argues that his convictions were contrary to the manifest weight

of the evidence. He argues that M.S.’s testimony was largely incredible. He asserts that

her trial testimony was riddled with inconstancies when compared with her

statements made during her Mayerson interview and statements she made to Sergeant

Whitacre. Lenzer also emphasizes that M.S. failed to turn over the phone with which

she filmed the assault, that she failed to share with police the log-in information for

her phone, her iCloud storage or her Snapchat account, and that she did not promptly

disclose that she had an intimate relationship with her neighbor

{¶18} A manifest-weight challenge requires that we “weigh the evidence and

all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether

in resolving conflicts in the evidence the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way.” (Cleaned

up.) State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d

380, 387 (1997); State v. Reillo, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 38 (“when

conducting a manifest-weight review, appellate courts must defer to the fact-finder’s

witness-credibility determinations.”). Credibility determinations are questions for the

trier of fact to resolve. State v. Washington, 2025-Ohio-5830, ¶ 28 (1st Dist.).

7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶19} “Convictions are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence

simply because witnesses provided inconsistent testimony at trial.” State v. Sawyer,

2025-Ohio-5834, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Olverson, 2024-Ohio-5583, ¶ 26 (1st

Dist.). When the jury is presented with inconsistent testimony, the jury is well

positioned to believe or disbelieve all or some of the testimony. Id. at ¶ 34, quoting

Olverson at ¶ 26.

{¶20} Having conducted a complete review of the record, we hold that

Lenzer’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We note

that there were certainly inconsistencies between M.S.’s trial testimony and her

Mayerson interview and statements made to Sergeant Whitacre. The specific

inconsistencies relied on by Lenzer include whether other children were present at the

home on the date of the incident, whether M.S. immediately ran to her neighbor, and

whether Lenzer laid her on the couch or she voluntarily got on the couch with him.

These inconsistencies, to the extent they exist, are minor, relate to nonmaterial details,

and are insufficient to support Lenzer’s manifest-weight challenge. See State v.

Mitchell, 2022-Ohio-3713, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.) (minor inconsistencies in a witness’s

testimony do not reflect that a conviction was contrary to the manifest weight of the

evidence). After considering the ample testimony from all the State’s witnesses,

including the recording of the assault, paired with testimony from M.S. and her

mother, both of whom identified Lenzer as the assailant in the video, we cannot say

that Lenzer’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶21} Accordingly, Lenzer’s second assignment of error is overruled.

C. Merger

{¶22} In his third assignment of error, Lenzer argues, and the State concedes,

that the sexual battery in Count 3 should have been merged with the rape in Count 1.

8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

The sentencing entry indicates that both counts of sexual battery were merged with

the rape in Count 2. This is clearly a clerical error. Clerical errors are mere technical

mistakes that are “mechanical in nature” and do not impact the underlying legal

decision. State v. Gray, 2026-Ohio-814, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Miller, 2010-

Ohio-5705, ¶ 15. This clerical error in the sentencing entry may be corrected by the

trial court by a nunc pro tunc entry. Crim.R. 36. Lenzer’s third assignment of error is

sustained.

III. Conclusion

{¶23} Having overruled Lenzer’s first two assignments of error and sustained

his third, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for the court

to correct the sentencing entry by a nunc pro tunc entry.

Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.

KINSLEY, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.