State v. Lee, Unpublished Decision (4-28-2006)

2006 Ohio 2126
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 28, 2006
DocketC.A. No. 21144.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2006 Ohio 2126 (State v. Lee, Unpublished Decision (4-28-2006)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Lee, Unpublished Decision (4-28-2006), 2006 Ohio 2126 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Charles J. Lee appeals from his conviction and sentence for Assault. Lee contends that the State failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he knowingly caused physical harm to the victim — the mother of the mother of his child. We have reviewed the evidence in the record, and we conclude that when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the State, as the prevailing party, a reasonable mind could conclude that Lee was aware that his conduct would probably cause injury to the victim, which is the requirement for the culpable mental state of acting "knowingly." Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.

I
{¶ 2} In early March, 2005, Lee, his girlfriend, Tiffany Spencer, and their infant son Anthony were living with Tiffany's uncle. As a result of a purely verbal argument between Lee and Tiffany's uncle, Lee decided to go to his brother's residence, taking Anthony with him. Tiffany did not want Lee to take Anthony. The two quarreled for perhaps a half an hour, and Tiffany called her mother, Mary Spencer.

{¶ 3} Mary Spencer, understanding that Lee was threatening to take Anthony, her grandchild, against Tiffany's wishes, decided to come and support Tiffany. Mary Spencer lived nearby, so she was able to arrive from five to ten minutes after the phone call.

{¶ 4} A physical altercation ensued, with Lee on one side, against Tiffany and her mother, on the other. At one point, Lee was attempting to get Anthony's car seat past Tiffany and her mother, with both women trying to stop him, their hands on the handle of the car seat. Lee was trying to get them to let go of the car seat. During this struggle, Tiffany's sister, Cherokee Kinser, arrived. Lee decided to leave without Anthony, and exited through a window. He was later arrested and charged with one count of Domestic Violence against Tiffany, one count of Assault against Tiffany, and one count of Assault against Tiffany's mother, Mary Spencer.

{¶ 5} Following a bench trial, Lee was acquitted of the two counts involving Tiffany, but was convicted of the count of Assault involving Mary Spencer. He was sentenced accordingly. From his conviction and sentence, Lee appeals.

{¶ 6} As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial transcript in our record is missing page 19. We conclude, however, that this is of no consequence. Page 19 of the transcript was during the direct testimony of Tiffany Spencer. We conclude that the testimony of Mary Spencer, the entirety of which is transcribed, is sufficient to adjudicate Lee's sole assignment of error.

II
{¶ 7} Lee's sole assignment of error is as follows:

{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING CHARLES J. LEE GUILTY OF ASSAULT ON MARY SPENCER BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. LEE KNOWINGLY CAUSED MS. SPENCER PHYSICAL HARM."

{¶ 9} Lee contends that there was a failure of proof on the element that he knowingly caused Mary Spencer physical harm. In determining whether the evidence in the record supports the judgment of the trial court, a reviewing court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492.

{¶ 10} Lee was charged with Assault, in violation of R.C.2903.13(A), which provides as follows: "No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another's unborn." "`Physical harm to persons' means any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration." R.C. 2901.01(A)(3). "A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist." R.C.2901.22(B). In the absence of an admission by a defendant that is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result, the proof of this fact, being the defendant's state of mind, can only be proved inferentially, by circumstantial evidence.

{¶ 11} Lee, Tiffany Spencer, and Mary Spencer all testified. Lee's testimony and Mary Spencer's testimony conflicted in some respects, but there is nothing inherently incredible in Mary Spencer's testimony, so that the trial court was entitled to find her testimony credible, and choose to believe it.

{¶ 12} Based upon the following testimony of Mary Spencer, we concluded that there is evidence in the record that, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, permits the conclusion that Lee caused Mary Spencer physical harm, and was aware that his conduct would probably cause her physical harm:

{¶ 13} "Q. And what happens after you hang up the phone [after calling and talking to Cherokee Kinser]?

{¶ 14} "A. By that time I was in the kitchen, at the back door, waiting on either the police [whom she called before calling Kinser] to show up or my daughter. I couldn't handle no more. Then here come Joey [Lee] and Tiffany screaming. Joey had the baby in this stroller and his car seat. I got one side of his car seat handle and Tiffany had the other side. He was arguing. At that time (inaudible) or more or less to take a baby to.

{¶ 15} "Q. OK. What happened then?

{¶ 16} "A. Then the first time I just ended up back into the wall.

{¶ 17} "Q. How did you end up back into the wall?

{¶ 18} "A. I guess when he was trying to get my hands loose from the car seat and he pushed me back into the wall on my left side.

{¶ 19} "Q. And what happened then?

{¶ 20} "A. And the second time I can't say if he did it with his fist or his hand. I'm not really for sure and I will not swear to either one. He got me right in the chest. There was a bruise right on my chest that — the pictures were took in here the next morning.

{¶ 21} "Q. OK. Was there any other times that he pushed you?

{¶ 22} "A. The third time — at the same time the third time happened and he threw me back into the wall is when my oldest daughter [Kinser] walked in.

{¶ 23} "Q. So he pushed you and threw you into the wall?

{¶ 24} "THE DEFENSE: Objection he's characterizing.

{¶ 25} "THE COURT: Sustained.

{¶ 26} "Q. The third time what did he do to you?

{¶ 27} "A. He just swung me back into the wall.

{¶ 28} "Q. I apologize. (Inaudible) when Joey pushed you back the first time did that hurt?

{¶ 29} "A. My left shoulder yeah.

{¶ 30} "Q. Your left shoulder? The second time that he [sic] indicated that he pushed you in the chest did that hurt?

{¶ 31} "A. Yeah that's when it caught my air and I started having problems breathing.

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Related

State v. Goble
450 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1982)
State v. Jenks
574 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
2006 Ohio 2126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-lee-unpublished-decision-4-28-2006-ohioctapp-2006.