[Cite as State v. Lee, 2026-Ohio-173.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250197 TRIAL NO. C/24/CRB/21413 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY PRESTON LEE, JR., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the appellant is discharged. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 1/21/2026 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Lee, 2026-Ohio-173.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250197 TRIAL NO. C/24/CRB/21413 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : OPINION PRESTON LEE, JR., :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Appellant Discharged
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 21, 2026
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. Springman, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Preston Lee, Jr., appeals the judgment of the
Hamilton County Municipal Court convicting him of endangering children. For the
reasons set forth below, Lee’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, and
therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and Lee is discharged from
further prosecution.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} On December 15, 2024, Colerain police were called to Lee’s residence in
response to a domestic disturbance. The affidavit of M.G., the complaining witness,
and Lee’s former step-child, stated that Lee threw a brick through a glass pane of the
storm door in front of Lee’s home, and that M.G.’s two-year-old son, M.D., was hit in
the back. The filed complaint identified Lee as the child’s grandfather. Lee was charged
with child endangerment, in violation of R.C. 2919.22, a first-degree misdemeanor.
{¶3} The matter proceeded to a bench trial. In the State’s opening remarks,
it admitted that two of its subpoenaed witnesses, M.G. and Lee’s ex-wife, failed to
appear. The State’s sole witness was Colerain Police Officer Robert Bolt. In
accompaniment to Officer Bolt’s testimony, the State played portions of his body-
worn-camera (“BWC”) footage from the encounter.
{¶4} Officer Bolt testified that when he arrived, he saw Lee standing in his
driveway, and spoke with him. Officer Bolt’s BWC recorded that Lee admitted he and
his wife owned the home, that the two were getting a divorce, and that in response to
his wife locking him out, he threw a brick through the front door. Lee told Officer Bolt
that he did not believe the brick struck anyone.
{¶5} Officer Bolt testified that he then walked into the house to speak with
Lee’s wife. Officer Bolt testified and his BWC captured that the bottom pane of the
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
glass screen door had shattered, that glass littered the floor, and that M.D. was being
examined by paramedics. Officer Bolt testified that he observed cuts on M.D.’s hand
and foot. Officer Bolt’s BWC recorded the paramedic addressing M.G., stating that he
did not see any other injuries to M.D. besides the cut on M.D.’s right hand.
{¶6} As the excerpt was played, counsel for Lee objected, arguing the
paramedic’s statement was hearsay and that the State failed to lay a sufficient
foundation. The State argued and the court agreed that the paramedic’s statement
could be admitted under the medical-treatment hearsay exception in Evid.R. 803(4).
{¶7} Officer Bolt returned outside to speak with Lee. Officer Bolt told Lee the
brick injured M.D., and that the child had cut his hand. The following exchange
occurred:
OFFICER BOLT: The brick caused injury to the child.
LEE: What happened to him?
OFFICER BOLT: Cut his hand.
LEE: Oh no, he fell on the glass.
OFFICER BOLT: From where you threw the brick.
At this point, Lee was placed under arrest.
{¶8} On cross-examination, Officer Bolt stated he did not see how the injury
was sustained or know if M.D.’s injury occurred when the brick broke the window or
if it had occurred 15 minutes after the fact.
{¶9} At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Lee moved the court for an
acquittal under Crim.R. 29. Lee argued that there was insufficient evidence to
demonstrate Lee knowingly caused harm to M.D. Lee argued that no witness offered
direct testimony in support of the State’s case, and that the evidence the State was
relying upon was inadmissible hearsay. Following the State’s argument in opposition,
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the court denied Lee’s motion.
{¶10} Lee was found guilty of child endangerment under R.C. 2919.22(B)(1).
This section provides in pertinent part that
(B) No person shall do any of the following to a child under eighteen
years of age or a child with a mental or physical disability under twenty-
one years of age: (1) Abuse the child.
Lee was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with the sentence suspended while serving seven
months on community control. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
{¶11} Lee raises two assignments of error. Under his first assignment of error,
Lee argues the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse
witnesses when it permitted the State to introduce segments of Officer Bolt’s BWC
video, which contained statements from the paramedic that were testimonial and
constituted inadmissible hearsay. Under his second assignment of error, Lee raises
sufficiency and manifest-weight challenges to his conviction. Because Lee’s second
assignment of error is dispositive, we address that first.
A. Sufficiency
{¶12} A sufficiency challenge requires that we review “whether the evidence
presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Dunn, 2024-Ohio-5742, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Dent, 2020-Ohio-6670,
¶ 15.
{¶13} Ohio courts have required three elements to be satisfied for a successful
conviction under R.C. 2919.22(B)(1):
(1) that the child is under eighteen years of age or a mentally or a
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
physically handicapped child under twenty-one years of age, (2) an
affirmative act of abuse, and (3) which act was reckless, that is,
perpetrated with heedless indifference to the consequences of the
action.
State v. Burdine-Justice, 125 Ohio App.3d 707, 713 (12th Dist. 1998); see State v.
Howe, 2024-Ohio-5143, ¶ 28 (12th Dist.); State v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-1141, ¶ 39 (8th
Dist.); State v.
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[Cite as State v. Lee, 2026-Ohio-173.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250197 TRIAL NO. C/24/CRB/21413 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY PRESTON LEE, JR., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the appellant is discharged. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 1/21/2026 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Lee, 2026-Ohio-173.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250197 TRIAL NO. C/24/CRB/21413 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : OPINION PRESTON LEE, JR., :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Appellant Discharged
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 21, 2026
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. Springman, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Preston Lee, Jr., appeals the judgment of the
Hamilton County Municipal Court convicting him of endangering children. For the
reasons set forth below, Lee’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, and
therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and Lee is discharged from
further prosecution.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} On December 15, 2024, Colerain police were called to Lee’s residence in
response to a domestic disturbance. The affidavit of M.G., the complaining witness,
and Lee’s former step-child, stated that Lee threw a brick through a glass pane of the
storm door in front of Lee’s home, and that M.G.’s two-year-old son, M.D., was hit in
the back. The filed complaint identified Lee as the child’s grandfather. Lee was charged
with child endangerment, in violation of R.C. 2919.22, a first-degree misdemeanor.
{¶3} The matter proceeded to a bench trial. In the State’s opening remarks,
it admitted that two of its subpoenaed witnesses, M.G. and Lee’s ex-wife, failed to
appear. The State’s sole witness was Colerain Police Officer Robert Bolt. In
accompaniment to Officer Bolt’s testimony, the State played portions of his body-
worn-camera (“BWC”) footage from the encounter.
{¶4} Officer Bolt testified that when he arrived, he saw Lee standing in his
driveway, and spoke with him. Officer Bolt’s BWC recorded that Lee admitted he and
his wife owned the home, that the two were getting a divorce, and that in response to
his wife locking him out, he threw a brick through the front door. Lee told Officer Bolt
that he did not believe the brick struck anyone.
{¶5} Officer Bolt testified that he then walked into the house to speak with
Lee’s wife. Officer Bolt testified and his BWC captured that the bottom pane of the
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
glass screen door had shattered, that glass littered the floor, and that M.D. was being
examined by paramedics. Officer Bolt testified that he observed cuts on M.D.’s hand
and foot. Officer Bolt’s BWC recorded the paramedic addressing M.G., stating that he
did not see any other injuries to M.D. besides the cut on M.D.’s right hand.
{¶6} As the excerpt was played, counsel for Lee objected, arguing the
paramedic’s statement was hearsay and that the State failed to lay a sufficient
foundation. The State argued and the court agreed that the paramedic’s statement
could be admitted under the medical-treatment hearsay exception in Evid.R. 803(4).
{¶7} Officer Bolt returned outside to speak with Lee. Officer Bolt told Lee the
brick injured M.D., and that the child had cut his hand. The following exchange
occurred:
OFFICER BOLT: The brick caused injury to the child.
LEE: What happened to him?
OFFICER BOLT: Cut his hand.
LEE: Oh no, he fell on the glass.
OFFICER BOLT: From where you threw the brick.
At this point, Lee was placed under arrest.
{¶8} On cross-examination, Officer Bolt stated he did not see how the injury
was sustained or know if M.D.’s injury occurred when the brick broke the window or
if it had occurred 15 minutes after the fact.
{¶9} At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Lee moved the court for an
acquittal under Crim.R. 29. Lee argued that there was insufficient evidence to
demonstrate Lee knowingly caused harm to M.D. Lee argued that no witness offered
direct testimony in support of the State’s case, and that the evidence the State was
relying upon was inadmissible hearsay. Following the State’s argument in opposition,
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the court denied Lee’s motion.
{¶10} Lee was found guilty of child endangerment under R.C. 2919.22(B)(1).
This section provides in pertinent part that
(B) No person shall do any of the following to a child under eighteen
years of age or a child with a mental or physical disability under twenty-
one years of age: (1) Abuse the child.
Lee was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with the sentence suspended while serving seven
months on community control. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
{¶11} Lee raises two assignments of error. Under his first assignment of error,
Lee argues the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse
witnesses when it permitted the State to introduce segments of Officer Bolt’s BWC
video, which contained statements from the paramedic that were testimonial and
constituted inadmissible hearsay. Under his second assignment of error, Lee raises
sufficiency and manifest-weight challenges to his conviction. Because Lee’s second
assignment of error is dispositive, we address that first.
A. Sufficiency
{¶12} A sufficiency challenge requires that we review “whether the evidence
presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Dunn, 2024-Ohio-5742, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Dent, 2020-Ohio-6670,
¶ 15.
{¶13} Ohio courts have required three elements to be satisfied for a successful
conviction under R.C. 2919.22(B)(1):
(1) that the child is under eighteen years of age or a mentally or a
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
physically handicapped child under twenty-one years of age, (2) an
affirmative act of abuse, and (3) which act was reckless, that is,
perpetrated with heedless indifference to the consequences of the
action.
State v. Burdine-Justice, 125 Ohio App.3d 707, 713 (12th Dist. 1998); see State v.
Howe, 2024-Ohio-5143, ¶ 28 (12th Dist.); State v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-1141, ¶ 39 (8th
Dist.); State v. Adkins, 2016-Ohio-7250, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.); State v. Carse, 2010-Ohio-
4513, ¶ 40 (10th Dist.). As explained below, because the State failed to put forth
sufficient evidence to establish the element of recklessness, Lee’s second assignment
of error is well taken.
{¶14} A person’s conduct is reckless when the person “disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is
likely to be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(C); see State v. Lee, 2024-Ohio-3080, ¶
10 (1st Dist.), citing R.C. 2901.01(A)(8) (defining substantial risk to mean “a strong
possibility, as contrasted with a remote or significant possibility that a certain result
may occur or that certain circumstances may exist.”).
{¶15} Turning to the facts of this case, Lee’s arguments that the State failed to
demonstrate that Lee acted recklessly are well taken. At oral arguments the State
insisted that Lee’s conduct of throwing a brick through a window in a residential
neighborhood was likely to cause a certain result, an injured child. However, beyond
the State identifying that this occurred at a residence, there was no evidence
introduced that demonstrated that Lee’s conduct of throwing a brick through a glass
door pane into his own home would have a strong possibility of resulting in harm to a
child. The State failed to put forth any evidence that a child frequently visited or stayed
in Lee’s home or that Lee might anticipate a child was in the home when he threw the
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
brick, nor was there any additional context that would demonstrate that Lee had
reasonable forethought that his conduct would pose a risk to a child. Even when
considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the State failed to put
forth sufficient evidence that Lee disregarded a certain and unjustifiable risk that his
conduct would likely cause a child to be harmed.
{¶16} Because the State failed to prove all requisite elements of the offense,
Lee’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, we sustain
Lee’s second assignment of error in part. This in turn renders Lee’s manifest-weight
challenge and Lee’s assignment of error alleging a Sixth Amendment violation moot,
and we do not address them.
III. Conclusion
{¶17} Because Lee’s conviction for child endangerment under R.C.
2919.22(B)(1) was not supported by sufficient evidence, the judgment of the trial court
is accordingly reversed, and Lee is discharged from further prosecution for this
offense.
Judgment reversed and appellant discharged.
KINSLEY, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.